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ABSTRACT 
This project covers the development of a model framework intended to allow 
researchers of the archaeology of the Cold War to recognise a range of behaviours 
played out on military sites. The order and chaos model developed and utilised in 
this thesis introduces a heterotopian landscape populated by the Royal Observer 
Corps. Through a process of archaeological fieldwork a number of behavioural traits 
are recognised and discussed here for the first time. The group in question is fully 
researched, providing a historiography of the practice played out during the groups 
life-cycle. The landscape archaeology is discussed and contextualised by narration 
from the volunteers who once operated the posts. A range of case studies are 
introduced confirming the validity of the order and chaos model and potential for 
application elsewhere. Finally, the findings are discussed in detail and a proposal for 
the next step in the research are revealed.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
Anti-Aircraft Operations Room 
A central control where a number of automatic guns in an area known as a 
Gun Defended Area were operated. The structures are semi-sunken, two 
storey blockhouses. They were operated by Anti-Aircraft Command, a 
component of the Royal Artillery. The organisation was disbanded in March 
1955.  
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
A network of three powerful radar stations intended to detect missile launches 
from the east and compute their trajectory and intended target. The site in the 
United Kingdom, RAF Fylingdales, gave rise to the phrase ‘Four Minute 
Warning’. 
Bomb Power Indicator 
A visual indicator located in the control room of every underground monitoring 
post, operated by a baffle plate at the surface. Standard equipment the BPI 
measures the blast force of the pressure wave as it passes over the post. 
Carrier Control Point 
The United Kingdom had a network of 250 carrier control points - usually in 
police stations - each fed by information from the ROC and other government 
sources. From here it was possible to initiate over 7000 powered air-raid 
sirens and 9000 over warning devices nationally. 
Civil Defence Corps 
The Civil Defence Corps was a mainly voluntary organisation funded by 
Central Government between 1948-1968, although organised on a county 
level and the responsibility of that unitary authority. It comprised a number of 
specialist departments including warden; ambulance; rescue, control and 
welfare. By the early 1960s the organisation had over 300,000 members. 
Defence of Britain Project 
The Defence of Britain Project was a long running recording project managed 
by the Council for British Archaeology. The initial concept was to record all 
military remains in the United Kingdom. Eventually the task became so 
massive the project was downgraded to just those sites from World War II.    
Fixed Survey Meter 
An electronic instrument capable of recognising the ionisation of the 
atmosphere and subsequent radiation from a nuclear weapon once 
detonated. Standard equipment on underground monitoring posts. 
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Ground Zero Indicator 
A drum-like device used to capture the direction and height of the nuclear 
flash. Operates like a pin-hole camera. Standard equipment on every 
underground monitoring post. 
Gun Defended Areas 
An air defence network operating heavy anti-aircraft, and later, missiles. The 
United Kingdom was divided into thirty-three Gun Defended Areas. The 
structure was disbanded in March 1955. 
Home Defence Region 
The United Kingdom was divided, during the Cold War, into eleven Home 
Defence Regions. This form of decentralised government reduced the country 
to a number of self-controlled regions managed from two control centres by 
an appointed junior minister. The key purpose was to maintain the machinery 
of government had central government become incapacitated.   
Orlit Post 
The Orlit post was an overground observation point for aircraft reporting. It 
was constructed using pre-cast concrete panels manufactured to a design by 
Messrs’. Orlit, Bedfordshire. 
Rotor Project 
The Rotor project was the regeneration of the radar network post- World War 
II. In several phases the construction phase of Rotor was the biggest capital 
works for a generation.  
Underground Monitoring Post 
The form of post used by the ROC during the nuclear reporting role. It 
comprised a control room, utility room and entrance stack with steel access 
ladder. The whole structure was buried at least 10ft (3.04m) below ground.  
United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation 
The government organisation responsible for warning the public and 
authorities of air and nuclear attack. The ROC fed information to it during 
phase two of its Cold War life-cycle.  
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INTRODUCTION 
‘The seductive interest of concrete should not hide wider significances; what it tells 
us about the Cold War cannot be assumed to be obvious or unarguable’ (Fairclough 
2007, 27). 
The study of the remains of both warfare and the impact recent military activities 
have had on the landscape of the British Isles is a relatively new concept to 
archaeology. There is one overriding reason for this. It is only through redundancy 
that military remains and landscapes become available for investigation and 
research. Prior to that the military appears to be the preserve of historical 
commentary and often a very subjective one at that. The twentieth century is 
punctuated by anniversaries and commemorations, 11 November 1918, the 
Armistice of World War I and 6 June 1944, D-Day, the liberation of Europe, are two 
key dates that resonate through the British psyche as surely as the year 1066.  
One such key date is 9 November 1989, the opening of the Berlin Wall to traffic and 
pedestrians without restrictions. This date is significant; this singular event initiated a 
radical change to the British military landscape, defence industries and, indeed, to a 
lesser degree the social structure of the ‘left’; it also signalled the beginning of the 
eventual end of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991 (Judt 2005, 657) .The end of 
the Cold War and subsequent drawdown of forces in Europe, especially by the 
United States, brought about an academic and conservation discussion in 2001 with 
the publication of Cold War Monuments: An assessment by the Monuments 
Protection Programme by English Heritage (Cocroft 2001). This and subsequent 
works (discussed later in this thesis) were a reaction to the sudden and extensive 
reduction of land holdings by the British government for defence purposes. 
The Complexity of Military Sites from the Twentieth Century 
The release of so many military sites stemmed from how the Cold War estate had 
developed over the period (1948-1991). Many sites now available to the researcher 
are often a landscape of complexity, driven, on the whole, by advances in 
technology; developments that were often so rapid that structures became redundant 
before they were fully commissioned (Cocroft et al 2003, 3). Expand that premise to 
the whole period of the Cold War (41 years) and one can readily appreciate the 
challenges facing the archaeologist concerned with twentieth century military sites 
and their landscapes. 
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This Project 
This challenge is exciting. Complexity, especially when investigating the recent past, 
should be embraced, it exposes the research community to other avenues of 
investigation and complements it by introducing other disciplines. The Cold War is 
especially attractive; moreover as unlike other military activities the Cold War suffers 
something of an identity crisis. I have spent most of my working life on military bases 
in Britain, Europe and the United States and have witnessed this first-hand. Indeed, 
the phrase ‘Cold War’ evokes some wild interpretations in the personal histories of 
those who lived through it, mostly they centre on one aspect, nuclear weapons and 
the threat of their use. 
To allow this attitude to influence the current debate surrounding the value placed on 
monuments connected with the weapons of mass destruction, without an appropriate 
level of discord from those who are seen as the perpetrators, is unwise. Cold War 
monuments are not only a necessary component of the military landscape; they are 
often integrated into a far more social landscape than one is aware. The Royal 
Observer Corps is one such organisation whose monuments are dispersed across the 
British landscape, often hiding in plain sight. These monuments, or posts to give them 
their correct title, demonstrate how close to home components of the art of nuclear 
warfare really were. Moreover, the Royal Observer Corps was essentially a volunteer, 
or spare-time, organisation; many observers - some who served the whole period of 
the Cold War - are still alive, as is quite a large cross-section of the records produced 
by the organisation during its operational life-cycle. The opportunities for a multi-phase 
research agenda of the period is self-evident. 
The historiography of the organisation is extant through the works of a handful of 
historians, Derek Wood especially in his work Attack Warning Red published in 1976 
and updated in 1992. To date no known systematic review of the archaeological, 
cultural and social elements of the Royal Observer Corps has been undertaken; 
neither has an assessment of its activities both before and, more importantly, after the 
organisation was disbanded. This is where my interest, and this project, begins. 
Having been inducted into organisations whose primary purpose was to support the 
nuclear deterrent, maintain a nuclear centred ‘flexible response’ and, in case that 
extreme form of retaliation was needed, fly such weapons, I have held a privileged 
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position; one that provided a grandstand view of how organisations act when in pursuit 
of their objective. I have been able to exploit this in this project.   
Archaeologically, I have been at the forefront of much of the recording of Cold War 
sites, although very little of my, or others research appear to have an overarching 
account of such monuments. What happens to Cold War sites once abandoned? 
What processes can we identify? Are they specific to the location of the monument? 
Connected with its original use or just ‘natural’ interactivity? Can we interpret certain 
social behaviours displayed by those who interact with monuments from this period? 
I am convinced we can; this thesis introduces the work aimed at demonstrating that 
certain military remains do have much to offer the archaeologist; it also shines light 
on a secret landscape and highlights the very real value of multi-discipline research, 
thus ensuring the results reach a much wider audience. The implications of the 
findings, especially when considering the process of abandonment of places, are 
important. The archaeological record is littered with areas of ‘no activity’. Is this an 
accurate assessment of the interactions once enacted there - I believe it is not. 
The Precis of the Following Work 
To discuss any period archaeologically requires an assessment of the current debate 
concerned with the topic being researched, subsequently, this literature review 
follows a number of avenues, including the level of current work on the Cold War 
period. The form the research takes is necessarily multi-faceted; the methodology 
introduces both the research questions set and the route to maximising the 
information derived from a number of fieldwork and social expeditions. I then 
introduce the group under study, enlightening a surprisingly secret world with 
accounts from the Observers themselves, while laying out the historiography of the 
Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War period. 
Beyond that, I layout the terms of the ‘order and chaos’ model; developed specifically 
to investigate the social structure and behaviours of organisations such as the 
military; especially their ability to influence both the landscape and the material 
culture connected with a given period. A number of routes increasing the detail of 
observations and interactions are presented and a case made for the utilisation of 
this model in research beyond this project.  The landscape archaeology is presented, 
specifically concentrating on specify chronological markers in the Royal Observer 
Corps life-cycle, an important factor of abandonment processes. I then discuss the 
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life-cycle of the spare-time Observers, contextualising the archaeology and material 
culture located on ROC posts and elsewhere. Key aspects of the Observers’ 
activities are discussed, demonstrating how fragile, or potentially invisible, many of 
the roles were during operation phases.  
The field results are then offered and interpretations threaded through the new ‘order 
and chaos’ model. The results indicate a very complex series of activities are being 
enacted out on the ROC posts, ones that, even with the complexity of ‘chaos’ are still 
quantifiable. The extended discussion that follows offers a number of points that 
require further testing beyond this project. Moreover, I feel they currently support my 
thoughts on the process of abandonment, the form of the social group involved in the 
world of mass destruction and demonstrate the value of both historical archaeology 
and the study of Cold War monuments within a holistic framework.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the in the introduction, the study of the Cold War, indeed the study of 
contemporary archaeology is necessarily multi-faceted (Harrison and Schofield 
2010, 90); subsequently any review of the current academic position has to follow 
suit. What follows is an account of the work carried out in the areas identified as 
being relevant to the research objectives of this project. It calls on a wide range of 
forms of publication and methodologies demonstrating that the Cold War, especially 
when placed under archaeological scrutiny, still has much to offer.  
Concentrating on the United Kingdom the research topic intends to examine a 
number of areas, including the conservation and contextualisation of structures 
connected with the defence of the civil population against nuclear war, located in the 
specific geographical location known as Home Defence Region 7 (fig.1-1) (discussed 
in chapter 5). At the forefront of this research is the remit to demonstrate ways in 
which such monuments can be assimilated into the current educational system, thus 
stimulating their use as a cultural resource rather than a chronological marker of a 
contested and contentious period. Reference to the Cold War’s influence on social 
and popular culture over the last five decades of the twentieth century is the key to 
understanding this.   
 
 
 
 
Fig.1-1. Home Defence Region 7. This 
map represents the core area under 
investigation in this project. This was the 
Geographical footprint of the Regional 
Seats of Government in the South West 
until the end of the Cold War. (Source: 
Civil Protection 1986)   
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THE DEVELOPING LANDSCAPE  
To fully exploit the archaeological, educational and social value of Royal Observer 
Corps monuments, one first has to recognise and understand the multi-disciplinary 
debate that surrounds this relatively new area of investigation. The range of 
recognisable, defence orientated, sites originating in the twentieth century 
throughout the United Kingdom is staggering in both number and preservation. 
When peripheral sites, such as shadow factories intended to increase manufacturing 
output during World War II (Clarke 2009, 87); or civilian company test facilities like 
Smith’s Industries missile site at Boscombe Down (Clarke 2005, 39) are considered 
the number is probably without international parallel (Osborne 2004, 7). Reasons for 
this are legion. Two major European wars dominated the first 50 years of the 
twentieth century; both preceded by major arms races. The first focused on the 
development of naval power leading indirectly to the outbreak of World War I 
(Massie 1991; Halpern 1994); although, by the cease of hostilities (November 1918) 
this focus had shifted to aerial warfare. The following two decades are dominated by 
development of both aircraft and the facilities to maintain and operate them. By the 
end of World War II the United Kingdom contained over 700 military airfields, 450 of 
them built between 1939 and 1945 (Clarke 2009, 100). Literally thousands of other 
defence related structures encompassing everything from small Observer Corps, 
Warden posts and pillboxes (Osborne 2008) through to Royal Ordnance Factories 
covering hundreds of hectares had also appeared on the landscape by 1945. Many 
of these defence related structures survive today or their effects are still visible in the 
landscape.  
Post-World War II a major part of the wartime structure was retained as political 
relationships rapidly deteriorated with the Soviet Union; many of these sites have 
only recently started to be disposed of by the British Government. What drives 
defence related site survivability throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
has been the United Kingdom’s unique geographical location in both World Wars 
and subsequent Cold War. The defence of Britain’s coastline had been of concern 
since the mid-1850s with the French navy’s construction of ironclad vessels 
(Osborne 2004, 11). By 1915 the Government had embarked on an ambitious plan 
to protect all sea lanes around the United Kingdom with airships (Mowthorpe 1995); 
during 1917 America entered into World War I on the side of Britain and France. 
Utilising the United Kingdom mainland as a marshalling area for additional troops 
 21 | P a g e  
from the Commonwealth and the United States, London demonstrated how 
strategically placed it was when fighting in Europe (Clarke 2009, 23). This was 
famously illustrated again in 1940 when, after the Battle of Britain and Germany’s 
failure to invade, Britain stood alone against the Fascist threat. In early 1944 the 
Isles were again a marshalling point for the invasion of Europe; estimates suggest 
that over one million troops were stationed on Salisbury Plain and in the surrounding 
landscape at this time (Rhatz pers commm). After the collapse of the Third Reich in 
May 1945, tensions increased between the three main Allies (Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom, United States), primarily over control of the defeated Germany and her 
assets. This rapidly expanded to involve the whole of Central Europe, culminating in 
the first ‘Battle’ of the Cold War – the Berlin Blockade and Airlift through 1948-49 
(Jackson 1988; Taylor 1999; Clarke 2007). It was at this point that nuclear weapons 
were brought to the United Kingdom for the first time by the United States; again 
capitalising on the United Kingdom’s strategic position (Clarke 2007, 110). The point 
is many of the sites constructed during World War II continued to be utilised 
throughout the last five decades of the twentieth century, encapsulating earlier 
technological advancements and chronicling development of newer, often more 
potent, weapons.  
The Shrinking Estate 
Interestingly, the debate surrounding monuments connected with twentieth-Century 
militarism is both sporadic and subjective; Cold War sites are by their very nature 
prone to extremes of interpretation, brought on primarily by the secret nature of the 
period. There are a number of reasons for this. There is now recognition that 
twentieth-Century military structures and sites have much to offer the researcher. 
Indeed, in 1997 the call was already being made to consider military sites a part of 
the historic environment ‘-it is timely that the remains of both World Wars and of the 
Cold War are considered seriously as part of the nation’s historical fabric’ (Dobinson, 
Lake et al 1997, 289). Conflict archaeology has steadily moved to the forefront of 
mainstream archaeology since then. Initiatives at the national level such as the 
Defence of Britain Project (CBA 2002), have, in the last decade, been complemented 
by the rise of interest groups like the Fortress Study Group and, recently, the 
academic publication The Journal of Conflict Archaeology, hosted by the University 
of Glasgow’s Centre for Battlefield Archaeology. That said, Cold War archaeological 
sites have a different level of social interaction to sites connected with both World 
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Wars. Indeed, Uzzell noted this difference in 1998, suggesting their importance and 
educational value lies in what they represent and might have been (1998, 18).  
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union took many, including the British 
Government, by surprise. It also heralded the start of large scale reductions of the 
military and civil defence estates. In 1990, in the wake of the collapse of communism 
across Europe, the British Government embarked on a major reduction of defence 
spending (Clarke 2005b, 244). Options for Change reduced service manning by 18% 
along with defence commitments across Germany. Moreover, funding was removed 
from the UKWMO and ROC and the organisations were subsequently disbanded 
(Wood 1992, i). Further reductions in expenditure, namely Front Line First 1994 and 
the Strategic Defence Review 1998, have had a major impact on the defence estate, 
releasing large swathes of the Ministry of Defence’s land holdings to private 
developers (Clarke 2009). This presented the academic community with a hitherto, 
largely unknown, landscape that was under serious threat of destruction almost 
immediately. Structures built to withstand the full effects of nuclear weapons are now 
no match for the concerted efforts of the developer; much has already been lost 
(fig.1-2).  
 
Fig.1-2. The destruction of a Gaydon Hangar during the redevelopment of RAF Alconbury. 
The Gaydon Hangar was designed specifically to house V-bombers and as such is a Cold 
War monument. (Source: Bob Clarke 04/07/2016)  
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To review what has been discussed we must consider the evidence from a number 
of sources. This literature review first considers the output of statutory bodies such 
as English Heritage and other archeologically based work in the recording of both 
landscapes and structures. It then moves on to investigate the role of oral history 
when considering how to tackle the recording and conservation of sites linked to the 
Cold War. I have only included English based organisations in the discussion as the 
landscape under consideration (designated Home Defence Region 7) is located in 
the south-west of the country. That said, precious little is to be found in the literature 
beyond England. Disappointingly there is scant published discussion relating to work 
on Cold War sites; consequently, the following review of archaeological and 
conservation based is dominated by the work of English Heritage and a few 
academics and volunteers. 
The Archaeologically Orientated Discussion 
The involvement of the archaeological community in the debate surrounding 
monuments of war – especially those relating to the twentieth century – has been in 
evidence since the late 1980s, although, specific work on the interpretation of the 
Cold War archaeological record appears to have had to wait the turn of the twenty 
first century, then, English Heritage, utilising the Monument Protection Programme 
framework first proposed in 1987 (Darvill, Saunders et al, 396-399), led to the first 
nationally based assessment of Cold War monuments in England (Cocroft 2001). 
The work drew on a number of field surveys conducted under the auspices of the 
Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England (RCHME, later English 
Heritage) in the period 1996-99 (Cocroft and Thomas 1998) and a discussion paper 
that appeared in Antiquity (Dobinson, Lake et al 1997). This laid the foundations for 
many later initiatives, the most recognisable being the Defence of Britain Project 
administered by the Council for British Archaeology. The authors argue that military 
history has, throughout the conflicts of the twentieth century, been ‘- conditioned by 
the politico-military preoccupations of documentary historian’ (Dobinson, Lake et al 
1997, 288), an observation that charts more the development of history in general 
than one specifically aimed at military structures or indeed the archaeological 
community.  They go on to acknowledge that the majority of information covering 
archaeological sites at the time of writing were ‘- held largely in the records and 
heads of amateur groups and individuals -‘(1997, 288), a situation that, in my 
opinion, prevails to this day. The primary reason for this is that the task of 
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interpreting any defence orientated monument, even with a view to conservation or 
education, is a far more complex process than it first appears. To illustrate the point, 
it is worth considering the Defence of Britain Project.  
The Defence of Britain Project   
The Defence of Britain Project set out to enlist voluntary help to create a publically-
accessible database of the twentieth century’s sites and monuments of war, thereby 
heightening awareness of the subject (CBA 2002). The scope of the undertaking was 
arguably far too ambitious from the outset. At the project’s inception in 1995 all 
twentieth-Century military structures would be recorded up to and including those 
from the Cold War; by 1998 this had been reduced to focus on one particular period 
containing the anti-invasion defences of the Second World War (ibid 2002). Even 
after the project was re-aligned it still took eight years to co-ordinate the efforts of 
over 600 voluntary investigators.  
The final database extended to well over 20,000 sites across the United Kingdom 
and serves as a primary resource for the investigation of anti-invasion monuments 
from World War II. The wisdom of re-focussing the project in 1998 was borne out by 
the fidelity of the record produced. A hitherto unparalleled level of detail, 
encompassing a major aspect of military archaeology, has been made available to 
all heritage and interested parties. Moreover, the database makes use of the internet 
to the level where each feature can be viewed via Google Maps® and the 
Archaeological Data Service (online) (fig.1-3).  
The final report included the question of Cold War monuments; however, citing 
English Heritage’s recently released report Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by 
the Monuments Protection Programme (Cocroft 2001) the CBA removed post World 
War II structures from the projects remit (CBA 2002). Subsequently little work 
outside that undertaken by English Heritage (Historic England from 2015) has 
appeared. This underscores the problems raised by the sheer number of defence 
related sites that still survive in the British landscape. From this point on the 
monuments of the Cold War, especially those of a functional or unremarkable life-
cycle, have featured little in the discussions surrounding the preservation or 
recording of military sites.  
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Fig.1-3. A screenshot of the Defence of Britain overlay to Google Earth. Site specific and 
additional reports are accessed via the ADS link on the information pop-out (white box). 
(Source: Google Earth®) 
 
THE COLD WAR DEBATE 
Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme 
(Cocroft 2001) was the first major work intended to demonstrate the historical 
importance of defence-related structures constructed after 1945 (Cocroft 2001, 1). 
As such this work should be considered the primary initiator of the current study. The 
report was released at a seminar on the Cold War held at the Public Record Office, 
Kew, London in December 2001 and benefitted from a review in Antiquity in early the 
following year (James 2002), all intended to launch the subject with maximum 
coverage. The report divided England’s surviving Cold War monuments into nine 
categories, offering a comprehensive list of sites considered to be of national 
importance and recommended for statutory protection through listing or scheduling 
(Cocroft 2001, 13). This paper is important, as not only was it the first time a 
conscious effort was made to differentiate between military and non-military 
monuments within the defence arena but It also introduced a completely new 
monument class to the archaeological record. English Heritage’s aspirations were 
such that a representative suite of sites contained within each English county would, 
through consultation, receive statutory protection. Unfortunately, this aspiration has 
not been fully realised, indeed one might conclude the project failed. The reasons 
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surrounding this are legion; a number require further description if we are to fully 
demonstrate the validity of the current work and its value in the study of conflict 
archaeology.  
As with any proposed management plan, a suite of assessment criteria was offered 
which broadly matched the current Monument Protection Programme. The usual 
dialogue covering condition, period, rarity and cultural and amenity featured, all 
sound conservation topics, have been articulated by English Heritage (Cocroft 2001, 
11). Subsequently, these have been seen to be, in the main, adopted by the heritage 
community (Strange and Walley 2007, 159), although caution was noted as ‘It is also 
recognised that the archaeological recording and analysis of twentieth-Century 
military sites is still in its infancy, and where the opportunity arises some sites may 
allow new methodologies to be developed’ (Cocroft 2001, 13).  
Later Cocroft reflected on the effort surrounding the primary assessment of the Cold 
War monumental landscape, citing the project as a predominantly field-based 
exercise (2007, 111). This approach had been especially effective in the assessment 
of those structures and sites utilised until the mid-1990s, whose paper record was 
still restricted and likely to remain so for 30 years (ibid 2007, 111). This had not been 
considered by Dobinson, Lake and Schofield when they published their discussion 
paper in Antiquity in 1997, a great deal of which promoted the use of documentation 
in the interpretation of England’s defence heritage (ibid 1997, 288). Interestingly 
Fairclough warns against placing too much weight in the ‘official’ record as ‘Public 
documents tend to be political and military’ (2007, 24). This clearly had an effect on 
the structure of investigation and goes some way to explaining the paucity of sites 
actually fully investigated by English Heritage over the last decade. A distinction can 
be made here. Documentary and official accounts covering the monuments of World 
War II are copious; practically every facet of a particular building can be located, 
including the discussions surrounding the reason for location, financing and 
construction. The Cold War ushered in an unrivalled period of secrecy and ‘need to 
know’. This now transmits through the sparse documentary evidence, very little of 
the day to day aspects survive or were indeed recorded in the first place. Those 
documents that are available are often subject to censorship (fig.1-4), rendering key 
aspects of the life-cycle of sites invisible, through documentation at least.     
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Fig.1-4. Governmental censorship 
can often be at such a level that it 
renders the document useless. An 
extract from a request made for 
information regarding the 
movements of the IRA in the 
United States. (Source: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 61-7601, 
19/02/2009)   
 
 
Contained within English Heritage’s assessment paper was a detailed recording 
regime, worryingly noting ‘Many, although not put forward for designation, have been 
identified as being of national importance, with the presumption that local planning 
processes will endeavour to ensure appropriate levels of protection’ (Cocroft 2001, 
12). To date few initiatives have followed this call, one such scheme between the 
University of Bath and Wiltshire County Council produced a quantitative report on the 
amount of sites contained within Wiltshire (Clarke 2005a), however, lack of funding 
has ensured that no further work has been undertaken. Beyond the usual recording 
footprint was the acknowledgement that oral history had a part to play in the 
recording of Cold War monuments (Cocroft 2001, 12). The use of oral testimony has 
many advantages when constructing a competent, useable record of recently 
redundant military sites, especially those whose rarity dictates only a few people 
ever worked or operated them. The validity of subject based oral accounts in a 
military setting has been previously demonstrated through the Defence of Britain 
Project, in which 180 sites were identified through the follow up of testimonial 
accounts (CBA 2002). Further, it was recognised that some sites were so ephemeral 
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that they almost certainly only survived through memory, re-enforcing the potential of 
the oral account.  
During 2003 English Heritage published what has to be considered the standard 
descriptive account of Cold War archaeology. Cold War: Building for Nuclear 
Confrontation 1946-1989, covered all the main topic lines of the period; crucially 
discussing the formation of the landscape connected with both aircraft and nuclear 
reporting (Cocroft et al 2003, 174-196). The relevant chapter in this work attended to 
distribution, technology developments, structural typology and command and control. 
It did not contextualise the changes in structural types, nor populate the landscape 
with volunteer accounts. What was presented, therefore was a functional starting 
point, reliant on imagery and illustration to convey a populous narrative of the Royal 
Observer Corps operational footprint. 
Academically, the situation is better. Matériel Culture: The Archaeology Of Twentieth 
Century Conflict, sought to open the debate on monuments of conflict by assembling 
a series of papers aimed at demonstrating the variety – and complexity – of what 
remains from the twentieth century (Schofield, Johnson and Beck 2002). Of the 
twenty-five chapters presented, only four discuss Cold War sites, two of those relate 
to exemplar sites (Nuclear Testing Sites (Beck 2002, 65) and The Berlin Wall (Dolff-
Bonekämper 2002, 236)). A number of singular authored and multiple papers 
followed in quick succession after Matériel Culture; encouragingly the study of the 
Cold War landscape also gained ground within their pages.  
In Combat Archaeology: Material Culture and Modern Conflict John Schofield 
published a detailed manifesto calling for military remains to be considered heritage 
(2005, 41). He proposed a wide range of study tactics utilising both traditional 
methods of archaeology and the inclusion of other disciplines to help contextualise 
the military landscape (ibid 2005, 32); moreover, he proposes a series of categories 
aimed at structuring the material culture of the subject matter (ibid 2005, 42-78). 
Encouragingly the Cold War features throughout the work, indeed, key defence sites 
across Britain are described, contextualised and preservation strategies proposed. 
Two years later a series of papers aimed at providing the researcher with ‘- a critical 
assessment of the places, events, people and things that together constitute the 
contemporary archaeology of the Cold War era’ appeared in a monograph of the 
One World Archaeology series. A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold 
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War explored a wide range of off-shoot topics from the standard militarily based 
discussion of the Cold War centrepiece – specifically defence and offence sites. 
Landscapes of protest were presented along with domesticity on and around bases, 
recording of sites through the traditional survey and photographic work was 
complemented by more artistically based concepts (Schofield and Cocroft 2007). An 
important theme ran throughout the publication – the premise that we do not simply 
inherit the past, we engage and modify it and in so doing promote new ways to 
interpret activities (ibid 2007, 13). I suggest this can be mapped as part of the 
abandonment process, and mapped with a fair degree of chronological accuracy 
when considering contemporary sites.  
The Public Cold War 
In 2003, multiple specialist authors appeared in the Conservation Bulletin (2003) in 
an attempt to present the wider conservation community with a research agenda that 
comprised all Twentieth century conflict orientated structures and sites (Morris 2003, 
3; Thomas 2003, 18; Holyoak 2003, 34). That said, a number of contributors 
indicated that conservation is often problematic especially when considering the 
limited funding available (Holborow 2003), a point usually lacking in academic 
debate (Cocroft pers commm). Again the subject of the oral record was raised, 
noting it as a main component in the work needed to construct an archaeology of the 
period (Schofield 2003, 4). The year 2003 also saw the publication of a discussion 
document aimed at maintaining the plight of military remains, again an English 
Heritage document. Twentieth Century Military Sites sought to categorise defence 
related structures, offering just six main streams (Lake 2003, 16) – not one contained 
or identified a Cold War site.   
In 2007 Ian Strange and Ed Walley investigated the, by then, problematic issues 
surrounding the conservation of Cold War monuments in Yorkshire. They were well 
placed to do so: Yorkshire was, at the time, one of the few counties in England 
containing a Cold War site, the Royal Observer Corps headquarters  bunker built in 
1961 at York, that has benefitted from recording by English Heritage (Cocroft 2001, 
10) and subsequent scheduling (Emerick 2003, 46). The authors recognise that the 
discourse, to be successful, has to address a number of period-specific issues 
including the symbolic popular culture of the era and the deep rooted opposition to 
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nuclear weapons that permeated the majority of the Western World (Strange and 
Walley 2007, 158).  
Issues surrounding a site’s social standing and value pale into insignificance 
however, when the practical aspects of conservation are considered. The twentieth 
century has, through the advance of technology, seen more defence related 
construction than any other period. Much of that estate is now being released back 
into the public domain, presenting an ever widening choice of defence related sites 
to record, understand and possibly preserve, overloading an already struggling 
heritage system (Strange and Walley 2007, 158). Unfortunately, the amount of 
documentation released into the public domain rarely keeps pace with the number of 
sites going through the disposal process, forcing field based investigation, often 
overloading survey teams in the process. Whilst this does not affect the validity of 
traditional archaeological methods, it does further remove the wealth of Cold War 
monuments from the twentieth century defence heritage footprint discussed in 
Dobinson, Lake and Schofield (1997). 
Attitudes to Nuclear Conflict and the Conservation Argument 
Beyond the professional debate surrounding the assessment of Cold War 
monuments, Strange and Walley tackle one of the more difficult aspects of the whole 
post World War II period – public perception (2007, 159). Public opinion, especially 
in the West, has been extensively captured through a number of media. This should, 
however, be treated with caution. The majority of texts are either driven by 
disarmament pressure groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or 
latched onto by the media and portrayed as no more than humorously optimistic 
episodes of civil defence planning. The Cold War, especially its landscape, is rarely, 
if ever, considered in an archaeological context. That said, this landscape is key to 
providing a balanced view that has an appropriate, objective, level of educational 
and social value. Strange and Walley consider ‘the national experience of the Cold 
War - is a history that can be placed within other historical narratives of progress, 
grandeur, modernisation, adaptation and even national decline’ (2007, 160).  
The Cold War permeated much of the social fabric of the Western World, ensuring 
that the narrative can be articulated from a number of angles. The authors consider 
resource areas such as veterans and defence industry workers have much to offer 
here (ibid 2007, 160). It is true this would expand the understanding of sites and 
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allow for better contextualisation. That said, the Cold War should not be considered 
a perpetuation of the rest of the twentieth century’s military experience. In his work 
The Secret State Peter Hennessy observed ‘the Cold War neither socialised large 
numbers of people into its disciplines, rationales and complexities nor did it, in 
modern argot, give them any sense of ownership on outcome’ (2003, 3). This should 
be noted when considering the comments of Cocroft (2001; 2007) and Strange and 
Walley (2007). It is likely the publically accepted view of the Cold War will continue to 
be at odds with the conservation community for many years to come. Clearly then, to 
include the public in a debate surrounding conservation places the Cold War 
landscape at risk and as such must lead to a level of enforced disenfranchisement.  
The question of the continued existence of monuments from this period, especially 
those concerned with the ‘protection’ of the public, is one that needs to be answered 
now. Attrition, currently being driven by the disposal of large areas of the defence 
and governmental estate, should drive the urgency in recording the current 
monument cohort. Indeed, there are some quarters that suggest that it might be too 
early to initiate a study of Cold War sites as many military sites are still in use 
(James 2002, 664). This view has been countered by Rachel Woodward who 
suggests that doing so risks sanitising the true intent of such sites to appease the 
clear ethical conflict associated with nuclear war (2004). This sentiment is echoed by 
Graham Fairclough who recently warned against accepting a history that is ‘too 
clean’ and devoid of conflicting memory and subsequent re-interpretation (2007, 31). 
That said, the archaeological community does not have the luxury of time, sites are 
being readily removed now; it would be far better to re-interpret a site once its future 
is secure than lament its removal due to public indifference or, worse, opposition 
(Clarke 2005a). The answer lies in how one presents the conservation issues 
surrounding such monuments as ‘fighting’ the Cold War, by its very nature, was an 
exclusive activity.     
When considered within a twentieth century framework this point is even more 
salient. Both World War I and II called for the total mobilisation of the population. 
Everyone in the United Kingdom was inextricably linked with world events, from the 
agricultural fraternity, those in industry, Home Guard and Civil Defence orientated 
organisations through to the relatives of men and women fighting around the world – 
all had some ‘ownership’ of events both major and minor. Nowhere has this been 
demonstrated better than through the Defence of Britain Project; unfortunately, this 
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public ownership and participation does not extend to the Cold War period. During 
their research in Yorkshire Strange and Walley were exposed to the whole breath of 
emotion the spectre of nuclear war continues to instil in the public. ‘Indeed, in our 
empirical research within the Yorkshire region we have encountered hostility, 
incomprehension and accusations of poor taste in response to our attempts to 
discuss the heritage value of Cold War sites’ (2007, 159). However, the opposite is 
also true; during research on the Berlin Airlift many of those veterans interviewed for 
the project were surprised that interest was shown in a period where there was no 
combat (Clarke 2007). What is important here is that the Berlin Airlift, is considered 
the first ‘battle’ of the Cold War (Tusa and Tusa 1988). Little tangible archaeology 
survives after the event, often little more than a fading cognitive image. The 
recognition that memory - an integral part of any experience - assumes an added 
importance when placed within a late twentieth century context should dictate its 
inclusion in any project scoping from this point forward.  
The Memory Record 
Other events present similar problems. It would be impossible to recognise the 
Aldermaston Marches in anything other than the printed media or film, even though 
the concept of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is one of the more 
internationally recognisable organisations of the entire Cold War. Fairclough notes 
that an archaeology of the Cold War is far more than just a study of military sites; 
through its global perspective it allows the investigator to explore the vast ‘complexity 
of human social activity’ (2007, 29), what better way to experience this than through 
an oral history tied to specific sites. For nearly five decades the Cold War shaped 
international relations, driven, in part, by extremes of ideology. The effects of the 
Cold War continue to reach deep into the current international landscape, this legacy 
should be informed by a monumental landscape not simply left to an officially driven 
narrative. One of the most iconic structures in Cold War Britain, save the ‘Golf Balls’ 
of RAF Fylingdales, has to be the Ground Launched Cruise Missile Alert and 
Maintenance Area (GAMA) site at Greenham Common. How to contextualise this 
monument was first discussed by the archaeological community in 2000 by John 
Schofield and Mike Anderton. They argue ‘that to present the recent past at 
Greenham Common Airbase as it was, and not in some diluted, biased, or sanitised 
form, is desirable but difficult’ (2000, 249); this is directly contradicted by 
Woodward’s (2004) later thesis but has many compelling positives. The very 
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existence of structures intended to launch or preside over nuclear warfare force the 
researcher to confront complex social issues. The Cold War landscape should not be 
presented solely as one of protest and opposition; the two acts do not adequately 
describe the true nature of the archaeological record.  To ‘present’ as Schofield and 
Anderton suggest is indeed difficult, however, it is required. The current project 
contains a landscape study of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) in Devon and 
Wiltshire. This multi-phase landscape charts both the development of airpower and 
nuclear weapons against a backdrop of mounting civil opposition to certainly the 
latter. Where these sites are placed is of importance and allow the researcher to 
experience the tension between groups involved in the act of protest and the passive 
defence of the population.  
Recently the recommendations made by Schofield and Anderton (2000, 244) have 
been redefined (Fiorato 2007, 152). What was seen as an opportunity to present a 
balanced view of an internationally important site in 2000 now finds itself in danger. 
After a protracted discussion over the form the former airfield and its monuments 
would take it has been recognised that the fragile archaeology of the peace camps 
around the site are under threat (Fiorato 2007, 152). The discourse has once again 
turned to the part played by ‘living memory’ now being employed to complement 
archaeological techniques ‘used in understanding the anticipated difference in 
material culture between the camps’ (Fiorato 2007, 152). The call for a concerted 
effort in the compilation of oral testimony from the Cold War period, specifically 
relating to given sites and monuments, is compelling.     
Recording Memory 
In 2009, two Research Department Reports were published by English Heritage 
(Cocroft and Alexander 2009; Cocroft and Newsome 2009), concerned with the 
military landscapes at Orfordness and Foulness. They demonstrate the effort that 
goes into the recording of a complete military site, especially one that has been 
connected with the military since World War I. Both are survey reports in every 
sense of the word compiling the expected level of topographical, historical and 
architectural information to produce credible pieces of work. Neither make further 
recommendations for expanding the research nor do they fulfil the original research 
remit proposed by Cocroft (2001, 16). Moreover, their original remit proved far more 
complicated to fulfil than was first envisaged. The message to any official body 
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involved or responsible for heritage management is clear – Cold War sites will be a 
major drain on financial resources. The prospect of justifying any expenditure in this 
area, especially under intense scrutiny from the majority of the population, makes it 
all the more important that heritage agencies promote the correct level of social 
debate surrounding such landscapes. This has serious implications and probably 
drives the decisions by many local authorities to generally ignore the Cold War 
landscape within their respective county boundaries. Rather than approaching a 
large site, with all the financial restraints that brings, it would be far more cost 
effective to investigate a class of monuments that appear across the landscape. The 
aircraft reporting and later underground monitoring posts of the ROC are one such 
solution. Their purpose has been reported previously (Wood 1992; Cocroft and 
Thomas 2003; McCamley 2002; Clarke 2005b) however, how these copious, but no 
less fragile monuments, have survived long periods of abandonment has not been 
considered. 
A condition survey of ROC posts within Devon allows for the investigation of a 
uniform structural type across three known periods. In 1968 slightly over 50% of 
Devon’s posts were closed as a cost saving exercise (Wood 1992, 247), 21 years 
later the remainder closed. It is now 25 years since that event. The opportunity to 
demonstrate the survivability of a subterranean concrete structure, making reference 
to location and geology will have major implications for all subsequent conservation 
discussions on similar buried defence structures nationally. So far I have recognised 
no parallels to this project. It is hoped the results will encourage other local 
authorities to confront nuclear orientated structures within their own landscape. To 
influence the debate surrounding the appropriateness of the conservation of nuclear 
structures an oral history of Royal Observer posts is also to be constructed.    
The Place of Oral History 
The role of oral histories in the pursuit of contextualising events has been employed 
in a small number of archaeo-historical investigations, especially those concerned 
with the development of the agricultural landscape (David et al 2004, Harvey and 
Riley 2005). That said, oral history has been a primary source of historical 
information when considering major conflicts (Arthur 2005; Patch and van Emden 
2007). Reasons for this are legion, however; anniversaries, the inclusion of conflict 
study in the National Curriculum and the recognition that the oral testament provides 
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an added human dimension to such events by media companies have all conspired 
to raise interest in the technique. Latterly, there has been recognition that veterans 
are always a finite, ever reducing, resource as demonstrated in recent times by the 
passing of the First World War from living memory.      
Within the archaeological community the majority of research on singular sites, 
landscapes or, indeed, at a national level still favours the linear narrative of the 
expert (Harvey and Riley 2005, 2). There have been a number of papers recently 
indicating the value of the oral approach, most pertinent to this project is Landscape 
Archaeology, Heritage and the Community in Devon; an Oral History Approach 
(Harvey and Riley 2005). Here the authors describe the Community Landscape 
Project (CLP), a project intended to encourage ‘- greater participation and ensuring 
wider access to heritage within the UK’ (Riley et al 2005, 40). They argue that rather 
than being considered mutually exclusive, oral testament and archaeological enquiry 
do complement one another, especially when applied to questions surrounding the 
use of landscape – for example agricultural practices (Riley et al 2005, 41). 
Particular value is recognised when considering late twentieth century industrial and 
agricultural practices, indeed; ‘Even in just the last 50 years, technological and 
economic changes have been so considerable, that oral histories may provide an 
almost unique line of enquiry for the exploration of certain aspects of landscape 
experience and meaning’ (Riley et al 2005, 47). 
 
Technology as a Driver 
This observation is extremely true of the defence driven landscape, especially that 
that developed as a consequence of the ideological struggle between East and 
West. Indeed, recently Graham Fairclough has pointed out that ‘Despite being so 
thoroughly documented, it [the Cold War] is still a period that requires us to ‘hear’ the 
material culture’ (2007, 23). The pace of technological breakthroughs in the 
development of nuclear weapons alone dictated radical changes in both offensive 
and defensive systems. The changes to doctrine and subsequent military posture 
often had an immediate effect on both sites and organisations throughout the Cold 
War (Clarke 2005b). Often, so quick was the rate of redundancy and implementation 
of a successor system that the previous or original role of a site was never fully 
implemented. This is true of a great many, purpose built, protected structures for the 
Royal Artillery throughout the 1950s (McCamley 2002, 114). The incessant drive for 
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faster aircraft removed the possibility of such vehicles being shot down by gunfire; 
the Gun Defended Areas were disbanded in the mid-1950s with the result that a 
great number of the rooms in many bunkers are of no known function (Cocroft et al 
2003, 150). This supports Fairclough’s point that the paper record can only ever be 
considered one facet of a site’s physical record (2007,24), subsequently, however 
contradictory, the evidence from the oral transcripts are clearly to be considered 
necessary in the current work. A further advantage of an oral history approach 
complementing the archaeo-historical landscape is the socialisation of the site 
through the contextualisation of the monument, especially when linked to external 
events. As an example, RAF Duxford was an airfield built during World War I, it was 
still in operation in 1940 and is subsequently famous for the part it played in the 
Battle of Britain. Duxford then, is commemorated for acts in World War II but is 
actually a World War I airfield. Commemoration does not make distinctions between 
structures on site and subsequently, the station as a whole is preserved. This linking 
of a site to national and international events becomes a critical component in any 
discussion over preservation or educational status.   
The Vocal Public 
Recently a number of excavations at modern militaristically orientated sites in 
London have recorded oral accounts when they have been offered by members of 
the public. Work undertaken by the Museum of London Archaeological Service 
(MoLAS) in 2004/5/6 investigated the site of a crashed aircraft and bomb damaged 
housing, the latter as part of a community based project (MoLAS 2010); both 
recorded eye witness accounts of the events on, and surrounding the sites under 
investigation. During the aircraft excavation it was noted by the information officer 
that a significant number of those who came to look at the work had stories to offer 
about the event (Moshenska 2007, 93). A similar situation prevailed at Shoreditch 
Park during the excavation of the bombsite. Indeed, so valuable was the exercise 
MoLAS currently notes ‘Although the excavations finished some time ago, even 
today work on the Shoreditch Park project continues as we explore ways to exploit 
the rich potential of an oral history provided by former residents’ (ibid 2010). When 
considering this and the comments on the Defence of Britain project the call for an 
oral history of the Royal Observer Corps and other Home Defence Region 7 
activities appears even more pressing.  
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There are distinct differences between the proposed recording of ROC and other 
Cold War activities and those encountered on the Defence of Britain Project and in 
London. The samples will be of a limited number and in the case of true Home 
Defence operation could be extremely difficult to locate. The sites in London were 
clearly in the public eye and media attention served to heighten the public’s 
awareness of the research. Not only did this attract people to the excavation, but the 
subsequent records were complemented by the interviewee recognising parts of the 
site and even some artefacts as they were excavated (Moshenska 2007, 96). This 
has been confirmed by Riley et al noting that providing the individual with a 
topographical starting point stimulates memory and structures the following interview 
(2005, 409). Further, they support the use of the ‘premeditated’ artefact (Riley et al 
2005, 410) as a method of stimulus. 
This approach presents a problem. Cold War sites are, by their very nature, remote. 
This makes the ‘chance’ visit almost non-existent and the possibility of organising 
visits to probably unsafe structures unwise; clearly another direction is required. The 
‘premeditated’ use of artefacts as suggested above will, with minor modification, 
provide an excellent surrogate for the Royal Observer Corps posts which are the 
focus of this research. Quite a range of material culture relevant to the ROC survive, 
much held by me, also it would be advantageous if the structures intended to be 
discussed had already been visited. Providing a high quality photographic record of 
the site, current appearance and environs has the potential to further stimulate 
discussion.  
Gender in the Record 
Earlier I made reference to the currently subjective view of women’s roles in the non-
military Cold War environment citing accounts from Greenham Common as the main 
reason for this. Academic papers and articles are numerous (Campbell 1982; Finch 
1986; Carroll 2004; Laware 2004; Marshall et al 2009; Welch 2010; Titcombe 2013). 
This is to be expected; the peace camps around Greenham Common became a 
worldwide phenomenon, inspiring much emulation worldwide (Schofield and Cocroft 
2007). The political stance throughout the 1980s ensured that the camps were never 
far from the spotlight of the media (Emberley and Landry 1989). The paradox here is 
that the capture of personal accounts from members of Royal Observer Corps, or 
indeed any Cold War activity in the United Kingdom, appear to be non-existent in the 
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current record (2011). Moreover, it has not been possible to ascertain the gender 
distribution of staff within the ROC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1-5. ROC recruiting 
leaflet promoting the cross-
gender activities the 
organisation intended to 
portray. (Source: The ROC 
– The Service with a 
Difference (1979)) 
A review of material held at the Public Record Office has so far drawn a blank, as 
has enquiries to the Royal Observer Corps Museum and the National Cold War 
Exhibition at RAF Cosford. Ominously the RAF Museum’s archivist responded ‘We 
are not aware of any records for individual members of the ROC, or operational 
records, having been preserved’ (Elliott email Wed, 11 May 2011 16:06) Discussion 
with members of the Royal Observer Corps Association however, suggest the 
organisation, especially in No. 10 Group (Devon) would appear to be of mixed 
gender; this is supported by the recruiting and information literature from the period. 
A brief look at just one recruiting pamphlet (The ROC – The Service with a 
Difference published in 1979) promotes women’s roles throughout the organisation. 
The pamphlet contains 25 photographs – 19 contain both genders. Clearly a 
recruitment drive would aim to appeal to the widest possible audience, but it does 
indicate that the publicised demographic depicted an overtly open organisation (fig.1-
5). This reaffirms the point that an oral history of the ROC concentrating on the role 
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played by women will allow any recommendations as to monument conservation far 
more robust. 
 
THE WAR FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 
It is clear that Cold War studies, when applied within an archaeological framework, 
are in their infancy. As I have noted above, a concerted effort by English Heritage 
since 2001 has produced a small number of reports and papers, yet take-up outside 
the body has been extremely slow. A number of reasons appear to to account for 
this. Most important is the public’s perception of what the Cold War actually means. 
Many see no worth in preserving sites that would have seen the perpetuation of 
Government at the exclusion of the public (Strange and Walley 2007). This view is 
presumably driven by the overwhelming bias in texts that punctuated the book 
shelves from the mid-1980s (The Nuclear Survival Handbook, Popkess 1980; 
Protest and Survive, Thompson and Smith 1980; Nuclear War: What’s in it for You?, 
Ground Zero 1982), buoyed up by the work of CND (Nuclear Disarmament for 
Britain, England (undated); Have you ever wished you were better informed: Facts 
Against the Bomb CND 1981)) and a wide range of other pressure groups (The 
Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Medical Campaign Against Nuclear 
Weapons 1982; The Christian and Nuclear Weapons 1983). The Government 
certainly countered the demand for the abandonment of the nuclear deterrent. A 
series of information booklets were issued to the public including such titles as 
Advising the Householder on Protection Against Nuclear Attack (HMSO 1963); The 
H-Bomb: What About the Millions of Survivors? (HMSO 1959); Civil Defence: Why 
We Need It (HMSO 1983); The Balanced View: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control 
(HMSO 1983) and without doubt the most famous piece of government sponsored 
material culture, Protect and Survive (HMSO 1976 and 1980). 
 
The question is, should we consider these publications within a literature review, or 
consign them to the material culture of organisations both with vested interests in the 
nuclear debate, while being poles apart in demand? I believe we should include 
them. True, both sides are reporting activities in either the best or worst light, 
although to ignore such a valuable resource covering such a contentious issue would 
be to render the character of the Cold War impotent. Public protest, civil 
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disobedience and, in the case of a number of underground monitoring posts 
operated by the Royal Observer Corps, acts of destruction and vandalism 
characterises this period like no other period of ‘conflict’ so far. The fact that political 
parties – especially the Labour movement – supported the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament demands that the material is at least used to demonstrate the very real 
fears of both public and state.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The pace of political change throughout the period immediately following the end of 
the Cold War in 1991 has a major part to play in the apparent lack of progress in 
recording Cold War sites. Devon Heritage Environment Record (HER) currently 
carries a fairly consistent record of military sites across the county, much of it from 
the records generated by Colin Dobinson or the Defence of Britain Project (CBA 
2002). However, Wiltshire County Council comprises very little military material, and 
certainly no current Cold War sites were recognisable during catalogue searches of 
their archives for this project; the situation has now been partially resolved 
(McQueen, Wilts County Archaeology Staff pers commm 2014). Somerset HER 
contained the record of just one ROC underground monitoring post and the 
Headquarters of No.9 Group whilst South Gloucestershire HER returns primarily 
aviation orientated structures and war memorials.    
 
How the Home Defence landscape is promoted will clearly be at the centre of the of 
the problem. Any discussion on the Cold War will naturally bring forward certain pre-
conceived ideas of nuclear warfare and specifically its aftermath. The key to 
promoting the investigation of the Royal Observer Corps landscape is to 
demonstrate its humanitarian aspects, primarily fallout and air raid warning, no 
matter how sceptical the public. This area has the most relevant educational value 
and through a series of interviews could be contextualised in a number of ways. 
Aspects of the ‘Home Front’ during World War II are studied through a number of 
media at primary school level; it would be advantageous to project this concept into 
the current Cold War studies of the secondary education curriculum. By its very 
nature the Cold War carries the burden of secrecy and this has perpetuated the 
misrepresentation of the United Kingdom’s role in the development of the modern 
world. Irrespective of the research frameworks previously offered, this project has 
validity across a number of areas. A number of lines of investigation are required, 
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these include the research and characterisation of a specific region and monument 
type, the capture of accounts of the operation and planning for the protection of the 
public through the spoken media and the use of historical documentation from a wide 
range of sources. We have an opportunity to present a more balanced view of this 
period through its archaeology, contextualising sites with a coherent, if contested, 
narrative, thus making the period more accessible and open to a more balanced 
debate. This balance will be more difficult to maintain as time goes on unless more 
structures representative of this period are retained across the landscape. 
  
The archaeological community now recognises the importance of Cold War 
monuments when considered within a twentieth century framework. Official bodies 
have, however, found it difficult to stir more than a passing interest when the debate 
centres around specific sites. The amount of fieldwork and recording work 
undertaken over the past decade is small; site surveys have demonstrated that Cold 
War landscapes are extremely complex and require major investments of time and 
staffing to complete. Others recognise that the Cold War, especially when discussing 
physical remains, is interdisciplinary and for the barriers to current views to be 
breached this multi-faceted approach must make much of the tools available. A 
decade on from Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by the Monuments Protection 
Programme (Cocroft 2001) the picture is bleak. Only a handful of sites have received 
protection while many HERs still only hold basic information on the sites within their 
care. At the forefront of this apparent lack of effort is the difficulty the whole spectre 
of nuclear war presents the investigator, coupled with the unique, ‘secret’ nature of 
the structures currently available for research. There are also problems with using 
documents in the public record with the majority of archives holding just the 
Government and military view – further exacerbating, and possibly perpetuating the 
public’s perceived view of secrecy.   
 
What is clear is that the current investigation into the surviving archaeology of the 
Royal Observer Corps will provide a unique view of a specific part of the United 
Kingdom’s planning for nuclear war. Moreover, work intended to build a fuller picture 
of the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation and Royal Observer 
Corps footprint in Devon is desperately needed. To date there has be no academic 
work undertaken on this, subsequently a major piece of the United Kingdom’s Cold 
War legacy, one that was almost totally staffed by volunteers, has no real footprint in 
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the archaeological record. The intended work in Devon and, to a lesser degree the 
South-West, will benefit greatly from an oral history of the operations of the 
organisation through 1947-91, the target sample of interviewees aimed to include as 
many female members as possible. This will help challenge the currently subjective 
view of women’s roles in the non-military Cold War environment primarily driven by 
accounts from Greenham Common. Moreover, if we are to confront our recent past 
we must understand the unpleasant and controversial aspects of nuclear warfare. 
Any such event would have immediately involved the entire population of Britain. We 
have a duty to manage at least a representative Cold War landscape so that this 
important, dominant social and economic aspect of the twentieth century is not 
misrepresented, or worse, lost.     
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CHAPTER 2: RECORDING THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A 
METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War has a well-defined beginning and end (1948-1991) and moreover the 
period is only twenty years past. This raises problems for the archaeologist, not least 
the notion that archaeology has no place in the investigation of this recent historical 
period (Strange and Walley 2007) and is, instead, mere tautology, repeating the 
work of other disciplines (Andrén 1998, 179). Moreover, it is argued that the written 
record should suffice, especially when considering military sites sponsored by 
Central Government (Dobinson, Lake and Schofield 1997).   
 
Increasingly, the debate surrounding the place of archaeology, especially when 
studying the material culture of periods provided for by a substantial official record, 
has come to the fore (Launius 2009; Myers, 2011). Nowhere has this been more 
evident than in the study of conflict archaeology (Cocroft 2007; Kean 2010; Harrison 
and Schofield 2010; Carman 2013). Events – especially those encapsulated in the 
twentieth century – have rapidly shifted modern warfare, once solely the domain of 
the historian, into a multi-disciplinary arena. The period now comprises many 
humanities-based research interests studying everything from structures of war 
(Osborne 2004; Schofield and Cocroft 2007) to attitudes on the Home Front 
(Campbell 1982; Grant 2010). So does archaeology, or more correctly historical 
archaeology, have a role to play in this multi-faceted approach to the recent past? In 
this chapter I introduce a number of research objectives that aim to prove that it does 
and has much to offer the researcher, especially in the interpretation of material 
culture, behaviour and ethnographical studies. 
 
Current Aims 
The aim of this study is to utilise a number of methods and models to discuss, 
interpret and explore a particular social group - the Royal Observer Corps - within 
the confines of the Cold War. To achieve this, the research comprises a number of 
key themes, namely processes linked to abandonment, the formation of 
archaeological sites witnessed through fieldwork (Schiffer 2010, 53), and the role of 
the volunteer in secret landscapes via a study of the life-cycle of a specific group. 
Furthermore, the development of a model designed to link the distribution of relevant 
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material culture to the organisational processes connected to rules and regulations is 
also required. 
 
Objectives 
 
1. Demonstrate the archaeological potential of the Royal Observer Corps 
through the monuments, memories and material culture of the organisation 
via an investigation into the current state of the Royal Observer Corps 
archaeological record.  
 
2. Capture the narratives, attitudes and personal histories of individuals who 
were members of the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War period. 
This will enable the activities enacted on all sites to be contextualised with 
individual experience. 
 
3. Construct, and test, a new model intended to structure the interpretation of 
material culture, especially that encountered on sites recognised as highly 
ordered. 
 
4. Identify the processes involved in the abandonment of structures constructed 
specifically for the monitoring of the effects of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
5. Construct a more appropriate chronology of the Cold War, relying on the 
archaeological record currently extant in the United Kingdom. 
 
What are presented in this chapter are the processes and lines of investigation 
developed that have provided the dataset utilised in the discharge of the current 
objectives. Each objective is presented separately below. 
 
OBJECTIVE 1: DEMONSTRATE THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE 
ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS THROUGH THE MONUMENTS, MEMORIES AND 
MATERIAL CULTURE OF THE ORGANISATION VIA AN INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD. 
 
LINES OF INVESTIGATION – DATABASE 
Introduction 
Recently Harrison and Schofield (2010, 88) reminded us that ‘there is no one method 
for undertaking archaeological studies of the contemporary past’; that sentiment 
extends to this project. However, two main objectives of the present study required a 
traditional fieldwork element to ensure that those objectives were met. The following 
 45 | P a g e  
section describes the processes employed leading up to, and refined during, the 
fieldwork element, ensuring the appropriate level of data was available for the final 
thesis. 
 
It became clear from the outset that the current sample of surviving Royal Observer 
Corps posts across the County of Devon, and indeed across the South-West, was 
anything other than complete or representative. To accept the extant information 
would have quickly rendered any attempts monitor behavioural patterns pointless. To 
fulfil this requirement a number of sampling strategies were developed. The primary 
one was the creation of a database to utilise as an up-to-date reference tool which 
served as the basis for recording and interrogation. 
 
Baseline Database Construction Jan-April 2011 
The database comprises a hyperlinked Excel® spreadsheet containing all extant 
written information held by a number of organisations across the United Kingdom. 
This included the Royal Observer Corps Museum (since disbanded), Royal Air Force 
Hendon and Cosford Collections, The Public Record Office, QinetiQ Ltd and the 
Defence Science and Technical Laboratories Library. This was further 
complemented by the opportunity to use information from a number of personal 
archives. This wide range of organisations took fully two years to integrate into the 
database. 
 
The initial database population was carried out early in 2011, with the intention of 
providing a quantitative view of the ROC landscape in Devon. Three main sources of 
information were identified during the development of the database structure 
(English Heritage, Devon County Historic Environment Record (HER) and the work 
undertaken by Derek Wood intended for publication). The interrogation of these 
initial groups official records proved most informative; it had been suspected that 
there may be some variation in the way sites had been recorded but not to the extent 
discovered.  Perhaps unsurprisingly all were either incomplete or contradictory of 
each other. Sites that had been visited by one or all interested parties had a high 
degree of accuracy, whereas the level of accuracy for those that had been destroyed 
or were in difficult to access locations varied enormously.  
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To illustrate the point: a site noted on a county HER often relied on information 
collated by Colin Dobinson of English Heritage and subsequently published via that 
organisation (2003). This in turn drew specifically on information provided by Derek 
Wood (1992) in his work Attack Warning Red. This publication was the first, and 
only, complete history of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and ambitiously listed all 
observation post locations across the United Kingdom. Wood’s account is, at the 
time of writing, 24 years old and, while extremely useful at the time, now bears little 
resemblance to the extant landscape. Moreover, where no field visits were 
undertaken by Dobinson or the County Archaeologist, reliance of Wood’s gazetteer 
has produced errors on the HER. Clearly an accurate and succinct database was 
needed to move forward any intended fieldwork. The creation of a geographically-
focused database concentrating on ROC posts in Devon and Cornwall was the first 
step to providing a consistent and definitive view of the extant ROC landscape. By 
April 2011, the migration of information to the database was complete. The database 
contains 73 ROC posts (both Devon and Cornwall) and has 24 sections of 
information covering the location and history of each post, extant or not. This 
provided a baseline from which to begin the fieldwork.  
 
Database Utilisation April 2011 to Present 
Desktop Database 
With all known, or suspected, sites noted on the baseline database, the task now 
required the verification of the location of surviving ROC posts. With a potential 52 
sites across Devon it was imperative that those ROC posts removed after the 
creation of the HER were identified to reduce the fieldwork size, initially the entire 
landmass of Devon, as much as possible. This was partially achieved by utilising a 
number of online programmes and sites. The work was sub-divided into three key 
elements:  
 
• Location 
• Extant Physical Record and Environs 
• History 
Location 
To minimise wasted effort, especially during the initial fieldwork, the baseline dataset 
required a level of refinement. Utilising the information outlined in the previous 
section, complemented by oral testimonies by a number of former observers, it was 
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possible to place the majority of ROC posts in the two counties within 500m² of their 
original construction point. All ROC posts in Devon and Cornwall are now 
represented in the database, irrespective of their current condition, along with the 
command and reporting structure of the organisation. This is important as a number 
of chronological markers, indicating changes in the archaeological record, 
(specifically 1953, 1968, 1973, 1991) dictate significant changes to the reporting 
structure of the ROC and its parent organisation, the United Kingdom Warning and 
Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). Finally, each ROC post was given a unique 
project number preceded by D- in the case of those in Devon and C- for Cornwall. 
Locational information is now recorded for each ROC post through a series of 
geographical, numerical and geological reference points which are consistently 
applied across all post locations in the county. 
 
Extant physical record 
The next step was to select a representative sample of sites to include in the 
fieldwork. The intention was to visit any suspected structural remains, an opportunity 
frustrated by almost total lack of cartographic recognition of Royal Observer Corps 
posts by the Ordnance Survey (OS). Interestingly the OS do, on occasion, 
acknowledge the existence of ‘something’ on the map. However, it is not obvious, 
nor is it often labelled, although if it does have a label it usually names the feature a 
‘covered reservoir’ (fig.2-1). This could be considered a clear indication of a secret 
archaeology with links to a heterotopic landscape.  For example, an extant site is 
often depicted by the OS as no more than a single rectangle denoting a fence 
around the ROC post. If such a shape appeared on the map it was recorded as a 
potential site – subsequently all shapes were identified as potential sites.   
 
 
 
 
Fig.2-1. A screenshot of the 12th level of detail 
map with the ROC post compound D-41 
described as a reservoir. (Source: © Crown 
copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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The aerial photographic records at the National Monuments Record and the Devon 
HER were interrogated but proved to be of limited use. In both cases, the vertical 
image series did indicate an ROC post. The series were often created ten years 
apart (i.e. 1973; 1983; 1994) and by the mid-1990s had stopped being produced 
altogether for some counties, this seriously limited the resource’s potential. 
Unexpectedly, the most effective tool, when undertaking the remote search for ROC 
posts, has been Google Maps®. This reliable and recently available data is already 
utilised by the Defence of Britain Project. This allowed me to gain a ‘feel’ for the 
surrounding landscape, especially when considering the possibility of other Cold War 
structures in the immediate area of suspected ROC posts. Moreover, it provided an 
indication of the current land use (certainly within the last three years) in the 
immediate locality of any site under investigation. Subsequently it has been possible, 
by blending information sources, to virtually investigate the landscape surrounding 
the ROC posts and significantly refine the sample of sites visited to those known, or 
suspected, to be extant.  
 
Database Verification Case Study 
D-19 - Holsworthy, Devon  
What follows are a number of screen shots demonstrating the process whereby a 
site identified through the baseline database was further investigated using remote 
methods. Using the database generated NGR it was possible to characterise the 
immediate topography of an ROC post’s location, noting whether a compound fence 
or other feature was recognisable (fig.2-2). This information was then used to open 
the same area in Google Maps®. The programme was then switched to the satellite 
view where the existence of the post was quickly verified (fig.2-3).  
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Fig.2-2. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the 12th level of detail from the current 
OS mapping in Digimap with the ROC post compound clearly indicated at the centre 
(Source: © Crown copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service). 
 
Fig.2-3. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the same area as Fig. 2.2 with Google 
Maps® set to satellite, the ROC post compound fence clearly indicated at the centre. 
Internal Features are also recognisable. Note imagery date is 2006 (Source: Google Maps® 
accessed and image created 14/05/2011). 
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As a final verification, each post was ‘visited’ via Google Street View® (Fig.2-4). This 
programme contained information just two years older (2009) than the construction 
of the database, subsequently providing information on 16 of the 23 sites identified 
as extant from the previous steps. The information does, however, have limits. All 
Google Street View® imagery is taken from metalled roadways, therefore any 
feature more than 200m away from the roadside is difficult to discern. That said, this 
proved a powerful tool when utilised within a desktop environment.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.2-4. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the same area as Fig.2-3 with Google 
Street View® from the road to the north-west of the site. The ROC post compound fence 
(white), Orlit A (blue) and entrance to Underground Monitoring Post (red) are clearly visible 
on the skyline. Note imagery date is post 2009 (Source: Google Street View® accessed and 
image created 14/05/2011). 
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Fig.2-5. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A ground level view of post D-19 Holsworthy depicting the 
extant – above ground – archaeology as of 1 May 2011. Picture taken during the baseline 
survey. View looking south-west (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011). 
 
History 
A history of the location of each ROC post is also included in the database, noting 
the opening date, re-locations due to the 1953 aircraft reporting re-organisation, and 
subsequent repositioning of structures connected with nuclear warfare, the 
construction of underground monitoring posts and their eventual closure in 1991. 
This has two intentions. Objective 4 is an attempt to understand the processes 
involved in the abandonment of structures constructed specifically for the monitoring 
of weapons of mass destruction. For this to be effective, a chronological framework 
was required. Organisational changes were also included as the ROC comprised an 
organisational geography rather that one laid out on county landmasses, this had a 
bearing on which posts I selected for monitoring.   
 
The final desktop database identified 72 sites across Devon and Cornwall of which 
52 were within the current Devon County border. Using the processes mentioned 
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above, it was possible to reduce the number of posts in Devon requiring visits to 23, 
which included sites where limited evidence still survived in 2009.  
 
LINES OF INVESTIGATION - FIELDWORK 
Introduction 
Any analysis of recent archaeology is necessarily multi-disciplinary in its approach. 
Indeed, Harrison and Schofield reminds us that ‘- an archaeology of the 
contemporary past is defined by, and is even reliant upon, working with and across a 
series of academic disciplines’ (2010, 89). Furthermore, Schiffer notes that if we are 
to move beyond ‘assumptions about formation processes especially post-initial-use 
life histories’ then a multi-disciplinary approach is a pre-requisite in project design 
(2010, 31). This is especially true of the current project, attending as it does to 
behaviours acted out on abandoned sites, the discovery of attitudes towards such 
sites and the story of specific organisations through their life-cycle, memory and 
material culture. That said, this work is primarily a project investigating the 
archaeology of mass destruction. Subsequently, a large part of the research requires 
site visits and elements of traditional archaeological fieldwork. 
  
Sub-objectives 
The field recording of the sample monument type (Royal Observer Corps 
Underground Monitoring Posts) set itself number of key sub-objectives. These were 
designed to capture as much information about each surviving monument in its 
current physical condition as possible.  A number of sub-objectives were included 
within each site visit that were intended to contextualise each field experience. 
Those sub-objectives were, but not restricted to, the following: 
 
• To ascertain the current number and/or condition of extant sites across 
Devon. 
 
• To audit threats to the extant archaeological record posed by current land 
use. 
 
• To audit threats to the extant archaeological record posed by external 
agencies i.e. vandalism, development or neglect. 
 
• To complement the current database with field results allowing the selection 
of a number of sites for the monitoring of abandonment and post-
abandonment. 
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• Capture the attitudes of members of the public who were in the vicinity during 
the field recording of monuments. 
 
Field Recording 
Those sites identified as having archaeological potential were initially visited 
between late April and May 2011, with subsequent recording events taking place 
throughout 2012 -2013. To ensure a coherent, comprehensive and consistent 
record, a standard recording form was designed and completed separately for each 
ROC post (Appendix One for Devon, disc for all others). The form included criteria 
recommended by English Heritage (Cocroft 2000) although a more directed series of 
questions and fields was considered essential if the work was to capture the true 
nature of each site. The recording form comprises information covering the 
environment and geology of the site, condition survey of above ground, sub-
terrainian features where accessible, environs and perceived or recognised threats 
to the welfare and survivability of the site. Recording activities enacted on the site 
between one visit to the next was a key function of the dataset. This was 
complemented by a comprehensive photographic survey of all known features, again 
following a predetermined series of directional shots to ensure consistency in the 
record.    
 
Final Record 
The final record maintains the unique serial number issued to each ROC post on 
inclusion of the site in the desktop database. This ‘D-‘ serial number is the 
nomenclature utilised in the creation of the completed record. Each post file 
comprises a digitally transcribed version of the field recording form.  Located within 
the form are a number of hyperlinks to the photographic record created for each site; 
this is broken down into singular images allowing the enquirer to locate specific 
views instantly. The file also contains the remains of the images produced during the 
field exercise, accessible by opening each file (Fig.2-6). This information is to be 
passed to the Devon County HER in its entirety, including the transfer of copyright 
from the originator where appropriate, on completion of the project.  
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Fig.2-6. Screenshot of the file content and structure for each ROC post visited. File name 
with D- county code; main contents of specific file; ROC post image. (Source: Bob Clarke 
18/05/2011). 
 
Additional Landscape Investigation Post 2013 
During a meeting of the supervisory staff in early 2013, the number of posts under 
investigation were discussed. Underground monitoring posts had been constructed 
in 52 locations across the county, of those 14 were extant. It was decided that it 
would be beneficial to include at least one more county and perhaps a token post 
from a number of others. Subsequently, I enlarged the fieldwork considerably. The 
survey now includes all extant sites in Devon and Wiltshire alongside a number of 
sites in Gloucestershire, Cornwall, Yorkshire and Berkshire; the sample has now 
been increased to 33. 
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OBJECTIVE 2: CAPTURE THE NARRATIVES, ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL 
HISTORIES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL 
OBSERVER CORPS THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR PERIOD. THIS WILL 
ENABLE THE ACTIVITIES ENACTED ON ALL SITES TO BE CONTEXTUALISED 
WITH INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE. 
 
Introduction 
Two public engagement surveys, intended to provide information and contextualising 
any archaeological work, have been developed as part of this study. One was aimed 
at the general public, the other targeted just those who had been volunteer members 
of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC). The public survey proved to be a straight 
forward exercise, however, that aimed at the ROC proved far more problematic and 
is thus discussed below. The construction of an oral history to contextualise the 
archaeology and material culture of ROC is a key component of the present 
research. Objective 2 notes ‘capture the narratives, attitudes and personal histories 
of those who were members of the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War 
era’; this involved capturing the memories and thoughts of the surviving observer 
cohort, which targeted, but not restrictively, those who served in Devon or the wider 
Home Defence Region 7 landscape. The identification of likely interviewees was 
initiated in late December 2010; by April 2011 it had become apparent that the 
methodology was flawed. Only three observers agreed to speak and then exclusively 
about one particular event, the 1991 stand-down. Interestingly this situation was not 
unique as others had also encountered similar problems with the same group 
(Oldcorn 2010, 51).  
 
The capture of accounts drawing on the collective memory of an organisation 
disbanded 25 years ago naturally presents a number of challenges. In the small 
number of successful interviews, one event dominated the discussion – the 1991 
stand-down - and, more importantly, the way in which this was carried out by the 
authorities. It is now clear what influenced the poor engagement and focussed 
responses was a high level of disenfranchisement. That is ‘a unique combination of 
culture with current and past political realities’ (Scham 2001, 190). The methodology 
surrounding the capture of the oral history of the ROC requires expansion at this 
point as the modification of collection methods has been the key to later successes.  
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Background to Failure 
The Target Group 
The capture of narratives is an extremely valuable part of this project. There are a 
number of recognisable periods of activity in the Royal Observer Corps 
archaeological record spanning 40 years; to contextualise these periods with human 
experience is essential. Only with an increased level of fidelity would it be possible to 
indicate any sort of taskscape (Ingold 1993) and changes in the material culture 
encountered on site indicating episodes of abandonment (Schiffer 2010, 31). 
Membership of the Royal Observer Corps was a voluntary undertaking and 
subsequently terms of service were not of fixed length, therefore, members’ 
recollections expose different operational facets dependant on their lengths of 
service. To this end a number of key concepts were required to be placed within the 
design of the recording regime. Foremost was the empathetically based 
considerations when discussing past experiences with observers. 
 
The Observer Demographic 
Little, if any, investigative work has been undertaken academically into the social 
make-up of the Royal Observer Corps. The demographic of the ROC suggests a 
male orientated, ex-military service group primarily of retirement age, but this is not 
the case. Throughout the organisation's existence, the demographic changed 
dramatically; subsequently it is clear a number of changes are recognisable. From 
the restoration of the ROC network on 1 April 1947, two groups dominate 
membership: the returning observer who had performed the function during World 
War II; and, increasingly, the de-mobbed serviceman. By the 1970s, this had made 
way for a large number of non-service background applicants. It is possible that this 
‘demilitarisation’ of members stems from an influx of applicants caused by the stand-
down of the Civil Defence Corps in 1968 (Clarke 2005b, 164).  
 
The role of women in the ROC is also a further neglected area of study. Women 
have been eligible to join the ROC since at least 1942 (Wood 1992, 181); initially 
employed in Group Headquarters but from the 1950s onwards this included positions 
out in the field. An accurate record of their role in Cold War activities is absent. 
Additionally, unlike other military services, rank in the ROC had no gender 
connotation, so an observer was an observer regardless of gender. Furthermore, it 
has proved impossible to locate the ROC service records; this was an unexpected 
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development, blamed by the RAF Museum Hendon on ‘a number of recent moves 
and funding cuts’ (Museum Curator 8 November 2014, pers commm). Taking this 
into consideration we are currently left with the information provided by a rapidly 
dwindling number of ROC Association memberships. 
 
Disenfranchisement 
When Peter Hennessey noted that ‘the Cold War neither socialised large numbers of 
people into its disciplines, rationales and complexities nor did it, in modern argot, 
give them any sense of ownership on outcome’ little did he know how accurate a 
point he was making (2003, 3). The ‘Cold War’ has built a self-imposed dichotomy 
into the historiography of the period. The initial research for this project discovered 
that observers were reluctant to engage with the research. Two reasons loomed 
large; the apparent lack of self-worth through connections with nuclear warfare and 
the level of disenfranchisement felt over the decision to summarily stand-down the 
organisation without any form of consultation period.  
 
Regrouping 
If we reflect on Peter Hennessey’s (2003, 3) comment, it is possible to recognised a 
paradigm shift in the mentality and attitudes of the public to warfare. In the United 
Kingdom, World War II was recognised as total war; almost all public activities were 
turned over to war production or support of the military. The nation assumed a ‘need 
to know’ stance as total war was just that – total. This is not the case regarding the 
Cold War, as it constructed many dichotomies and exposed many prejudices, 
especially in the relationship between the public and official agencies. This is further 
exacerbated by the overarching ideologically aspect of East vs. West, re-enforced at 
a national level with the personal ideology of the individual. Boundaries between 
those who supported nuclear weapons as a deterrent and those who were opposed 
to their retention, or stationing on British soil, were marked. This should come as no 
surprise. Strange and Walley noted while discussing the heritage value of Cold War 
sites that ‘ - in our empirical research within the Yorkshire Region we have 
encountered hostility, incomprehension and accusations of poor taste‘ (2007, 159). 
Unfortunately, there is no indication as to the demographic of the respondents 
however, the sentiment is clear: Cold War archaeology forces an identity crisis in 
those who were involved in its practice or engaged against it. The recognition that 
the Royal Observer Corps veterans were displaying a high level of 
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disenfranchisement due to their abrupt disposal now drove the research in a different 
direction.  
 
The Secret Organisation 
As I have already discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, the Royal Observer 
Corps was a secret organisation. Their monitoring posts are typically 'incognito', 
especially when appearing on Ordnance Survey maps, so it come as no surprise that 
this level of secrecy should be displayed by the Observers themselves.  Membership 
or initiation into this or other organisations was via a personal agreement with the 
Government; the signing of the Official Secrets Act. The completion of this document 
initiates the signatory into a parallel world identifiable in Foucault’s ‘other space’ or 
heterotopian landscape (1967); a world where the general public are excluded 
(Scham 2001, 187). 
 
To what degree did the Official Secrets Act impact on my research? Moreover, why 
was it initially so difficult to engage any former members of the ROC in the project? 
To answer these questions, I first needed to understand the motivation behind 
joining a voluntary organisation. The reasons why members of the public decide to 
join a particular group – especially one as highly ordered as the ROC – are legion 
(Wardell and Lishman et al 2000; Yanay and Yanay 2008). It is clear that an 
understanding of such motives would be a key driver to success; this is where the 
breakthrough came. While re-evaluating some of the initial interviews/conversations 
one notion, mentioned almost in passing, stood out; the existence of a ROC 
Association. This had been in existence for many years and during the stand-down 
in 1991, all Observers had been encouraged to join, some did but others left in 
disgust. The ROC used a number of recruitment strategies across its life-cycle. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the ROC Association adheres to the 
same structural framework as the organisation proper. In this instance, it included a 
form of pseudo-Official Secrets Act. The key, therefore, to successful participation of 
groups or members of groups associated with highly ordered organisations is 
through a quasi-chain of command, irrespective of whether the organisation is still in 
existence or a member’s association has replaced it. One has to obtain official 
approval before any contact is made with members and only then is it possible the 
access the organisation. A re-assessment of the original observer contacts from 
2010-11 revealed one further salient point: that none appeared to have joined the 
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ROC Association. Being outside the current ROC social group, complete with its ‘old 
boys’ support network, appears to underpin the lack of perceived self-worth apparent 
in the initial data collection (Yanay and Yanay 2008, 74). 
 
Initiation 
Initial contact with the ROC Association was made in late 2011. Contacting the 
general membership requires a level of ‘official sanction’ before information is offered 
to the researcher. I underwent what can only be described as a vetting process, 
justifying my motives and background but luckily I too am a signatory of the Official 
Secrets Act, which I am sure smoothed over some initial apprehensions. Now the 
ROC website has an ‘officially vetted’ link to the current project survey, and a 
number of Observers have contacted me, via the ROC Association, expressing 
interest and help. The quality of the information supplied is such that it is now 
possible to narrate the life-cycle of the organisation from at least 1952 to stand-down 
and beyond.  
 
The Role of Social Media in this Project 
Social media is a fairly recent and complex phenomenon; it has also become an 
important research area for this project. A number of online areas have already been 
exploited for this thesis (discussed above) although, social networking (as defined in 
Cann, Dimitriou and Hooley 2011, 7) was not initially considered. Reasons for this 
are many.  
 
Paramount to any research is the accuracy and authenticity of the date provided 
from those who are engaged for information, memory and life-cycles of organisation. 
It is already widely accepted that a level of phenomenology creeps into any personal 
account. This has been suggested by Cann et al to have an impact on the quality of 
the data obtained, noting ‘This inevitably means that it is more difficult to identify 
which contributions are valuable or authoritative’ (2011, 11). Apparently, supporting 
this Perry and Beale noted that ‘all that seems clear about social web engagement in 
archaeology is that it may [authors emphasis] have the capacity to foster a series of 
very productive relationships and spaces for knowledge-making and knowledge-
sharing’ (2015, 155). My decision to pursue this direction of knowledge collection 
came primarily from the dramatic increase in Royal Observer Corps focussed 
interest groups on the social networking site Facebook®. 
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In the initial phases of this project the amount of information contained on social 
networks was so minimal it was of no value - occasional photographs requesting 
what sites were etc., by 2014 this had exploded to groups who represented the 
Royal Observer Corps Association; ROC post restorers; Cold War enthusiasts and, 
recently a group interested in the restoration of just Orlit posts. All are known as 
‘closed groups’, essentially a member, usually the one who sets up the site, acts as 
a moderator, vetting applications to join. Currently I have been inducted into all four 
sites, providing access to over 2000 members with a vested interest in the ROC. 
Moreover, group members are from both the order (pre-Sept 1991) and chaos (post-
Sept 1991) periods of the life-cycle of Cold War ROC field monuments. The 
information provided has greatly enhanced the research in a number of areas.  
 
Maintaining a Record 
The process where by a record of conversations undertake on social media, 
especially sites such as Facebook®, Twitter® and, to a lesser extent, Myspace® has 
been, and remains, problematic (Green 2014). Currently the Archaeological Data 
Service, based in York, is working to produce a set of guidelines that promote both 
best practice and appropriate levels of storage (ibid 2014, 1). That work has yet to 
achieve maturity. For the purpose of this project all names have been removed from 
all text and transcripts obtained from a third party through both social media and 
other electronic means. These records can be found in the appendices  
 
The Use of Pre-set Questionnaires 
The collection of data has taken a number of forms. With Observers being dispersed 
across the United Kingdom and, on occasion, in the Far East and beyond, it quickly 
became apparent that a form of online collection would be beneficial. A response 
form was developed and constructed on WWW.Wufoo.com – an online data 
collection programme. Links to the page were then lodged on the Royal Observer 
Corps Association website. The survey was open for 12 months (Jan – Dec) in 2012) 
and 31 responses were returned in that time. The survey reopened between January 
and June 2014, this time on social media sites that were aimed specifically at ROC 
members; this elicited a further 30 responses. All returns were anonymously 
recorded, although IP addresses were available, allowing an audit for multiple 
returns from a single correspondent.  
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The Royal Observer Corps form comprises ten questions: 
 
Table 2-1. Royal Observer Corps Online Question Set   
1) What made you want to join the Royal 
Observer Corps? 
6) What were your feelings towards 
members of the peace movements such 
as CND? 
2) To which group did you belong? 7) How long did you serve in the Corps? 
Please indicate your first and last year 
i.e. 1976-1987 
3) Could you describe some of the duties 
you undertook during your time in the 
ROC? 
8) Were you serving at the time of the 
stand down? If you were, what were your 
thoughts on the way it was conducted 
(be as frank as you like)? 
4) What would you say was the greatest 
advance made in the equipment used 
during your time in the Corps? 
9) Are you, or did you ever consider 
joining an ROC association? Please give 
reasons why you did or did not join. 
5) If the 'balloon had gone up' how do 
you think you would have coped knowing 
everyone you held dear could be in grave 
danger? 
10) Finally, do you think the role of the 
ROC should be taught in schools, and if 
so why? 
 
 
Further information has been forthcoming from the ROC Association itself. The 
President was able to obtain an additional 13 returns of the form via a hard copy he 
posted out to members. To date 62 members of the Royal Observer Corps have 
offered information – a vast improvement on the three begrudgingly obtained 
previously.  
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The General Public Survey 
Alongside the survey targeted at the Royal Observer Corps I conducted a survey, 
open to the general public, intended to provide some background evidence to the 
period. The survey has been in two parts; Form One was offered as a hard copy 
completed at a number of events (Poltimore House open heritage open day, Veryan 
ROC post open day (Fig.2-7), Wiltshire Industrial Archaeology symposium and so 
forth).   
 
 
Fig.2-7. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. Members of the public completing the General Public 
Survey using the vent stack of the ROC at Veryan, Cornwall 18 October 2011. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 18/18/2011). 
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Form One was used throughout 2011 and comprised the following questions: 
  
Table 2-2. Hard Copy Public Question Set  
1) When did the Cold War end? 
Respondents were requested to select a 
date between 1987 and 1993 
6) What colour was associated with the 
Soviet Union? 
Respondents were requested to select a 
colour from seven offered 
2) Who in the list were Soviet Leaders? 
Respondents were requested to select 
as many names as they thought from 
seven offered 
7) Name a historical event you believe is 
connected or a result of the Cold War. 
3) Name a location, site of base outside 
the UK that you think has connections 
with the Cold War. 
8) Name a location, site of base inside 
the UK that you think has connections 
with the Cold War. 
4) Name a location, site of base in 
(county survey is conducted in) that you 
think has connections with the Cold War. 
9) Name an organisation, other than the 
Armed Forces, that was in existence 
during the Cold War. 
5) Did you answer the last questions 
from memory or after listening to today’s 
presentation or investigating the display? 
a) yes 
b) no 
10) Should an abandoned Cold War 
bunker be considered – 
a) A historic building 
b) An archaeological site 
c) An eyesore 
 
 
Additionally, to the ten key questions, I requested respondents indicate their gender 
and age. The survey achieved 138 completed returns. The data has been analysed, 
bringing a number of intriguing points to the fore, not least the role age plays in 
shaping memory (Schuman and Rodgers 2004, 218). Schuman and Rogers work 
has been used to calibrate my answer set when utilised in the order and chaos 
model. 
 
Refining the Questions 
Form Two was produced after it became clear some areas were worthy of deeper 
investigation. This was offered exclusively through Wufoo and posted on a number 
of historical and archaeological interest group websites. Between 19-01-2012 and 
26-02-2016 the form received 1193 views, 178 were completed, a return of 14.92%. 
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The results were encouraging and have gone some way to helping contextualise the 
activities witnessed on redundant Cold War sites and the subsequent material 
culture during ROC post evaluations. The survey closed on 28-02-2016. 
  
Form two comprised the following questions: 
Table 2-3. Online Public Question Set 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1) For over 40 years successive British 
Governments spent millions of pounds 
building 'nuclear bunkers' around the 
country. What do you think was the true 
purpose of these structures? 
5) Is too soon to investigate the Cold War? 
Some think we should be protecting sites 
now as they force us to confront the period 
both personally and nationally. What do 
you think? 
2) The development of an independent 
nuclear deterrent was promoted by 
successive Governments as essential to 
maintaining the British way of life. Was this 
a justified claim? 
6) The Cold War is a relatively new subject 
to schools. Do you think we should a) 
teach it in a worldwide context; b) 
concentrate on the British story; c) not at 
all? Please give some context to your 
answer. 
3) The Cold War dominated four decades 
of British life; in that time a vast defence 
orientated manufacturing industry 
developed. Many communities relied 
heavily on the defence industries for work. 
Do you think reliance on such industries, 
both here and abroad, perpetuated the 
Cold War?  
7) Have you any other thoughts on the 
subject? 
4) Did you or your family play any part in 
the Cold War? And if so could you describe 
what the activity was? 
8) To enable me to filter your responses I 
need to know what age bracket you fall into 
please. 
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OBJECTIVE 3: CONSTRUCT, AND TEST, A NEW MODEL INTENDED TO 
STRUCTURE THE INTERPRETATION OF MATERIAL CULTURE, ESPECIALLY 
THAT ENCOUNTERED ON SITES RECOGNISED AS HIGHLY ORDERED. 
 
Introduction 
Material culture humanises the process of deposition. It also has the potential to 
differentiate between order and chaos; in the current study this concept is important. 
‘Order and chaos’ is a descriptive model I have developed relating to the 
abandonment of sites or landscapes originated, inhabited or utilised by highly 
organised and ritualistic entities – in this case aspects of the British military of the 
twentieth century. ‘Order and chaos’ can be applied to sites of any size, making it the 
ideal vehicle to use in the investigation of the material culture of the United Kingdom 
Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) and, more importantly, the Royal 
Observer Corps (ROC). The highly ordered environment required to effectively 
carrying out nuclear warning and fallout monitoring manifests itself through the 
almost clone-like order of the environs of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP). 
This is in stark contrast to the chaos now encountered on UGMPs after 20 years of 
abandonment. 
 
‘Order and Chaos’ as a Model 
The concept and structure of the model is expanded in chapter 4, however, below is 
a brief, high-level introduction. Order and chaos, as a way of interpreting the material 
culture of recently abandoned or decommissioned military sites, appears an 
appropriate model to describe the pre- and post- use phases encountered. This 
model is specific to military, or agencies of the military, such as the Territorial Army; 
however, sub-sets may be appropriate for other, institutionally based, organisations 
such as the National Health Service, Prison Service or Central Government. Taking 
that into consideration the ‘order and chaos’ model is most effective when applied to 
military sites of any size. The model argues that it is possible to recognise differing 
levels of interaction initiated by the primary user on a site if the user is, itself, a highly 
structured organisation (Fig.2-8). Moreover, the model offers the chance to 
recognise pre- and post- organisational activity and offers an explanation for areas 
on a site that present little or no material culture. 
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Fig.2-8. Divisions in authority when applied to an RAF Station. Core/Peripheral Activities 
support a range of facets. For brevity here they are noted in numerical descending order of 
importance. (Source: © Crown copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service; Overlay Bob Clarke) 
 
The illustration above (fig 2-8) demonstrates divisions of order when applied to a 
functioning Royal Air Force station. Taking into consideration the operational aspects 
of the station, it is possible to recognise all facets of the proposed model. The Station 
is divided into ‘core’ (green line) and ‘peripheral’ Zones (blue Line). ‘Highly 
Organised Operational Space’ (red 1) includes all areas where activities required to 
ensure the air transport task of the squadrons are successfully carried out. ‘Highly 
Organised Domestic Space’ (orange 2) includes all administrative tasks required to 
support the primary tasking including the Officer’s and Senior Non-Commissioned 
Officer’s Mess. ‘Domestic Space’ (pale green 3) is less ordered than those 
previously mentioned but still with a high degree of military ethos. ‘Peripheral 
Activities’ (purple 4) are support functions that include Married Quarters and family 
orientated activities. It is here that the greatest level of interaction with the public is 
encountered.  
 
Application 
The Order and Chaos model was applied to each site visited over the period of this 
thesis with useful results. The concept of Core and Periphery – utilised to great effect 
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in Iron Age coinage studies – has been used to demonstrate the distribution of 
material culture, the taphonomy and systemic context (Schiffer 2010, 20) of sites 
connected with the Cold War. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4: IDENTIFY THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THE 
ABANDONMENT OF STRUCTURES CONSTRUCTED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE 
MONITORING OF THE EFFECTS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To complement the results generated by objective 3, a further level of detail was 
applied; this time investigating the processes at work on a site or landscape once it 
has been abandoned. Abandonment processes have long been discussed (Michael 
Schiffer 2010) however; the role of the organisation rather than the social groups 
appears to be ignored in the majority of cases. To ensure the interaction of as many 
actions and agencies as possible are captured a series of specific recordable criteria 
have been developed; these criteria are human; animal; meteorological and 
vegetation.    
 
Application 
Objective 4 was intended to answer one specific question ‘Is abandonment and post-
abandonment a consistent process across all extant ROC sites when considering 
their uniformity in both construction and use prior to September 1991?’ Obviously the 
answer was no, the processes were, and continue to be, complex and multi-faceted. 
Applying the same criteria to each ROC post built a picture of the processes being 
acted out at each location. It soon became clear that activities were far more 
complex than the initial four criteria suggested (fig.2-10). Processes on site could be 
a combination of all four criteria or permeations including one, two or three in any 
order. 
 
Considering the results from the initial baseline visits conducted in 2011, it became 
apparent that while the recording of human interaction with ROC posts did leave 
certain archaeological markers, that same interaction fell into broad streams of 
activity.  Towards the end of the fieldwork cycle in 2014 enough data had been 
recovered to start streamlining the activities. Subsequent analysis identified four 
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main topics; Overtly Curated; Covertly Curated; Transitional, and ruined or removed 
posts. A greater level of detail covering these topics can be found in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2-10. D-7 Christow, Devon. The same ROC post’s entrance stack over a two-year 
period, demonstrating the complexity of activities being enacted on a single site. (Source: 
Bob Clarke 2011; 2012;2013) 
 
 
 
25 May 2011 
13 June 2012 
2 April 2013 
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OBJECTIVE 5: CONSTRUCT A MORE APPROPRIATE CHRONOLOGY OF THE 
COLD WAR, RELYING ON THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD CURRENTLY 
EXTANT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
Introduction 
The historiography of the Cold War deals with a potentially global conflict, and 
subsequently, records it on a global scale. Politics feature largely in the narrative, as 
do events recognised as likely causes of potential war between the Superpowers. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, Invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent effects on two 
Olympic Games (Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984) as well as tensions over the 
continued partition of Germany, Korea and Vietnam, strengthened by ideological 
rhetoric, are all recognised components of the period. Underpinning this was the 
constant drive to counter technological developments by both East and West, 
probably best demonstrated by the race to develop first nuclear, then thermonuclear 
weapons, as well as the means of delivering them which culminated in the Space 
Race and it is easy to see how the intricacies played out on a day-to-day basis are in 
danger of being lost. 
 
Détente 
In the United Kingdom, the period is dominated by Britain’s desire to retain a position 
of global authority through the development of an independent nuclear deterrent and 
delivery method (Young 1993, 114), followed by an increasing reliance on the United 
States ‘Umbrella’ (Cocroft et al 2003, 52). Currently the period is divided into the 
First and Second Cold War, coinciding with times of heightened tension between the 
Superpowers (Cocroft 2001; Cocroft et al 2003, 10). This is not just the view of the 
archaeological community; it permeates many historical works (Young 1993; Judt 
2005). The lull in hostilities is generally accepted to be the period immediately after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culminating in an extended period of détente 
throughout the 1970s. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops on 24 December 
1979 is recognised as the terminus anti quem to this period of relative calm. 
 
The Balanced View 
Viewed from a historiographical standpoint, this can be mapped. This simplified 
chronology adequately describes the period between the traditional First and Second 
Cold War. When the first major piece of work to describe the Cold War 
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archaeological record was published in 2001 (Cocroft) the view was still that ‘- it is 
helpful to split the Cold War into a number of chronological periods.’ The current 
research, coupled with observations on other sites located within Home Defence 
Region 7, has discovered that the archaeology does not readily demonstrate the 
inferred First and Second Cold War. Indeed, when considered against a backdrop of 
continued development in both passive and offensive technologies the period 
recognised as détente does not exist archaeologically in the United Kingdom. 
 
Objective 5 intends to demonstrate that a chronology considering the archaeology of 
the Cold War structures of the United Kingdom, utilising but not exclusively relying 
on, the Royal Observer Corps offers a far more acceptable and rigorous method of 
interpreting activities within the Cold War. 
 
Discussion 
The multi-disciplinary approach of the present thesis levelled a number of challenges 
for me. Taking that into consideration the information, however hard won, has 
indicated that there is a measure of validity in the project. It is also clear that without 
inputs from social media there would be very few observer account available with 
which to contextualise the landscape of the organisation. Such accounts have 
ensured, as will become apparent in later chapters, that the role of the Royal 
Observer Corps in the monitoring of air, and later, nuclear attack have been more 
fully exposed to scrutiny. Subsequently, a contextualised landscape of both order 
and chaos has been identified and recorded. Through analysis, a wide range of 
activities have been recognised, not least that undertaken by the observers while on 
duty. The role of the internet and access to online information beyond social aspects 
should also not be underestimated. At least 50% of the fieldwork undertaken has 
been carried out remotely, certainly the reduction of posts requiring a visit has 
reduced the environmental impact of the project dramatically.  
 
The following chapters investigate the roles undertaken by members of the Royal 
Observer Corps during the Cold War revival of the organisation (1947-1991). The 
next chapter introduces the reader to the Royal Observer Corps, describing the life-
cycle of the organisation through its history, both institutional and social, and 
methods of recruitment intended to enlist volunteers into a heterotopian landscape. 
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CHAPTER 3 - POPULATING A HETEROTOPIAN LANDSCAPE: AN 
INVESTIGATION OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL, ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL LIFE-CYCLE OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Successive British Governments, throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, 
relied on the general public for the greater part of their home defence policies. 
Indeed, the increasing level of voluntary organisations in the defence of the mainland 
can be matched with advances in aviation technology and its growing use in war; this 
was not to last. As the cost of weapon development increased along with destructive 
powers they could unleash on the population, organisations such as Civil Defence 
and Auxiliary Fire Service became increasingly impotent, so by 1968 many had been 
disbanded. However, one voluntary group, the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), was 
destined to play a full part in the continued defence of the British Isles until the end of 
the Cold War. The ROC offers the researcher the opportunity to investigate the 
archaeological, ethnographical and anthropological life-cycle of an organisation 
linked with weapons of mass destruction. The ROC has been categorised, through 
my research, as a highly ordered organisation which adheres, in an almost ritualistic 
fashion, to regulation. This chapter describes the life-cycle of the organisation 
through its history, both institutional and social, and methods of recruitment intended 
to enlist volunteers into a heterotopian landscape. 
 
THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The origins of volunteers acting as aircraft reporters can be traced back to 1916 as a 
reaction to the increasing Zeppelin air-raids targeting the East Coast and London. 
Originally known as the Metropolitan Observation Service (MOS), the organisation 
identified aircraft and airship types from fixed ground-based locations and reported 
directional information to a central control (Cocroft et al 2003, 174). By 1916, the 
MOS had been drawn into a fledgling Home Defence Network (HDN). The HDN 
controlled a significant number of military assets concentrated along the east and 
south coasts; anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, balloon screens and fighter aircraft 
were all deployed in an attempt to deter enemy incursions (ROC Training Manual 
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1985, para 103). The organisation was disbanded at the end of World War I, but not 
before it had proved the concept of reliance on volunteers to support military units in 
the field (Wood 1992, 17). In 1925, with economic unrest spreading across Europe, 
an observation network was reinstated along the eastern approaches to London, at 
that time manned by volunteers who were enrolled as Special Constables (ibid 1992, 
22). Control of the Observer Corps, as it was now known, passed to the Air Ministry 
in 1929 (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 107). It was to remain there until the 
development of the Hydrogen Bomb.  
The rise of militarism in Europe throughout the 1930s, often in support of a fascist 
ideology (overtly obvious in Italy, Spain and Germany) relied heavily on a projection 
of influence through air power. The increasing political tensions coupled with the 
threat of aerial warfare so haunted the Continent that as early as 1932, Stanley 
Baldwin, British Prime Minister, was discussing the situation in Parliament: 
‘ - the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if 
you realise the area of space. I said that any town within reach of an 
aerodrome could be bombed.’ 
‘The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more 
women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save 
yourselves.’ 
Stanley Baldwin INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HC Deb 10 November 1932 vol 
270 cc525-641 para 632. 
In an attempt to counter the threat, the British Government embarked on a series of 
substantial capital works designed to prepare the country for war (Clarke, 2009, 73). 
Known as the ‘Expansion Schemes’, these initiatives rapidly developed the structure 
of air defence, integrating the Observer Corps into a fully functioning reporting 
network. From the mid-1930s, a radar network had been in development and by the 
outbreak of war units were stationed around the coastline; crucially, it was of little 
use inland. Consequently, the Air Ministry deployed the Observer Corps across the 
United Kingdom’s land mass to provide inland cover and complement the coastal 
radar network (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 109). The network was tested to 
the limit during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz (fig.3-1) although it did not find 
favour with the public, often been seen as the ‘easy way out of service’ (Wood 1992, 
136). However, it proved so effective throughout the winter of 1940-41 that the 
Observer Corps was subsequently awarded the suffix ‘Royal’ on 9 April 1941 for its 
efforts (ibid 1992). 
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Fig.3-1 Traditional view of the ROC in World War II. This 
image, part of a comprehensive series of colour 
transparencies produced by the Ministry of Information in 
1943, currently held by the Imperial War Museum, presents 
the now traditional view of the ROC ‘guarding’ the southern 
coast of the United Kingdom. (Image No. TR1443© Crown 
Copyright IWM) 
 
Observation posts were geographically static throughout the conflict, a necessity of 
the function of aircraft tracking whereas personnel were not. Over a thousand 
observers accompanied the invasion forces into Northern France from 1944, some 
even making it to Germany. Towards the end of World War II, the ROC performed 
‘Granite’ and ‘Darkie’ duties, warning aircraft of height related obstacles through a 
coloured flare system at night or in poor visibility, enemy incursions being rare by this 
time.  Less than a week after the surrender of Germany (7 May 1945) the Royal 
Observer Corps was stood-down, all infrastructure was dismantled and the post 
network was abandoned (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 130; Clarke 2005b, 139).  
A letter to Flight Magazine captures the mood: 
It is impossible for us P.B.O.s [Poor Bloody Observers] to convince the public 
that we did have anything useful to do when Jerry ceased to come over in 
person. “What about Radar?”  I believe that there are still uses in a future war 
– and perhaps in peacetime, too – for a similar organisation to the R.O.C., 
and I do not believe that Radar has in the recent war rendered us entirely 
obsolete. 
YET ANOTHER P.B.O, (Anon, 1945, 6 September, 268).   
 
COLD WAR  
However, stand-down was short lived. The Soviet Union’s clear intention to continue 
occupying many Central European countries forced a re-think of Britain’s air defence 
network, the reformation of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) was a direct 
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consequence of this (Clarke 2005b, 140). In the immediate post-War period the 
Government had placed much of the radar network in ‘care and maintenance’, a 
phrase now recognised as a euphemism for abandonment. With many of the radar 
sites derelict or their equipment obsolete – the Air Ministry looked once again to the 
ROC to plug the gap and the recruitment of former observers started in earnest in 
September 1946 (Anon 1946a, 5 September, 254). The operational landscape of the 
ROC essentially followed those developed throughout the Second World War. 
Observers were to spot enemy aircraft, identify the type, height, range and direction 
and pass on the information, in real-time, to a reporting centre. 
The centre liaised with RAF Fighter Command whose aircraft would intercept the 
enemy. At this time the threat from nuclear weapons was considered slight and, if it 
was an atomic attack, damage was expected to be on a limited scale similar to that 
experienced at Hiroshima in 1945. This was fortuitous as an article in Flight 
Magazine in 1950 suggested the both the Corps and the RAF were ‘groping in dark 
over the future of air defence’ (Anon 1950, 20 April, 482).  
 
 
 
Fig.3-2 ‘Searching the sky for planes – Javelins fly 
over the observation post, are logged and 
transmitted’. This image, taken on 12-06-58, actually 
chronicles the demise of the aircraft spotting role as it 
is one of a series reporting the opening of the first 
underground monitoring post at Farnham, Surrey. 
(Source: Central Press Photos Ltd.)  
The infrastructure of the wartime ROC had also fallen quickly into dereliction. Of the 
1,420 observation posts reactivated across the British landscape by 1949, nearly all 
were unusable (Cocroft et al 2003, 174). So in 1952, orders were placed by the Air 
Ministry with Messrs Orlit Ltd of Colnbrook, Buckinghamshire for a standard structure 
to replace the dilapidated posts. Two designs, known as the ‘Orlit A’ (see fig.3-2 for 
example) and ‘Orlit B’ were approved and supplied. Importantly the Orlit Post is one 
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of the first recognisable structures in the archaeological record linked exclusively to 
the Cold War.  
The aircraft reporting network was also short lived. Technological advances including 
jet aircraft operating at extreme height and, later, rocket deliverable hydrogen 
bombs, quickly rendered the role of aircraft observer obsolete (Clarke 2005a, 2). In 
1955, the poor level of preparedness of the British Government against the effects of 
nuclear weapons were finally explored by a government commission. The findings of 
the study, conducted by William Strath, into the effects of a hydrogen bomb attack 
exposed the entire country’s vulnerability (Hennessy 2003, 131, Hughes 2003, 258). 
What is now known as the Strath Report is a pivotal document in the study of the 
British Cold War. Strath concluded that ten, megaton range, hydrogen weapons:  
– delivered on the western half of the UK or in the waters close in off the 
western seaboard, with the normal prevailing winds, would effectively disrupt 
the life of the country and make normal activity completely impossible (JIC 
1955).  
Of the many initiatives to come out of the report, the importance of the process 
whereby radioactive fallout should be monitored and tracked was by far the most 
revelatory. Prior to Strath, the residual effects of a nuclear blast had been based on 
the attacks on Japan; locally devastating, but with little physical effects beyond the 
target area. The true nature of H-Bomb warfare had become apparent through a 
series of tests in the early 1950s. Strath recommended a new monitoring force 
structured on similar lines to the current ROC aircraft reporting network (Hughes 
2003, 267). Indeed, a ‘central fall-out plotting organisation will be required to collate 
the reports of the monitoring organisation and interpret them in light of current 
meteorological information’ (ibid 2003, 268). As the ROC’s existing reporting role 
was now effectively redundant, the organisation moved from the Air Ministry to the 
new organisation alluded to by Strath – the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring 
Organisation (Clarke 2005, 142). The move to the new monitoring role was swift, 
during 1955 ‘Exercise Beware’, an annual air defence exercise, a report noted - ‘The 
Royal Observer Corps would do valuable service by taking over the duty of 
measuring the strength of radioactive fallout’ (Anon 1955, 30 September, 569). 
Meanwhile in Parliament: 
Radio-Activity (Warning Organisation)  
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Mr. Ian Harvey asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
whether he is yet able to make a statement upon the Government's plans for 
setting up a national monitoring organisation to give warning and to measure 
radio-activity in the event of air attack on the United Kingdom. 
Major Lloyd-George Yes. I am glad to be able to inform the House that 
arrangements are being made for the Royal Observer Corps, in conjunction 
with the Air Raid Warning Organisation, to undertake this important new 
function in addition to their existing duties. 
HC Deb 15 June 1955 vol. 542 c18W 18W 
By 1956 the move of the Royal Observer Corps from aircraft reporting to fall-out 
monitoring was clearly in development. 
III. The Warning System 
11 The development of a fall-out warning system, supplementary to the 
system for giving warning of the attack itself, is proceeding. The Royal 
Observer Corps would monitor fall-out so as to provide the Air Raid Warning 
Organisation with the data on which to base public warnings of fall-out.  
Manual of Civil Defence Vol. 1, Pamphlet No.2, 1956, page 7. 
The ‘H’ Bomb  
The United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) encompassed 
a number of functions which, from 1956, became increasingly orientated towards the 
scientific monitoring of nuclear detonations and their after-effects (Anon 1956b, 27 
July, 175). The most important aspects were fallout monitoring, warning and 
tracking. For this to be effective a comprehensive and evenly distributed network of 
monitoring stations was required – the ROC was the ideal solution (ROC Training 
Manual 1985, para 143). In an ambitious construction programme 1,563 
Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) were built over the period 1957-64, with a 
number re-sited due to water-logging over the next few years (Cocroft et al 2003, 
180). Operated by three or four voluntary observers, the UGMP reported directly to 
one of 31 new control bunkers constructed through Home Office finance. The Group 
Headquarters, housing both UKWMO and ROC staff, were a mixture of semi- and 
fully protected structures intended to ‘enable observers to live in it comfortably and 
healthily for a considerable time’ (Anon 1961, 23 November, 798). All Headquarters 
were completed by 1962; No. 10 Group, designated Exeter and located at Poltimore 
Park, is extant (fig.3-3). The Underground Monitoring Posts (fig.3-4. is an example) 
and above and below ground Group  headquarters s are the final recognisable 
structures to enter the archaeological record of the Cold War ROC. 
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Fig.3-3 No. 10 Group Protected Headquarters, Poltimore Park, Exeter.  The site is now 
utilised by a recreational company. (Source: Bob Clarke 25/072012) 
 
 
Fig.3-4 C-17 Veryan Post, Cornwall. A component of No.10 Group Exeter from 1973. This 
post is now run by a group of observer volunteers on behalf of the owner the National Trust. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2011) 
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The re-focussing of the Royal Observer Corps task, along with the major capital 
investment required to build the new monitoring network, was overshadowed by 
repeated demands for a reduction in arms expenditure in the wake of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Clarke 2005b, 150; Grant 2010, 175). The Labour Government, under 
Harold Wilson, set about initiating swinging cuts across a wide range of public 
services. This, coupled with reductions in Britain’s defensive capability agreed 
throughout 1966-67, also focussed on the role of Civil Defence and with it, the Royal 
Observer Corps.    
In January 1968 the Wilson announced:  
Now I turn to Home Department Services, including Home Defence. We have 
decided to reduce Home Defence—Civil Defence —to a care and 
maintenance basis, with a saving of about £14 million in 1968–69, and £20 
million in 1969–70 and in subsequent years. This will involve the disbandment 
of the Civil Defence Corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service and the Territorial and 
Army Volunteer Reserve Category III. The Government propose to restrain 
the growth of expenditure on other Home Department Services by £6 million 
in 1968–69 and £12 million in 1969–70. 
HC Deb 16 January 1968 vol. 756 cc1577-620 
 
For a while it appeared the Royal Observer Corps had been spared any reduction – 
however: 
Mr. Merlyn Rees In consequence of the Government's decision to reduce 
expenditure on home defence the number of observation posts will be 
reduced from 1,559 [sic] to 873, the number of group headquarters from 29 to 
27 and the complement from 25,000 to 12,500. I regret that upwards of 5,000 
volunteers—to whose services I pay sincere tribute—will become surplus.  
HC Deb 20 March 1968 vol. 761 c399 
 
The implications were clear, the public had now become the lowest priority tier of 
Home Defence; there would be no ‘real time’ rescue or provision from Central 
Government. Local Authorities would now be expected to make provision for nuclear 
warfare against a set of Government guidelines, intended to maintain the machinery 
of government but almost totally at the exclusion of the civilian population. The ROC 
too would become more militarily focused. Indeed, ‘The Organisation also has an 
ability to provide more detailed information, particularly on fall-out, to services which 
can make use of it’ (HC Deb 18 January 1968 vol. 756 cc2093-104). 
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UKWMO Operations  
The Royal Observer Corps, as the field-force of the UKWMO, was regulated by a 
nationally imposed series of strict operating procedures. The UKWMO, in turn, 
provided an over-arching national command structure reporting directly to the Home 
Office. The organisation had four main objectives: originate air attack warnings; 
confirm nuclear strikes; provide an emergency meteorological service for fallout 
prediction, and provide Government agencies with a scientific appreciation of nuclear 
bursts (ROC 1989, 11). To facilitate this, the United Kingdom was divided into six 
UKWMO sectors (fig.3-5). Each sector was further divided into a number of groups, 
each comprising a protected operations room and a number of Underground 
Monitoring Posts (UGMP) (ibid 1989, 7). The number of UGMPs in each group 
varied enormously (anywhere between 27 and 58) dependant on the geographical 
area of the group. Beyond the Field-Force (as the ROC component became known) 
a number of Nuclear Reporting Cells were established at major military command  
headquarters, primarily to interpret fall-out information passed from each Group 
headquarters  (ROC Nuclear Reporting Cells 1989 part A - Function). 
 
Southern Sector  
The Southern Sector latterly (post-1975) comprised five groups (Shropshire, 
Swansea, Bristol, Yeovil and Exeter), with the Sector  headquarters  located at 
Lansdown, near Bath. Lansdown comprised the peacetime offices of the UKWMO in 
a purpose built structure and a converted Anti-Aircraft Operations Room (AAOR) as 
a protected facility (McCamley 2002, 118). An early casualty of the Strath report, the 
AAOR network was disbanded at the same time plans were being laid for the UGMP 
building programme. In 1962, the redundant structure was converted for use as 
No.12 Group, Bristol Head Quarters and the Southern UKWMO Sector  
headquarters.  
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Fig.3-5 Royal Observer Corps national layout depicting sectors and groups in 1964. (Source 
Home Office Scientific Intelligence Officers’ Operational Data Book 1964) 
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No.10 Group, Exeter  
No. 10 Group (Exeter) initially utilised the World War II Sector Operations Room 
located at Poltimore Park as a headquarters from 1947 (Wood 1992, 271). In 1960-
61 the construction of a purpose-built, above-ground, protected structure brought the 
group in line with the UKWMO Sector organisational framework. At that time the 
Group was bordered to the south-west by No.11 Group (Truro) and the north-east by 
No.9 Group (Yeovil).  The 1968 reduction in voluntary services reduced Truro’s 
capability to that of a communications centre parented by No.10 Exeter. By 1973 
Truro had been disbanded and its UGMPs transferred to No.10 Group (fig.3-6 and 3-
7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figs.3-6 and 3-7 Recent work on a 
protected structure in West Wiltshire 
discovered this ROC distribution chart from 
1983. The extract on the right depicts the 
Southern Sector, marked EXE. (Source: 
Bob Clarke 01/06/2012) 
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The closure of Truro made No.10 Group geographically difficult to operate and 
subsequently the southern border of Yeovil was moved further south, absorbing ten 
Exeter posts in the process. The ROC then entered a period of relative stability; the 
geographical landscape remained stable for the rest of the service's life-cycle. There 
was, however, one event deemed so momentous it entered the ROCs training 
manual: 
173. Other developments were foreseen by the purchase of Headquarters 
United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation of their first micro-
computer for trials at Oxford to see whether programmes could be devised 
which would help in the operational tasks of the ROC and warning teams.  
Royal Observer Corps, Training Manual,1985, para 173. 
Advances in technology, especially after 1980, had a visible impact on the way in 
which both the ROC monitoring posts and Group  headquarters  operated. 
Throughout 1981 the carrier warning network, a system linking all police, fire and 
council  headquarters to a national warning centre at RAF Northwood in London, 
received a substantial upgrade, including the introduction of ‘Handel’, an air-raid 
warning circuit utilising the speaking clock system (Clarke 2005b, 143). As part of 
new ‘Home Defence’ legislation brought in by the Thatcher Government (returned in 
1979) the UGMPs were refurbished. Twenty-one days’ rations (from the original 
seven) were issued to all posts, improved lighting was provided via strip lighting, 
insulation for floors, wall and ceilings was installed and No.2 Group  headquarters, 
Horsham was selected to trial a new form of ventilation system. By March 1989, all 
Group  headquarters  had been placed on the advanced automated switchboards of 
System X 2000, a national secure network, capable of withstanding the effects of the 
electromagnetic pulse issued by an exploding nuclear device. In November that 
same year the Berlin Wall was breached. Just over 18 months later Mr Kenneth 
Baker announced in the House of Commons: 
I have decided that the arrangements for monitoring details of nuclear bursts 
and radioactive fall-out in wartime must be restructured. 
I have therefore concluded with regret that the Home Office can no longer 
justify the continued use of the ROC and Home Department volunteers for the 
monitoring task. It has therefore been decided, following consultations 
between the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence, who share 
responsibilities for the ROC, that the Corps will be stood down in its 
operational role.  
HC Deb 10 July 1991 vol. 194 cc391-4W 
 83 | P a g e  
On 25 July 1991, 2,000 members of the ROC undertook a Royal Review and Garden 
Party (fig.3-7a). On the penultimate day of the Corps' existence, over 300 members 
attended a service at the Royal Air Forces Central Church on the Strand in London. 
On 31 September the Royal Observer Corps was stood-down (Wood 1992, iv), and 
although a small number of observers continued to man Nuclear Reporting Cells, 
these too had gone by 1995 (Clarke 2005b, 152). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3-7a. The Royal Observer Corps 
Journal for September/October 1991. 
The cover depicts Her majesty the 
Queen reviewing the Corps on 25 July 
1991. (Ministry of Defence) 
 
 
End-Game 
In the wake of the 1991 stand-down, a number of organisations have struggled to 
keep the story of the Royal Observer Corps alive. An official museum was intended 
to be run from the Winchester Group  headquarters  building (by 1998 designated a 
Grade II listed structure) (fig.3-8), unfortunately the structure was demolished and 
the site redeveloped less than a decade later (fig.3-9).  
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Fig.3-8 No.14 Winchester Group Headquarters  depicted on the Ordnance Survey map of 
1970. The red border depicts the ROC compound. Note – only the World War II centre is 
noted, the large grey block to the north is the actual Cold War structure. (Crown Copyright 
and database rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence) 
 
Fig.3-9 Redevelopment of No.14 Winchester Group Headquarters  site. (Crown Copyright 
and database rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence) 
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There has been more success at York where No. 20 Group  headquarters was gifted 
to the Royal Commission for the Historical Monuments of England (later English 
Heritage). The structure was scheduled in 2000; English Heritage later noted the site 
was ‘considered one of the best surviving examples of either surface built or semi-
sunken Royal Observer Group headquarters in the country’ (fig.3-10) (Emerick 
2003).  
  
 
 
 
Fig.3-10 No.20 Group  headquarters, York. The steps 
up into structure are mirrored behind the door back 
down to the ground surface. On the right is an 
extendable aerial, intended to be used after a nuclear 
detonation. This site is now a Scheduled Ancient 
Monument. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/05/2004) 
 
Moreover, a number of monitoring posts have now been recognised as nationally 
important throughout the United Kingdom, attracting statutory preservation through 
listing or scheduling. This is complemented by a small number maintained by ex-
observers and enthusiasts for the purpose of education (discussed in detail in 
chapter 7). Former observers also have access to a ROC Association Network, 
which at the current time is something of an ad-hoc affair. Now, two decades since 
the events of 1991, brought this ‘delicate balance of terror’, as Winston Churchill 
noted, to an end, the Royal Observer Corps and its monuments have been 
consigned to a period of suspicion, often ridiculed or sensationalised in the press. 
Throughout the Corps history little investigative work was conducted into the material 
culture of the organisation or the motivations of those who volunteered as spare-time 
observers, some of whom served for three decades or more.  The following section 
investigates that sense of ‘belonging’ utilising a number of theoretical concepts and 
the interim results from the current observer-centric survey conducted for this thesis.  
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Fig.3-11. Veryan Post on a public open day. The three-monthly event is supported by the 
National Trust and manned by ex-ROC members. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2011)  
BELONGING 
The period spanning the post–World War II reformation and operation of the ROC 
encompasses four decades of major social and political change, both in the United 
Kingdom and internationally. In that time, personal attitudes towards the state 
changed dramatically: the optimism of the 1950s was replaced by the pessimism and 
defiance to authority of the 1960s, industrial decay of the 1970s and doom-boom of 
the 1980s. Underpinning all this were the Superpower politics of East and West 
politics that solidified Central Europe in attitude and political geography for nearly 
forty-years. As Tony Judt noted, it took a political earthq uake to shatter the frozen 
topography of post-World War II Europe (2005, 1). That ‘earthquake’ demolished the 
Berlin Wall, and in so doing provided the British Government with an opportunity to 
dramatically reduce defence spending. The majority of Government funded voluntary 
services were disbanded over the next two years – amongst them the ROC and 
UKWMO. The entire Home Defence network was disposed of, often recovering just a 
fraction of the costs incurred during construction, all to a backdrop of a rapidly 
slowing economy initiated, in part, by political unrest spreading across Europe (Higgs 
1994, 308).  
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The stand-down of the whole UKWMO network and closure of all ROC posts and 
group  headquarters provide us with an opportunity. We are in the unique position of 
being able to recognise a complete series of structures encompassing the entire life-
cycle of a heterotopian organisation. Moreover, the majority of the material culture is 
extant and we still have the opportunity to record the oral history of those for whom 
the ROC landscape formed a taskscape (Ingold 1993). Furthermore, the role of the 
voluntary services during the Cold War is an under investigated area. Indeed, the 
whole process of belonging to voluntary groups connected in some way to nuclear 
warfare presents the researcher with an opportunity to explore personal motivation, 
history and beliefs, occasionally in periods of international tension. Recognition of 
the motivation displayed by the act of membership or belonging to a specific group, 
in this case the ROC, also helps structure both the material culture and provide a 
map to the taskscape of the organisation. 
A Heterotopic Taskscape 
The physical infrastructure representing the Royal Observer Corps is, in many 
locations across Britain, extant. Here is not the place to discuss the archaeology in 
depth (see chapter 5 for a detailed discussion). However, a number of key concepts 
do apply if we are to contextualise the archaeological landscape with a social history. 
A study of the ROC is timely, not least due to the recent temporal timeframe through 
which the organisation enacted its life-cycle. The continued presence of a number of 
posts, both above and below ground, all attributed to the Cold War period, hints at a 
once complex, super-modernist landscape (Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008). This is not, 
however, a landscape tied solely to a chronological framework, neither is it driven 
directly by the ideological standpoint of the Superpowers. Furthermore, is not solely 
a physical account of technological developments in the detection of nuclear attack. 
Rather, it is a contested landscape displaying tension, disenfranchisement and, for 
the researcher, a wealth of other social and matériel related opportunities at both 
international and national level.  
Furthermore, the landscape of the ROC presents us with a dichotomy. The way in 
which military sites are depicted by the Ordnance Survey varies enormously – when 
considering the Royal Observer Corps two distinct levels are evident. The group 
headquarters are always noted with their true intent and function (see fig.3-8 above), 
whilst the underground monitoring posts, if they appear at all, are identified as 
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something mundane, certainly not revealing the intended  purpose of the post.  This 
level of apparent subterfuge introduces a level of tension into the landscape – not 
least driven by the public’s level of disenfranchisement when connected to nuclear 
warfare. However, tension is not a permanent feature; more activated in times of 
raised public awareness and protest such as the peace camps coverage in the early 
1980s. For the most part ROC underground monitoring posts are functionally and 
spatially ambiguous to those who pass by. This is a classic example of a 
heterotopian landscape as defined by French philosopher Michel Foucault. In 1967 
Foucault offered a number of principles in his discussion surrounding ‘other spaces’ 
or heterotopias – the British landscape of mass destruction adheres rigidly to all 
(Foucault 1967). 
Matching the Heterotopian Model 
Considering Foucault’s principles we can develop a landscape that demonstrates all 
aspects of heterotopian taskscape. At its crudest level, a heterotopia suggests a 
location that is known, but not experienced; a place born out of crisis and deviance, 
a place at odds with its location. Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring 
posts can be recognised here. When in operation, the sites rarely appear on maps or 
landscape plans, yet they were, and in some cases still are, a visible, albeit slight, 
component of the landscape. Occasionally, the Government sought to hide 
underground monitoring posts in plain sight, noting a number on the Ordnance 
Survey as ‘covered reservoirs’ (fig.3-12). Encounters with such structures would be 
slight, and as such, open to extremes of interpretation. The only reason for the ROC 
post's construction was a need to monitor fallout from nuclear weapons; the whole 
concept of nuclear warfare being seen as deviant to the majority of the population. 
Located in rural settings, the ROC posts present a dichotomy as their stark concrete 
construction and surrounding fencing clearly indicated a functional, possibly official, 
presence in usually rural landscapes or Areas of Outstanding National Beauty.  
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Fig.3-12. Change Underground Monitoring Post 
Stockleigh Pomeroy, surveyed as post D-41 for this 
projects. Noted here as a ‘reservoir (covered). A site 
hiding in plain sight. (Crown Copyright and database 
rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence) 
 
Today, that landscape is one of variety, much of which is in a state of decay – indeed 
the continued existence of the Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) appears 
deeply paradoxical. Structures comprising robust materials such as concrete, 
reinforced steel and tungsten, once capable of surviving the extreme environments 
caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon, now display incredible levels of 
fragility. Places of secrecy and order have transformed into places of neglect, losing 
much of their stark uniform lines to vegetation encroachment, destructive visitors, 
agriculture, the weather, individually or through combinations of all. That a 
substantial number of UGMPs are extant, 20 years after stand-down, appears to be 
a product of rural positioning coupled with sheer weight of numbers. If we consider 
the Royal Observer Corps footprint in Devon it is clear the continued reduction of 
post numbers has reached a critical level. Indeed, the current reduced level of 
removals should not seduce us into considering this a hiatus. Ingold reminds us 
‘What appear to us as the fixed forms of landscape, passive and unchanged unless 
acted upon from outside, are themselves in motion’ (1993, 164). This ‘motion’ 
provides one of the current research opportunities - the study of the processes of 
abandonment described later in this project. Moreover, the opportunity to understand 
this recent archaeology from the stand-point of those who worked in the organisation 
is still possible. Interestingly from the standpoint of the general public, Government-
sponsored organisations were clearly beyond the control of the majority. The security 
fence, considered to be no more than a landscape feature by Ingold (1993, 156), 
actually marks out a clear division between ordinary and extraordinary in this case. 
The absurdity of Government signage declaring places within the meaning Official 
Secrets Acts 1911-1989 reinforces that demarcation, creating a heterotopian world 
beyond (fig.3-13).  Those who populated this heterotopian world is the focus of the 
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next section. It concentrates on the Royal Observers themselves who served 
throughout the Cold War.  
 
Fig.3-13 ‘Official Secrets Acts’ signs at 
GCHQ  Oakley, Cheltenham. The blatant 
absurdity of such notices served, and 
continue, to create tension in the 
landscape. (Source: Bob Clarke 
27/09/2004) 
 
WORDS 
The construction of an oral history to contextualise the archaeology and material 
culture of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) was identified early in this project as an 
integral part of the research framework; it also proved to be frustrating in the first 
instance. My experience was not unique. In 2010 Benjamin Oldcorn noted in his 
doctoral thesis discussing an unrelated site: 
The focus of my original research proposal was on the built and lived heritage 
of the Cold War, specifically the work and sites of the Royal Observer Corps. I 
began my exploratory research by contacting former Observers – but the 
results were not at all promising. There was a definite sentiment amongst the 
research subjects that the work of the Observer Corps didn’t matter and that 
they were reticent to reply in any depth to my questions (Oldcorn 2010, 51).  
 
Reflecting on the results of the ROC survey returns, it appears the subject group 
was, and to a certain extent still are displaying a high level of disenfranchisement. 
That is ‘a unique combination of culture with current and past political realities’ 
(Scham 2001, 190), in this case events surrounding the stand-down and 
disbandment of the organisations to which much time was invested. 
EXCLUSION  
The Cold War exposed and constructed many dichotomies, especially in the 
relationship between official agencies and the public. This is further complicated by 
the ideologically dominated stance of East and West, and is re-enforced at a national 
level with the personal ideology of the individual. At a government level it served the 
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authorities to exclude the general public from, or allow them, as Hennessey 
succinctly noted, ‘any sense of ownership on outcome’ (2003, 3). We can say this 
lack of ability to influence national policy, especially when created on their ‘behalf’ 
leads to a deep level of disenfranchisement; a situation manifest in a number of 
highly visible social aspects surrounding the Cold War. Any group experiencing 
perceived or actual disenfranchisement will, through necessity, court the media or 
react in a way likely to highlight the apparent wrong-doing (Scham 2001, 188).  
During the Cold War a number of ‘peace’ orientated groups enacted just such 
policies. Most readily recognisable are the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) marches and rallies, Women’s Peace Camps at a number of defence 
orientated sites, the declaration of ‘Nuclear Free Cities’ by local authorities and the 
‘Doom-Boom’ of the 1980s as portrayed through a number of films, books and 
television programmes (Finch 1986; Hilliard 1986; Phythian 2001; Chapman 2006). 
All are reactions to differing levels of exclusion. It is also clear that there are a 
number of ways disenfranchised groups displayed their perceived level of exclusion, 
not all take the direct civil disobedience route noted above. Within the latter half of 
the twentieth century, the general public takes either a laissez-faire attitude towards 
the organisation constructing the barrier to belonging, or the fatalist view, outwardly 
ridiculing the absurdity of nuclear warfare. What corrals these activities as acts of 
exclusion, in my view, is the apparent lack of influence the public exerted over the 
development, storage and use of nuclear weapons.  
The intricacies of the nuclear deterrent were necessarily esoteric. For such a 
deterrent to be effective the United Kingdom needed to maintain a high level of 
secrecy with all activities connected to the policy. One major aspect of this is the way 
in which the Government creates a heterotopian landscape containing nuclear 
defensive and offensive capabilities. To access this heterotopia one has to have 
signed the Official Secrets Act; this initiation allowing access to a parallel world, or 
Foucault’s ‘other space’ (1967). It ensures deviation from the populous, forcing 
suspicion and disenfranchisement in equal numbers (Scham 2001, 187). In the initial 
stages of the Cold War, was overwhelmingly accepted by a population who had lived 
through the secrecy of World War II; however, Britain’s development of the hydrogen 
bomb quickly changes the social landscape. By the 1960s, and as a direct 
consequence of the terrible forces of the ‘H-Bomb’, civil disobedience had become a 
major feature of the British political landscape (Phythian 2001; Judt 2005, 255). 
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Scham warns against ‘categorising the archaeology of the disenfranchised merely as 
a component of resistance culture’ (2001, 186). However, ‘resistance culture’ is not 
evidence of formal subjugation, more a reaction to agency decisions (Clark, 2000); 
membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was a reaction to 
hydrogen weapons – so was continuing membership of the Royal Observer Corps 
after the Strath report in 1955. 
The motivation to join CND is self-evident, a clear statement of self-preservation 
orchestrated through the mobilisation of mass protest. What drives someone to enlist 
or volunteer in a highly organised or regimented service is complex, to carry out such 
duties voluntarily is infinitely more so (Wardell and Lishman et al 2000, Yanay and 
Yanay 2008). Nevertheless, the motivation should be explored as it has implications 
for the continued survival of ROC monuments both in the current study and moving 
forwards. The Home Office, responsible for recruitment, exercised a range of 
strategies intended to attract a specific type of individual to the ranks throughout the 
life-cycle of the organisation. What those strategies looked like, the people they 
attracted and the material culture utilised is now now discussed.  
‘Spare-Time Observer’ 
So what did attract members of the public to the Royal Observer Corps? To answer 
this, we need to explore the events surrounding the post-World War II stand-down, 
the new requirement for an observation element to complement Fighter Command 
and how that new requirement was staffed. 
On 8 May 1945, Air Ministry Order A.M.O. N.517/1945 informed all Groups of the 
ROC of the impending stand-down of the organisation, just five days after the 
surrender of German Forces in Europe, on 12 May 1945, the order was actioned. At 
this time there were c.600 officers and c.35,000 men and women observers in 
uniform. A few months earlier, with the end of the war in sight, the Air Ministry had 
canvassed serving members as to who would be prepared to continue with service 
into peace-time; 78% indicated they would (Wood 1992, 182). These loose figures 
alone suggest that membership of the ROC was viewed by many as more than just a 
wartime necessity. On 15 November 1946, those who had expressed interest 
received letters inviting them back into training; the following day the BBC broadcast 
the invitation (McCamley 2002, 123;  Clarke 2005b, 139). Some 9,000 returned to 
the service in the first three months of the regeneration drive, although, by mid-
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February 1947, this had tailed off dramatically and subsequently the recruitment 
drive targeted new membership (Wood 1992, 191). The demographic of the early 
Cold War period volunteers is worth relaying here; ‘Ex-servicemen with no reserve 
commitment, 16- and 17-year-old not immediately due for National Service, and a 
fair sprinkling of women, including ex-Wrens, ATS and WAAFs’ (ibid 1992, 191). 
Clearly, in this immediate post-war period a leaning towards ex-service personnel, 
especially from the women’s sectors, is to be expected. That considered, it does 
suggest a certain ‘type’ of volunteer was being sought. The methods of recruitment, 
in the main delivered through leaflets association with the Royal Air Force, are one of 
the primary items of material culture for the Royal Observer Corps, and much can 
inferred from their study. 
Recruitment 
“A Worthwhile Spare-Time Service”  
A key part of any spare-time service is the continued ability to demonstrate a 
worthwhile, relevant use of volunteers’ efforts. The post-World War II life-cycle of the 
Royal Observer Corps can be mapped through the varied methods of recruitment 
employed to attract new members. It also chronicles the changing face of warfare, 
downturn in Civil Defence and increasingly ‘clandestine’ approach to certain nuclear 
related tasks. The best place to start is often the recruitment literature. In the case of 
the ROC, this falls into three distinct areas – aircraft reporting, nuclear reporting and 
the post-1979 Home Defence Review.   
The opportunity to review material from the formative, Air Ministry orientated, days of 
the post-World War II ROC (1950s-1960s) have so far proved elusive, it might well 
be that no such material was produced. Certainly neither Cocroft (et al 2003) nor 
Wood (1992) make mention of its existence. That said the initial years of the post-
war build-up were chronicled through a number of articles in aviation orientated 
publications. One of the world’s first aviation orientated magazines – Flight 
International – published a number of news items, articles and recruitment updates 
between 1946 and 1961. They record the drive towards full volunteer manning and 
the eventual move underground initiated by the Strath Report (Cocroft et al 
2003,180, Hughes 2003, 267). What follows is a précis of the early years of the Cold 
War ROC, a period when aircraft reporting was the primary requirement of the 
tasking for volunteers.  
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Aircraft Reporting 
In the last edition of 1946 Flight International announced that those who had 
expressed a wish to re-join the corps but had received a break in service during the 
war ‘may now volunteer for the peace-time ROC’ (Anon 1946b, 26 December, 29). 
Now, the catchment cohort would comprise those who were not serving at the point 
of stand-down; by early 1947 this had been extended to ‘men and women without 
previous service’ (Anon 1947a, 6 March, 202). Since November the previous year 
over 10,000 had returned to the organisation (Anon 1947a, 6 March, 202); widening 
the opportunity to join suggests recruitment was slowing by this time; an assumption 
borne out by figures published that September. In just ten months 11,162 men and 
1,676 women had joined the service (Anon 1947b, 18 September, 242), although 
with over 10,000 already in uniform the reality was more like 2,500. By March the 
following year, the Air Ministry was pushing the benefits of service. Now ‘Air 
experience flights were to be given to members of the Royal Observer Corps who 
make organised visits to R.A.F. stations’ (Anon 1948, 25 March, 342). And even 
more telling – ‘volunteers sign on for three years and receive small annual grants 
with some additions for travelling expenses and for passing proficiency tests’ and 
‘There is a friendly club atmosphere in the Corps, and members are doing a valuable 
service’ (ibid 1948, 342).      
In less than three years it appears the ROC recruitment machine had almost ground 
to a halt. What is interesting here is the way in which this early change of direction 
responds to both the needs of the organisation and conforms to the proposed 
‘Intrinsic-Social-Service’ model proposed by Wardell, Lishman et al (2000, 237) 
(discussed below). By the middle 1948, the number of uniformed personnel, still in 
war service, that were being demobilised was rapidly slowing, by the end of the year 
events in Central Europe had stopped the flow completely. From April 1948 transport 
disruptions into the Soviet held Eastern Zone of Germany, including access to Berlin, 
had become increasingly frequent headache for the western allies. By June 2.5 
million people had been isolated in the city, their only hope of surviving a Central 
European winter was to be supplied from the air (Clay 1950; Tusa and Tusa 1988). 
Operation Plainfare (the Berlin Airlift) reduced de-mobilisation at a time when more 
voluntary recruits were being sought for organisations such as the Civil Defence 
Corps; Auxiliary Fire Service; National Hospital Volunteer Reserve; Women’s 
Voluntary Service; and the Royal Observer Corps (Clarke 2007, Grant 2010, 35). 
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Indeed, from 1948 the Civil Defence Act had placed an additional burden on Local 
Authorities to raise a primarily voluntary Civil Defence Corps from a public 
increasingly turning their back on uniformed service or already members of other 
voluntary organisations. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War (from 1950), 
and the occasion of the ROC’s Silver Jubilee, that any further mention is made in the 
press of recruitment numbers. ‘In three years recruitment has not been speedy, but it 
has been steady’ stated the author of a two page article in Flight International; 
indeed ‘they have achieved well over half their target of 28,000’ (Anon 1950, 20 
April, 483). Some eight years later a footnote declared ‘R.O.C. GOES 
UNDERGROUND’ ‘The R.O.C. in now some 15,000 strong, but with its new 
responsibilities still more numbers are needed’ (Anon 1958, 27 June, 904) – these 
rather telling figures all point to an organisation where the membership remained 
static for nearly a decade. With the move underground a new recruiting posture 
would be needed.  
Four Observers surveyed for this project served during the early Air Ministry phase 
of aircraft reporting. At this early stage it is not possible to recognise any trends – 
suffice to say two, ROC#2 and ROC#5, had interests in aviation whilst ROC#6 
followed a family member’s example. ROC#10 noted ‘I wanted to do my bit for the 
defence of our country’. Those with an aviation-motivated reason demonstrate 
‘Service’ behaviour, that is a desire to further one’s own experience through training 
and/or opportunity (Wardell, Lishman et al 2000, 237).  The whole of the ROC’s 
operation in the 1950s revolved around aircraft reporting, rank structure, and annual 
competitions – even the uniform was modelled and promoted as being linked to a 
Royal Air Force uniform. Indeed, irrespective of the decade they enlisted, 21% of all 
those surveyed cited an interest in aviation as their primary reason for joining the 
Royal Observer Corps. This is interesting as by 1960 the aircraft reporting role had 
all but gone from the ROC role. Taking that into consideration, the recognition aspect 
of the ROC and subsequently its aviation connection prevailed until stand-down in 
1991. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Home Office recognised that aviation 
was often a deciding factor in the recruitment of new observers. Retention of aviation 
subjects at a ‘social’ level ensured continuing recruitment – as the post -1950s 
observers who completed surveys testify. 
Of course it would be unwise to suggest people volunteered purely to fulfil an 
interest. A number of respondents actually cited ‘world events’ as the primary 
 96 | P a g e  
motivation to enlist. Probably the most prominent event in the Cold War’s 
international history has to be the Cuban Missile Crisis. ROC#9, an observer who 
served with No.10 Group Exeter recalled his reason for joining: 
I joined in late 1962 with the Cold War at its height, the Cuban Crisis had only 
recently been resolved. I felt that I could contribute something without having 
to give up my job and join the services. 
 
The final Flight International article relating specifically to the Royal Observer Corps 
appeared on 23 November 1961, covering the opening of the thirteenth Group 
Headquarters by the Mayor of Watford (Anon 1961, 23 November, 798) also (fig.3-
14). As the ROC steadily relinquished its aircraft reporting role and proceeded 
underground, aviation publications appear to have ceased reporting the 
organisation's progress; even though it was not until late 1966 that the Air Ministry 
relinquished responsibility for the ROC to the Home Office, thereby closing off the 
aircraft reporting role.  
Fig.3-14 ‘The Royal 
Observer Corps 
Thirteenth Underground 
Group Headquarters – 
The first to be built in the 
London area – was 
opened on Saturday by 
the Mayor of Watford.’ A 
press photograph 
recording the event on 
20/06/61 (Source Central 
Press Photos Ltd) 
 
A highly ordered organisation such as the one under investigation would be 
expected to maintain a recruitment record. Unfortunately, the chance to search those 
of the ROC has, and currently is, frustrated (noted previously in chapter 2). Until we 
do locate this valuable record we can only make assumptions about recruitment 
figures, demographics and the like, neither can we be certain the ROC ever reached 
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its aspirational recruitment figures for a full complement of 25,000 volunteers. 
Interestingly, by 1968, this becomes a moot point as underground monitoring post 
numbers were cut by 686 and with them a personnel count reduced to just 12,500; 
all part of the Parliamentary announcement in January that Civil Defence was being 
scrapped (Grant 2010, 188). Derek Wood suggested in 1976 that ‘since the strength 
was actually 17,500 – around 5,000 were made redundant’ (1992, 246) again this 
has not been verified. However, the redundancies clearly did have an impact as 
ROC#19, who served with No.2 Group Horsham, from 1971 noted:  
One Saturday lunchtime, when I was 18, I saw a public information film on the 
television about the ROC. It seemed to have everything to attract me – links 
with the RAF, RAF blue uniform, important and secret role, also being a self 
contained organisation rather than a reserve of something else. The ROC was 
doing a vital job not done by anyone else and all performed by volunteers. I 
applied straight away, but because of lack of vacancies (probably a hang over 
from the 1968 cuts) I tried again the following year and was duly enrolled. 
 
Nuclear Reporting  
Substantially more recruiting material survives for the last two decades (1970s-
1980s) of the ROC life-cycle, providing a useful, if official, insight into the 
motivational language used by the Home Office to attract new recruits. The effects of 
the Strath report, as I have already noted, provided the ROC with something of a 
lifeline. By the time of its delivery to Government (March 1955); the reporting of 
aircraft had become an almost pointless task – altitude and speed ensuring most 
went un-correctly or un-reported. Indeed, Strath noted a nationwide service 
dedicated to the monitoring of radioactive fallout would be needed ‘on the lines of 
that already in existence for the Royal Observer Corps’ (Hughes 2003, 267).  
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Fig.3-15 The cover of a 
recruitment leaflet. Published in 
1979 the front image comprises 
all three demographic elements 
of the ROC – Women, Uniform, 
Civilian. (Extract from Pub. 417. 
Dec. 1979, Prepared for the 
Royal Air Force by the Central 
Office of Information, 
Dd.8034345 Pro. 10923) 
 
In 1972 a 10-page A5 sized colour brochure bestowing the virtues of a role in the 
ROC appeared. Clearly by 1972, now four years after the disbandment of Civil 
Defence and reduction of ROC posts, the Corps was facing another staffing crisis, a 
combination of retirements and dwindling pool of those made redundant forced a 
new recruiting campaign. The brochure – titled simply ‘ROC’ – introduces some key 
language markers intended to attract a specific kind of individual. Throughout, there 
is emphasis on the following aspects: duty; service; rank; uniform; promotion, and 
proficiency through examination and training. There are also eight references to a 
close association with the Royal Air Force, further emphasizing the ROCs place in a 
militaristically orientated world – all are clear references to the highly ordered 
structure of the organisation, they also indicate the heterotopic nature of the group – 
post-initiation (fig.3-15). ROC#15, No.25 Group Ayr, noted: ‘I wanted to do 
something to help the country plus I was interested in the armed forces’, supporting 
this suggestion. However, world events also drove recruitment. ROC#16, serving 
with No.12 Group Bristol: 
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I joined the ROC in 1976 when the Soviet Union was flexing its muscles and 
the future looked bleak. Because of my age (then 37) I doubted if I would be 
called-up for military service. 
Interestingly, the biggest and final round of literature was produced between 
December 1979 and November 1985. This coincides with the return to office of a 
Conservative Government, a far reaching review of Home Defence, deployment of 
cruise missiles at British RAF stations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
deployment of the SS-20 medium range nuclear capability in Eastern Europe. The 
international perception of instability was further exacerbated by a succession of 
Soviet leaders (Brezhnev died in November 1982; his successor Andropov died in 
February 1984; and his successor Chernenko died just eleven months later) 
promoting a heightened level of political tension. It was also a period of increased 
civil disobedience – especially connected to the continued deployment of nuclear 
weapons. The language used in such literature echoes the uncertainty of the times – 
affectionately known as the ‘Doom-Boom’: 
The Corps exists today as a fully-working organisation, trained to take 
immediate action if any enemy were ever to launch a nuclear strike on the 
United Kingdom. At such a terrible moment, only readiness and training have 
any value. Knowing in advance what would have to be done, and training in 
advance to be ready to do it, are undoubtedly factors which could bring about 
the survival of, literally, millions of people at a time of devastation and chaos. 
These are indeed grim thoughts. But let us be quite sure that, in an uncertain 
world, it is the known readiness of Britain’s defence services that contributes 
to the continued existence of peace. 
In the Royal Observer Corps you help safeguard Britain’s future. 
PUB 417 (1985) 
The Central Office of Information, the Government department who orchestrated 
recruitment drives on behalf of the Home Office were, by the early 1980s, mirroring 
the post-détente stance of the Conservative led administration. Attention was now 
focussed primarily on the intrinsic volunteer, that is an individual who is task 
focussed, often combined with a sense of duty or have an altruistic reason for 
volunteering (Wardell, Lishman et al 2000, 237). For some respondents of the 
current survey this meant a continuation of their armed service career. ROC#4, 
serving with No.10 Group Exeter:  
I had just left the Army Cadets as an adult Sergeaqnt [sic] Instructor and was 
looking around for another volunteer job. I thought the work the ROC did was 
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important in the event of an attack as we would warn the population of 
dangers of nuke dust clouds as well as helping the Government forces. 
For others this became an opportunity to be involved in something out of the 
ordinary. ROC#14, an observer who served with No.12 Bristol and No.8 Coventry 
from 1982, noted: 
By chance I saw an advert for the ROC in a local newspaper. I toured the  
headquarters. It looked like interesting work, it appeared somewhat 
clandestine as I would have to sign the Official Secrets Act, another pulling 
point was that it seemed vaguely connected to the RAF. Furthermore, I would 
meet lots of people, the commitment was one night a week and a few 
weekends. 
 
ROC#14 also hints at the social component that appears in a number of observers 
accounts throughout the survey. Those who can be classed as the ‘social’ observer 
utilise membership to satisfy fears of isolation and to belong according to Wardell, 
Lishman et al (2000). For this current project, I suggest we attach those who enlisted 
via a family member to the ‘Social’ group or those whose social group were 
members. Probably most recognisable were the comments by ROC#8, an observer 
serving with No.10 Group Exeter and later Honorary Secretary of the Exeter branch 
of the ROCA: ‘Joined because my husband was in the corp and wanted to do 
something differant [sic].’ ROC#8 is one of the few female observers encountered so 
far by this project, six identified their gender as female, although more maybe 
present within the current survey results. This account underpins both the motivation 
for joining (family member serving) and the need to remain fully engaged with the 
service. Moreover, this simple account suggests a familiar structure to the ROC 
Association, one that must in many ways replicate that encountered prior to stand-
down within the organisation. Family provided a major influence in a further number 
of accounts. ROC#6, serving with No.12 Group Bristol noted:    
My late father worked for Post Office Telephones at the start of WW2 and 
looked after phone communications for 24 Group, Gloucester. He joined the 
corps also. After he had completed war service in the Army he rejoined the 
corps. I joined in 1958 at age 15. 
Demonstrating it was not all family orientated, ROC#13, No.12 Bristol, describes a 
different type of motivation to join:  
Me and my four grammar school friends were 14 years of age and the local 
ROC post held their meetings in the town’s RAFA club. It was thus the only 
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place where we could drink pints of beer at least once a week. (The minimum 
age limit was 16, but nobody asked for birth certificates and we lied – so sue 
me!)  
Of course there were some who joined having seen the practicalities of working in a 
protected structure during a nuclear attack: 
- it was a no-brainer, especially when, following the recent Cuban missile 
crisis, I’d come to expect a nuclear war within my lifetime and worked out that 
I’d rather spend it “underground” in an ROC control room, than in a Scout hut. 
ROC#31, No. 20 York. 
Gender and the Corps 
From the outset of the redeployment of the Royal Observer Corps in 1947 it had 
been made clear that both male and female volunteers were welcome to enlist. 
Women had served in the wartime corps from July 1941, primarily to support a lack 
of volunteers due to National Service call-up, although, later, in their own right as full 
observers (Wood 1992, 123). With total mobilisation on the Home Front the reasons 
for enlisting are self-evident; the Cold War appears far more complex. 
Cold War Service 
Interestingly, the role of women in the Cold War is relegated to a footnote in all but 
one area; civil disobedience and protest are a classic area of feminist investigation. 
As the literature review demonstrated, the academic sphere is dominated by 
activities surrounding the deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, 
specifically RAF Greenham Common. To find debate or discussion covering the 
activities of women who actively participated in the business of the Cold War is 
difficult. In 2009 Margaret Vining discussed the development of uniforms for women 
post-World War II, noting, on a number of occasions the overtly masculine signals of 
authority ‘Central to the foundation of the military, uniforms are proof of an imposed 
discipline; they are also indisputably masculine' (2007, 93). The United States only 
abandoned specifically designed women’s uniforms in the late 1970’s, moving to a 
more universal male/female standard that prevails today (Morden 1990, 457). In the 
United Kingdom the Royal Observer Corps had three basic uniforms; the first was a 
two-piece battledress first issued to all members in 1942/3; this pattern was retained 
until the late 1970s (Wood 1992, 127) before being replaced by the 1972 pattern 
service dress of the Royal Air Force. There is no clear indication as to when this 
change took place, although, a memo A Guide to Fitting: The Royal Observer Corps 
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No. 2 Dress Uniform (1972) Pattern was issued from ROC  headquarters  in July 
1977, suggests a reasonable point.  
The survey results revealed five women had completed the forms (additional ex-
members may also have answered and not indicated their gender), a very small 
sample, that while may be too small to infer much, does shine light on reasons for 
joining the organisation. 
Basically because I had always wanted to join the RAF, but in my day (the 
1960s) girls "didn't do that sort of thing" and were steered towards 
nursing/teaching and the like.  I saw a poster of people in RAF uniform and 
decided to give it a try.  I thoroughly enjoyed the work and the challenge, as I 
had done nothing like that before, and it gave a very shy person a great deal 
of confidence to be treated as a valuable member of the Corps.  When I was 
considering joining the Corps, I asked my father, who was ex-RAF and in 
favour of my joining the RAF, his opinion, and he encouraged me, saying that 
they had done a fine job during the war. 
ROC#27, Groups Oxford, Winchester and Bedford 
I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father wouldn't let me.  He didn't 
think it was a "proper" job for a young lady.   I wasn't fit physically but I wanted 
to serve.  I don't think I would have made the grade at that time, but a friend 
mentioned that he had seen the ROC and thought of me!  I was 18. It was the 
best decision I ever made - I became independent, self-reliant, confident and I 
made some of the best friends ever.  I got to go to RAF Stations to train and I 
had the time of my life! 
ROC#30, No. 23 Group Durham 
 
I would have liked to join the WRAF but my father didn't approve so I went into 
engineering and I (think - 1964) I applied to an advert. I visited the Coventry 
Group  headquarters, which was a fairly recently built sub-surface building 
and was shown round by Jack Matthews, my soon to be Crew Officer. Half-
way round I decided it probably wasn't for me; too complicated and very little 
to do with the aircraft in which I was interested BUT for some reason I don't 
understand I found myself signing on the dotted line one of the best things I 
have done - 30+ good years and a husband. 
 
ROC#50, No. 8 Group Coventry and No.2 Group Horsham 
 
 
As an ex-WRAF it was a way to get back in uniform. 
 
ROC#44, No. 15 Group Lincoln 
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The key motivational drivers for the four correspondents above has been the Royal 
Observer Corps apparent connection, or similarity, to the Royal Air Force. 
Interestingly, some social pressure is also revealed, noting the services are not the 
place for women - especially in the 1960s. Such social constructs are discussed by 
Sara Lennox who, when exploring the role of women in the United States (US) after 
World War II, noted that the assumption women retreated into domesticity across 
most of Europe and the US, a domestication if you will, aimed at supporting the 
family unit, is wrong (2004, 67); ‘-rather, women after 1945, - took on a role of central 
importance to post-war economic expansion, -‘(ibid 2004, 69). What the results from 
the survey suggest is that by the 1960s this attitude was being challenged and 
women were looking for ways to engage in similar defence activities as their male 
counterparts. This is simplistic at best, but it is an area worthy of further 
investigation. 
Discussion 
We can see from the brief examples noted above that the observer cohort is a 
diverse social group, demonstrating many facets of the recognised volunteer profile 
utilised within this chapter. They all, however, have one thing in common. They were 
prepared to populate a landscape – when called to duty – that was primarily 
concerned with the welfare of others. I propose the Royal Observer Corps volunteer 
or ‘spare-time’ observers display both an altruistic and personal-centred reason for 
enlisting. Beyond the individual, the organisation was structured in such a way to be 
easily assimilated into the highly organised world of the military – subsequently 
attracting those who had an interest in uniform, structure and even twenty years after 
the role was discontinued, aircraft recognition. The ROC initiated volunteers into a 
rigid structure through rank, promotion and secrecy of task, this has been continued 
through the ROC Associations where the uninitiated are excluded unless the top 
down structure is recognised and adhered to - presumably Oldcorn’s undoing (2010). 
Membership was maintained by a sense of duty, a number of perks, including visits 
to RAF stations and the possibility of flying. It was also maintained through the 
opportunity to progress one’s self in a form of pseudo promotional rank structure. 
The validity of a rank structure being that the organisation reacts rigidly to 
operational situations or emergencies. The value of this mode of self-
aggrandisement is intrinsically linked to the existence of the parent organisation; 
graphically demonstrated when the entire organisation was stood-down. The loss of 
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earned position through competitions, assessments and length of service was keenly 
felt, leading to a sense of disenfranchisement and morning through the loss of the 
organisation itself.   
An organisation as large as the ROC, with a national taskscape and heterotopic role 
naturally introduced tension into the landscape, especially with peace orientated 
organisations such as CND. The majority of the general public were disenfranchised, 
yet, appear to display a level of ambivalence to the general threat of nuclear warfare 
– indeed to many it was just ‘background noise’. CND, with its policy of non-violent 
civil disobedience used a number of methods to raise awareness including peace 
camps, rallies and damage to ROC posts. In this particular case Scham nicely 
summarised the lot of the excluded ‘In its political sense, the term includes those 
whose rights as citizens are diminished, in general, or arbitrarily curtailed’ (2001, 
187). It is unsurprising that when the ROC was arbitrarily stood-down, with no notice 
to the 12,500 members, it was to bring about a high level of hostility toward the 
Government – this time from the newly disenfranchised – the Royal Observer Corps 
membership itself. The following chapter discusses the order and chaos model, 
describing the structure of the concept, explaining the facets involved and the 
parameters and limits of its form before applying the model to the landscape 
archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps.  
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CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS AN ABANDONMENT MODEL   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Material culture humanises the process of deposition; it also has the potential to 
differentiate between one activity and another. In the current study this concept is 
important. A model relating to the abandonment of sites or landscapes utilised or 
inhabited by highly organised and/or ritualistic entities – in this case the British 
military during the Cold War – has been developed by the author and applied to the 
current study of the Royal Observer Corps. In this chapter the concept of the ‘order 
and chaos’ model is introduced and develop, providing the reader with a detailed 
breakdown of the structure and application of the concepts intended to underpin the 
numerous facets that comprise the model.  The order and chaos model can be 
applied to sites of any size, making it the ideal vehicle to use in the investigation of 
the material culture of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and its later parent 
organisation the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). 
The highly ordered environment required to effectively carrying out nuclear warning 
and fallout monitoring manifests itself through the, almost clone-like, order of the 
environs of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP). This is in stark contrast to the 
chaos now encountered on UGMPs after 25 years of abandonment.  
 
THE NEED FOR A FURTHER MODEL 
The interpretation of landscapes, the level of interaction recognised between 
individuals, or groups, mutually exclusive or cohesive, separated by, or operating 
within the same chronological timeframe, are key to most archaeological 
investigations. Relationships between structural remains and the material culture 
encountered through excavation is pivotal to all interpretations offered through via 
the results of the post-excavation process. Moreover, interpretations at a local level 
are now routinely factored into regional frameworks and works of national synthesis. 
All are driven by the evidence drawn from aspects of material culture. I argue that by 
following this ‘traditional’ form of archaeology we may be missing the true extent of 
the site under investigation, especially when it comes to the interpretation of space 
that provides no physical evidence. I argue that space devoid of such evidence does 
not necessarily indicate a lack of human interaction, and in some cases we should 
actively consider actions, or control systems, that leave ephemeral or no physical 
evidence in our interpretations of the archaeological record. 
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Constructing a Methodology 
To interpret the process of abandonment it has been necessary to deconstruct a 
series of events, agencies and natural processes that have been observed on a 
range of type sites across the South-West of England. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to decide what actually constitutes a phase of abandonment, for only then can the 
initiation of activities and processes be truly classified as components of 
abandonment. Subsequently, the activities of the originator of a given site, structure 
or location require identification, classification and intent/threat if the point of 
abandonment is to be accurately recognised through archaeological investigation. 
 
The Components of Order  
The British Government, as utiliser of the armed forces in the defence of the United 
Kingdom and the projection of foreign policy, states that the armed forces of the 
United Kingdom: 
 
- protect the security, independence and interests of our country at home and 
abroad. We work with our allies and partners whenever possible. Our aim is to 
ensure that the armed forces have the training, equipment and support 
necessary for their work, and that we keep within budget. 
 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence) (accessed 
20/07/2015) 
 
To achieve this apparently simple objective requires a system that functions 
increasingly autocratically the further down the chain of command one travels. This 
is often at odds with the society it serves, especially since the military system 
(currently under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence) in the United Kingdom is the 
instrument of a democratic governmental system. Considering this when 
investigating the landscape of the twentieth century – especially through the Cold 
War period – provides us with an opportunity to identify certain behaviours within 
such an organisation. It also allows us to interpret levels of activity, their boundaries 
when considering both the operation of the military landscape; and the interactions 
between those enacting government policy through military means, and the wider 
social system they are charged with protecting. That is not to say that there is total 
rigidity of activity across a military unit; a study provides the investigator with a range 
of activities, both coherent and unrelated, that allows the unit to function on a day-to-
day basis.  
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If we consider military airfields in the United Kingdom we are presented with a well 
know series of sites that span little more than a single century of activity; indeed, the 
first true military flying establishment was not formed until 1910 at Larkhill on 
Salisbury Plain (Brown 2013, 31). Airfields fall into six broad periods of development, 
each with their own characteristic architecture and geography, all driven by both 
technology and threat mitigation (Clarke 2009, 217). This well documented process 
is chronologically limited, offering the researcher a succinct number of period-based 
activities from which to formulate models and hypotheses. This allowed the ‘order 
and chaos’ model to be constructed utilising British military airfield. The reasons 
were as follows. 
 
• Airfields and their architecture are chronologically recognisable due to the 
technological development of aircraft. 
 
• Airfields are geographically located in accordance with the perceived political 
and militaristic threat of the period. 
 
• Military ethos is engrained in airfield layouts (rank dictates the position of 
living quarters and messes). 
 
• British military airfields tend to be a palimpsest allowing comparisons to be 
drawn. 
 
• Interaction between the military and local population is archaeologically 
recognisable through material culture. 
 
Order and the Military Landscape 
To ensure the effective operation of any military site requires a highly structured, 
rigid command structure, this naturally imposes itself on the landscape via structures 
or layout or, more often than not, a mixture of both. Researchers have, since the turn 
of the twentieth century, become increasingly interested in the archaeological 
possibilities presented by airfield study (Lake 2003; Schofield 2003; Clarke 2009; 
Schofield 2011; Carman 2013). This has become increasingly so since a large 
number of former stations have been declared surplus due to Government initiatives 
such as Options for Change and Front Line First (Clarke 2009). 
 
In 2002 Michael Anderton sought to quantify the geographical structure recognised 
in the military landscape. He correctly recognised an inherent level of military control 
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over the occupants of a given site, suggesting this was connected to rank structure 
(2002, 192). Unfortunately, Anderton did not use a wide ranging sample when 
considering airfield layout, subsequently, this hypothesis is only appropriate when 
considering the layout of airfields constructed the expansion period (1935-39) (for a 
full discussion covering expansion period Royal Air Force stations, see Clarke 2009). 
From 1942 this model is redundant through reaction to bombing technology and the 
switch from permanent to temporary, dispersed, structures (ibid 2009).  
 
Pre, or post-World War II, the rigid hierarchy inferred by Anderton is more difficult to 
find. Station facilities retained by the War Ministry, and later Ministry of Defence, 
after World War II are complemented with new, modern structures wherever 
possible, whilst accommodation is moved away from the immediate vicinity of the 
operational airfield. This is in evidence at Boscombe Down, Wiltshire; Greenham 
Common, Berkshire; Lyneham, Wiltshire and a host of other retained Cold War 
airfields. It follows then that the landscape of order is, by necessity, flexible at the 
point of implementation. It is driven by the geography of the site under investigation 
at a number of recognisable chronological markers; markers that, at the point of 
closure or abandonment, become static. 
 
TOWARDS A USEABLE FRAMEWORK 
The concept of order is, by its own volition, too wide a series of parameters to be 
applied without refinement or quantification. However, once underlying activities of 
the entity under investigation are exposed the concept achieves structured utility. 
Moreover, the influence of ordered entities in the development of the landscape 
requires identification, the extent of which is crucial to the interpretation of both the 
abandonment process and the creation of organisationally centred deposition of 
material culture.   
 
The order model dictates that the entity under scrutiny must contain a visible 
hierarchy, that hierarchy should be structured in a top-down process and it should 
impose values on the landscape. Whilst this concept has been developed utilising 
the landscape of the military in the United Kingdom, sub-sets are likely to be 
appropriate in the investigation of other, institutionally based, organisations such as 
the National Health Service, Prison Service or Central Government. 
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Segregation 
The concept of order influences two zones – core and periphery. A standard 
distribution model often used when considering tribal boundaries and economic 
exchange in the British Iron Age (Cunliffe 1981), the use of core and periphery 
appears appropriate in this context too. Moreover, I have developed a structure that 
deconstructs the activities enacted, through hierarchy, in the area demarcated as the 
core – Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS), Highly Organised Domestic 
Space (HODS) and Domestic Space (DS). While the periphery includes activities in 
connection with the core function but are not highly organised. Between the core and 
periphery lies the security fence or wall.         
 
Entities that rely on rigid structures of control to achieve their aims must, by 
definition, attempt to control the space to which they have jurisdiction. Within this 
thesis the most recognisable aspect of this has to be the security fence or wall. Such 
symbols of exclusion are instantly recognisable across the landscape, especially 
when punctuated by signs warning against entry or photography (fig.4-1). Here we 
must pause for a moment to consider the role of the fence and, moreover, the 
interpretation of the fence when considered as an instrument of control and 
landscape feature. 
 
Fig.4-1. Ministry of Technology sign on the security fence at MoD Boscombe Down. (Source: 
Bob Clarke 03/05/2015) 
 
The concept of the security fence is familiar to most of the population. Such 
structures appear to impose an authority on those ‘outside the wire’; the intent, 
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adorned by warning signs and topped with barbed or razor wire, becomes self-
evident. As the twentieth century progressed this authority was underpinned with 
motion sensors, video, and later, digital surveillance. In its extremes the fence 
moved from a singular structure to one of multiple components with killing zones, the 
most notorious being the Berlin Wall (Baker 1993, 289) (fig.4-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4-2. A view from the East. The 
multi-layered Berlin ‘Wall’, more 
accurately a series of obstacles to 
deter escape to the West (Source 
unknown). 
 
For the security fence to act as a watershed between components of the order and 
chaos model we need to understand the role of such constructions, their apparent 
meaning within social interactions, and the landscape implications for the 
archaeological record and deposition of material culture allied to both groups. A 
simplistic view is now offered utilising various military structures and activities before 
focus shifts specifically to the Royal Observer Corps 
 
COMPONENTS OF ORDER 
Once inside the security perimeter specific areas of activity can be recognised. 
Different strands of operational control are essential if the organisation who 
originated the structure is to operate effectively. To this end, a large military site 
often comprises a wide range of specialist and utilitarian structures which, in turn, 
contain an equally wide series of diverse activities, all with the common aim of 
supporting the activity or task. What is important here is that all activities in the core 
area influence the deposition of material culture across the site. This realisation 
helps determine the level of control in a specific area, and, more importantly, a 
distinction between that activity and one enacted elsewhere within the core area. 
What follows is a description of the three recognisable control mechanisms I have 
developed to aid the characterisation and nature of activities, specifically the 
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taphonomy related to the level and form of material culture encountered, during 
investigation.   
 
Fig.4-3. The divisions of core and periphery when applied to a functioning flying station, MoD 
Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. (Source: Underlying Airfield Image MoD © Crown Copyright) 
 
Taking into consideration the operational aspects of the station it is possible to 
recognise all facets of the proposed model (fig.4-3 above). The Station is divided into 
core (green line) and peripheral (yellow line). Beyond these two zones lies the 
incidental landscape, defined here as offering little direct support to the core activity, 
more a form of subordinate conjunction. Breaking this down further (fig.4-3a below) 
Highly Organised Operational Space (red) includes all areas where activities 
required to ensure the air transport task of the squadrons are successfully carried 
out. Highly Organised Domestic Space (blue) includes all administrative tasks 
required to support the primary tasking including the Officer’s and Senior Non-
Commissioned Officers Mess. Domestic Space (pale orange) less ordered than the 
previous, but still with a high degree of military ethos. Peripheral activities (yellow) 
are those support functions that include Married Quarters and family orientated 
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activities. It is here that the greatest level of interaction with the public is 
encountered.  
 
 
Fig.4-3a. The attributes of core activities when applied to a functioning flying station, MoD 
Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. (Source: Underlying Airfield Image MoD © Crown Copyright) 
 
Highly Organised Operational Space  
Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS) comprises buildings, specialist 
structures or specific areas associated with the primary task of the base, station or 
unit. This could be the battlefield command centre, aircraft hangar or bridge of a 
frigate although it could be just as easily a pillbox or, relevant to this project, a Royal 
Observer Corps underground monitoring post. All activities contained within these 
areas are rigidly directed by rules and regulations. The role of the individual is 
removed from the equation as all activities conform to a rigid set of procedures, 
reducing operatives to the level of automatons. Even in more technical 
environments, such as aircraft maintenance and operational spaces (runway; 
taxiway; hardstanding) there is a strict adherence to procedure and training, 
reinforcing the level of order placed on the surrounding environment. Activities within 
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this environment are managed and reinforced using a process of accountancy, 
responsibility and punishment.  
 
HOOS in Action 
Entities whose very existence relies on the total control of all activities enshrine in 
their belief systems rigid control over all aspects of their environment. As what this 
actually looks like can be complex, a brief case study is needed. To illustrate this the 
operational environment of a front-line fighter squadron, arguably one of the most 
‘ordered’ environments of the military landscape today. The operation of aircraft, 
especially since the end of World War II, has become increasingly technology based. 
Today, aircraft years in the design and test stage, capable of high energy 
manoeuvres – in excess of eight times the force of gravity –  managed by complex 
fly-by-wire systems and effective environmental control, routinely operate from a 
number of flying stations across the United Kingdom. The latest front-line aircraft on 
charge with the Royal Air Force, the Typhoon, currently cost in excess of £125million 
each and £3,875 per hour to operate (National Audit Office 2011, 26). Such is the 
complexity of the aircraft it requires highly trained pilots who are both mission 
management specialists and have the physical capability to survive the extreme 
environment of combat flying. Estimates note that the cost of training a new recruit to 
eventually fly the Typhoon is in excess of £4 million (in 2010) and takes 50 months to 
complete (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2015, 16). 
 
The environment in which the Typhoon is stored, maintained and readied for 
deployment is one of complete control. This environment is classified by my model 
as a Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS). All maintenance activities are 
rigidly structured to a series of procedures, divergence from them brings severe 
penalties including extra duties, expulsion from the service and even, in extreme 
circumstances, prison. Additionally, the service has a culture centring on ‘Flight 
Safety’; this includes impartial reporting of problems and ‘whistle blowing’. Effective 
flight safety saves the Ministry of Defence the additional expense of replacing major 
pieces of equipment such as aircraft engines or, indeed, a pilot and aircraft due to 
incorrect maintenance practices or negligent activities. An integral component of the 
flight safety culture, and one that explains the type of material culture entering the 
archaeological record on HOOS, is the ‘FOD’ or Foreign Object Damage regime 
(fig.4-4). 
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Fig.4-4. The control of material across an aircraft operating area is paramount to flight 
safety. Subsequently the amount of artefacts available to enter the archaeological record is 
practically non-existent. (Poster source MoD: Directorate of Flight Safety) 
 
Across airfields there is an almost obsessive drive to control the amount of debris or 
‘loose articles’ that are located within the HOOS. Indeed, it is convenient to 
demarcate HOOS from other areas and control mechanisms by utilising the FOD 
control area. FOD causes multi-millions of pounds’ worth of damage every year. An 
aircraft jet engine is a complex piece of equipment and one small piece of gravel 
entering it at speed on take-off can cause a catastrophic failure of that engine. 
Indeed, on 25 July 2000 an Air France Concorde was totally destroyed in a crash 
caused solely by damage caused by FOD; 109 people were killed on the aircraft and 
a further four on the ground (BEA 2002) (fig.4-5).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 | P a g e  
 
Fig.4-5. Air France Concorde Flight 
4590 seconds after take-off. A piece 
of debris on the runway was flicked 
up by one of the aircraft’s wheels at 
nearly 300kmh. It pierced a wing 
fuel tank, causing a fire, loss of the 
aircraft and 113 lives. (Source: Buzz 
Pictures/Corbis Sygma) 
 
To this end the aircraft operating areas are routinely swept every morning by a road 
sweeper vehicle. At least once a week a ‘FOD plod’ is initiated where the entire 
apron is physically walked by station personnel and any loose articles are collected, 
analysed for origin and flight safety notices issued. Furthermore, all personnel 
working on the apron are duty-bound to report any discoveries, no matter how small, 
to the flight safety team (Air Clues 2011, 4). In maintenance areas the FOD regime is 
even more controlled. All tools are accounted for at four chronological points 
throughout the day – each is individually tagged out by a numbered disc allotted to 
the tradesman carrying out the task – and double checked at the end of every day. 
Additionally, all consumables are accounted for (oil rags, emery paper, wire etc.). A 
task requiring nuts, bolt, rivets, splitpins, locking wire etc. has the specific amount 
required allotted to it. This ensures no spare items are left over, with the possibility of 
loss and subsequent FOD damage to the aircraft. The final job on any aircraft prior to 
release to service is to have a ‘zonal FOD check’ a role carried out by an 
independent staff member whose job is to ensure no loose articles are present prior 
to the aircraft being panelled up and declared ready for service. Essentially, the area 
is classed as surgically clean, again any infringement of the regulations brings 
severe penalties (fig.4-6).  
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Fig.4-6. Lightning Crews at RAF Binbrook, Lincolnshire scramble. The aircraft is off the 
ground in two minutes. The highly ordered operational space here is self-evident. A strict 
adherent to procedure and training makes this environment one of order. (Permission – 
Ministry of Defence© Crown Copyright 1988)   
 
Material Culture and the HOOS 
With the complete control of aircraft spare parts and FOD regimes enacted on a daily 
basis, artefacts that might indicate the use of a given space, be that a nut, bolt or 
washer, or discarded part of an aircraft, is systematically removed. Personnel 
conform to a rigid set of principles entrenched through a regime of training and 
discipline, this includes the uniforms and protective clothing they wear. Furthermore, 
the way engineering tasks are approached and managed and a high level of order 
ensures personnel do not introduce material into the aircraft environment from 
outside the HOOS. Subsequently, the type of material culture available to enter the 
archaeological record is specifically representative of the organisation. Unfortunately, 
the level of control, or order, enacted on the aircraft operating environment is such 
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that material from the activity is, in the main, non-existent. Essentially the operation 
of aircraft leaves no material culture behind.  
 
Indeed, provision for this eventuality has been voiced, Michael Schiffer, when 
discussing systemic contexts, noted that an artefact can pass through a series of 
events before it is available for deposition in an archaeological context (2010, 20). 
While this model, especially when applied to modern mechanical technologies 
describes the process of aircraft operation and maintenance, it cannot take into 
account that deposition in a Highly Organised Operational Space. Aircraft, and their 
spare components, are encountered in areas other than airfields, primary locations 
include scrapyards or museums. From the deposition of material in the scrapyard it 
would be possible to recognise the process of recycling, the recovery of materials 
that re-enters the manufacturing process through a process of reduction, before 
refashioned into other objects. At this point the aircraft (a substantial piece of 
material culture in its ow right) have entered a state of chaos. A similar state is 
encountered in the museum. Here the aircraft are ‘overtly curated’; that is preserved 
in a publically accessible way although, they are neither functional nor flightworthy. 
So it is only when the aircraft, the sole reason for the flying station's existence, are 
placed in an environment of chaos that the potential for material culture from the 
entity who operates the station can be encountered. The opportunity to indicate the 
activities of the entity within a Highly Ordered Operational space – in this case the 
operation of aircraft - by material culture alone is extremely slight.  
 
Highly Organised Domestic Space 
Highly Organised Domestic Space (HODS) lies beyond the HOOS. The level of 
organisation is as structured as the HOOS although, the activities encompassed by it 
form a different aspect of military life-cycles. There are two types of activity 
recognised within the HODS, the technical site supporting the flying function, 
including what are known as bays and engineering manufacturing and messing 
arrangements. Bays are workshops that repair and overhaul both aircraft equipment 
and station facilities. An example is the electronic bays where aircraft communication 
equipment is often repaired, as is the mobile radio kits used by the security force.  
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Fig.4-7. Royal Scots Dragoon Guards Mess Dinner January 23 2009. Highly ordered 
domestic space contains a level of formalised social space. The rules and regulations of 
military life are enacted within this space. (Permission – Ministry of Defence© Crown 
Copyright)  
 
The HODS also has a more domestic function including the Station Headquarters – 
the administrative centre of the unit – clothing stores, barrack stores, the gym, police 
section and other functional activities required to support the organisations primary 
function. While these functions are not as tightly controlled as the HOOS, they do 
require a high level of military ethos and ritual (fig.4-7). This includes respect for 
rank, correct dress and a high level of regulatory instruction. 
  
The second areas of activity encountered in the HODS are those involving Officers 
and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers and centre on messes. These areas display 
high levels of ritualisation through material culture. Past campaigns or battle 
honours, paintings of operations and past aircraft types in action adorn every wall, 
often these are arranged in chronological order. Specific activities drive behaviours: 
tea and toast is available from 15:00hrs; no coats should be worn; jacket and tie in 
the main bar, reading rooms; and a high level of domestic help in the form of waiters 
and secretaries ensure the experience is more akin to a gentleman’s club in the 
centre of London than a fighter station in central Lincolnshire. The Senior Non-
Commissioned Officers mess is similarly provisioned with the noticeable exception of 
the servile attributes. These areas have more potential for material to be introduced 
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into the archaeological record, again it is likely to be connected implicitly with the 
organisation.   
 
Domestic Space 
The final component of the ordered area is the Domestic Space. This component 
comprises the least organised area of a military site, often comprising the lower 
ranks’ mess and other junior social centres such as clubs and accommodation. 
However, aspects of military ethos are still displayed, and this includes respect for 
rank, saluting, ‘bull nights’ and a level of discipline. Domestic Space as a landscape 
is located on the edge of the Highly Organised Domestic Space and as such can fall 
within the influence of its rules and regulations. Here barrack-rooms and single billets 
are personalised in a similar way to those encountered in civilian life, often recreating 
something of a system of remembrance for earlier lifestyles (fig.4-8). This has 
become ever more acute as it appears that aspects of the wider social system the 
military serves can no longer be excluded or relegated to beyond the security fence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4-8. Hinaidi Block, RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire, mid-1984. Domestic Space comprises a 
low-level of formalised activities, expression is more singular here, reminding the participant 
of both a life earlier than the service while also mirroring wider society. (Source: Bob Clarke 
personal archive) 
 
Interestingly, whilst the aspects controlling both previous ordered areas (HOOS and 
HODS) appear to have remained fairly static, especially throughout the Cold War, 
those aspects governing Domestic Space have changed dramatically. The influence 
has not come from the ordered aspects of the core area, indeed the aspects 
identified as order-centric have also remained fairly static. It is more the fact that 
interactions with the periphery are at their most detailed in the Domestic Space. 
Personnel routinely travel to local towns and villages during periods of stand down, 
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travel abroad on periods of leave and often own their own home rather than utilise 
the married quarters.  
 
One easily recognisable change in Domestic Space is the increased ownership of 
motor vehicles and where to park them. Better pay and increased expectations have 
allowed service personnel, from the 1970s, to mirror a number of social trends that 
have increased in wider society, motor vehicle ownership is one of those trends. It is 
not uncommon to find that the parade square, once the centre of the Domestic 
Space, is now given over as a station carpark. Where once walking across the 
square attracted fatigues or extra duties, it is now necessary to access the space to 
park a vehicle (fig.4-9).  
 
This change in the social strata experienced in the wider community clearly 
manifests itself inside the security fence too. Interestingly, the carpark on the former 
parade square is usually open to all ranks. So what was originally intended as a 
Highly Organised Domestic Space, constructed for the enactment of military rituals 
has, through contact with the wider social construct, become a place of chaos. In this 
particular case the periphery (outside the security fence) drives the deposition of 
material culture inside the fence line; interestingly, it brings with it chaos and the 
opportunity to miss-interpret a substantial part of the military landscape if the original 
use of the parade square was not known. This interaction between the periphery and 
domestic space ensures that material is likely to enter the archaeological record. It 
is, however, unlikely to be representative of the ordered entity that inhabits this 
space. It is more likely that the material culture available for deposition will mirror the 
social system to which the military ultimately reports.    
 
 
Fig.4-9. Parade Square Royal 
Force Halton, Bucks. Once the 
scene of total order and control, 
parade squares are now a scene 
of chaos, brought about by the 
rise in car ownership. (Google 
Maps Image accessed 
15/04/2016) 
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Peripheral Areas 
Beyond the security fence lay the peripheral functions needed to ensure the military 
performs the tasks required. These can be the settlements that often congregate 
outside the military site comprising married quarters (fig.4-10), clubs and bars 
including the ‘NAAFI’, sports fields and pavilions, health or family centres. To these 
can be added general site maintenance both on and off station, that is grass cutting 
and other non-essential maintenance. Incidentally, general site maintenance should 
be considered the only activity that is constant throughout core and peripheral areas. 
 
 
Fig.4-10 Married Quarters in the 
United Kingdom are usually 
located beyond the security 
fence, placing them in the 
Peripheral Zone. Activities in 
support of the Core areas are 
enacted here. (Permission – 
Ministry of Defence© Crown 
Copyright) 
 
The material culture of society is prevalent here and conforms to the chronological 
development of consumerism and economic markers that can be encountered 
across the social system that defines the United Kingdom. Activities across the 
peripheral area dictate material, domestic or otherwise, will enter the archaeological 
record. 
 
Order then, can be recognised through the activities enacted on any given site or 
landscape providing it has its origins within certain organisational parameters.  
Making the model flexible at the point of application allows for reassessment of a 
given building or space and perceived usage. The spatial distribution of specific 
activities can be inferred through the material culture encountered on such sites, 
although there are other cultural sources that will assist in that interpretation, 
including memory sources and the written record. Moreover, with the majority of 
landscapes dating from World War IIland acquisitions, no new airfields have been 
constructed in the United Kingdom since 1946 (Clarke 2009, 162), subsequently, the 
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taxonomy of the majority of structures is well known (Osborne 2004). The geography 
of airfields is also well known and has been described elsewhere (Lake 2002); what 
is important to the proposed model is that, armed with a very clear set of parameters, 
that model has the opportunity to be tested and patterns of abandonment and 
alternative use proposed. It has also been possible to suggest the probable types of 
material encountered on a site that has been abandoned (fig.4-11). This helps this 
project demonstrate the role of the Royal Observer Corps, the landscape in which 
the organisation operated and say something of the social interactions between a 
volunteer force, attitudes towards the archaeology of mass destruction and the 
deposition of modern material culture at specific sites in the landscape. 
 
 
Fig.4-11. The closer one gets to a Highly Ordered Operational Space the more organisation- 
centric becomes the material culture encountered. The further away one gets from the core 
activity, the more one relies on narratives from those who inhabit a specific space it helps 
structure the material culture encountered there (Source: Bob Clarke).  
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Aspects of Chaos 
Chaos is the point whereby order is removed via processes initiated by human, 
animal, vegetation or meteorologically related actions – singularly or by a 
combination of two, three or all agencies. The processes identified as chaos related 
begin at the point of abandonment, although the actual decent into chaos is not 
chronologically recognisable beyond the framework offered by the analysis of 
artefacts that enter the archaeological record. Additionally, sites that have been 
closed can be curated for a number of years, often protected by private security 
firms. I suggest this has little effect of the abandonment process as a site that has a 
closed aspect to its life-cycle (the fence continues to exclude interaction) will deter 
much of the build-up of material culture and so not bias an interpretation of a given 
space. What follows is a breakdown of the four primary agencies that contribute to 
the process of abandonment, their attributes and affiliations. The primary interest – 
Human Intervention - is fully described here, followed by a brief summary of the 
further three.  
 
Human intervention – Material Culture 
The deposition of material culture, especially when connected with entities of high 
control or order, is steadily reduced in quantity and form the closer one gets to Highly 
Ordered Operational Space (HOOS). Ultimately no material at all should enter the 
archaeological record, at least not while the HOOS remains effective. Interestingly, 
the more ordered the entity, the more attractive the material culture apparently 
becomes to the collector. At the point of abandonment or decommissioning the most 
mundane of objects become highly prised; especially by those whose personal 
history connects them in some way to the organisation or site. This phenomenon has 
been discussed previously in a military context (Saunders 2002; Baldwin and 
Sharpley 2009) and this thesis expands on the acquisition of material related 
specifically to the Royal Observer Corps in chapter 7. It is, however, important to 
acknowledge at this point that the curation of objects related to personal histories 
expands far beyond the influence of the uniformed services.  
 
The fate of the Berlin Wall illustrates this perfectly. Constructed started on what was 
to become known internationally as The Berlin Wall at 2:45 a.m. on 13 August 1961, 
by the end of the day West Berlin was completely surrounded by a barrier 
comprising concrete posts and rolls of barbed wire (Baker 1993, 294). For the 
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following 28 years the barrier, strengthened and enhanced three times in that period, 
became a symbol of oppression, restriction and political soundbites. The 
construction of the Wall was partly a consequence of an overt period of political 
posturing culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Young 1993, 14). On the 9 
November 1989 crossing points from East to West were opened, initially for 24 
hours, however, the tide of movement was so great that the Wall ceased to be 
effective from that day forwards; just eleven months later East and West Germany 
were reunited. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4-12. My personal Berlin Wall. ‘Pecked’ 
parts of the original Berlin Wall I obtained from 
the site in January 1990, just two months after 
the wall was breached. (Source Bob Clarke) 
 
A large section of the structure centred on the city itself fell victim to the attention of 
the ‘peckers’, a small army of entrepreneurs who removed the face of the wall that 
had, over a decade or so, become covered in graffiti (Dolff-Bonekämper 2002, 244) 
(fig.4-12). Demand eventually outstripped supply, leading to areas of the Wall, 
mostly that on the other side of the death strip, becoming covered in pseudo-street 
art before being pecked for consumption (ibid. 2002, 241). Other aspects of the Wall, 
especially those made of recyclable material, were removed by the authorities. In so 
doing the scarcity of such artefacts was increased, as was demand, subsequently 
artefacts were removed at an even quicker pace (Baker 1993, 306). Soon the 
intrinsic value of the Wall, especially what it represented, was outstripped by re-sale 
value driven by the tourist industry. Today the structure that drove superpower 
confrontations is all but destroyed, sections survive in museums across the world 
(fig.4-13) although it is now very difficult to locate in the City of Berlin itself. 
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(Fig.4-13) Sections of the Berlin Wall and a 
watch tower in the allied Museum in Berlin, 
Germany. This section was moved to the 
museum to ensure its survival. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 012/07/2012) 
 
In 2011, Gregson, Crang and Watkins explored the material culture of war, its 
meaning to those who served and the process of end-of-life military material 
(2011,301). They discovered a complex series of meanings connected to a Royal 
Navy ship – HMS Intrepid – that was in the process of being scrapped. What is 
important here is that specific items, with little or no intrinsic value were ‘procured’ by 
a group of visitors to the ship in its final days. Interestingly, Buchli and Lucas noted 
that ‘material culture shoulders the larger responsibility of our personal and collective 
memory – the decay or destruction of these objects brings forgetfulness’ (2001, 80). 
Gregson et al conclude that the acquisition of such material culture demonstrates a 
commemoration of lives past, especially when considering close-knit communities 
such as those experienced in the military (2011, 319). They also demonstrate the 
problems attributed to leaving the armed forces and re-integrating back into civilian 
life-cycles – citing the collection and retention of items connected to personal service 
as a likely indicator of personal struggles (ibid 2011, 319).  
 
When we consider the point of abandonment of the Royal Observer Corps post 
network a similar set of activities appear to have been enacted. At the point of stand-
down all instrumentation was to be removed and returned to Group  headquarters. 
From here the equipment fell into two broad categories – disposal/scrap or retention 
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by the Home Office – both reduced the opportunity for the majority of task specific 
equipment to enter the archaeological record. A demand is built through this normal 
action of disposal. Collectors of the material culture of the Royal Observer Corps 
were minimal throughout the last decade of the twentieth century; now demand is 
such, especially since the development of online auction sites and the ability to own 
underground monitoring posts, that the most basic of equipment attracts wildly 
inflated prices (see chapter 7 for a full discussion).   
 
The progress of abandonment on a large site such an airfield can be easily mapped. 
Often first to be relinquished are the peripheral activities directly operated by the 
military site. All Highly Organised Domestic Space arrangements lose their 
previously ridged structure as a steady reduction of uniformed personnel drives 
efficiencies in messing arrangements and all three levels of rank are placed in one 
mess. Eventually the site is completely demilitarised and subsequently disposed of. 
Once this has occurred the recognisable aspects of chaos become clearly evident. 
This usually starts with the abandonment of grass cutting and other ground 
maintenance, clubs and shops close and, especially on rural sites, married quarters 
are abandoned. The security fence, a demarcation between the core and peripheral 
activities, is often damaged or breeched early after abandonment – usually by 
children.  
 
Material from the primary use of the site often has a scrap value and is removed, 
building maintenance become sporadic, even if the site or structure is used for 
another function such as business units or workshops. On small sites such as the 
ROC underground monitoring posts, chaos, through abandonment, comes quickly as 
the Observer crews simply stop visiting the posts. On larger sites the process is 
more protracted although no less chaotic in the end. Buildings are used for other 
purposes than they were intended, altered, or abandoned (fig.4-14). Vandalism is 
often rife whilst demolition is increasingly the preferred option. All this introduces 
masses of material into the archaeological record compared to the previous ordered 
state imposed by the military.   
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Fig.4-14. Aircraft Hangar at Greenham Common, Berks in the process of dismantling, 2004. 
The value of structures, especially those in the HO Operational Spaces, is often in their 
scrap value. Chaos through human action is compounded by meteorological conditions. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 02/06/2004) 
 
It is not just human agency that plays a hand in the alteration of sites, spaces and 
structures through abandonment. As building maintenance becomes increasingly 
sporadic, and eventually non-existent, three other agencies become increasingly 
destructive. If we consider the weather and vegetation, it is surprising how different 
aspects conspire to reduce the effectiveness of a building to protect itself against the 
elements. Recently during a watching brief at Boscombe Down the opportunity to 
record a series of abandoned buildings connected to aircraft gun testing was taken. 
The site comprised four structures, a Blister hangar, two-gun test buildings (fig.4-15) 
and a stop butt (rounds pit). The two-gun test buildings current state were described 
thus:  
 
Building 309 and 310 on 6 May 2015  
Both structures appear to have been abandoned although racking and trestles 
found inside suggest they are being utilised in some stores capacity. Windows 
are showing signs of deep corrosion, once this reaches a certain point the 
pressure caused by the delamination of the frame structure breaks the glass 
panes, further accelerating the decay to the building fabric. All painted internal 
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surfaces are now in a poor condition and whilst water is not actually getting 
inside, the general damp conditions are corroding fittings and fixtures. 
Externally, the render and paint finish is generally poor, water and frost action 
will continue to remove rendering at an accelerated rate whilst surface decay 
in the double doors structure is likely to reach a critical point in the next few 
years if untreated. Vegetation has started to encroach on the building 
footprint; externally, overgrowth in the southeast corner of B309 is damaging 
the external surface of the structure, moreover this has started to undermine 
one of the window frames with briers now penetrating inside the building.   
(Clarke 2015, 23) 
 
Fig.4-15 Building 310 Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. Note the poor state of the rendering 
around doors and windows. (IMG_0054 created 6 May 2015 ©QinetiQ Ltd - with permission) 
 
Clearly then the action of two natural processes is already reducing the possibility of 
these structures to survive without substantial investment. In all likelihood these 
buildings will be removed in the near future. This is the eventual fate of many 
buildings constructed for organisations who are either recognised specialists in what 
process they undertake, or perform a unique service, this included the British 
military. What is also interesting here is that all the buildings surveyed were 
constructed for a highly specific and dangerous series of tests and as such are 
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classified in this model as an area of Highly Ordered Operational Space. The only 
evidence of their original purpose was through the memory and personal histories of 
a few technicians who remembered the facility in the late 1960s.   
 
There is one final aspect of the life-cycle of military organisations that requires 
mention; the transition to war. Logistically, the movement of troops and equipment to 
theatres of conflict around the world demonstrates the value the military places on 
HOOS and the reliance on regulations. Once forces engage the enemy total order 
turns to total chaos in an instant; the outcome driven by the protagonists on the 
battlefield. While this aspect is currently outside the scope of this project it is still 
worth making the point that order, at its extreme promotes chaos.   
 
‘Order and Chaos’ as a Model 
The application of the ‘order and chaos’ model allows the researcher to apply an 
activity-based interpretation to the discussion of any structure, site or organised 
landscape's previous intended use. Utilising that contained within official reports 
covering the closure and subsequent disposal of military bases, complemented by 
local media and oral accounts, the point at which the site transitions from order to 
chaos can be recognised. The level of complexity of the record is dictated by the 
position of the feature or building within the core matrix (fig3-3a). Any discussion on 
abandonment requires a chronological point at which that process begins, this model 
goes someway to providing that point. 
 
Order, Chaos and the ROC Abandonment 
The Royal Observer Corps, up to the point of stand-down in September 1991, can 
be classed as a Highly Structured Organisation, staffed by a predominantly voluntary 
organisation modelled on the full-time military services. Training was compulsory, as 
was weekly attendance and participation in five exercises per year; a uniform was to 
be worn and the organisation had a militaristic rank structure. Processes aligned with 
the Royal Observer Corps are no longer enacted; a primary encounter with the 
organisation is now impossible. However, Highly Ordered Operational Space can be 
inferred and referenced against the official record. Aspects of organisation, technical 
development, maintenance and spatial distribution of artefacts throughout the 
structure appear in documentation that is now freely available (fig.4-16). Moreover, 
the day-to-day staffing and administrative functions can be explored through oral 
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transcription; a specific objective of this project. That said, this is likely to confirm the 
Highly Ordered environment in which the ROC Underground Monitoring Posts 
operated.  
 
The fact that we are able to recognise the level of order placed within the UGMP 
provides the researcher with an opportunity to follow a micro-level detail of 
abandonment.  The lack of Domestic Space, as recognised through the third tier of 
the proposed model, further accentuates this (fig.4-17). Naturally, the larger the site 
under investigation the more complex the issues surrounding the transition from 
‘order to chaos’. This is further compounded by the chronological distance from the 
point of abandonment through to the date any monitoring or study is initiated. That 
said; that complexity can now be predicted with some degree of accuracy. 
 
Fig.4-16 The Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post comprises both forms of 
highly ordered components of order. Encountering a structure still exhibiting such spatial 
organisation is now impossible. (Source: illustration created by Bob Clarke) 
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Fig.4-17. The size of the ROC underground monitoring post makes it simpler to recognise 
the point of abandonment on an ROC post. Personal recollections and imagery are also 
important. (Source: Malcolm Holland - Princes Risborough Post, Bucks closed in 1968) 
 
The peripheral aspects of order are, like some larger sites, evident by ground 
maintenance, the observers themselves mowed the compounds (personal account. 
ROC #55, Horsham Group). Remember, with this model ground maintenance has 
been identified as a constant activity across all core and peripheral zones. As with all 
military or highly ordered sites, prior to September 1991, location and compound size 
were the only deviations from an otherwise clone-like series of structures distributed 
across the landscape. In 2011, those that have survived over 20 years of 
abandonment display interaction with all four facets of the chaos model (human, 
animal, vegetation or meteorologically related actions). Moreover, they present an 
opportunity to study the process of abandonment first-hand, human interaction with 
sites connected to controversial activities, conservation efforts and the local adoption 
of abandoned monuments for both display and other functions. It is to this final 
structure that I now turn, demonstrating that even in the depths of chaos certain 
types of behaviours can be recognised.  
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THE FOUR STATES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 
It quickly became apparent during the initial fieldwork undertaken in 2011, that while 
the Royal Observer Corps posts displayed, individually, unique evidence for human 
interaction, when considered together tentative patterns were recognisable. Further 
planned visits to baseline posts and an increase of the sample sites over the 
following three years increased the visibility of these patterns. Moreover, this was to 
such an extent that I can now offer a series of activity based situations; essentially 
providing a much more detailed framework with which to investigate the 
abandonment process. The implications are great. It is now possible to characterise 
the taskscape (Ingold 1993) of the Observer and the regime that held jurisdiction 
over both the volunteer members and the landscape they inhabited.  Moreover, the 
activities enacted on the sites post-1991 (the Stand-down of the Royal Observer 
Corps) can now be characterised, allowing for the recording, narration and 
description of a class of contentious monuments. This next section introduces those 
recognisable states of abandonment deemed chronologically post the stand-down of 
the organisation. 
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The Basic Framework 
 
Fig.4-18. A flow diagram demonstrating probable interactions with a structure originally 
constructed and operated by a Highly Organised Group - in this case the Royal Observer 
Corps underground monitoring posts - and their relationships. This context of this diagram in 
regards to the order and chaos model is discussed in the following text (Source: Bob 
Clarke). 
 
Overview of Structure 
The move of any structure or site from order to chaos is initiated by a transitional 
phase, this is central to all other activities noted (fig.4-18). The majority of Royal 
Observer Corps posts still extant are in this phase, although some have already 
transited to a ruined or destroyed status (1). Those posts recognised as being in 
covert curation are restored from a position of transition (2); as are those now overtly 
curated and promoted as living museums (3). Importantly a covertly curated site can 
regress to a state of transition. As more posts experience covert curation, a number 
are starting to offer open days. Clearly this declares the existence of a once secret 
site to the public (4) and as such cannot be considered covert from that point. That 
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said, some sites are known, or suspected to be in existence, but not confirmed 
through public promotion (5). A further interaction is that between the site and a 
statutory body. In this case no recognisable effect on the structure is noted, although 
the state of the structure often mirrors the surrounding landscape.  
 
Overt Curation 
Overt curation, as the title suggests, is the point in an ROC post's lifecycle where it is 
maintained to a high standard and the existence of the post is outwardly promoted to 
the wider society. The group who usually undertake such activities often retired 
observers or have a strong affinity with the organisation; this includes family or 
dependants of former ROC members and are often members of the Royal Observer 
Corps Association. The activities involved in curation include the imposition of some 
original regulatory aspects of a highly organised organisation, especially the 
originality of equipment and post layout. Furthermore, the role of the post is to 
educate the wider community about the work the ROC undertook on their behalf and 
as such are publicised as a form of living museum. Open days are publicised 
through a number of channels, (social media is increasingly important in this area) 
and the public are encouraged to experience first-hand the secret world of the 
observer during their nuclear reporting role (fig.4-19).  
 
 
Fig.4-19. On Overtly Curated 
sites the onus is on education 
and experience. This is an 
annual open day at W-5 Great 
Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The key 
activity being a decent into the 
secret world of the observer. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 
04/08/2012) 
 
 
Overtly curated posts are not solely directed at the public. Many of those who 
maintain such sites tend to be members the original post crew, or members from 
posts nearby. It is likely that this form of membership, especially when interacting 
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with familiar landscape monuments, displays a form of remembrance - one that 
replaces the group that was ‘lost’ in September 1991 - it also acts as a form of 
association, even if not in the official ROC Association. One such group operates in 
North Wiltshire, the discussed their activities during a military exhibition in 2013 at 
Lacock, Wiltshire August 17 2014.  
 
Interviewer (IV) – Are you fellas part of the ROC Association now? 
Observer (Obs.) - No, all got too ‘political’, besides it was at Winchester, never 
had chance of a pint after meetings! 
(IV) - Ah, yes I can see how that could get in the way a bit. So you guys are all 
local then? 
(Obs.) - Yes, two of us live down the road about 5 minutes’ walk. He (points 
them out) lives at Chisledon and those two are from Swindon for their sins! 
Others dip in and out. Our section commander, he lives at Chissy [Chisledon] 
as well, usually gets to the pub once or twice a month. 
(IV) - So you use a pub for meetings? 
(Obs.) - yes, the Waggon and Horses at Beckhampton [Avebury]. Every 
Tuesday, we discuss the old days and usually moan about them over a few 
drinks. We had observers from four posts represented the other week. Ours is 
the only post maintained so we need help organising things like our annual 
barbeque and which [country] shows to attend. We don’t have all the kit you 
see, and it’s almost impossible to buy anything at a sensible price off eBay 
these days, these fellas lend their kit so we can present the post as originally 
as possible. They come and help out too. 
Overt curation works on a number of levels. Outwardly facing is the will to accept the 
public into a once secret society. The public are allowed access to the site, see all 
the instrumentation and are instructed in the craft of nuclear reporting by the very 
people who did it for real. Considering the ROC post, the landscape is one clearly 
demonstrating curation. New or good order paint, repairs and a compound recently 
mowed are all likely indicators that the post is maintained. Below ground follows a 
similar trend. Again the furnishing and fittings are in good order, usually the bunks 
are positioned in the correct place and no material culture, other than that related 
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directly to the organisation, appears present. A search online often brings forwards 
information about events and photographs are available through subject specific 
websites and social media. Overt Curation is the closest category to that of an 
‘ordered’ state, initially the appearance is one of a managed landscape, promoted as 
a historical site and high levels of originality. Overt Curation is, however, a state of 
chaos. Equipment is seldom laid out as it would have been during operational 
phases. There is far more information on posters on the walls of the underground 
monitoring post and, revealing many volunteers’ passion for aviation, posters of 
various aircraft. One of the key aspects of the public’s experience is through the 
physical encounter of the control room, at this point the actual layout of equipment 
becomes void; descending into the depths of the British countryside and 
experiencing the small control room lit using 12volt battery lights reinforces the 
unpleasantness of a prolonged period underground. It is this that the observers wish 
to relay to the public. 
Covert Curation 
Covert curation is a state whereby the Royal Observer Corps post is owned by an 
individual or group and is fully or partially maintained, although, those who are 
associated with the post are not necessarily former members of the organisation who 
built or operated the site. The motivation for covert curation is a more complex 
behaviour than overt curation. It appears that interactions with the post are more 
likely to be acts of remembrance than education, certainly levels of self-gratification 
are apparent. This form of curation is on the increase starting from a transitional 
point during the ROC post's life-cycle. A further consideration not connected to other 
forms of ROC post interaction is the issue of financial incentives; in chapter 7 this is 
discussed in detail, although, it is clearly a motivator and should be considered here 
too.        
Covert curation can have similar visual cues to those posts overtly curated, 
especially the above ground components; tidy compounds repairs to concrete 
structure above ground and paint in good order all point to maintenance activities. 
Below ground the posts can be laid out in a number of ways, the main drive appears 
to be to replicate a close resemblance to the original post layout. This brings with it a 
specific series of problems. As with any organisation there is a specific material 
culture that defines the group, in this case the most obvious items are those that 
carry the monogram of the Corps (fig.4-19). Although to the covert curator other 
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items are far more important - the instrumentation and equipment that made the 
ROC post operational. This sort of material is in short supply and has become 
increasingly difficult to source, subsequently, in recent years such equipment has 
attracted premium prices; the same can be said of the value of the post structure too 
(see chapter 7 for a description of the implications for ROC posts). By far the most 
interesting behaviour until the rise of the social media presence of post restorers has 
been a total lack of communication with the groups. A range of communication 
methods (emails, landline, mobile, leaving a calling card on the posts themselves 
and letters) raised no responses what-so-ever. Subsequently, any ROC post clearly 
under some sort of maintenance regime but is, to all intense and purpose still within 
a secret regime, is classified as ‘covertly curated’. 
 
 
 
Fig.4-19 The Royal Observer Corps Badge. This 
particular monogram dates from the immediate post-
World War II regeneration of the organisation. It depicts 
an Elizabethan period signaller below the Kings Crown. 
To the covert curator this symbol denotes authenticity 
and belonging. (Courtesy: ROC Museum)   
 
 
 
Transitional 
All Royal Observer Corps posts have, at one time or another experienced a 
transitional phase, indeed, no post recorded in this project appears to have entered 
any other state without first being ‘abandoned’ for a period of their life-cycle. Some 
(D-20 Hornscross, Devon; W-1 Alderbury, Wiltshire) may have, at one time, 
experienced a period of overt or covert curation; although, they are currently in a 
state chaos, due to the intervention of the key elements of the chaos model (animal, 
vegetation, meteorological and human). Structural components above ground tend to 
be in a poor state of repair; the compound is often slighted or totally removed 
although material such as concreate fence posts are still on site (fig.4-20). It is also 
possible that the compound is utilised for other purposes. At D-46, Torrington, 
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Devon, a piece of farm machinery was stood within the fence line, at D-37, Tiverton, 
Devon the structure of the underground post and surrounding compound has been 
converted to a radio ham station. The post structure is devoid of practically all 
furniture, ensuring D-37 is classified as ‘transitional’. In most cases the compound 
area is full of substantial regeneration, small saplings and briers making up the 
majority of species. The entrance and vent stacks are usually damaged by a mixture 
of weather, especially rain and frost, acting in areas already damaged by the 
destructive visitor. Grills for both the vent and entrance stack are increasingly 
missing, possibly the activity of those covertly restoring another post, and the hatch 
is often bent and twisted and loose on its mounts (fig.4-21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4-20. D-27, Modbury 
underground monitoring 
post. Devon The debris 
created by removal of the 
ROC post compound has 
been dumped on the post 
itself (note fixed survey 
meter at centre-right of 
picture) (Source: Bob 
Clarke 02/04/13) 
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Fig.4-21. D-47 Whitestone, Devon, the entrance hatch has been forcibly opened, snapping 
one of the hinges. This form of interaction allows water to ingress the control room, 
transitioning the structure, in time, from transitional to ruined status. (Source: Bob Clarke 
03/04/13) 
 
Below ground the post can appear to be a micro-landscape of variety. The control 
room can be dry and devoid of material completely, contain some cultural objects 
from the ROC period through to being flooded or completely burnt out. It appears 
that the majority of those posts accessed for this project comprised a control room 
with at least some of the furniture utilised before 1991. In addition, material from the 
wider core area is present, this could be containers, wrappers and plastic drinks 
bottles, although it is usually a mix of all. This material often carries a date and batch 
number; drinks cans can be dated by the material used in their construction as can 
the type of opening system employed. Often this material is discovered at the bottom 
of the entrance shaft (fig.4-22). ROC posts overtly or covertly curated do not have 
material accumulating in this area as it blocks the water catchment sump up, any 
serious amount of water then penetrates into the rest of the structure. 
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Fig.4-22. W-2, Amesbury, Wiltshire. Debris in the sump area is a clear indicator that the post 
is neither covertly or overtly curated. In this instance material dropped in, and that from the 
post itself, can be seen to be mixed, W-2, Amesbury is considered to be a post in transition. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 20/07/2016) 
 
In the control room there can be evidence from a number of sources. Interestingly 
material from the originating organisation is often limited to shelving, the main 
cupboard, chemical toilet and bunks (fig.4-23). We should not be surprised by this. 
Michael Schiffer, when discussing cultural formation processes, noted that items left 
behind are ‘usually bulky or of low replacement cost (2010, 37), I suspect size has 
something to do with this too. Furthermore, interaction is not restricted to removal, 
the addition of material can take a number of forms.  
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Figure. 4-23, D-20 Hornscross, 
Devon, Furniture and fittings, such 
as this cupboard, were standard 
issue to all underground monitoring 
posts. Examples of it were 
consistently located at nearly all 
posts. (Source: Bob Clarke 
01/05/2011) 
 
Candles have been recorded in six posts suggesting more than a fleeting visit; 
furniture is moved around and the walls can be the focus of graffiti. These posts are 
in the last stages of their life-cycles and if left will become completely ruined or 
removed from the landscape.   
 
Ruined or Destroyed 
Those Royal Observer Corps posts identified as ruined or destroyed represent the 
majority of ROC post sites across the project area (in Devon 38 posts out of 53 posts 
were destroyed, while in Wiltshire 8 out of a potential 20 had been removed by the 
baseline survey). This category exposes the dichotomy facing sites constructed to 
withstand the full force of the effects of nuclear weapon detonation but not 
prolonged, unmaintained, periods at the mercy of their environment. As will be 
apparent I have sub divided this category of condition, this is intentional. Structures 
that partially survive in the landscape, although only immovable or cast concrete 
remains have been classified as ‘ruined’ - that is they comprise no external furniture 
such as vent grills or master post fittings (fig.4-24). Hatches can be in place but 
might be welded shut, replaced by other forms of covering, or the entrance stack can 
be covered by a concrete cap or substantial obstacle. Below ground is chaos - often 
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with non-organisation specific material entering the space (fig.4-25). Whether the 
compound fully, or partially, survives at this point is immaterial.  
 
Fig.4-24. W-7, Sutton Veny, 
Wiltshire is a classic 
example of a ruined ROC 
Post. The post has no vent 
stack, or other equipment 
fittings and the entrance 
stack is devoid of grills. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 
07/07/2013)  
 
Fig.4-25. W-7, Sutton Veny, Wiltshire. Below ground the only surviving features are 
components of the bunks, other material has been introduced at some time (corrugated 
sheet), general, non-structured interaction can be seen on the walls. (Source: Bob Clarke 
07/07/2013)  
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Those ROC posts removed from the landscape completely, as I demonstrate in 
chapter 5, do still have a landscape presence. A small number of posts had ground 
zero indicators placed some distance from the underground monitoring post, often 
due to the immediate, topographical location (D-45, Torquay, Devon; D-7, Christow, 
Devon). Furthermore, a destroyed post, if a semi-sunken construction, can still have 
a partial landscape presence. Of 80 posts visited for this project only three (Y-1, 
Bridlington, Yorkshire; D-39, Sharpitor, Devon; W-7, Sutton Veny, Wiltshire) were of 
the semi-sunken type. Structure, D-39, Sharpitor, located on Dartmoor, Devon is the 
subject of a case study in chapter 7. Here the surface structure has been reduced to 
grass level although the earth mound covering the partially buried control room 
remains extant to over a metre high. It is, therefore, possible that a destroyed post 
can still have a visible aspect, although only if topography or geology are problematic 
at the time of construction.  
The control room can survive at a destroyed ROC post, however, it should not be 
accessible. Presumably the majority of posts in this category do have extant sub-
terrainian components as the effort to remove all vestiges of a structure up to three 
metres below ground would seem wasted effort. A description of all those sites 
devoid of any, above ground, features would be pointless, although, the location of 
former post positions using LiDAR (demonstrated in chapter 5) is a useful form of 
remote identification, especially when an ROC posts location is contested or 
inaccurate. 
Discussion 
The archaeology of abandonment, especially when considering contemporary 
archaeological sites, is controversial; that said, the amount of academic work 
currently being undertaken is increasing, as is the range of the subjects being 
researched, the ‘excavation’ of a Ford Transit van adequately demonstrates this 
(Myers 2011, 139). This should not force the researcher to shy away from such 
ventures. Controversy courts archaeological investigation of an ethically complex 
(Zimmerman 2003), or disagreeable nature (Kristeva 1982), it also forces comment 
from the press if the work is unusual or does not conform to the current public view 
of mainstream archaeology (Rathje and Murphy 2001; Bailey et al 2008; Myers 
2011). Indeed, as we move inexorably to the conclusion that the modern world 
contains an ‘archaeology of us’; voices for and against such work are likely to 
become more polarised (Myers 2011, 139). As Newland recommended ‘the 
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increasing engagement with modern and contemporary archaeologies necessitates 
a renegotiation of disciplinary boundaries’ (2004, 45). Unfortunately, these 
boundaries continue to undermine efforts to assimilate the archaeology of recent 
periods into the broader study of material culture (Bailey et al 2007; Strange and 
Walley 2007). 
 
By demonstrating that the sites and landscape of the recent past, in this case the 
landscape and monuments of the Royal Observer Corps, have much to offer in 
archaeological analytical investigation, I hope they will become a more recognised 
aspect of the whole heritage debate. The opportunity to investigate the origins and 
the creation of an archaeological record through a monitoring programme involving 
the underground monitoring posts, and wider Cold War monument landscape, 
should not be missed. It could be argued that the role of analytic activities has 
already been demanded. In 2010 Schiffer noted a five-point requirement for the 
study of cultural formation processes (2010, 31), including the demand that ‘-new 
principles of formation processes could - and should - be obtained through 
experimental and ethnoarchaeological research’ (ibid 2010, 31). Now with the 
realisation that a fixed point can be confidently recognised the process of 
abandonment can be monitored with a high degree of structure from the outset. 
 
Conclusion 
In the opening comments for this chapter it was suggested the study of material 
culture, in this case connected to activities in and around ROC posts, was key to 
understanding monuments constructed specifically for one purpose. It is important to 
recognise that redundant, or organised spaces, connected to the Cold War, were 
once centres of activity populated by groups (often volunteers) who were intent on 
carrying out roles under the most horrific of conditions. As the twentieth century 
recedes from living memory and personal histories to documented accounts and 
understanding utilising archaeological techniques, it is important that the correct 
interpretation is offered to those who encounter such sites as aspects of their past. It 
would be all too easy to note underground monitoring posts as simply observation 
sites to monitor the effects of nuclear warfare - this basic description pervades every 
Heritage Environment Record. With the current model it has been demonstrated that 
a humanised landscape, a landscape that clearly contains more than simple 
monuments to the folly of the Cold War. In this landscape a number of groups are 
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recognisable through their activities and interactions with underground monitoring 
posts; if we are to adequately discuss the landscape construct this level of detail is 
required as a minimum. Only then can the real Cold War landscape begin to be 
contextualised in anything like adequate detail. The next section attends to the 
landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps, placing the field monuments in 
a recognisable taskscape.     
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CHAPTER 5: THE LANDSCAPE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER 
CORPS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the following chapter the reader is introduce to the landscape archaeology of the 
Royal Observer Corps. It concentrates specifically on the Cold War period and the 
structures developed during that time, including the three field monuments placed in 
the landscape during that period. Specific reference is made to the functional 
differences between types, their location, and how they appear to the local 
population; a number of issues relating to topography are also explored. This chapter 
is a precursor to the results of the fieldwork and exploration of the relationships 
between the public and the ROC. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of 
chronological longevity in the landscape and allows for the introduction of the order 
and chaos model intended to formalise the material culture encountered on ROC 
sites. 
Britain’s role in the Cold War has been promoted by successive Governments as 
one of passive defence, that is to say all military activities, including the possession 
of nuclear weapons, are purely defensive in nature. It is incorrect to suggest that a 
landscape orientated towards passiveness could dominate the military landscape 
across the United Kingdom. Paradoxically, to consider oneself a passive participant 
in conflict demands that a state present an offensive posture. The most recognisable 
aspect of this is the continued maintenance of a nuclear deterrence. Whilst the 
weapons systems are promoted as defensive, the fact that they were deployed on 
submarines on a state of readiness throughout the Cold War places them in an 
offensive role. Subsequently, it is often difficult to recognise the true nature of the 
components of the British defence landscape. In 1999, Gold and Revill published an 
account of the ‘landscape of defence’, suggesting a specific component of the 
material remains of the activity could be quantified. In this early work they provide us 
with a definition that holds true over fifteen years later. 
Landscapes of Defence’ are regarded as landscapes shaped or otherwise 
materially affected by formal or informal defensive strategies to achieve 
recognizable social, political or cultural goals (Gold and Revill, 1999, 235). 
One such ‘defensive strategy’ of the Cold War was the ability to record the effects of 
nuclear weapons during and after a nuclear strike on Britain. The landscape 
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archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) is a classic manifestation of a 
passive organisation displaying a taskscape concerned only with specific, non-
aggressive, activities. The ROC also provides us with a dichotomy; the organisation 
conforms to a number of Michel Foucault’s key definitions of a heterotopia (1967). 
For the organisation to have a landscape presence there must have been a catalyst. 
For the ROC this catalyst was the development of aerial warfare. Subsequently, the 
ROC was born out of crisis and deviance – a government’s ability to wage war in the 
name of the population – even if not sanctioned by a popular mandate. The 
landscape displays an unfolding history driven by technological advances through 
weapons development. Furthermore the organisation operated within a closed, or 
secret, system, requiring initiation via the signing of the Official Secrets Act.     
This chapter describes the archaeological landscape of the Royal Observer Corps 
within the confines of this project. The archaeology presented here concentrates on 
the organisation’s Cold War activities only – specifically the structures synonymous 
with the ROC, the Orlit post, Underground Monitoring Post and Group Headquarters, 
placing them within a physical and chronological framework. In so doing, it 
demonstrates that, whilst a clandestine organisation, the ROC initiated many diverse 
groups, often not connected directly with its operation, into its ranks by proxy. Each 
architectural type is explained separately, followed by a discussion surrounding the 
complexity of multi-phase landscapes of Cold War defence and the implications this 
has for the study of remembrance and subsequent usage in a landscape setting.  
SAMPLING 
Interpreting the archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and its attendant 
monuments requires a large geographical area to be placed under study. Taken as a 
whole the ROC covered the entire United Kingdom (including the Channel Islands) 
thus conforming to an organisational, not local governmental, geographical structure. 
The history of the organisation was revealed in chapter 3 (above) although it is 
useful at this juncture to remind ourselves of the key dates in the organisations life-
cycle.  This landscape has its origins in the pre-World War II Air Defence of Great 
Britain, an organisation that was formed as a direct consequence of the aerial 
attacks Britain experienced during the 1914-18 conflict (Wood 1992, 16). In 1925 the 
geographical structure was resurrected as a direct consequence of increasing 
European tension (Clarke 2009); by July 1936, a four command system was 
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introduced by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Observer Corps became, via the Air 
Ministry, part of the newly formed Fighter Command (Armitage 1995, 72). The ROC 
(the suffix ‘Royal’ was bestowed in 1941) stood down in May 1945, only to be called 
back to duty 18 months later.  Tension in Central Europe led to restructuring, 
influenced by ever improving radar coverage, the increase in numbers of high 
performance fighter aircraft and, later, the hydrogen bomb (in 1955); all affected 
subsequent changes to the physical landscape of the organisation. 
The fluidity of the organisational structure poses challenges as there is no county 
distribution of ROC sites in the traditional sense. Moreover, the sector and group 
layout, crossing authority boundaries in almost arbitrary fashion, forces the 
investigation of specific landscapes on a less than regional footprint invalid (fig.5-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-1. Map of ROC sectors 
and groups, note that current 
county boundaries are not 
recognisable. (Scientific 
Intelligence Officers’ Operational 
Data Book, 1964, HMSO) 
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There is, however, another opportunity for investigating the landscape of the Royal 
Observer Corps that, importantly, allows for the retention of much of the 
organisation’s reporting structure throughout the Cold War period. The sampling of 
sites for this thesis subsequently relies on another Cold War landscape, the Home 
Defence Region, specifically Home Defence Region 7 (HDR7).  HDR7 comprises 
seven counties (Cornwall; Devon; Dorset; Wiltshire; Gloucestershire; Somerset; 
Avon) , the majority of which, crucially, have extensive coastlines. Coastlines provide 
a definitive boundary to the research area, simplifying the area of interest. 
Furthermore, the entire reporting structure of the organisation - everything from ROC 
post to Sector Headquarters - is available for scrutiny if this approach is adopted. 
 
Home Defence Regions 
The Home Defence Region (HDR) layout used in this thesis has its origins in post-
World War I Britain during a time of increased political tension both in Britain and 
Europe (Cocroft et al 2003,197). By the mid-1930s, the rise of political extremism 
across the Continent had forced the British government to start an ambitious re-
arming programme (Morgan 1992, 552). A key focus of this programme was the 
manufacture of aircraft and construction of aerodromes. With the threat of large 
scale devastation across British cities inflicted by fleets of enemy bombers, the 
government revisited the HDR. The premise was that London would be a likely target 
in any future conflict and a concerted effort by the enemy could reduce or remove 
central government control for extended periods. Accordingly, the geographical 
landmass of the United Kingdom was divided into 12 areas, designated as Home 
Defence Regions (HDR). Any disabling of central government, via ordnance damage 
or invasion, would be countered by devolving power to a Regional Commissioner 
who was located in a protected location within each HRD (McCamley 2002, 153). 
The network was stood down in 1945, however, as tensions grew over the blockade 
of Berlin (through 1948-9) by Soviet forces the British government renewed both its 
Civil Defence commitment and the Home Defence Region network (Fig.5-2) 
(Campbell 1982, 114). Throughout the remaining Cold War period, the HDRs 
changed little, save the inclusion of Dorset into HDR7.  
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Fig.5-2. Map of Civil Defence 
Regions (England and Wales) and 
Zones (Scotland). Note this map is 
prior to Dorset being moved to 
Home Defence Region 7.  
(Scientific Intelligence Officers’ 
Operational Data Book, 1964, 
HMSO) 
 
The Sample Utilised Within This Project 
Demonstrating specific behaviours enacted on Royal Observer Corps posts requires 
a sample size that provides a degree of geographical separation between ROC 
posts; Home Defence Region 7 adequately provides for this. It comprises both the 
primary study area (Devon) where a total of 53 posts were constructed, and 
secondary study area (Wiltshire), comprising a potential 20 posts. Importantly, both 
counties are geographically separate reducing the potential for similar groups 
interacting with posts in each area. A number of ROC posts in the five remaining 
counties encompassed by HDR7 have also been recorded as they have been 
encountered (Fig.5-3). ROC post recording in these five counties has been driven by 
the activities suspected or known prior to the visit, for example C-17 Veryan Post, 
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Cornwall. Here there is a complex history of ownership and presentation, including 
tensions between a local group and the local authority. 
Fig.5-3. The Home Defence Region layout for early 1980 overlaid with the ROC Group 
Footprint of the same period. (HDR map from Community Adviser Training Course, 1983, 
HMSO. Group overlay in pink after Wood 1992, 251) 
 
Furthermore, Home Defence Region 7 contains the entire hierarchical organisation 
of the Royal Observer Corps and United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring 
Organisation (UKWMO), offering an opportunity to study command and control up to, 
and including, governance. This is important as only when the entire structure of the 
organisation is considered can a fully contextualised picture of activities be 
understood in any detail. 
Examples from counties outside Home Defence Region 7 – primarily in Yorkshire – 
have been limited to those that display multi-period activity. This includes a 
monument sequence comprising at least an Orlit post and Underground Monitoring 
Post (UGMP) as well as those located within archaeologically sensitive areas such 
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as Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire. Here an Orlit and UGMP are built into the top of 
an Anarchy Period siege mound (Parishes: Pickering 1923) and have subsequently 
attracted statutory protection (National Monument No: 32662).  
 
THE LANDSCAPE OF CONTROL 
The control of the Royal Observer Corps was the responsibility of two radically 
different government organisations over the period of the Cold War. From 1947 to 
1955, the Air Ministry utilised the ROC in a supplementary role, deploying the war-
proven skills of the organisation to plug a radar gap. It would be a decade before the 
network of radar stations were well equipped enough to provide total coverage 
across the United Kingdom (Hansard: Henderson 1951, text block 247 – 248). In this 
period the Royal Observer Corps was controlled via an organisational structure 
reminiscent of that used during World War II. From 1947, Group Headquarters were 
often located in redundant operations buildings, recently vacated by the Royal Air 
Force (Group 10, Exeter was housed in the ex-RAF sector operations room at 
Poltimore Park), or original purpose built wartime structures such as that at 
Knavismire, York (Cocroft et al 2003, 174).  
UKWMO 
In 1955 the Home Office introduced a new organisational structure, the United 
Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). It was to provide 
confirmation of a nuclear strike on the United Kingdom, warn of imminent radioactive 
fallout and advise national authorities accordingly. The UKWMO was a scientific 
body comprising staff from the Meteorological Office, a range of government and 
volunteer scientific officers and representatives from the armed services, the utilities 
and government. The Royal Observer Corps, with its distribution of posts across the 
United Kingdom, became the Field-Force of the UKWMO.  In 1957, the entire 
network experienced a period of upgrades, including the relocation of posts and 
Group Headquarters (ROC 1989, 7).  The first new Group Headquarters became 
operational at Maidstone, Kent in 1960; 31 locations were originally identified, 
although by 1960 this appears to have been reduced to 29 (Cocroft et al 2003, 187). 
There were a number of designs, and in some cases old structures were, again, 
reused. Within the thesis sample area three Group Headquarters were in operation: 
Group 10 Exeter (1961); Group 11 Truro (1963); and Group 12 Bristol (refurbished 
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Anti-Aircraft Operations Room 1959).  The surface structure located in the town of 
Truro was demolished in 2003 (Lawrence Holmes pers commm 2010) (Fig.5-4).  
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-4. Group 11 Truro in the 
process of demolition in 2003. 
(Image courtesy of Lawrence 
Holmes) 
 
Extant Landscape  
At this time the Southern Sector was administered from a redundant Anti- Aircraft 
Command bunker at Lansdown; 4 kilometres north-north-west of Bath, Avon. Anti-
Aircraft Command was under the control of the Royal Artillery. By 1951 a mixture of 
684 fixed and mobile anti-aircraft gun positions had been readied across the United 
Kingdom organised into 33 Gun Defended Areas (GDA) (McCamley 2002, 114; 
Cocroft et al 2003, 147). In all but a few cases, each GDA was provided with a new, 
semi-sunken Anti-Aircraft Operations Room (AAOR). The organisation was 
disbanded in March 1955 as the concept of shooting down invaders into British 
airspace with shells had become increasingly discredited, due to the increasing 
height and speed of military aircraft by this time. The AAOR at Lansdown thus stood 
empty until the Home Office restructuring of the ROC Southern Sector in 1958. Until 
then the Sector had been commanded from RAF Rudloe Manor, Wiltshire, part of the 
vast government complex at Corsham (McCamley 2002, Phimester and Tait 2014). 
The Lansdown site was remote, although in this case, owes more to the original 
location of the structure than it does pre-planning. Whilst there appears to be no 
reference to the site on Ordnance Survey maps prior to 1960, the  headquarters  is 
recorded a decade later as a ‘Royal Observer Corps Operational Headquarters’ 
(Fig.5-5). In the early 1980s a suite of offices for the United Kingdom Warning and 
Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was built – a requirement of the 1979 Home 
Defence Review – to house new computerised equipment. 
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Fig.5-5. Ordnance Survey map extract from 1972. The Royal Observer Corps facility is 
clearly noted. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service) 
 
A site visit on 23 May 2012 for this project revealed that little survives of the original 
fixtures and fittings, save a display board utilising a number of map panels and a 
brief description of the structure’s previous history. The air conditioning system 
ducting from the original 1950s AAOR is extant, as are later additions on the roof of 
the bunker, including a plinth for a Ground Zero Indicator. The site was substantially 
refurbished in 2005 by the Avon Fire Brigade (Fig.5-6); it now houses a suite of 
disaster training scenario classrooms and theatres. The adjacent structures once 
occupied by the UKWMO are now home to the offices of the Brigade.  Hierarchically, 
Lansdown was the central point to which all information from Truro (Group 11) and 
Exeter (Group 10) would flow. 
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Fig.5-6. Lansdown, Avon. Southern Area UKWMO Headquarters and ROC 12 Group 
Headquarters looking north. The original AAOR is central to the image with the grey roof. 
The later UKWMO offices are to the left of the image. (Source: Bob Clarke 12/06/2006)  
 
Exeter, Group 10 Headquarters 
Exeter Group 10 Headquarters is situated in a well investigated rural landscape 
(Creighton, Cunningham and French 2013). It is located on a minor road from 
Pinhoe, Devon towards the hamlet of Poltimore. The site is multi-phase, comprising 
both World War II and Cold War structures, with further buildings in the immediate 
environs. The Royal Observer Corps Group 10  headquarters  was, from 1947, 
housed in the redundant RAF Sector Operations Room, originally connected to RAF 
Exeter (Fig.5-7). When the Group was provided with a new protected surface 
structure in 1961, the wartime site was retained for training and office space. At the 
time of the site visit for this project (08 August 2012), both structures were in use as 
recreational facilities, owned by a paintball company. 
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Fig.5-7. The Ex-RAF Sector Operations Room at Poltimore Park. The building was used by 
the UKWMO and ROC as No. 10 Group  headquarters  until 1961. (Source: Bob Clarke 
08/08/2012) 
Structure 
The Home Office-designed protective structure (completed by 1961) measured 32m 
by 13m in plan and was double storied at the centre to accommodate the control 
room. Entry to the structure (Fig.5-8) was via a decontamination room and then to a 
central corridor which runs the entire length of the building. To the left were the 
domestic rooms (dormitories, toilets, restrooms), whilst the operational aspects of the 
structure lay to the right (control room, communications, plant room). Group 10  
headquarters retains some features contemporary with the operation of the ROC 
warning and monitoring function. These include tote boards (Fig.5-9) in the control 
room, and the diesel generator and filtration system is in situ in the plant room. Much 
of the structure has been damaged by fire or the effects of smoke, some walls have 
been punched through and paint from the current use is evident across the site.  
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Fig.5-8. Entrance to Group 10 Headquarters at Poltimore Park, Devon. Note the pseudo-
military reuse of the site today. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/08/2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-9. Tote boards survive at the Group 10 Headquarters. Each number signifies an 
UGMP. 50 denotes Modbury, one of the posts studied in this project. (Source: Bob Clarke 
08/08/2012)   
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Visibility in the Landscape 
The Sector  headquarters  at Bristol is difficult to see from any other vista than above 
(Fig.5-6), although it is clearly marked on the Ordnance Survey map once the site is 
signed over in 1958 to the Home Office (Wood 1992, 268). The Group  headquarters 
at Poltimore Park, Exeter can be seen clearly from the M5 but is itself on a minor 
road. This suggests that when it was first designated the site would be fairly 
secluded. The Group  headquarters  site in Truro was close to the centre of town and 
could not possibly be hidden in any way. Exeter and Truro Group headquarters  are 
correctly depicted on map sheets dating 1967 and 1968 respectively (Fig.5-10 and 5-
11).  A number of trees are noted at Poltimore Park (fig.5-11), which appear to 
surround the site, possibly shrouding it from view. However, a site visit on 29 
January 2015 noted that the trees were too dispersed to be intended to obscure the 
structures inside the compound from view. Interestingly this topic was discussed by 
Cocroft et al who discovered the majority of trees were planted specifically for their 
aesthetic value (2003, 242) rather than obstructive qualities, as had been originally 
thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-10. Truro Group 11  headquarters  1967. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An 
Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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We are subsequently presented with a dichotomy. This project is investigating 
heterotopias in a Cold War landscape; surely then it cannot be expected that sites so 
overtly placed in the landscape – especially when located in the centre of town – a 
component of this project. In reality, this is an example of the Cold War suggesting a 
restricted space yet offering no hint as to the activities enacted within. Access was 
restricted to such sites, ensuring only those initiated into the activities required by the 
British Government in pursuit of its own political remit were allowed entrance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-11. Exeter Group 10  headquarters  1968. (© Crown Copyright/database right 
2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
All components of the Royal Observer Corps facilities were surrounded by security 
fences. Out on the underground monitoring posts, a 122cm (48inch) high chain link 
fence enclosed the site. The fencing comprises two inch square, galvanised, wire 
supported by three strands of galvanised wire themselves supported by square 
concrete posts with a rounded top. An entrance gate allows entrance to the sounded 
space, these are often constructed using angle iron, although there are a number of 
locally manufactured examples. Those fences encountered through fieldwork are 
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very reminiscent of stock proof fencing, enclosing a space and deterring visitors from 
entering, although not totally excluding them visually.    
The fencing around Group Headquarters was a far more substantial structure. This 
time it was 244cm (96inches) high, with the final 30cm projecting forward away from 
the compound, acting as a deterrent to climbing. The same galvanised chain link as 
on the UGMPs was used for the vertical aspect, although the projecting aspect 
comprises three strands of barbed, or later, razor wire. This type of fence is a clear 
physical barrier to those who wish to enter; the height of the structure and the final 
projection exerts an authority on those standing close to it; even the view of the 
facility beyond is partially obscured by the chain link and signs declaring this a quasi-
military installation. Considering the taskscape element of this formalised landscape 
Tim Ingold reminds us: 
‘- it is important to note that no feature of the landscape is, of itself, a 
boundary. It can only become a boundary, or the indicator of a boundary, in 
relation to the activities of the people (or animals) for whom it is recognized or 
experienced as such.’ (Ingold 1993, 156) 
When we consider the role of the security fence in an urban location, a number of 
tensions can be identified. Despite the height of the fence is it cannot remove the 
visual aspects of those structures and activities enacted within the confines of the 
barrier. Utilitarian structures around the compound have a view into such regulated 
spaces, as does anyone passing by the entrance or fence. Indeed, facilities located 
in such urban settings hint at ‘overt subterfuge’ – a classic representation of a 
heterotopic environment – that ‘other space’ as Michel Foucault notes (1967). 
Naturally, this does not apply to all command aspects of the Royal Observer Corps 
and UKWMO structures, although it can be recognised as to why this is. Southern 
Sector  headquarters  at Lansdown, Bristol and Group 10  headquarters  at Poltimore 
Park, Exeter are both remote sites and thus their level of public visibility is 
subsequently reduced. Exeter can be seen from the main arterial roadway from, and 
to, the south-west (the M5 motorway), yet is physically located on a minor road; 
therefore, only local traffic would have encountered the structure during pursuit of 
their own activities. Bristol is even more secluded, situated 700m down a single lane 
track and would require a concerted effort to view, encounters were even less likely 
here. One benefit of such seclusion has manifested itself in the preservation of the 
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group  headquarters  nationally. Those sites within urban areas have – in many 
cases –been demolished as the land they stand on has a very high commercial 
value; structures dispersed in the landscape tend to be utilised in other ways. 
This overt landscape of command, displaying itself through Ordnance Survey maps, 
large monolithic concrete structures and substantial fences, is not restricted to the 
Royal Observer Corps; rather such structures came to symbolise the Cold War and 
Britain’s intent (more accurately by 1960, the machinery of government) to survive a 
nuclear strike. The next section explores the landscape of the Orlit post, the first 
structural type to appear on the landscape that was specifically designed with 
aggression from the Soviet Union in mind. 
THE LANDSCAPE OF THE ORLIT POST 
The Orlit Visual Reporting Post, or Orlit post as the structure quickly became known, 
is one of the few monuments connected with the Cold War that provides the 
researcher with an opportunity to investigate a defined chronological period of the 
organisation’s life cycle. The post design (there were two versions), purpose and 
operation was so specific that those surviving as landscape monuments today do so 
virtually without modification. Moreover, the Orlit post stands testament to the speed 
at which technologies and, to a lesser extent, organisations could, and were, 
rendered redundant by scientific breakthroughs during the Cold War arms race. 
Surprisingly, this was often at the point of their introduction or very soon afterwards. 
In the case of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) the operational usefulness of the 
aircraft monitoring role was less than a decade, and within that decade the Orlit post 
saw just five years’ service.  
Importantly, the Orlit post bridges the gap between the regeneration of the Royal 
Observer Corps in the immediate post-World War II era, defined as an ‘age of 
innocence’ where the atomic bomb was still upheld by many as a credible and 
acceptable component of the ‘free world’s’ arsenal (Newhouse 1989, 52). And, as 
Albert Wohlstetter noted in his work in 1959, ‘The Delicate Balance of Terror’ 
became imposed on the world by the development of the immensely more powerful 
hydrogen bomb. However, the structure also presents a number of problems for the 
researcher. Their use as a platform for aircraft surveillance and reporting is not in 
question, despite the fact that some parts of the Orlit post’s life-cycle remain 
unattended to through the current literature and published accounts of the ROC. 
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Were the structures manufactured in the same place or at a number of sites across 
the United Kingdom and, more importantly to this project, what was the criteria used 
to decide whether a Type ‘A’ or Type ‘B’ post appeared in a particular landscape? 
Moreover, how were the structures seen by the observers operating on later, 
underground monitoring posts on the same site, can we recognise remembrance in 
this instance?  
The Structure 
The Orlit post was a simple structure manufactured to a standard design. Precast 
concrete slabs were pinned or bolted together to produce a rectangular box 3.05m 
by 2.03m in plan (10ft by 6ft 8in). Access was via a wooden door leading into a small 
covered area 1.52m high by 1.06m wide (5ft by 3ft 6in). This area acted as a shelter 
from the elements, an equipment store and also housed the communications board, 
basically a telephone and place to hard-wire headsets used for real time plotting. To 
the immediate right of the entrance was a sliding door providing access to the 
observation platform. The platform was open to the elements, although it was 
covered by a corrugated, removable, tin roof when not in use. Central to the 
observation platform was a square plinth comprising four sections of angle iron 
bolted into the concrete floor, providing rigidity to a surrounding timber cladding. On 
top of this structure the post instrument was mounted and used to plot the bearing 
and altitude of suspicious aircraft. Two variations of the structure appear on the 
landscape: Type ‘A’, constructed directly onto a concrete base at ground level (Fig,5-
12) and Type ‘B’, standing 1.82m (6ft) above ground on four precast concrete legs 
(Fig,5-13). In total, 413 Orlit posts were erected in almost equal numbers, 207 Type 
A; 206 Type ‘B’, across the United Kingdom (Cocroft et al. 2003, 175).  
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Fig.5-12. An Orlit Type ‘A’ at Farnham 
2/N.1, Surrey. Observers visually tracking 
a pair of Gloster Javelins acting as 
intruders on an exercise in 1958. (Original 
picture taken by Press Associates 1958; 
Image now part of the author’s collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-13. Diagram showing 
the internal arrangements 
of a Type ‘B’ Orlit Post. (© 
English Heritage 
Permission No: 2937 22 
March 2013) 
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Messrs. Orlit Ltd, Manufacturer? 
In early 1951, the Air Ministry requested tenders from industry to provide the ROC 
with a purpose-built structure. It had to be capable of sheltering crews from the wind, 
while also providing a stable, level platform from which to mount aircraft tracking 
equipment. Current literature has it that the contract was awarded to Messrs’ Orlit 
Ltd, Colnbrook, Buckinghamshire (Wood 1992, 206; McCamley 2002, 125; Cocroft et 
al. 2003, 175). Moreover, the suggestion is that posts originated from one central 
point, being delivered in sections for ease of transportation to a wide range of 
locations (ibid 2003, 175). This is somewhat deceiving as a number of Orlit posts 
surveyed during research for this thesis display subtle differences. The problem 
requires expansion if we are to fully appreciate the Orlit post landscape and explain 
the archaeology that remains extant. 
Messrs’ Orlit Ltd, proficient in the construction of precast concrete structures, had 
manufactured air raid shelters and emergency housing during World War II (Kohan 
1952, 428). In the immediate post-war period, the company under the Housing 
(Temporary Accommodation) Act 1944, as amended by Section 5 of the Buildings 
Material Act 1945, provided a large amount of replacement housing, utilising precast 
components. In total, the Act made provision for a number of construction 
contractors to build 158,748 houses (ibid 1952, 428). Designed by Czech architect 
Erwin Katone, the majority of Orlits were built in Scotland where – crucially - the 
company had a production plant (Grinrod 2013, 33). Housing construction was, at 
the time, high on the government’s agenda with companies courted by eager 
politicians: 
With regard to the prefabricated houses I welcome the Orlit Company. I have 
been able to aid them in getting their factory at Edinburgh and in securing for 
them a licence for a factory near Glasgow. They are now in negotiation for a 
fairly large contract from my native city. I want to see them succeed in their 
work in Glasgow, because they are part of my efforts. 
HOUSING (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL Mr George 
Buchanan, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Labour. 
HC Deb 19 March 1946 vol 420 cc1698-818 
 
 165 | P a g e  
By the time the Air Ministry had decided to provide a number of posts with new 
facilities in the early 1950s, Messrs. Orlit Ltd was a substantial government 
contractor. Assembly of the Orlit designed structure started in 1952 and was finally 
completed by mid- 1955 (Wood 1992, 207; Cocroft et al. 2003, 175). By 1955 over 
1500 ROC posts were back in action, 413 of them with the new Orlit post structure. It 
is accurate to suggest that the posts were supplied as a ‘flat pack’, although 
logistically such heavy objects must have been manufactured in, and delivered from, 
more than one location. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the manufacture of 
Orlit posts must have been contracted out to a number of local construction firms. 
One such instance of contracted manufacture has come to light.  The Melton 
Constable Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works, Norfolk made a number of pre-
cast concrete items for its own business (NRM 2007), including a number of Orlit 
post panels (Stephen Wright pers comm 29 September 2014). This assumption can 
be tested through the surviving archaeology. As described earlier the sample for this 
thesis is geographically wide-spread. Subsequently a number of small regional 
variations were noticeable during recording. While the majority of concrete panels 
utilised in the construction of the Orlit post bare no markings a small number do 
indicate a method of assembly.  
Reminiscent of carpenters’ marks often encountered on timber or stone structures 
(Brunskill 1999, 35), at least two examples display information for those who would 
later assemble the structure in the field. Those marks executed using a finger in the 
wet concrete cast provide a possible tracker for the identification of other Orlit panels 
manufactured at the same place. Unfortunately, they convey little other information 
(Fig.5-14). The stencilled identifications found at Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire allow 
us to deduce some of the circumstances surrounding the manufacture of posts by 
contracted civilian organisations (Fig.5-15). The majority of panels at Y-3 Pickering 
display a stencilled code, either: OPR; OPR2; OP1; OP2 or OP9, it is clear OP 
represents Observer or Orlit Post. If this is the case then those manufacturing the 
panels would have, generally, understood the role of the ROC. This represents a 
level of initiation into the organisation by those who were not actually members of the 
ROC. This can be interpreted as a further component of Foucault’s heterotopia when 
considered alongside wider society (1967). When studying the lifecycle of the Orlit 
post there is clearly a connection between manufacturer and operator. However, the 
role is unlikely to be one of mutual understanding. More likely, the manufacturer 
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understands what the role the components they are making will play in the nation’s 
defence. However, they could not fully describe the activities enacted within the 
space of which those component parts form once assembled.  
Fig.5-14. D-44 Teignmouth, Devon. Orlit Type ‘B’. Floor planks bearing two distinct marks. 
‘F’ and ‘B’, both capitalised and executed using a finger in the, still wet, concrete cast. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 10/07/2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-15. Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire. Orlit 
Type ‘A’. Stencilled panel markings to aid 
assembly. (Source: Bob Clarke 07/06/2014). 
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The Question of Positioning 
The Orlit post poses a further significant question in so much as there are two 
variants, the Type ‘A’ and Type ‘B’, recognisable within the current archaeological 
record, yet what was the decision process that influenced the positioning of one or 
other type at a certain landscape location?  
Unfortunately, the extant landscape record is not complete enough to suggest trends 
between one or other post type. Almost two decades ago Colin Dobinson, through 
sponsorship by the Council for British Archaeology, produced a series of reports 
covering much of the known archaeological footprint of the Cold War (1998). Using 
documentation covering the distribution of Royal Observer Posts in support of the 
construction of a new radar network, Dobinson identified two locational 
arrangements: Elevated Post Required or Ground Level Post Required (1998, 174). 
No reason for the choice is noted, and the text contains a number of inaccuracies, 
for example the Type ‘B’ post at Teignmouth does not appear in the post record. 
Furthermore, there is no definition in official papers to suggest how many Orlit posts 
were actually constructed in the current project area, further exacerbating the 
situation. The Devon Historic Environment Record utilises Dobinson’s earlier work 
alongside that of Wood’s (1992) and so forth, cannot be considered complete due to 
the inaccuracies this project has recognised during the current research. A search of 
The National Archive and contact with the Royal Observer Corps museum has 
currently revealed nothing of consequence. Moreover, published work avoids the 
question with astonishing briskness (Wood 1992; Dobinson 1998; Cocroft et al 2003; 
Dalton 2011). This is not to be unexpected, especially as it appears that the relevant 
documentation has not survived.  One notion is clear: when investigating the 
surviving archaeology, there appears to be no clear reasoning as to which post type 
is located where it is.  
The extant landscape evidence, slight though it is (just ten posts in the project area), 
demonstrates the problem. At G-1 Rodmarton, Gloucestershire ROC post 3/B3 was 
identified as requiring an elevated Type ‘B’ post (AIR 20/10699). In 1954 a Type ‘B’ 
post was constructed at NGR SU 937 985 (Fig.5-16). Topographically, the post is 
located in an area that is, in the main, uniformly flat. To the north the ground rises 
10m every 500m on average, whilst to the south it drops away at a rate of 20m every 
400m (Fig.5-17). Elevating the observer platform does, in this instance, allow for 
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better 360° visibility. A post at ground level would have to contend with hedge rows, 
which if close to the post could hamper the possibility of locating and tracking low 
flying aircraft. The landscape context is, therefore, central to the decision to erect a 
Type ‘B’ post at his location.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-16. G-1 Rodmarton, 
Gloucestershire 3/B3 
Type ‘B’ Orlit post. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 
31/12/2010) 
 
Fig.5-17. Contour map of area surrounding G-1 Rodmarton 3/B3 (Red Cross in centre). The 
post has almost uninterrupted views around 360°. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. 
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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At D-19 Holsworthy, Devon ROC post 11/B1 was identified for relocation in 1952 
(AIR 20/10699) including the provision of a ground level Type ‘A’ Orlit post; the new 
structure was built in 1953 at NGR SS 352 040 (Fig.5-18). Topographically, the post 
sits at 168m OD and has clear, uninterrupted views across 270° for at least 9km. 
The only high ground lies to the west of the post, although with the nearest coast 
10km to the east it is probable that this direction was the most important focus for the 
observers manning the post (Fig.5-19). Clearly then a Type ‘A’ ground level post was 
adequate at this position. 
 
 
 
Fig.5-18. Type ‘A’ Orlit post 11/B1 located 
at Holsworthy, Devon. (Source: Bob Clarke 
01/05/2011) 
Fig.5-19. Contour map of area surrounding Holsworthy 11/B1. The post has almost 270° 
views. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service) 
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The previous examples appear to work when the topographical aspects of the 
landscape, interact overtly with the visual aircraft reporting remit enacted by the 
Royal Observer Corps during the early Cold War. Where the topography is fairly flat 
an elevated post appears appropriate. Those posts situated on the highest sections 
of ground in the area do not need additional elevation and so are provided with a 
ground level post. Unfortunately, not all appear to conform to this thinking; although, 
when considering the geographical surroundings of an Orlit post reasons for type 
choice become clear.  The most striking examples of counter-intuitive locations/types 
are D-44 Teignmouth, Devon and Y-2 Holme-on Spalding Moor, Yorkshire. 
The Type ‘B’ situated at Teignmouth, Devon, designated ROC post 10/V4 was built 
in 1953 (AIR 20/10699) at location NGR SX 917 751. The post has commanding 
views around 360°, extending at least 7km in any direction; the reason for this is 
because the post is located on the highest point in the area – taking this into 
consideration why does the post require an extra 1.82m? The post looks out across 
Babbacombe Bay and the mouth of the River Teign which provides a straight inland 
route for just over 6km. This also provides low flying aircraft with an inland entry 
possibility, using the high ground on either side of the river as cover. When this is 
taken into account the reason for a Type ‘B’ Orlit post being chosen for this position 
becomes clear.  
 
The topography for the first 100m in the direction of the river and coastline is such 
that a ground level post’s view would be obscured by it. To ensure an unobstructed 
view of probably the most critical observational aspect the post, and more 
importantly the plotting equipment, was raised a further 1.82m from the ground.  
 
This hypothesis can be further explored when considering the landscape position of 
the Orlit Type ‘B’ at Y-2 Holme-on-Spalding Moor, Yorkshire. Designated 18/R4, the 
Orlit post was erected on an existing wartime site known as Beacon Field sometime 
after November 1953, at NGR SE 822 387 (Wood 1992, 319). Views from the post 
appear unobstructed; only in the east does ground stand higher than the post 
although it is 7km distant. Over 270° there is an uninterrupted view of over 15km. 
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Fig.5-20. View from Teignmouth Orlit post Type ‘B’. The River Teign can be clearly seen. 
Reducing the height of the post by 1.82m allows the topography in the foreground to obscure 
this. (Source: Bob Clarke 10/07/2014)  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-21. Holme-on-Spalding Moor visual obstructions if an Orlit Type ‘A’ had been erected. 
(© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Again the answer as to whether a Type ‘A’ or ‘B’ was selected lies in the immediate 
area the post is located within. Beacon Field, as the name suggests, has clearly 
been a point of reference for some time prior to the erection of the Royal Observer 
Corps posts. Topographically, Beacon Field is a flat geological feature formed by a 
remnant of the Mercia Mudstone Group. It extends 500m north-south and is 300m at 
its widest point, the post is located on the highest spot at 46m OD (Fig.5-21). If a 
ground level post had been built at Beacon Field substantial views to the north would 
have been obscured, therefore a Type ‘B’ Orlit post ensures clear views in the north-
east to north-west sectors are uninterrupted. Also areas to the south are more visible 
including the River Humber, Goole and Hull which are all important industrial targets.  
So it would appear that the immediate surroundings of a post, tied to topography and 
key landscape features, drives the type of choice for one post over another. It also 
demonstrates the tactics expected to be employed by enemy aircraft. A clear thought 
process can be demonstrated here, one that suggests each post site was visited and 
an assessment of the key, low flying entry points, topographical cover and industrial 
targets taken into consideration. Certainly, Wood notes that around 300 sites were 
moved during the 1952-55 upgrade period (1992, 208). If this is accurate, and there 
is no reason for dispute, then the topographical location and type of Orlit post chosen 
is a direct consequence of developments in aircraft tactical information and ability.   
I propose that the selection of sites for Orlit posts was carefully considered, it also 
demonstrates a specific type of threat, the fear of low-level incursions from aircraft 
utilising, where possible, topographical aspects of the British mainland. Moreover, 
the Royal Air Force had requested a regeneration of the ROC, post-World War II, to 
carry out the aircraft reporting role, due mainly to the issues with radar development. 
Again, topography was the main issue as aspects of the radar development 
programme (Operation Rotor), in the 1950s, were still struggling with low-level 
detection (Gough 1993; McCamley 2002). Considering all this I can now say that the 
type of Orlit monument located in the field is a direct reaction to the air threat 
considered by the local topology, this explains the apparently counter-intuitive choice 
of Orlit post encountered during this project. It also strengthens my argument that 
monuments constructed during the Cold War do not readily conform to the notion of 
a first and second Cold War demarcated by the years of détente. 
 173 | P a g e  
It is clear then that the Orlit post is a useful indicator of the technologies employed by 
both sides in the Cold War. The construction techniques of the Orlit post mirror the 
post- 1950s, a period which contained a drive for accommodation utilising, where 
possible, concrete (Grinrod 2013) This had two implications. Firstly, concrete 
provided a normalising effect on the structure’s outward appearance, especially 
when encountered by the general public. And secondly, when considered within a 
chronological context, the Orlit post lies within a closed system (Foucault 1967). 
Here rites of admission are required – signing the Official Secrets Act – and the 
population in the 1950s still worked on a ‘need to know’ basis. Subsequently, the 
Orlit post site became a closed taskscape of the ROC; one in which a series of 
activities confined to those dictated by rules and regulations were enacted.  
Interestingly, whilst the activities were bound by official military legislation the 
primary activity was anything other than covert. As I have demonstrated, to gain the 
maximum visual coverage it proved necessary to exaggerate the height of a number 
of the reporting platforms on the landscape. An additional 1.82m elevation of a post 
hardly reduces the structures visibility, yet there appears to be no recorded 
examples of damage caused to posts in this period. Nor did any of the personal 
histories recorded for this project reveal anything. The manufacture of component 
parts also appears to have been a dispersed activity. Whilst the structure, especially 
while in those component parts, does not hint at a particular function, the fact that a 
number of posts have been noted with assembly marks stencilled on them suggests 
the function of the component parts was known. 
 
GOING UNDERGROUND 
Whilst the Orlit post network of the Royal Observer Corps presents an overt 
presence on the landscape, concerned primarily with aircraft reporting, what came 
next was in complete contrast. Certainly by the mid-1950s, it is known that the race 
to develop an air-deliverable hydrogen weapon had seen both East and West in 
possession of a potential to completely destroy each other (Newhouse 1989, 80). 
That success was to radically change public opinion and Government preparedness. 
The latter manifested itself on the landscape as acts of subterfuge, exemplified by 
the construction of structures underground for the preservation of the machinery of 
government (Campbell 1982, 263). This activity was increasingly viewed as deviant 
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by members of public - an activity born out of crisis, the Cold War and weapons of 
mass destruction. Indeed, when Foucault suggested heterotopias (1967) – that 
‘other space’ - he might well have had bunkers in mind. This next section 
investigates the archaeological evidence for the change driven by the development 
of the hydrogen bomb; essentially a move – for the Royal Observer Corps - from 
overt to covert activities that was technologically driven.   
The Shock of the Strath Report 
In 1954, the British government committed to developing a hydrogen weapon; if the 
country was to remain at the world ‘top table’, there was no alternative (Oulton 
1987). Unfortunately, until this became a reality it was clear Britain would have a 
weapons gap, the question was what threat would such a gap represent? William 
Strath was commissioned to chair a committee exploring the threat posed to Britain 
by this alarming new development in mass destruction (Grant 2010, 90). When the 
‘Strath Report’ was published in 1955, it portrayed a picture of a country devastated 
by a small number of the new weapons. The report identified a relatively newly 
recognised phenomenon responsible for this – radioactive fallout. Most troublingly 
there appeared to be nothing that the government could do to stop this most 
dangerous of effects (Hughes 2003). The most the country could hope for was 
adequate and timely warning in advance of the radioactive cloud. Accordingly, Strath 
proposed the formation of a monitoring service with a national distribution along the 
lines of the Royal Observer Corps, throwing the redundant organisation a life-line 
(ibid 2003, 167).  
The proposal could not have come at a better time for the ROC as the plotting of 
aircraft across the refurbished network was becoming increasingly difficult to control. 
A series of exercises in 1954 and 1955, demonstrated that low flying aircraft were 
now operating at such speeds that the observers abandoned instrument plotting and 
use estimation only (Wood 1992, 216). Often an aircraft would appear, pass over the 
observation post and be behind the next visual obstruction before a true bearing or 
identification had been obtained. The problem was that the ROC had been brought 
back into existence to complement the current radar coverage. Unfortunately, 
breakthroughs in radar development were constant, often rendering reporting tactics 
redundant. In another example of technology influencing the archaeology, the radar 
network developed in the immediate post-World War II period, was all but redundant 
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by 1954 (Cocroft et al 2003, 87). Advances throughout the rest of the decade further 
removed aspects of the ROCs aircraft reporting roles by 1955, it was clear the role, 
and the organisation, was redundant. 
 
Mr. Ian Harvey  
Asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is yet able 
to make a statement upon the Government's plans for setting up a national 
monitoring organisation to give warning and to measure radio-activity in the 
event of air attack on the United Kingdom. 
Major Lloyd-George  
Yes. I am glad to be able to inform the House that arrangements are being 
made for the Royal Observer Corps, in conjunction with the Air Raid Warning 
Organisation, to undertake this important new function in addition to their 
existing duties. 
 
15 June 1955, Written Answers (Commons), CIVIL DEFENCE 
Radio-Activity (Warning Organisation) 
HC Deb 15 June 1955 vol 542 c18W 18W 
Discussion surrounding the requirements needed for the Royal Observer Corps to 
assume a nuclear reporting role had been initiated in April 1955 (Dobinson 1998, 
137). The realisation that observers would need a new purpose built structure to 
remain safe and functional was self-evident, as the current post structures provided 
no protection from blast or radiation. By August 1955, architects at the Ministry of 
Works had designed the basic shape of an underground structure intended to house 
instrumentation and at least two observation crew for at least two hours in lockdown 
(ibid 1998, 138). By May 1956 the crew requirement had been increased to four. A 
prototype was constructed at Farnham, Surrey in May 1956; designated 2/C1 the 
post was used for all early equipment and lockdown trials (Wood 1992, 312) (fig.5-
22). Unfortunately, this important Cold War monument was demolished sometime 
between 1998 and 2003.    
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Fig.5-22. An article from January 1957 that appeared in Flight International. The post 
depicted is the prototype built at Farnham in Surrey. Note that it has a radically different 
entrance hatch to all others surveyed for this project. (Flight International 1957) 
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The Underground Monitoring Post 
Construction of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP) structure had to be 
undertaken completely on site. Where the geology permitted, posts were completely 
buried, although semi-sunken examples are evident within the sample area (Y-1 
Bridlington, North Yorkshire; D-39 Sharpitor, Devon; W-7 Sutton Veny, Wiltshire and 
W-12 Cricklade, Wiltshire). The construction method was simple; a hole was dug 
deep enough to ensure the post ceiling was covered with at least 1m of earth. This 
was often achieved using a mechanical digger, although, on occasion, explosives 
were used due to the underlying geology (Wood 1992, 223). A number of techniques 
were then used to create the main, monolithic, concrete box. Construction workers 
laid a concrete floor 5.8m by 2.6m (19ft by 8ft 6in). Reinforcing steel rods were then 
built up along the wall line before being shuttered with either wooden panels or a 
rough brick construction. Following that concrete was poured until a height of 2.3m 
(7ft 6in) had been reached. A roof was laid, again using shuttering, and the vent and 
entry point cast. Holes were cut in the roof for the Bomb Power Indicator, Fixed 
Survey Meter and telephone cable entry point before the whole structure was coated 
in a thick layer of pitch intended to keep out moisture. Finally, the structure was re-
buried (fig.5-23).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-23. The finished structure prior to applying the pitch coat to waterproof the structure 
and then reburial. Note the instrument pipes attached to the roof. Unknown post. (Courtesy 
of The Royal Observer Museum)   
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Imagery showing the construction process has been difficult to locate, as are details 
of who actually built the structures out in the field. However, a chance encounter with 
a family member has shed light on at least one UGMP site. The post being described 
here is Cayton, North Yorkshire 20/P3. The post was moved to this location in 1961 
and then provided with a protected post in March 1964; the post was closed as part 
of the Civil Defence drawdown in 1968. 
“We were contracted, I think, by the Borough Council [Scarborough] to build a 
bunker over at Wheatcroft, sometime in the early 1960s. It was basically a box 
– about the size of a caravan – shuttered and poured in three days. It was 
then blathered with large amounts of road pitch to seal it up before we buried 
it. The whole job took about a month.”                
  Alec Bayes, 12 December 2012. 
The construction effort was conducted on a massive scale. Over 1500 overground 
aircraft reporting posts were already in operation across the country; the problem 
was that not all were in the correct place for nuclear reporting. The new reporting 
role demanded 1,563 posts, which nearly all required a new Underground Monitoring 
Post. The average cost of each structure was put at £1,250, although on a number of 
sites the geological conditions required more than a pick and shovel to excavate, 
pushing the costs up considerably (Wood 1992, 223).   
Field research for this study has identified 53 sites in Devon where Underground 
Monitoring Posts (UGMP) were initially constructed. The first secure reference to an 
UGMP in Devon is D-35 Plympton 10/Q1 (NGR SX 560 510), constructed in April 
1958 (Wood 1992, 285). Fieldwork for this project has noted Plympton has 
subsequently been demolished. The final UGMP was commissioned in July 1964 at 
D-36 Plymstock 10/J2 (NGR SX 498 518) (HER Mon. No. 72368). This post was 
located 200m east of Staddon Fort, a Victorian period structure operated latterly as a 
communications centre for the Royal Navy. It too had been demolished by the time 
of the project baseline survey (2011). There is one anomaly in the Devon record that 
is perpetuated through all currently located records. Wood, Dobinson and the Devon 
HER (Mon. No. 72347) all note D-39 Sharpitor 10/J1 as having an UGMP provided 
by April 1953. Although it has been demonstrated here that the first underground 
structure in the United Kingdom was built in May 1956, a 1953 date is not, therefore 
possible. It is more likely Sharpitor had an Orlit post constructed here in 1953 – 
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certainly there is archaeological evidence to support an Orlit Type ‘A’ being present 
on Peek Hill just a few metres south-east of the current, partially demolished, UGMP.  
 
Landscapes of the posts 
The new nuclear reporting role demanded a high level of restructuring, especially in 
the field. Conveniently, the distribution of underground monitoring posts required to 
establish an effective network broadly resembled that that had been devised in 1953 
for aircraft reporting. Subsequently, the majority of posts were retained, Cocroft et al 
suggest this was as much to do with problems acquiring land as with distribution 
(2003, 180). Certainly, fieldwork for this project has identified a number of multi-
phase sites, including a palimpsest at D-20 Brixham, Devon that demonstrates the 
last three monument changes in one landscape; displaying the lifecycle of the ROC 
from July 1940 to stand-down in 1991. Brixham is the focus of a case study below. 
The Orlit post concerned itself with observation, a notably overt undertaking (in this 
case), the Underground Monitoring Post, while still interested in the observation of 
phenomena, promoted an air of subterfuge. The surface features are slight and 
unremarkable, displaying an air of functionality that can be easily misinterpreted. The 
fieldwork conducted here has not discovered any posts depicted on the Ordnance 
Survey in Devon under their actual use; indeed, where they do appear, it is either 
only the fence around the post that is illustrated or, more interestingly, or noted as a 
‘Covered Reservoir’, adding to the feeling of deception considered by many to be a 
classic trait of the Government (fig.5-24 a and b).  
 
The fact we see many structures annotated as reservoirs is clearly suggestive of a 
will to mislead or hide the true intention of posts out in the field. The question is – is 
this an intentional act? From the 1960s it became increasingly common to update 
Ordnance Survey maps via information obtained through aerial surveys. It is possible 
that the ROC post looks, to all intent and purpose, like a small reservoir and were 
interpreted as such by the Ordnance Survey team, although if this was the case then 
it does not adequately explain why some posts do not feature at all. 
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Fig.5-24 a. G-1 Kemble 3/J3 UGMP and ‘reservoir’ designation. (Source (Left): Bob Clarke 
31/12/2010) (Source (Right): Map © Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 24 b. D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy 10/D2 UGMP described as a ‘Covered Reservoir. The 
map actually depicts the compound fence. (Source (left) Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) (Source 
(right) Map © Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service)  
More likely these omissions or mislabelling demonstrates a tension in the landscape 
between the public and the Government. A number of enquiries to the Ordnance 
Survey have revealed nothing, although it is clear that there must have been such a 
policy, a cursory glance at a wide range of military sites demonstrates this.  
The large Group Headquarters, as it has been seen, appear on the map with plenty 
of detail. Their physical presence is undeniable, especially in an urban setting. To 
‘miss-interpret’ these sites would simply confirm the public’s suspicions. Out in the 
field, the opposite is true. ROC posts were locked whilst unattended, however the 
determined ‘visitor’ could easily break in. Once the hatch had been breached the 
5m 
 
5m 
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whole post was vulnerable, as they were full of the equipment required for service. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to insulate the posts against the cold, many had 
polystyrene tiles covering the walls and ceiling.  A number of observers who 
provided information for this project noted vandalism on sites by members of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). This resulted in the destruction of a 
number of posts by setting them on fire. Once the fire took hold – supplied with 
oxygen via the ventilation stack – everything inside was quickly destroyed. The 
majority of ROC posts were located in extremely rural settings and interference was 
probably a major concern (fig.5-25). Considering the geographical location of the 
underground posts, we should view the exclusion of the posts from the Ordnance 
Survey map an act of government sponsored subterfuge. This subterfuge is more 
likely intended to reduce acts of interference linked to CND or other peace orientated 
groups than because the site is llinked with mass destruction and defence. 
 
Fig5-25. C-17 Veryan post 10/P2 Cornwall three miles from the nearest settlement. A fully 
rigged UGMP. Note there is no compound fence around this site. (Source: Bob Clarke 
11/10/2011) 
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Reporting an Event 
The underground monitoring post had a number of reporting functions. It recorded 
the direction and height of the nuclear flash via an instrument known as a ground 
zero indicator as well as recording the amount of radioactive fallout present through 
a fixed survey meter and the power of the blast via the bomb power indicator. 
Surprisingly, the majority of posts were serviced by overhead telegraph wires on 
traditional telegraph posts, the network only being ‘hardened’ (buried General Post 
Office (GPO) cables) on the mid-1970s. Subsequently a number of telegraph poles 
across the landscape often terminate at the site of a now demolished post, serving 
as markers to redundant technology that was, for a time, at the forefront of the 
nation’s defence. Each post formed part of a cluster (fig.5-27), usually three or four 
other sites (map below), and within this group one had a VHF radio, in case the GPO 
network failed. 
 
Information was passed directly to the Group Headquarters, where it was assessed, 
triangulated with information from other posts and the results plotted on large back 
lighted perspex screens. From here, the information was distributed to a number of 
other agencies (see fig.5-28 below for full diagram), including the Regional Seat of 
Government, local authorities, military departments and warning and broadcast 
systems run by the BBC and local police (fig.5-26).  
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-26. Police Officer operating the public warning 
system. On the flick of a switch powered sirens in 
the local area would operate. The information 
required to initiate them came from the observations 
taken on the underground monitoring posts. (Source: 
HMSO Dd 085337 Pro 11/76) 
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Fig.5-27 Map depicting UGMP clusters locations as of 1982 across Devon and Cornwall. 
This layout prevailed until stand down in 1991. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An 
Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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 Fig.5-28. The communications network serviced by the ROC and UKWMO in 1976 
(red rectangles indicate ROC activities) (HMSO Dd 085337 Pro 11/76) 
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Underground monitoring posts present us with yet another conflicting landscape. 
They are the most widespread and numerous of archaeological features on the 
British Cold War landscape, and large numbers survive. They also appear to be – 
outwardly – the most difficult to interpret. Surface features are non-descript, offering 
a utilitarian interpretation. This is hinted at by at least one official body, the Ordnance 
Survey (discussed above). The ROC posts’ often secluded position in the landscape 
presents those who encountered, and continue to encounter them, with a tangible 
link to the horrors of nuclear warfare. They are also the most fragile of monuments. It 
is interesting to note that structures designed to withstand such destructive force are 
now being consumed by the weather, vegetation and individual acts of vandalism 
(fig.5-29). 
 
Fig.5-29. W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire. Located within a World Heritage Site, Avebury post has, 
since stand-down in 1991, steadily succumbed to weather, vegetation and human 
destructive actions. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012) 
Currently those visited for the fieldwork are in varying states of repair. A number are 
currently under private ownership, while others are in the last stages of collapse or 
are heavily vandalised. The details of the states of abandonment and their 
archaeological implications are the subject of chapter 7, while in chapter 6 the 
landscape of nuclear warning and monitoring will be integrated with the activities 
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enacted on them by the volunteer observers. What follows is an examination into the 
levels of archaeological inference that can be applied to underground monitoring 
posts that had been destroyed prior to this project. Working with the Ordnance 
Survey publications and a number of local and national websites and publications it 
is now possible to navigate this once secret taskscape (Ingold 1993). The fieldwork 
conducted here encountered a number of sites where all vestiges of the ROC had 
clearly been removed from the landscape. 
Demolished Underground Monitoring Posts 
The fieldwork conducted here has recorded a number of ROC posts in various states 
of preservation. The majority of these can be adequately explained through the 
‘Order and Chaos’ model, presented in chapter 4. However, one - demolition or the 
deliberate act of removing a post - is the most obvious of activities recorded at many 
of the sites in Devon. In this county alone 39 ROC posts out of 53 constructed have 
been destroyed. While the focus of this project is on surviving monuments, and 
interactions enacted with them, it is clear that the majority of ROC Orlit posts and 
underground monitoring posts (UGMP) had, by the start of this project (2010), been 
removed from the landscape. Orlit posts survive in small numbers (four in this 
survey), often where a later UGMP was constructed at the same National Grid 
Reference. Additionally, when considering the UGMPs, the more remote a site, such 
as D-47 Whitestone 10/N.4 (D-47), the more likely the ROC post survives. As 
explained previously, the process of constructing an UGMP required a substantial 
amount of groundwork, an activity that might offer an opportunity to locate recently 
removed posts. The desk-top survey was unable to ascertain whether or not all posts 
were extant, subsequently visits were conducted to an additional twelve sites where 
posts were suspected. All but two sites (D-16 and D-45) were completely devoid of 
any surface indications. This section demonstrated that while surface features may 
be removed, utilising a number of other remote sensing techniques, it is still possible, 
in some cases to recognise the original positions of UGMPs. ROC posts D-13 and D-
45, are used as case studies to demonstrate this. 
 
D-13 Five Barrows, Exmoor, Devon 
Five Barrows Hill is located on the eastern edge of Exmoor, in the parish of North 
Molton, Devon. The crest of the hill contains a grouped cemetery comprising nine 
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round barrows (8 bowl and 1 Bell), also a trig pillar is located in the top of the highest 
barrow, recording an elevation of 491m above sea level. The area is designated a 
scheduled ancient monument (1003183). Dobinson records an Orlit post being built 
on the hill in April 1954 but omits the type (1998, 202), while Wood notes an UGMP 
becoming operational by September 1959 (1992, 284). The post was closed as part 
of the civil defence reduction, initiated by the Labour government in 1968. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-30 The post at Five Barrows in 1976, eight years after closure. Note both the Orlit Type 
A and UGMP are extant (Image No. CBO013 ©Cambridge University Collection of Aerial 
Photography) 
Map regression provided no clue as to the actual location of the post, nor the 
presence of any other related features. A site visit, conducted on 1 May 2011, gave 
no indications as to a possible location. In this instance aerial photographic records 
provided far more interesting results. Images from the Cambridge University Aerial 
Collection (fig5-30), depict the post before demolition. It is clear from the image that 
an Orlit post Type ‘A’ was built at the site. Furthermore, it was retained when the 
UGMP was constructed. Interestingly the outline of a rectangular fence line is visible, 
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along with a soil discolouration from the excavation of the pit to construct the UGMP 
in.  A search of the National Monuments Record (Swindon) aerial collection 
produced a false colour image taken on 7 March 1979, depicting both the Orlit and 
UGMP as shadows (fig.5.31). By 28 August 1989, the date of the next available 
aerial survey, these structures had been removed. The visual information was used 
to interrogate the current Environment Agency Geomatics database. A positive 
response contained within the LiDAR data depicts a feature at the same point as the 
location of the, now removed, post (fig.5-32).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5-31. False colour image taken on 07/03/1979 showing both the Orlit post and UGMP 
(Red box). (SS7336/5/89 – NMR SF1460) 
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Fig.5-32. The scar left by the removal of the UGMP at Five Barrows, via LiDAR imagery. 
(SS7336nw DSM 50cm, The Environment Agency) 
 
D-45 Torquay, Devon 
The ROC post at Torquay was situated close to a minor road, to the north-west of 
the A379. It was not possible to say with any degree of accuracy whether the post 
was extant at the time of the baseline survey; subsequently a site visit was 
conducted on 25 May 2011. The baseline visit discovered that there was no 
evidence for an Orlit post and that the UGMP had been a non-standard layout. The 
main structure of the ROC post, now removed, was constructed in the corner of a 
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steep sloping field, in which views to the north and east were unobstructed. 
However, those to the south and west were totally obscured as the UGMP had been 
constructed 7m below the crest of the hill (153m above Ordnance Datum) (fig.5-33). 
To counter this the visually dependant instrumentation, the ground zero indicator, 
was placed on a brick plinth 27m south-west of the UGMPs former location. The 
plinth is 1.5m high and still extant in the hedge line. Six concrete steps leading up to 
the plinth survive; the GZI holdfast also survives, however, there is no evidence for 
the UGMP or its former position on the ground. Map regression located one 
depiction of a compound fence line in 1993 (fig.5-34), just after the posts closure in 
1991 (Wood 1992, addendum xi). Interestingly the LiDAR tile covering the site of 
10/G.2 Torquay depicts the structure as extant (fig.5-35). 
 
 
Fig.5-33 10/G.2 Torquay photographed in 1993. Note the position of the post in relation to 
the topography. Arrow indicates the ground zero indicator plinth in the higher hedge line. 
(Richard Sirley). 
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Fig.5-34 Post 10/G.2 Torquay (arrow) depicted on the 1:10000 1993 Landmark 
Information Group (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
Fig.5-35 The UGMP 10/G.2 Torquay depicted via LiDAR imagery. (SS9211se DSM 50cm, 
The Environment Agency) 
10/G.2 
Torquay 
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The Potential of the ‘Lost Landscape’ 
The two case studies, albeit simplistic, demonstrate that by using a number of 
resources it is possible to recognise features that depict the location of a now 
removed ROC post. The position of the ROC post at Five Barrows has, until now, 
been reported incorrectly; original positions, due to findings at Torquay, can also be 
inferred by the use of earlier records. The obvious potential here is the possibility of 
populating landscapes with earlier – lost or invisible – features. Five Barrows Hill is 
well known for its prehistoric landscape; it clearly also played an important part in the 
defence of the United Kingdom throughout the Cold War. To fail to acknowledge that 
presents an incomplete picture, and therefore interpretation, of the land use of the 
hilltop, it also reduces the accuracy of any characterisation study.   
COMPOSITE LANDSCAPES 
One noticeable aspect of the sites included in this fieldwork has been the number of 
posts that have made use of earlier military sites. Ten sites were of at least two 
phase construction (Orlit and UGMP), but it is when exploration occurs regarding the 
environs beyond the chain link fence that a real possibility to discuss some 
behavioural aspects of the defence landscape presents itself. This last section 
introduces two very different landscapes with exactly the same activity in mind. It 
argues that, irrespective of technology, one activity always underpins the defence 
network in the United Kingdom - observation. 
D-6 Berry Head, Devon  
D-6 Berry Head, overlooking Brixham harbour is the site of numerous listed military 
structures (Fig.5-36). Additionally, there are two scheduled areas, Berry Head Fort 
and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, scheduled in 1950 (SAM 29694/01), and The 
Old Redoubts, scheduled on 14 March 2000 (SAM 29695). It is a popular local area 
with many visitors throughout the year. Berry Head Fort comprises structures from a 
long period of military activities; the fort was originally built in 1780, during the 
American War of Independence and later refurbished as response to continued 
threats from the French, under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte (Pye and 
Slater 1990). 
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Fig.5-36. The density of military remains can be seen on this LiDAR image. Inset Orlit post 
(prominent square in centre) and the underground monitoring post (a very low mound 
indicated by arrow). (SX9456 DSM 1m, The Environment Agency) 
 
In World War II, the site had a coastal battery installed along with the establishment 
of the first of a number of observer related structures in July 1940 (Wood 1992, 284). 
The ROC post was stood down in May 1945 but was quickly regenerated in 1947 as 
the infrastructure at the site was built of brick and concrete. In 1953, the post was 
designated 21/J3 and provided with a Type ‘A’ Orlit post. What is interesting here is 
that the Orlit was constructed on top of the wartime post, the extension allowing for 
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visual clearance of the immediate topography. In 1960, the post was refurbished with 
an underground monitoring post, which subsequently closed in September 1991 (ibid 
1992) (Fig.5-37). The entire landscape is scheduled, including now all aspects of the 
Royal Observer Corps facilities.  
 
Fig.5-37. The three phases of Royal Observer Corps structures represented at Berry Head, 
Brixham. (13/06/2011 Bob Clarke) 
Berry Head comprises over 250 years of military use. The landscape is one primarily 
of observation. The early forts were not there for a show of reactive force, nor were 
they constructed in an effort to conceal themselves in the landscape. The World War 
II facilities are similarly overt in their visibility, as is the lighthouse on site from 1908. 
The principle is similar when considering the Royal Observer Corps. Two posts 
concerned with observation of aircraft are replaced by a post dedicated to witnessing 
the effects of a nuclear detonation. While the UGMP may be a buried structure, an 
act of concealment and thus suspicion in the public’s eyes, is not true. The posts and 
their attendance crews were buried for protection from the effect of nuclear weapons, 
the role is still one of observation. 
 
Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire 
Pickering Town, North Yorkshire surrounds a motte and bailey of at least Norman 
date (Steane 2003, 147). The castle is segregated from another, similar, feature by a 
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small river known as Pickering Beck. The feature, known locally as Beacon Hill, is a 
probable siege castle connected to the reign of King Stephen (1135-1154). The 
period was marked by civil war and it is thought that the mound is connected to an 
unrecorded siege of Pickering Castle during this period (Parishes: Pickering 1923) 
(Fig.5-38). The mound was scheduled on 22 March 1962 (SAM 60349). 
 
Fig.5-38. Pickering Castle and Beacon Hill are plainly seen in this LiDAR image. Inset (top 
left) white arrows depict Orlit (bottom centre) and underground monitoring post (centre) 
Other medieval features including a wide market place and ridge and furrow are also 
noticeable. Inset Orlit post and UGMP. (SE7984 DSM 1m, The Environment Agency) 
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Beacon Hill was one of the earliest of the pre-world War II observer posts to be set 
up by the Air Ministry. The first structure was located on top of the motte mound in 
January 1937. The post was upgraded with an Orlit Type ‘A’ in 1953 and received an 
underground structure in November 1961. The post closed in September 1991 
(Wood 1992, 320) (Fig.5-39). The mound is scheduled as are the Orlit post and 
Underground Monitoring Post. 
 
 
Fig.5-39. Two phases of construction at Beacon Hill, Pickering, North Yorkshire. (07/06/2014 
Bob Clarke) 
Beacon Hill provides us with an interesting suite of monuments – all intended for a 
similar purpose. The role of a siege castle is, primarily, to observe the enemy’s 
movements. Clearly the site has been used as a visual reference point, hence the 
name ‘Beacon Hill’ and there has been a succession of ROC posts covering almost 
the entire lifecycle of the organisation. Again all activities have been connected with 
observation. 
Both Berry Head and Beacon Hill provide us with examples of similar practices 
connected to potential political tension and subsequent warfare over extended 
periods of time. For both sites there are periods of relative calm before the next 
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threat arises. However, when it does authorities return back to the old landscapes. 
This connection with past organisations, especially those undertaking the same 
operation, must have an effect, through remembrance and physical connection, for 
subsequent observer’s needs.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter demonstrates that the Royal Observer Corps has a complex landscape 
archaeology. It is clear that we cannot consider the organisational footprint as 
following a standard military layout. Diversity appears in the Group  headquarters, 
Orlit posts and subsequent underground monitoring post. The organisation is one of 
paradox, with members being sworn to secrecy via an initiation into the group 
through the signing of the Official Secrets Act, whilst it inducted more and more 
members into the periphery of its activities. This heterotopia manifests itself through 
the manufacture of Orlit posts, and, one presumes, the construction effort that 
covered the underground monitoring post network and the Group  headquarters, all, 
it has to be remembered, built by private companies. Tensions are created in the 
countryside, especially once the ROC moves to the reporting of nuclear detonations. 
Tensions are also created in towns where substantial Group  headquarters  
structures are situated, although, in this instance to try and hide the group  
headquarters when they were in plain sight would only have increased tension with 
the public. 
The landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps also hints at a defence 
landscape that has a deeper level of antiquity. The re-use of field monuments and 
previous, defence related, landscapes surely ties the observers into a historic 
landscape, one where remembrance is key. This remembrance after stand-down in 
1991 has been evident in research for this project. What follows investigates the role 
played by the observer in the life-cycle of the organisation and the Cold War. It is 
also the first step in humanising a landscape that today is one of almost total 
diversity. From this point on the research will concentrate on the field monuments of 
the organisation (Orlit posts and underground monitoring posts) as the group  
headquarters footprint lacks enough numbers to be useful.  
 
CHAPTER 6: THE LANDSCAPE OF THE OBSERVER 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of contemporary archaeology challenges us to co-habit the same 
intellectual space as historians, sociologists and other, human based, disciplines. 
This is especially important if we are studying a period located in recent memory. 
The previous chapter explored the physical remains of the Royal Observer Corps 
(ROC) relating to the Cold War. It identified a number of facets. While the 
organisation is recognised in the literature discussing the Cold War, especially when 
focussing on the United Kingdom, the life-cycle of those who operated the posts, the 
volunteer observers, is not. Subsequently, we have a dislocation between the 
monumental landscape, the organisation’s material culture and the observers who 
enacted thousands of hours on duty at the many ROC posts distributed across the 
British Isles.      
The landscape of the observer does not readily lend itself to scrutiny. While the 
previous chapter discussed the landscape of ROC posts and the reasons for 
positioning and choice of structures, what the evidence cannot easily do is place 
human activity into that landscape. At the time of stand-down (30 September 1991) 
at the end of the Cold War, 12,500 volunteer staff were working across nearly 800 
ROC headquarters and posts, mostly spare-time volunteers (Clarke 2005, 152). The 
nature of the clandestine world they occupied means that beyond the extant 
monuments (Orlit posts, underground monitoring posts and group headquarters) the 
archaeological landscape of the observer is almost undistinguishable from the acts 
of the public around them. However, using aspects of Tim Ingold’s taskscape (1993) 
and the ‘order and chaos’ model I have developed it is possible to reconstruct the 
observer’s landscape, thus offering a framework to which a number of aspects of 
both voluntary service and membership of highly ordered organisations can be 
adhered.  
Once that landscape has become ‘visible’ the process of recognising activities not 
bound by the regulations governing the ROC becomes clear. Only then is it possible 
to laminate the landscape of a highly ordered organisation, differentiating it from 
activities being enacted around it. Once that point is reached all activities outside 
that organisation should also be recognisable. This chapter intends to demonstrate 
that the members of the ROC are, in some instances, just as visible a feature of the 
twentieth century landscape as the monolithic structures often associated with 
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nuclear warfare. To achieve this aspects of the observer’s operational life-cycle will 
be evaluated and categorised according to models by Ingold (1993) and Foucault 
(1967).  
TOWARDS AN IDENTIFIABLE LANDSCAPE 
To experience the landscape of the observer, one first has to understand the 
environment in which they operated, the political climate and, most importantly, the 
motives, both personal and nationalistic, under which volunteers elected to place 
themselves on the front line of the Cold War. The life-cycle of the organisation is 
explained elsewhere (chapter 3); However, activities that require direct interaction 
between observer and landscape are introduced here. Utilising the responses to the 
ROC targeted survey initiated for this project (full results can be found in the 
appendices) I have been able to map activities that are organisation centric and 
contained within certain specific, controlled, landscapes, juxtaposing them with more 
overt tasks that bring the ROC into clear contact with the general public.   
To do this requires a reconstruction of a multi-faceted landscape, especially when 
considering the number of ROC posts investigated for this project. To adequately 
discuss the landscape of the observer requires a recognition that, while the 
organisation remains essentially the same across the total post-World War II life-
cycle (1948-1991) - a voluntary uniformed force operating to a strict series of 
regulations - the activities and environment in which their tasks were enacted 
changed dramatically towards the end of the 1950s. To simplify the discussion 
surrounding the landscape of the ROC it is convenient to continue with the two 
phase approach utilised in the preceding chapter of this thesis. Phase One (pre-
1960) deals with the overt, over-ground aircraft reporting role, while Phase Two 
(1960-1991) considers the underground, covert nuclear reporting role. 
Following Earlier Footstep 
The origins and remustering of the organisation after World War II is described in 
detail in chapter 3, When the wartime ROC was stood-down on May 7, 1945 many 
observers expressed an interest to re-join should the need arise (Wood 1992, 182; 
Clarke 2005, 139). It was not long before the intentions of the Soviet Union became 
clear, especially its plan to retain, through satellite states, a buffer between it and the 
West. Moreover, by 1948, these intentions had started to destabilise the 
reconstruction efforts of the West, especially in Germany (Clay 1950; Clarke 2007; 
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Judt 2005). In contrast the immediate post-war period in the United Kingdom was 
one of rapid reduction. Much of the infrastructure concerned with Civil Defence and 
other voluntary organisations – including the ROC – had been dismantled by 1946 
as Britain moved into a period of austerity and increased rationing (it was not to end 
until 1954 (Morgan 1990, 124). So when the decision was made to reform the ROC 
in 1947 (Wood 1992, 193) and events in Central Europe drove the passing of the 
Civil Defence Act (1948) the call for volunteers was met with a certain amount of 
apathy. The Air Ministry had a vested interest in the reinstatement of the observer 
network as the radar network project, Rotor, was far behind schedule and constantly 
required updates to keep the pace with advances in radar development. Naturally 
this was not outwardly promoted; rather the growing threat to our shores by ‘enemy’ 
aircraft was the headline (Wood 1992, 199). Moreover, the connection with aircraft 
was emphasised, playing to the recently demobbed serviceman, original members of 
the corps and the young who, even though they had experienced the horror of war, 
were still excited by the prospect. Those who became members were inducted back 
into a world dominated by aircraft – stimulating the needs of many who joined at that 
time. Recognition training, visits to live RAF flying stations where air experience 
flights were arranged and exercises utilising low level flying were regularly part of the 
observer experience. The issue of uniforms cemented the volunteer’s will to belong 
to a specific group while social activities interspersed with formal meeting evenings 
further immersed the observer in the required activities.  
Phase One: The Landscape of the Orlit Post 
The ‘Cold War’ Royal Observer Corps, by now under the control of the Air Ministry, 
required 1800 observation posts equally distributed across the whole of the United 
Kingdom. From these posts, a mix of locally built architectural types often dating to 
the early Second World War period, ROC crews visually scanned the skies from the 
horizon to vertically above the post; they also listened, as often the sound of the 
aircraft’s engines was the first indicator that an intruder was in the area. In 1951, the 
Air Ministry requested tenders from industry to provide the ROC with a purpose-built 
structure capable of sheltering crews from the elements, while still providing a steady 
level platform for tracking instruments. Over the next five years (1952-1956) 413 Orlit 
Posts, as the structures became known, were constructed where existing World War 
II buildings were deemed unfit (Cocroft et al 2003, 174). The Orlit Post is the first 
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structure designed and constructed in the British landscape that has a purely Cold 
War origin.     
Those Who Served 
Interrogating the ROC survey results it is possible to suggest that the motives for 
around one-third of those joining the organisation was an interest in either aircraft or 
a connection – maintained or by association – with the armed services. Of phase 
one (pre-1960) respondents, around two-thirds cite these two reasons for joining. 
This may sound encouraging, unfortunately the number of respondents who served 
during phase one only made up 12% of the total completed survey forms. Moreover, 
those who indicated they were involved in the aircraft reporting role did not elucidate 
their activities, moving instead to a more detailed description of their responsibilities 
during phase two (1960-1991).    
This reveals something of the complexities we encounter when interpreting 
contemporary archaeology. To ensure there is a level of accuracy in the 
interpretation of both monuments and landscapes – especially defence related – a 
number of avenues are available, usually site visits and operational records. 
Although this does not adequately explain the role of those who spent time on the 
post, for that we must make use of Tim Ingold’s Temporality of the Landscape, 
specifically the taskscape element (1993). 
Nationally, the Orlit Posts are poorly represented and, subsequently their physical 
remains are difficult to interpret without an understanding of the function. Over half a 
century since they were abandoned it was not surprising to discover that all seven 
Orlit Post visited as part of this project retained very few, and often no, original 
features; indeed, the situation is such that in some counties there are no extant 
examples. The remains of Orlit Posts across the sample area were no more than 
four walls enclosing a rectangular area 3.05m x 2.03m, and a small covered area 
with a few wooden battens screwed against the wall. The enclosed walls provide no 
hint as to the structures’ intended function, nor the operational aspects of the tasks 
undertaken within the walls. It is to these earlier structures that I now turn. The 
following case study applies Ingold’s thoughts on hills and valleys and people – 
specifically sight and sound – to the study of the Royal Observer Corps’ role in 
aircraft identification and reporting (1993, 166). 
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Aircraft Reporting (1950s) - Sight 
Of all the activities undertaken by the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold 
War one remained constant: observation. Up to the late 1950s visual and audio 
aircraft reporting was the primary task, post-H bomb the key function remained 
observation even though the corps members had moved underground. Both can be 
explored through Ingold’s work. If we consider the taskscape of the observer in 1954, 
armed with a pair of binoculars, scanning the skies for invading aircraft, a range of 
parallels become clear. Each post was positioned in an elevated location, making 
use of the surrounding topography to increase the vantage point. Ingold (1993, 166) 
discusses the hills and valleys, in this particular case the limit of the observers’ field 
of view, as a kinaesthetic experience where ‘the contours of the landscape are not 
so much measured as felt’.  The task of visual detection is not a static one; it 
requires motion by the participant. The ROC post is placed centrally to a section of 
landscape; it is then the observer’s job to monitor the surrounding area. This requires 
movement through 360° at the horizontal and 180° vertically from horizon to horizon, 
effectively a dome of observation above the ROC post. The observer moves head, 
eyes, arms and body through any combination and direction in a search for aircraft 
and in so doing experiences the hills and valleys on the horizon. This concept, then, 
adequately describes the activities of the ROC when in the aircraft reporting role. 
Unfortunately, it does not provide for the piece of sky that the observer is scanning. 
For convenience I now introduce ‘the skyscape’. The skyscape is that area of sky 
that is bound by the horizon and ends directly above one’s head. To experience the 
skyscape one employs Ingold’s kinaesthetic model (1993, 166) however, the 
experience of the hills and valleys is secondary to the utilisation of the space known 
as skyscape. Hills and valleys have no meaning for the observer beyond limiting the 
field of vision, the role of the observer is to monitor ‘in’ the sky. This concept is 
underpinned by the fact that aircraft, by their very nature, also inhabit this space 
when flying. Subsequently any hostile aircraft over the United Kingdom would have 
been operating within an ROC post’s skyscape, with an observer at the centre of 
each ROC post. So the taskscape of the observer can be recognised if we apply the 
additional concept of the skyscape, a workplace above the landscape. This is 
appropriate as the ROC was not concerned with any terrestrial activities, although 
the terrain does limit the extent of the activities they are monitoring. 
 
 203 | P a g e  
Aircraft Reporting (1950s) – Sound 
Aircraft, by their very nature, are noisy; they are also recognisable by their engine 
note, a rather obvious example being the Rolls-Royce Merlin and its long association 
with the Spitfire. The mere sound of the Merlin stirs emotions well beyond the 
technological interpretation, visions of war, patriotism and bravery are associated 
with the note. It is also chronologically ‘charged’ as often the Second World War and, 
more specifically, Battle of Britain are instantly associated with the experience. This 
phenomenological aspect should not come as a surprise, indeed Kirby notes ‘Our 
perception of things and events, experienced, interpreted, and then communicated to 
others, form our history, our culture, our world’ (2008, 23). Events then, can be re-
visited through a number of mediums, sound being one such aspect. The medium of 
sound was another aircraft detection method utilised by the ROC and in many ways 
this was more important than the visual aspects of the organisation. 
Ingold (1993, 170) notes that ‘the air is full of sounds of one kind or another’. This 
rather obvious statement masks the true nature of the audio taskscape. Sound, 
unlike sight, is an all-encompassing experience. For example, you cannot see the 
car approaching from behind, but you can hear it; you may optically focus on the 
footballer scoring the goal, but you hear the roar of the attendant crowd when the 
ball hits the back of the net. The point is we are immersed in sound, it is a constant 
backdrop to everything we do, we may create sound, like the drop of a hammer in a 
workshop, but it is accompanied by all the other sounds being generated in that 
same workshop. 
The recognition and identification of an engine note was a critical part of the 
observers’ role. Unless the aircraft was travelling at supersonic speeds, which would 
have been unlikely in the early 1950s, the engine note aided estimation of the height 
and direction of the approach. The observer would then search that quadrant of sky 
to visually detect the incoming aircraft. While the aircraft, if detected, becomes the 
visual focus of the observer, they are still immersed in ‘localised’ sound. Ingold 
(1993, 170) suggests that the entire cacophony, everything from village voices in the 
distance to those eating under a tree next to you, is a taskscape. While this might be 
correct as a generalised snapshot for someone traversing the countryside or walking 
through town, it does not allow us to recognise nor adequately explain the specific 
activities of a specific group. When considering the ROC observation tasks in the 
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audio sphere it is appropriate to refine his proposal. There are two specific regions of 
audibility: Low Level – immediate background sound, and High Level – task-
focussed sound.  
Low-Level 
Low-level sound is the sound we are all immersed is as we undertake our daily 
activities, or if we are carrying out a specific task. The sound could be task specific, 
in the case of the observer this might be the other members of the team making a 
cup of tea, operational chatter between team members, from the group  
headquarters  via a loud speaker, or the clanking setting up equipment. It might as 
easily be the passing car or the conversation between a member of the public and 
one of the observers. One post in Devon is located on a golf course; this too would 
introduce task–specific sounds for those playing, juxtaposing with the sounds from 
the post generated by the observers. The point is low-level background noise, 
conforming to Ingold’s thoughts on the matter (1993, 170), does indeed offer a 
taskscape, it is however, a backdrop to the lives of those who hear it. To those 
engaged in the minutiae of the process, all those generating the small components 
that become the whole, all other sounds are also background noise, and so are 
filtered out subconsciously. 
High-Level 
High-level sound is that that can be directly attributed to the primary task of the 
organisation, group or team. In the case of the ROC this is the engine note of the 
aircraft, but might well be the call of another observer drawing the attention of others 
to a specific location in the skyscape. The engine note is being specifically hunted 
out by the observer; all other sounds in their immediate location are subconsciously 
filtered out. Once located the observer uses visual references to report the aircrafts’ 
location, heading and height. The important point to make is that the observer team 
may not visually spot the aircraft; however, the engine note information will still be 
passed forwards as it too provides direction, type and rudimentary height readings.  
It is appropriate to say that Phase One in the life cycle of the observer is a period of 
overt activities and that all tasks were undertaken in plain sight of the public. The 
post may have stood in a specific compound (Fig.6-1), but the activities enacted here 
would be well known, especially coming so soon after the end of World War II, 
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indeed on more than one occasion an encounter with a member of the public while 
recording an Orlit Post brought forward a World War II interpretation for the structure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6-1. The Orlit Post Type B, G-1 Rodmarton, Gloucestershire. Post 3/B.3 opened in April 
1954. This post stands within its own compound. The observational aspect of the structure is 
clear. This site produced a World War II interpretation from a passing member of the public. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 31/12/2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6-2. Observers at an unknown Orlit post tracking a target. Both are interacting with the 
‘skyscape’ around them. The Observer on the left wears the RAF Aircrew Wings 
demonstrating a connection with the services, both wear medals presumably from World 
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War II service as this image originates from the mid-1950s. (Source: Rosemary Victoria 
Ward) 
The environment in which hostile aircraft operated in was also fully integrated with 
public life and, as I have already proposed, should now be considered a theoretical 
landscape, or, perhaps more appropriately, skyscape. Activities within the skyscape 
are bound to sensory recognition; sight and sound, be that mutually exclusive or 
combined (fig.6-2). What is interesting is that this interaction between sight, sound 
and environment was the primary reason for members of the public volunteering 
between 1948 and 1955 (four respondents noted aircraft spotting as a pre-
organisation interest). Ergo the required life-cycle of the volunteer is served by the 
structures and activities presented after initiation, through the signing the Official 
Secrets Act. Considering other points, the chronological interpretation of the Orlit 
Post when first observed is often incorrect, usually ascribed to World War II, while 
the purpose is not, recognising that the structure is connected to observation.  
Moving onto Phase Two of the Royal Observer Corps activities during the Cold War 
brings new challenges for both the researcher and the public. Interpretations are 
complicated by unfamiliar structures and subterfuge perpetrated by both the 
organisation itself and other government departments.  
Phase Two: The Move Underground 
Throughout 1955-1956, a secret committee (later known as the Strath Committee) 
comprising senior civil servants and members of the armed services assessed the 
potential danger of a new and more powerful weapon, the H bomb. The committee 
concluded that a small number of the weapons targeted on the western seaboard of 
the United Kingdom would devastate large parts of the country, primarily through 
radioactive fallout (PRO DEFE 13/45). As a direct consequence of the report the 
aircraft observation tasks of the Royal Observer Corps were abandoned in favour of 
fallout monitoring. This change of role required new protected facilities, eventually 
over 1500 Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP), were constructed across the 
United Kingdom. The UGMP was, where the geology allowed, buried at least 4m 
underground to protect a small control room (5.8 x 2.6m by 2.3m high) from blast 
and radiation. A number of instruments were located on the surface to monitor bomb 
power, radiation and direction and height of detonation. The post crew, usually three 
observers, telephoned the information, from the relative safety of their sub-terrainian 
hideout, to a group headquarters, who in turn informed the military and Home Office 
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of the developing situation in a given geographical location (Wood 1992; Cocroft et al 
2003; Clarke 2005). 
Almost all activities in Phase Two were carried out underground; the only tasks that 
were not included the initial running up of a manual air raid siren, and/or the firing of 
maroons to warn of approaching fallout. Everything else was operated remotely from 
the bunker below. With observers disappearing down a hatch in the middle of a field 
it is not surprising, given the political climate and level of awareness connected with 
the H bomb, that the UGMP attracted suspicion and rumour from the public. The 
activities above ground were enacted within a specific compound and although this 
demarcation was only a small, stock-proof fence (Fig. 6-3), it helped exacerbate the 
misconception of restricted, or encoded space (a suggestion by John Schofield 
2011, 166). 
 
 
Fig. 6-3. The compound fence at Avebury Underground Monitoring Post, Wiltshire, 
Post14/B.1 opened in June 1961. The compound fence is intended to be stock proof. I 
suggest It was latterly interpreted as concealing ‘deviant’ activities. Range Pole 1m. 
(Photograph Bob Clarke 17/11/2013) 
 
By the mid-1960s a number of posts, usually one out of three, were equipped with a 
radio to reduce reliance of vulnerable telegraph wires (Wood 1992). Above ground 
the post was provided with a pump-up aerial mast attached to the vent stack on the 
post. This was, where possible inside the limits of the fence, some posts 
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demonstrate an extension of the fence to accommodate this (one example is D-41 
Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon fig.6-4), the erect aerial further visualising suspected 
‘secret’ activities.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 6-4. D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy Devon, 10/D.2 
opened in June 1959. The dome fitted on the left of 
the vent stack maintained support for a large aerial. 
Earthing straps are also visible in case of lightning 
strikes. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) 
 
Underground Tasking 
Operationally the tasks carried out by the observer differs little from that of his above 
ground counterparts. Key to nuclear reporting was the direction of the detonation, 
including height and strength. The same environment, the skyscape, is involved, 
however this time rather than eyes and ears, a pinhole camera, or Ground Zero 
Indicator (GZI), with graduated photographic paper is used (Fig.6-5). After the blast 
wave has passed over the post, indicated on an instrument called the Bomb Power 
Indicator (BPI), an observer ascended the steel ladder and replaced the used 
photographic paper in the GZI (Fig.6-6).  
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Fig.6-5. C-17 Veryan, 
Cornwall Ground Zero 
Indicator, Graduated 
photographic paper in the 
instrument. The dark smudge 
on the lower sheet is the 
passage of the sun. (Source: 
Bob Clarke 18/10/2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6-6. Observer changing ground zero indicator paper on an unknown post. (Photograph 
by permission of the Avon Fire Brigade) 
 
ROC #55 (No.2 Group, Horsham) provides a succinct account of the activities 
enacted on an underground monitoring post in the last few years of the organisations 
life-cycle.  
Monitoring radiation levels 2. Monitoring the BPI (Blast Pressure Indicator) 3. 
Changing the GZI papers (Ground Zero Indicator) 4. Changing water in the 
post 5. Charging the batteries 6. Decorating the post so it looked spic and 
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span! 7. Undergoing lots of training and drills 8. Taking part in national and 
local exercises 9. Going on camp (Fabulous experience) 10. Visiting the 
Luftmeldakorpset in Denmark 11. Monitoring and reporting the weather 12. 
Aircraft recognition training 13. Reporting diplomatic number plates on cars.  
Once back inside the protected control room the height and direction of the 
detonation, as indicated on the photographic paper, would report in to the Group  
headquarters  with the relevant information. Initially this was via a telephone system, 
later three posts were connected to each other via a ‘Tell-Talk’ system – the master 
post then radioing in the information (Fig.6-7). 
 
Fig.6-7. Tell-Talk system at 
W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. 
This simple device allowed 
communication between 
posts and the  headquarters 
at Winchester. It has three 
buttons – two connected to 
posts, the other to the  
headquarters . (Source: Bob 
Clarke 26/05/2012) 
 
This wide range of activities is typical of the majority of responses provided by 
observers and demonstrates that, where possible, post crews could perform all 
activities, presumably to cover shortfalls in crew members in times of crisis. It also 
provides an insight into the number of activities that were motives for those who 
volunteered. The majority of tasks were undertaken either below ground or within the 
bounds of the post compound, restricting a chance for those outside the group to 
interpret the activities. Moreover, the observers, signatories of the Official Secrets 
Act, probably would not have told anyone who did ask – such was their commitment 
to duty. Indeed, 37.5% of all correspondents cited ‘doing their bit’ or similar as an 
important factor in joining. Interestingly a number of other activities appear in 
ROC#55’s duties including reporting diplomatic cars and, while more mundane, 
probably more important – changing water in the post. This essential activity is an 
ideal vehicle to explore part of the observers taskscape, primarily because it 
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demonstrates that once outside the post fence, topography and location suddenly 
come into play, in some cases reducing the effectiveness of highly organised entities 
to a level of chaos. 
Organisation on the Edge 
On 31 August 1978 Southern Area Command, through each group headquarters, 
issued an ‘Operational Procedures – Posts’ order number 163/Ops. Operational 
Procedures (OP) covered changes to the regulations and orders that governed every 
facet of the volunteer observer’s life while on duty. No activity was undertaken 
independently of an OP or specific operating manual, ensuring the standard level of 
recording and reporting remained identical across the United Kingdom. 
Headquarters No 10 Group, Poltimore Park, Exeter, subsequently issued the OP as 
10G/163/Ops. It is the content of 10G/163/Ops that allows us to glimpse something 
of the observer’s peacetime activities while on duty. 
Operational Procedures – Posts 
1. In the southern Area we are already working on a system whereby 
water containers at Posts are kept full by replacing one container of water on 
each occasion on which the Post is visited. 
2.  headquarters  ROC has now established and promulgated the 
following standard procedure which is to replace that is use in the Southern 
Area. It will be noticed that the standard operating procedure achieves the 
same objective but differs slightly in detail. 
3.  headquarters  ROC states that where practicable all Posts should 
establish a water supply which is as near to the Post as possible. Water 
containers should be kept full and the routine established whereby there is a 
regular replacement of drinking water every time the Post Crew visits the 
Post. The routine is to be as follows: 
a. One container of fresh drinking water to be taken to the Post 
and left there – sealed. 
b. The contents of one container of the general purpose water 
emptied away and refilled with drinking water which is to be 
replenished. 
c. The empty drinking water container taken from the Post for 
return full of fresh drinking water on the next visit. 
d. On mobilisation – all the water containers should be replenished 
if time allows. 
e. All containers will have to be numbered or marked in a 
way which ensures each container is replenished systematically. 
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4. It is recommended that within the Southern Area – containers are 
marked by means of a tie-on label on which is noted the date of the last 
change of water. Reinforced tie-on labels are issued herewith.  
10G/163/Ops, Operational Procedures – Posts, 31 August 1978 (Original 
document gifted to this project by former member of the Royal Observer 
Corps) 
What is not indicated is the size of containers used to store and transport water to 
and from the ROC posts. A specific ROC post held seven water flasks, each with a 
capacity of 20L, or weighing in at 22kg (including the hard plastic ‘jerry can’) when 
full. At the majority of ROC posts across the United Kingdom vehicular access was 
no problem, water was transported to the entrance of the facility. Subsequently 
carrying out OP 10G/163/Ops became part of the daily life-cycle of the site, raising 
no little difficulty for the observers. Subsequently, the changing of the fresh water 
supply does not feature in the majority of narratives, nor any written account, of the 
day-to-day operations. On posts that were difficult to access with a vehicle the order 
was to become a rather contentious issue.  
Avebury Post  
The underground monitoring post designated Avebury, Wiltshire 14/B.1, later post 
number 16 (W-3 for this project), after the alpha-numerical system of post 
designation was abolished in 1982 (YEO/635/COMMS). It appears the ROC post, 
located some distance from metalled roads, and built on the top of a substantial hill, 
offered little opportunity to take a vehicle right up to the post. For the observers 
stationed at Avebury 14/B.1 the continual circulatory movement of fresh water was a 
constant source of disgruntlement. A topographical assessment of the landscape 
surrounding the post demonstrates why.    
W-3 Avebury 14/B.1 is located on the summit of Waden Hill, overlooking the 
Neolithic henge enclosure to the north, West Kennett Avenue running from north-
east to south-east and Silbury Hill to the south-west. The village of Avebury itself is 
located in and to the west of the henge enclosure. Just a few metres south of the 
ROC post there is a mound concealing a reservoir, and just to the south of that is a 
trig point with a value of 191 metres above Ordnance Datum.  
When carrying out order ‘Operational Procedures – Posts 163/Ops’ – which 
incidentally required at least one can of water to be changed every two days – the 
observers were faced with one very obvious obstacle, Waden Hill itself. To reach the 
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post required negotiating the steep rise from either east or west (Fig.6-8). The 
following extract is from a discussion with a crew member of Avebury post in 1980s. 
The discussion took place on 20 March 2015.     
 
Fig.6-8. The environs of Avebury underground monitoring post Wiltshire, Post14/B.1 opened 
in June 1961, latterly Post 16. Post 16 is actually depicted as a ‘covered reservoir’ on the 
Ordnance Survey extract. With a kilometre on foot from the carpark and a 400m walk up a 
steep gradient, the crew of this post must have been noticed by members of the public. 
(Crown Copyright and database rights 2016, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)). 
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Interviewer (IV) – Where did you park when you were on duty at the post? 
Observer (Obs.) in the carpark opposite the bookshop. 
(IV) And the last question, did you have to take water to the site?  And if you 
did was it carried manually? 
(Obs.) Yes, we did. Several gallons was stored up there in jerry cans and was 
replaced every couple of days. We used to take it in a minivan up the back 
side of Waden hill and then carry it the rest of the way when the laws of 
physics resulted in wheel spin and no progress! By some lucky chance I only 
ever got involved in carrying water on a couple of occasions over a ten-year 
period. 
(IV)  So I take it it was not a popular duty? 
(Obs.) Got it in one. 
(IV) So was the drive up from the avenue end? 
(Obs.) No, we went up the west side of the hill via the field entrance opposite 
the EH carpark on the A361. However, on occasions it came up the other side 
from the Avenue side. 
(IV) I suppose what I’m asking is - was the avenue ever used either on foot or 
in a vehicle? 
(Obs.) In truth I can't remember fully. I think we used to carry it up by hand. I 
don't remember him bringing his van into the Avenue but, that's not to say he 
didn't. I did take my motor bike up the Avenue once and parked it at the 
bottom of the hill leading to the post. 
 
The activities of the observer during phase two of the life-cycle of the ROC, 
while the majority of the time, invisible to the public in a protected bunker do, 
in the main, mirror that of the phase one, above ground crews. Both phases 
are concerned with the monitoring, recording and reporting of activities that 
happen within the proposed skyscape. 
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Fig.6-9. W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire. 
This label, with added lines in pen, 
was discovered inside the control 
room of the underground 
monitoring post. Left column 
‘WATER and 5 JUNE’. Right 
column ‘Change’. Presumably it 
was originally tied to a water filled 
jerry can. This label demonstrates 
the fragility of artefacts connected 
with nuclear warfare. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 27/07/2016) 
The move underground comes at a time when the true horrors of the new hydrogen 
devices are just  becoming apparent to the public through pressure groups such as 
the recently formed Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in London on 17 
February 1958 (Judt 2005, 255). Even the word ‘protected’ elicits a view of 
demarcation, further driving both the activities and, probably more important to those 
outside the organisation, the life expectancy of the observer further into the 
heterotopic states discussed by Foucault (1967). The most prominent of those being 
in regard to crisis and deviance, or deviation.  
Comparing both proposed phases of operation then there are a number of clear 
parallels enacted by the post crews; this is not immediately obvious as phase two 
dictates activities out of sight of the public. Tasks undertaken by the Royal Observer 
Corps during phase one of the organisations life-cycle are overt, they are almost 
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immediately recognisable to anyone with experience of the British defence 
landscape in World War II, although the archaeology is not easily interpreted. Phase 
two, while similar in activity, contains much more heterotopic elements. Drawing 
together the concepts of hills and valleys, sight and sound we can suggest that 
Ingold does provide a framework from which further investigation into the behaviours 
of certain groups can be explored. This is specifically so when looking at the 
taskscape of secret organisations, in this case phase one of the Royal Observer 
Corp’s life-cycle. The role of the observer in the defence of the United Kingdom was, 
as far as possible, a clandestine undertaking, requiring the volunteer to be inducted 
into the organisation through the signing of the official secrets act and attendance of 
official courses. Now, over two decades later, the majority of members still hold true 
to that official code of silence. Utilising Ingold’s initial concepts it has been possible 
to expose something of the taskscape of the early Cold War observers. It is also true 
that with structures overtly placed in the landscape – especially in locations of 
prominence – those not initiated into the activities of the group can still reasonably, if 
not accurately, interpret the generalised concept of a given structures’ utilisation. 
This is especially so when the interpreter considers the topography of the location.  
The study of the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps in the pre-
hydrogen bomb era (pre-1954) has also demonstrated that rather than blindly 
accepting or discarding concepts, we should be receptive to the basic framework 
they offer. Furthermore, we should not be afraid to complement such theoretical 
frameworks with additional concepts and observations.  
POSTS AS ‘WORKSPACE’ 
All workspace is constructed or demarcated, although all activities enacted within a 
workspace have the potential to change. This change could be for a number of 
reasons, be that political, social, environmental or driven by technology. The 
challenge is to identify the initial activities enacted within a certain space, only then 
can a true interpretation of the building, construct, space or place in society, be 
offered. Within a highly ordered organisation (see chapter 4) this can prevail for 
many decades, often masking changes within the wider group construct. We need to 
understand what ‘workspace’ actually means before we decide whether it is an 
appropriate vehicle to discuss the monuments of the Royal Observer Corps. For 
clarity this section will concentrate on the workspace of the post-Second World War 
in the United Kingdom. 
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Workspaces, by their very nature, are places of production, be that physical or 
cognitive, and they are usually, but not exclusively, distant from the home 
environment. A workspace is often an environment that contains many tensions, 
imposition of company values and rules over the social need of the occupant are a 
recurring theme in late twentieth- early twenty-first century Europe.  During a study of 
recently vacated offices in Saville Row, London, John Schofield noted abandoned 
pot plants, the victim of ‘- a memorandum that the owners of the new 
accommodation forbade their tenants to keep them’ (Harrison and Schofield 2010, 
204). The point is workspaces appear to attract personalisation. The ‘clutter’ of 
personal life encroaches on work life in a myriad of ways, the most noticeable being 
photographs of family and friends, be that in frames, simply stuck on walls or, as 
microprocessor technology has irreversibly altered the way we use information, as 
screen savers or wallpaper. Subsequently tensions over what is either appropriate or 
not have risen over the last three decades, especially when considering racial or 
gender issues.  
Within a highly organised organisation such as the Royal Observer Corp the issues 
of ‘personalised workspace’ were less of an issue. Every underground monitoring 
post has a similar orientation and geography; subsequently, tensions do not feature 
as heavily as those connected to the majority of workspaces beyond the home 
environment. In this instance we are assisted by the restrictive nature of the 
organisation’s self-imposed internal rigidity – the desire or necessity for order. The 
question is how recognisable are these primary geographical layouts in an 
Underground Monitoring Post and, critically, is the post considered a place of work 
by those who operated them. Moreover, what is the reason for the imposition of such 
rigidity in the landscape of the observer? 
What the UGMP is not 
It is an interesting dichotomy that while most offices start out life as a bland shell, 
often neutrally coloured, exuding conformity and regimentation; it is not long before 
personalisation of the blank space begins. Sometimes this is overtly personal – 
pictures of families or holidays, pot plants and beverage material often being the 
norm. Considering the micro-landscape, for example the office desk, we can also 
recognise personalisation. The layout of the computer equipment, pens and the 
phone position can suggest a right or left handed individual. Pens are an interesting 
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case in point, often branded with company logos and given out at conferences or 
when encountering reps, they have the potential to indicate connection, travel and 
trade. Computers are often personalised, with the desktop and screensavers 
depicting family holidays or images suggesting certain interests and gender. 
Essentially the blank canvas of the workspace is coloured by the individual, their 
specific personal familiarities and the material culture of their society. That familiarity 
is fragile and can, all too often, be swept away by a change of regime, refurbishment 
or by the individual leaving. What is clear is that the micro-landscape of an office 
desk, once occupied, is specific to the occupiers’ needs to function within the 
‘workspace’, it is individual and unlikely to be encountered anywhere else. 
Considering this, is it clear that individuality, regardless of company rules, mission 
statements or values, ensures a level of ‘chaos’ prevails in the majority of office 
based ‘workspace’. To a certain extent individuals carry out different tasks within the 
company, driving a specific micro-landscape, although generally speaking, the 
sociality of those within the workspace drive its unconformity to a state of chaos. I 
believe that unconformity excluded the operation of the underground monitoring post 
and its crew from the ‘workspace’.  
Moreover, the language used to describe what one is doing can provide an 
interesting insight into the value placed on that activity. Twenty percent of those 
responding to the survey cited ‘duty’ as the activities they performed while in uniform. 
This is further supported by 55% of correspondents citing a connection with the 
armed services as a primary reason for joining. Considering the observers’ 
landscape, it appears that we can, through a number of attitudes and personal 
traits/values, start to recognise the motives for certain activities, especially the micro-
geography of the underground monitoring posts.  
Reasons for Uniformity 
One clear aspect of a highly ordered entity, as identified by my research, is the 
emphasis on uniformity, especially when considering the layout of the Royal 
Observer Corp (ROC) underground monitoring post (UGMP). Each post adheres to a 
strict, specific, geography, and, while this is partly explained by the fact that the 
UGMP, irrespective of sunken, or semi-sunken construction, is to one design, the 
fact the same internal geography has been identified at the majority of sites recorded 
for this projects does appear to present other interpretive opportunities.  
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Familiarity 
The UGMP, until 1990, was lit by a 12-volt light powered by car batteries (Fig.6-10) 
(ROC#55 noted the charging of batteries as a specific duty of the post crew). In 
operational conditions there was a distinct possibility that the crew might find 
themselves in darkness, or operating by torchlight. The layout of the post would, in 
this instance, lend itself to the continued function of the basic tasking.  
 
 
Fig.6-10. W-3 Avebury, 
Wiltshire. The battery box, 
abandoned in a scene of 
chaos, still offers a chance to 
interpret specific activities. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 
11/03/2012) 
 
Routine in the guise of a regimented training regime, aligned where possible with 
military establishments in the locality, serves to reinforce the cognitive aspects of 
familiarity. It also plays to the requirements of the volunteer, especially those who 
expressed an interest in the service aspects of the organisation.  Constant repetition 
allows for the development of a unconscious activity map, it also allows observers to 
operate from any of the 1500+ posts originally located across the landscape without 
training fade.  
 
Cognitive loading 
Introducing such familiarity across the service has benefits beyond the initially 
apparent operational one. If one considers the primary tasking of the ROC from the 
1960s, the detection, monitoring and reporting of nuclear explosions, it is clearly 
apparent how stressful such an activity would, should the event be real, quickly 
become. When considering the task during the attack phase and subsequent 
reporting of effects on the local area it is clear that carrying out all duties becomes 
more ‘cognitively loaded’. Cognitive loading deals with the ‘working memory’ of brain 
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function. It is short term and restrictive in its capability to run more than five or six 
functions at once (Lavie and Hirst et al 2004, 339), it is also susceptible to 
distraction. Moreover, tests have shown that a distractor can have an effect on 
performance, especially when considering chronology. 
If we consider the effect of cognitive loading on an underground monitoring post 
even the most basic functions required to successfully operate the post, would, had 
a nuclear device detonated nearby, become increasingly difficult to perform. Training 
and repetition, coupled with replication of the immediate environment reduces the 
loading, essentially stripping it bare, ensuring the basic information required by 
headquarters  is more likely to be: a) accurate and b) coherent. 
Research through the ROC survey explored attitudes towards actually turning up for 
duty during a nuclear war. I believe this demonstrates an important aspect of the 
organisations concerns for the future. Training, no matter how comprehensive, could 
not shy away from the inevitable fact that, had the unthinkable happened it would 
have deeply affected decision making. The fact no one answer stood out underpins 
that view. Although very few indicated that they would definitely be on duty had war 
broken out.   
I would have done my duty as expected, most corps members would have 
done the same, the Group control was over manned in that it could operate 
effectively with 1.5 crews instead of the peacetime 3 crews, it was an 
expectation that the crews not in the control would look after an[d] advise the 
families of those that were inside to enhance their chance of survival, Post 
crews operated in a similar way. 
ROC#41, 21 Group, Preston; 22 Group, Carlisle; 23 Group, Durham and 24 
Group Edinburgh 
 
It would have been very difficult to leave loved ones but both my wife and 
father-in-law had served in the ROC. They understood that I'd do my duty so 
that took a lot of the potential pressure off me. 
ROC#46, 10 Group Exeter. 
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Very badly, I think, knowing your family was in danger outside, we were told 
approximately 40 per cent would report for duty, I was hoping my children 
would be older, and I would have persuaded them to join too, there were 
several crew members who were parents and their adult children on my crew. 
ROC#36, 23 Group Durham 
 
To be frank would never have left my children. 
ROC#44, 15 Group, Lincoln 
This has implications for the order and chaos model developed and presented in 
Chapter 4. We can no longer reduce the role of the original participants to that of 
mere automatons, simply placed within a regulated environment and expected to 
carry out a number of required tasks regardless of external events. It now appears 
that some recognition of the level of cognitive loading must have been considered 
when designing the UGMP.  It also allows us to challenge to rather static view of the 
archaeology of the workspace. There is also a differentiation between the aircraft 
and nuclear reporting roles, one that can be inferred through the specifics of both 
roles. They also challenge the perceived view of the taskscape, further fragmenting 
the original thesis into visible and non-visible spectrums. 
THE PUBLIC  
Whilst members of the public consider the role of any defence related activity to be 
necessarily clandestine, veiled in a shroud of secrecy, the reality is that the majority 
of the ROC’s operations were enacted in plain sight, as were most members’ 
movements across the landscape.   
Encounters with the public while on fieldwork for this project provided a number of 
interpretations for phase one structures, primarily Orlit posts. Interestingly, whether 
the post was a type A or B appears to have an effect on that interpretation. As 
discussed in (chapter 5) it appears the majority of Type A posts were built inland on 
geological summits rather than plateaus. Subsequently the general consensus was 
that the structures were sheds to store equipment. Conversely, those encountered 
near Type B structures suggested that the Orlit functioned as a lookout or anti-
aircraft gun platform. This local interpretation appears to be driven by the fact that 
Type B’s are predominantly located a few hundred metres inland from cliff edges. 
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Interestingly both architectural types were suggested to originate in the Second 
World War. 
The Encounters 
The underground component of the Royal Observer Corps has a far more complex 
archaeological presence in the landscape than that of the Orlit post period. In this 
instance the function of the organisation is not readily recognisable from the extant 
archaeological remains or the remnants of material culture available for scrutiny still 
in situ.  
Clearly the most obvious of all differences is that the Orlit post, including all 
subsequent activities, inhabit a space above ground dictating all tasks are 
atmospherically based. When we consider the role of the ROC during World War II 
and the similarities of the aircraft reporting role in the immediate Cold War period, it 
should not come as a surprise that the interpretation of a structures’ use is often 
correct, although many ascribe the Orlit post to a World War II origin. The dichotomy 
is that while nuclear reporting and monitoring also relies on the basics of sight, 
sound and direction the activities are enacted underground. Furthermore, relocation 
to sub-terrainian activities coincided with an increasing awareness of the horrors of 
nuclear warfare (Clarke 2005, 124). This awareness manifested itself in growing acts 
of civil disobedience. It also drives a recognisable change in the archaeological 
record connected to the Cold War in the United Kingdom. The nature of that change 
is demonstrated late in this project (chapter 8), although a brief introduction is 
required here. The key driver for the change in the archaeological record is the 
invention (1952) and subsequent development from 1954, of the hydrogen bomb. 
Physically, its potential was theoretically limitless (Clarke 2005, 17). Psychologically 
it shocked many across the world, including Governments and the military alike. At 
this point it became clear that any attempt to protect the entire population from 
nuclear warfare was essentially pointless. This realisation was not lost on the public, 
nor was the sudden construction or conversion of a large number of structures 
intended to survive an attack. By 1958, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) was publicly calling for transparency with Government plans for war (Cocroft 
et al 2003, 82). One of those plans was the relocation of monitoring posts 
underground for added protection against blast and radiation. In doing so the ROC 
ceased to be a passive force monitoring the skies above the Orlit Post, they became 
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implicit in the perceived view of Government self-protection, in the publics’ view an 
opportunity for the chosen few to wait out the holocaust above.     
To those experiencing the physical remains of the ROC out in the landscape the 
encounter is both confusing and difficult to interpret; recently John Schofield (2011, 
166) described certain aspects of the Cold War as ‘Encoded Places’, places that can 
only be fully understood once all the pieces are assembled (documentation – 
including operational components - and, possibly personal accounts). Encountering 
an underground monitoring post out in the field often provides no clue as to what the 
true function of the small concrete structure, or why it is where it is. Of those 
recorded on Ordnance Survey maps very few divulge the structures true identity, 
both adding to the visual deception of the post and forcing visitors to come to their 
own conclusions as to function. However, with the rapid development of internet 
interest groups such as Subterranea Britannica or the Fortress Study Group, the 
location of many posts has become better known. This said, posts are always 
encountered in isolation (the network dictated they were constructed at least 7km 
from one another), and subsequently are likely to be interpreted singularly rather 
than as a component of a national network.  
On the rare occasion access to an underground monitoring post is possible the 
visitor encounters a subterranean world devoid of much of the material culture of the 
organisation or the temporal periods of its operation. Often the control room has a 
few centimetres of stagnant water in it, is covered in graffiti and on occasion has also 
been damaged by fire. It offers no opportunity to interpret the function of the post, the 
implications of that function had war broken out, nor the life-cycle of the organisation 
or the volunteer observers whose temporality this space depicts. Those sites that are 
protected are few and far between. In the South-West there are only two posts, C-17 
Veryan, Cornwall, and W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire that are still in prime condition 
and curated with education in mind. This project has also discovered a number of 
other sites in the geographical area under scrutiny that are clearly not abandoned or 
are in the process of refurbishment. Making contact with the owners of such sites 
has proved extremely difficult, presumably linked to the fact a number of such posts 
displayed evidence of attempted, and successful, forced entry.  
So we are presented with a number of problems. Any attempt to describe or interpret 
activities purely from the field monuments in the sub-terrainian world of the observer 
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is frustrated by a number of factors. The primary one is that the observers still 
adhere to the initiation they undertook on joining the organisation – specifically 
becoming a signatory of the Official Secrets Act. Closely followed by the problem 
presented when trying to interpret a monument, specifically the underground 
monitoring post, that is only 10% visible. To fully understand the abandonment 
process in this case relies heavily on the input, memories and service of the 
volunteer observers themselves. 
SUMMARY 
The aircraft reporting role, described as Phase One of the ROCs’ Cold War life-
cycle, comprises a series of overt activities enacted in the landscape. The activities 
are, in the main, readily identifiable via investigation of the extant monuments. The 
landscape should be considered a restricted landscape, with readily accessible 
functions. The organisation during phase one of the ROC life-cycle plays to the 
requirement of the volunteer, stimulating their desire for aviation and the military, 
supported by annual camps to airfields and recognition contests that both earned 
badges and kudos. Essentially the key needs of the volunteer appear to be directly 
catered for by the role required when on duty.  
I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father wouldn't let me.  He didn't 
think it was a "proper" job for a young lady.   I wasn't fit physically but I wanted 
to serve.  I don't think I would have made the grade at that time, but a friend 
mentioned that he had seen the ROC and thought of me!  I was 18. It was the 
best decision I ever made - I became independent, self-reliant, confident and I 
made some of the best friends ever.  I got to go to RAF Stations to train and I 
had the time of my life! 
ROC#30, 23 Group, Durham 
Going underground had a profound effect on the volunteer cohort of the ROC. Many 
left the corps citing the lack of aircraft reporting as the main reason to leave (Wood 
1992, 221). The social aspects of the Corps were subsequently retained (summer 
camps and recognition training) and became the key reason for joining the service. 
Nuclear reporting, then, became a secondary or necessary task, something of a pay 
off if membership of the group was to be maintained. For the Government the 
opposite is true. The social structure had a budgetary implication; however, to 
maintain trained membership the costs were justified. 
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When we consider the landscape of the observer in Phase Two (1960-1991) a whole 
new set of problems confronts the interpretation of monuments. Those 
interpretations are further frustrated by a growing awareness that nuclear warfare 
has irreparable consequences. The observer landscape is also affected, becoming 
far more rigid in its appearance. Moreover, activities take on a new level of secrecy, 
often self-imposed but occasionally due to a change in structures. What we can say 
is that the observers’ taskscape is different from that surrounding it. The ethos of the 
group is one of duty rather than work, the micro-geography, especially within the 
underground monitoring post, conforms to that required by a highly ordered 
organisation and the tasks are simple and ordered with cognitive loading in mind. Put 
simply the observer becomes automatons’ in the government pursuit of defence 
policy.    
Within this chapter I hope I have argued for a specific landscape inhabited by the 
observers. It is distinct in many ways from the everyday activities enacted by the 
surrounding population. A population who become increasingly disenfranchised in 
their say in defence policy. I propose that the two-tier descriptor (Phase One and 
Two) is accepted as the watershed is chronologically important and has implications 
for objective five in this project. Furthermore, the opportunity to populate the ROC 
landscape with personal histories of those who spent many thousands of hours on 
the posts allows for a far richer contextualisation of both monument and surround 
taskscape. It also allows for the period when both structural types are utilised by the 
organisation for whom they were constructed to be recorded. Now this has been 
done it is possible to discuss the act of abandonment. The next chapter looks 
specifically at the post-1991 landscape and interprets a number of behaviours 
through the application of the order and chaos model. I map the regression of 
activities to a more chaotic period where the landscape is not overtly bound by 
organisational regulations. I also investigate the motives behind the reclamation of 
the observers’ landscape, in some cases by the observers themselves, a 
phenomenon that has increased substantially over the period of this project.    
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CHAPTER 7: THE YEARS OF CHAOS AND A RETURN TO ORDER: MODELLING 
ABANDONMENT PROCESSES. 
 - with regret that the Home Office can no longer justify the continued use of 
the ROC and Home Department volunteers for the monitoring task. 
It has therefore been decided, following consultations between the Home 
Office and the Ministry of Defence, who share responsibilities for the ROC, 
that the Corps will be stood down in its operational role. 
Mr. Kenneth Baker, HC Deb 10 July 1991 vol. 194 cc391-4W 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the activities being enacted on, and in, the physical 
landscape of the Royal Observer Corps since the organisation’s stand-down in 1991. 
It relies heavily on the ‘order and chaos’ model introduced earlier in this thesis and 
the multitude of field visits over a four-year period (2011-2015). Four key phases of 
the abandonment process have been recognised through the observation of 
activities on ROC posts included in the current work. Utilising case studies I present 
the results of the field survey programme, developing each phase in turn. Each site 
is introduced with a historiography of the post from first inception through to closure 
before the post-closure activities are interpreted. Where possible information from 
former ROC members, curators, post restorers and landowners is used to 
contextualise the findings. The next chapter will discuss the validity of the findings 
against current thinking on the abandonment process.  
The redundant posts will be disposed of, and in some cases, if there is a demand by 
Government authority or local authorities, they will be made available to them. Some 
of the areas of the posts will be required for agricultural purposes, and if there are 
any agricultural former owners they will receive priority if they wish to resume 
ownership of the land where the posts are established. Consideration is being given 
to the retention, in what one might call a cocooned state, of a number of posts that 
will come out of service, in addition to the 873 which we are retaining. 
 
The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Ennals), HC Deb 
03 May 1968 vol 763 cc1569 
 
There used to be a small box next to the canteen at Wards. They did have a timber 
box next to a shed across the road during the war for spotting aircraft – apparently it 
got quite busy through the war. Sometime later they built a similar sized concrete box 
on the opposite side of the road. Latter end of the 60s I think, an underground thing 
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was built – or is that dug? – that was before Wards built the big rolling mill shed next 
to it – blocking out most of the view. At the end of the 60s we used it as a waste 
water interceptor tank. The new canteens over it now. 
 
Personal Recollection from Wards employee and local resident of Sherburn, North 
Yorkshire.   
 
THE ABANDONMENT PROCESS – INITIAL FRAMEWORK 
Number four of the objectives I set for this project is: Identify the processes involved 
in the abandonment of structures constructed specifically for the monitoring of the 
effects of weapons of mass destruction. To fully answer this the ‘order and chaos’ 
model was developed, each with specific criteria of activities and/or actions. The 
mechanism where by a given criterion is selected and applied to a specific site has 
been discussed elsewhere (chapter 4), in this chapter those criteria are tested 
utilising the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP) of the Royal Observer Corps 
(ROC), a specific monument type dispersed widely across the landscape of the 
United Kingdom (fig.7-1). 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-1. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. Each act of post 
stand-down activity assumes a level of 
individualism – but are there markers within this 
individualism that reveals certain activities in 
reaction to the structure’s original intent? At 
Avebury the executor of the graffiti on the control 
room door makes clear reference to nuclear warfare 
(Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012) 
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The Sample 
The sample monuments are restricted to those identified as belonging to phase two 
of the ROC life-cycle (nuclear monitoring). The underground monitoring post is far 
more numerous than the phase one aircraft reporting, or Orlit, post, they are 
constructed to the same basic design both above and below ground and there is a 
very good chronology for the construction and abandonment of all structures (see 
Wood 1992 and Dobinson 1998).  
The Four States of ‘Chaos’ 
This chronology allows for the duration of different activities, post-abandonment, to 
be recognised and structured interpretively within the ‘order and chaos’ model. The 
fieldwork results are broken down into four components of activities, ruined or 
destroyed where only the bare infrastructure remains or components of it; transitional 
– in so much as no curatorial activities have been recognised; covert curation – 
those sites owned and maintained although not promoted as such; and overt 
curation – that is those posts retained for educational purposes and only used as 
such. Through the following sections a sample of the ROC posts, investigated for 
this project, are summarised prior to a full analysis of the results obtained by field 
visits, record analysis and testaments from former Royal Observer Corps members 
are used to underpin the findings where possible. 
Underground monitoring posts have been considered for inclusion if they were 
located within the geographical Home Defence Region 7 (HDR7). This offered a 
potential 179 posts across the HDR7 landscape. By the time of the first baseline 
survey for this project a potential 53 posts in Devon had been reduced through 
demolition to just 14 and of those only 13 were visited as I was denied access to one 
ROC post. Furthermore, a degree of separation was needed between two 
substantial groups of posts if any rigour was to be introduced into the result set. The 
sites in Wiltshire were subsequently selected for analysis; of the 20 originally 
constructed 10 remained extant in 2013-15, all were visited and recorded. Other 
sites in the South-West region were visited on an ad-hoc basis. In total 33 sites have 
been assessed for this project. 
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Reclaiming The Landscape 
One of the most complex, but noticeable, activities currently recognised on ROC 
UGMPs in recent years has to be the re-adoption of a growing number of posts 
across the United Kingdom. At the beginning of this project only two posts (Great 
Bedwyn, Wiltshire and Veryan, Cornwall) in the entire South-West were overtly 
promoted as sites of educational value and curated as museums. Of those visited 
during the initial baseline survey a further four in Devon (Modbury, Christow, Tiverton 
and Drewsteignton) were in some form of curatorial ownership while three more 
(Brixham, Sharpitor and Stockleigh Pomeroy) had been scheduled due to their 
location in earlier landscapes. 
Between the baseline visits in May 2011 and subsequent monitoring expeditions a 
number of posts were clearly identified as being in the process of refurbishment. 
Nationally this phenomenon has expanded exponentially, with information about 
such work appearing on various dedicated websites and Facebook. Naturally this 
reinvigoration of the ROC landscape is welcome as it appears the number of posts 
destined to be lost due to abandonment and the chaos elements discussed above, 
might, in the short-term, be slowing. 
Old for New? 
The prospect of restoration for ROC posts raises a number of questions: can we 
consider posts that are restored actually the same as those that were closed in 1968 
or 1991? If not, what should we recognise them as? Just what are the motives for 
restoration and what do those who are restoring consider the underground space to 
be? Moreover, landowners who, via government disposals, have become the 
possessor of a former ROC underground monitoring post only have certain options 
available to them, clearly one was to rent the structure to others. In recent years this 
has morphed into sales of ROC posts. The primary route of investigation, if we are to 
answer these questions, has to be in establishing an understanding of the motives 
that currently drive post restorers. We should also be able to differentiate post 
restoration from other aspects of a given ROC post’s lifecycle. What follows, then, 
are case studies intended to underpin my thoughts on the recognisable aspects of 
any given ROC post and interactions driving the next, and in some cases, last 
aspects of a post's lifecycle.  
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The Taskscape Element 
A proposed area of interaction between observers and public is indicated on each 
map used in this chapter. Indicated by a red line and depicted as the ‘Taskscape 
Element’, it is a proposed area of activity connected to each post when staffed by the 
observer crew. The Taskscape Element has been constructed via the framework 
offered by Tim Ingold (1993) and complemented by site visits, observer accounts 
and operational considerations such as a post with dispersed elements, a ground 
zero indicator plinth some distance from the underground monitoring post (D-7, 
Christow, Devon). Within this red line lie all active aspects of the post when in 
operation up to the stand-down of September 1991.  
A SECRET LANDSCAPE IN PLAIN SIGHT 
It appears that whenever a nuclear facility, especially a bunker or any description, is placed 
up for sale it attracts media attention as the following attest.  
 
‘1 Bedroom Cave House for Sale’ 
Rightmove: 29 May 2008  
 
Safe as houses: Concrete bunker built at height of Cold War to shelter officials from 
Soviet nuclear strike that boasts metre thick walls and steel blast doors on sale for 
£350,000 as country retreat. 
Daily Mail: Published: 12:59, 10 July 2014 | Updated: 14:45, 10 July 2014  
 
Devon house for sale - and nuclear bunker comes free. 
BBC Devon: Page last updated at 14:37 GMT, Friday, 22 October 2010 15:37 UK 
 
Bunker built to protect councillors from a nuclear attack on Plymouth is up for sale 
Plymouth Herald | Posted: July 10, 2014 
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Clearly we are still fascinated by the morbid sense of annihilation that the memory of 
the Cold War presents some twenty-five years after the conflict was officially 
declared over – in the general sense at least. Ownership, certainly when it comes to 
bunkers, is a fairly complex activity, bringing with it a range of tensions, and in this 
case, a substantial monetary investment. Moreover, it has implications for the Cold 
War landscape, educational value of sites connected with weapons of mass 
destruction and the ‘order and chaos’ model. The motives behind interactions 
between the public and redundant Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring 
posts is the focus of this next section. In it I have used a range of case studies, 
generated through fieldwork, anonymous questionnaires and face-to-face 
discussions with those who interact with the ROC posts. All are structured to the four 
states of chaos I have proposed above. The case studies presented here follow a 
hierarchy. Of the 53 Royal Observer Corps posts investigated in Devon for this 
project, 39 were either ruined, or more often, destroyed. It is with this classification 
that I start, working through the transitional phase, to those sites where order has 
mostly been restored through a process of covert curation, and final to those sites 
that most closely resemble order, the overtly curated ROC posts.  
 
RUINED OR DESTROYED 
The classification ruined or destroyed represents the majority of ROC post sites 
across the project area. In this category we encounter the true dichotomy facing 
structures constructed to withstand the full force of nuclear weapons but not 
prolonged, unmaintained, periods at the mercy of their environment. Here are the 
sites that are stripped of all external furniture such as grills or access covers or 
whose very existence above ground may have been removed, rendering access to 
the structure below ground impossible unless remote applications are used. Some 
aspects of the ROC post might survive such as a remotely placed ground zero 
indicator or fenced and gravelled car park area although on the whole no 
immediately recognisable features remain. A description of all those sites devoid of 
any above ground features would be pointless, save the discovery of former post 
positions using LiDAR discussed previously in chapter 5, although some sites do 
warrant discussion here. The following case study is restricted to those sites where 
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components of the ROC landscape remain, although the underground monitoring 
post is now rendered inaccessible. 
 
 
Case Study –  D-39 Sharpitor, Devon 
Post and Location History 
The Royal Observer Corps post located at Sharpitor, Devon (original designation 
21/L.2) was opened in October 1940 at map reference SX 590731. In June 1952 it 
was re-located to SX 559703 and in November 1953 was equipped with a Type ‘A’ 
Orlit post. In April 1963 the post was moved underground, where it was to remain 
operational until the stand-down of the ROC in September 1991 (Wood 1992, 265).  
The ROC post, while technically destroyed, actually does leave a series of extant 
markers that can be ascribed to the operational days of the site. The foundations of 
the Type ‘A’ Orlit post are just visible on an outcrop 22m to the south east of the 
underground post, at 400m ordnance datum observers in the aircraft reporting role 
would have had uninterrupted views around 360° for at least 15km. There is a pull-in 
capable of taking at least six cars just off the B3212 to the west of the site and a 
track marked with large pieces of granite, the majority over 500mm sq., traverses the 
60m climb to the ROC post. The underground monitoring post is the only one 
encountered in Devon that has a semi-sunken underground component. The 
entrance and vent stacks have been reduced to ground level, although they are still 
visible; there is no sign of the mounts for either the bomb power indicator or fixed 
survey meter. 
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Fig.7-2. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Sharpitor ROC post (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
Biography of Sharpitor Post Landscape 
Records connected specifically to the post at Sharpitor are difficult to locate due to 
the involvement of multiple agencies. The records do demonstrate a military 
involvement in the specific environs of the ROC post and are worth describing here 
as they indicate some of the tensions encountered when secret and public occupy 
the same landscape. During the Second World War the area of Dartmoor known as 
Sharpitor was requisitioned by the Air Ministry for the construct of a radio navigation 
station for Bomber Command; as with many sites established during this period little 
survives of the process of acquisition at this time. Post-war is a different story. 
 
As relations between East and West began to breakdown, especially in 1948-49 over 
the Berlin Blockade, many stations were retained rather than disposed of (Clarke 
2007, 63). With the very real prospect of war breaking out the RAF retained much of 
its wartime estate (Armitage 1995, 195), included in that was the radio and radar 
network capable of guiding Bomber Command aircraft onto targets in eastern 
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Europe. By 1955 the equipment at the station required refurbishment, including the 
replacement of a substantial timber mast with a more substantial steel structure; this 
is the point where tensions surrounding the military use of sections of Dartmoor enter 
a very public phase. On 2 February 1955 the proposed steel erection made its way 
into the House of Commons with Michael Foot requesting the ‘Under-Secretary of 
State for Air - give an undertaking to consult all local interests concerned before any 
such step is taken’ (Radio Mast, Dartmoor, HC Deb 02 February 1955 vol 536 
c107W). By the 16 November a growing number of protests over the proposals 
brought the plans back to the Houses of Commons with still no compromise (Radar 
Mast, Great Links Tor, HC Deb 16 November 1955 vol 546 c386).  
 
Permission was granted in 1956, but as a temporary measure, for ten years. 
And ten years later, the Air Ministry was told that the use must cease in 
another three.  
 
DPA: Friends of Dartmoor website – Accessed 24 April 2016. 
 
Four years earlier the ROC post at Sharpitor had been relocated to Peek Hill and an 
Orlit Type ‘A’ constructed (fig.7-3). No records have so far been located for this 
construction and it is highly likely the Orlit, a fairly unobtrusive structure, was built 
with no planning consent as it lay within the Air Ministry landscape. Certainly when 
Frank Hayman, Member of Parliament for Falmouth and Camborne, raised the 
question of restricted access it was with reference to Orlit structures the reply was 
made. The fact the question was asked at all suggests pressure being maintained 
through public representation. 
 
Dartmoor National Park 
Mr. Hayman 
asked the Secretary of State for Air what areas of Dartmoor National Park 
come within his control; what are their acreages; and to what extent civilians 
are excluded from these areas. 
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Mr. Ward  
Five Royal Observer Corps posts with an average area of 0.06 of an acre; a 
radio station at Sharpitor with an area of 1.25 acres; and three acres of land at 
Harrowbeer which were formerly part of the airfield. Members of the public are 
excluded from all these areas. 
 
HC Deb 18 March 1958 vol 584 c129W 129W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-3. D-39, Sharpitor, Devon. 
The site of the Orlit post Type 
‘A’ located on Peek Hill (white 
line); operated when the Corps 
was still in the aircraft reporting 
role. (Source: Bob Clarke 
26/05/2011) 
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In April 1963 the underground monitoring post was constructed at the site (Wood 
1992, 285), again there appears to be no clear record of this occurrence. What is 
interesting is the construction method employed at Sharpitor. The ROC post is a 
semi-sunken type, the only one of its type recognised during the survey of structures 
in Devon. Considering the local geology, Granite, the likelihood of a fully sunken 
structure was probably considered remote (fig.7-4). 
 
R.A.F. Station, Sharpitor (Closure) 
Mr. Carol Johnson  
asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to close down the 
Royal Air Force Station at Sharpitor on Dartmoor, dismantle the equipment 
and aerials, and restore the site to its natural beauty in accordance with the 
undertaking given on behalf of his Department in 1956, when this temporary 
installation in a national park was agreed. 
 
Mr. Hattersley 
The Royal Air Force Station at Sharpitor is expected to close by 31st March, 
1970. The question of removal of installations and equipment and restoration 
of the land will be considered in consultation with other Departments and local 
authorities in the normal way. 
 
HC Deb 19 December 1969 vol 793 cc432-3W 432W 
 
The closure of the Gee Chain, including RAF Sharpitor, was later reported in Flight 
International although no mention was made of the disposal of the site (Gee Chain 
Closure, 26 March 1970). On closure the whole landscape was acquired by the 
Dartmoor Preservation Association but not before a planning application was placed 
by the government with a view to changing the use of the site to one aimed at 
housing young offenders (DPA: Friends of Dartmoor website – Accessed 24 April 
2016). After more public objection the idea was refused and the site eventually 
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cleared in 1972 (Pastscape 2015). The land then containing the former RAF Station 
was purchased by the Dartmoor Preservation Association, the rest passed back to 
the successor of the former owner – South West Water (personal email from James 
Paxman to this author 13/02/2012).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-4. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The 
underground monitoring post was actually a 
semi-sunken structure due to the challenging 
geology. (Source: Bob Clarke 06/04/2014) 
 
 
When members of Subterranea Britannica visited the site in 2001 the structure had 
already been reduced to just the semi-sunken mound. Both the entrance and vent 
stack had been reduced to ground level, the material being used to backfill both 
shafts (Subbrit 27/04/2001). On the 11 February 2002 the whole landscape received 
statutory protection when the area was scheduled; the underground monitoring post 
was mentioned in the notice and, significantly, not excluded from it, other features 
included Bronze and Iron Age coaxial field systems and enclosures and the 
remnants of RAF Sharpitor (Historic England 1020238). 
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The Chaos of Abandonment 
Sites in the latter stages of their lifecycles present opportunities to observe 
snapshots of the abandonment process, Sharpitor underground monitoring post is 
one such opportunity. Considering the wider landscape, ROC involvement is extant, 
a series of organisational markers still being present. A number experience 
interaction at the human level, others influence movement through this part of the 
landscape. 
 
 
 
Fig.7-5. D-37, Sharpitor, 
Devon. The remnants of the 
locked traffic post. Hinting at 
the once controlled landscape. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 
06/04/2013) 
 
 
The original carpark, located to the south west of the underground post, is now used 
by visitors and dog walkers, continuing the presence of parked cars in the 
landscape. The original lockable post preventing vehicular access to the track 
ascending the moor to Peek Hill is still locked but pushed flat, hinting at a once 
restricted landscape (fig.7-5). As if to confirm control and restriction the route to the 
ROC post, once taken by the Observers, remains an important feature. Blocks of 
granite continue to line the route and vehicle tracks and presumably from the 
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operational phase of the ROC post, are still recognisable in the area to the north of 
them (fig.7-6).  
 
 Fig.7-6. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The granite lined road through an earlier prehistoric 
landscape. Vehicle tracks from the time of the posts operational life can be seen to the right 
of the stones. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) 
 
While recording the site for this project in April 2013 nine separate groups of people 
parked in the old pull-in and walked to the summit of Peek Hill, following the stone 
markers to the top. What makes this important is that the markers are not the most 
direct route to the summit, taking instead a more even, vehicle friendly, direction. 
Furthermore, the usual stop-off point is Peek Hill, often people stand inside the 
remnants of the Orlit post foundations, naturally oblivious to them, and visually scan 
the moor and landscape surrounding them, again continuing the activity enacted by 
the observers from the 1950s.  
By far the most interesting activity has to be the interaction between the public and 
the remains of the underground monitoring post. Both entrance and vent stacks had 
been razed to the ground by 2001, however, the shafts were only partially filled with 
loose material. The outlines of both are currently visible as rough concrete 
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rectangles and it is clear they are the remains of something that has been partially 
removed. 
Fig.7-7. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The removal of material from the entrance stack, revealing 
the top rung of the steel steps. Top left and bottom left 26/05/2011; top right 01/04/2013. 
(Source: Bob Clarke) 
The baseline visit conducted on 26 May 2011 noted that the entrance stack was 
almost full to the top with debris and the whole thing partially capped with a large 
stone. Grass had grown over the edge of this, suggesting it had not been disturbed 
recently. The vent stack had been, fairly recently, partially emptied. Utilising a 
section of galvanised pipe (that looked very similar to the pipe utilised as a drain on 
the entrance stack) someone had begun to remove the fill of the shaft; seven stones 
of various geological types and chunks of concrete lay just 0.5m to the north-east; 
they had clearly been placed there. A subsequent visit on 11 June 2012 revealed 
that some small stones had been removed from the entrance stack, exposing the top 
rung of the steel ladder. Interestingly most of the material near the vent stack had 
been re-introduced to the vent (fig.7-7), all except one stone that now lay 32m to the 
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north-west. No attempt had been made to remove the large stone blocking the shaft 
of the entrance stack (fig.7-8). 
 
Fig.7-8. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The removal and subsequent re-filling of the vent stack. 
Above and above right 26/05/2011, top left 06/04/2013. (Source: Bob Clarke) 
 
This activity, focussing on both the entrance and vent stacks can be interpreted in a 
number of ways, primary to that interpretation is the age of the person, or persons, 
who enacted the interaction at the time. It is highly unlikely that anyone familiar with 
the layout of an underground monitoring post would attempt to remove the stone fill 
as they would appreciate the work involved to reach the control room. Furthermore, 
the vent would have been a very unlikely choice. The recovery of sections of 
structure (specifically grills and the access hatch) to use on other posts can also be 
ruled out as they are all utilised at a higher level on the above ground structure than 
now survives. The probability is that children are those that have been investigating 
the site, the location is a well-known beauty spot and popular with walkers, the 
previous tension over the RAF station proves testament to that. The point is, while it 
is tempting to place substantial meaning on activities enacted on such contentious 
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sites as these, a mundane reason, such as a child investigating a hole in the ground, 
should also be considered. 
 
While surveying the earthwork during the final visit of this project a member of the 
public engaged me in conversation, what was revealed was interesting. On 6 April 
2013 a lady appeared enquiring ‘what I was up to’, presumably the surveying 
equipment had given her the impression that some sort of development was 
imminent. After a brief discussion covering my work she commented that she had 
been into the post in the late 1970s. At that time the lady had been the local doctor 
and had sat on the local Civil Defence Committee. The post, she assured me, had 
the potential to protect at least fifteen people with food and water for a ‘good month’. 
Phenomenologically, it is clear that the doctor had had some contact with civil 
defence, although her knowledge of the ROC post was well off the mark. Moreover, 
the suggestion that fifteen people might survive, or at least have the rations available 
to support them, for a month or so is not totally inaccurate if we consider a local 
authority control in the 1970s (Clarke 2006; McCamley 2002). This, if the account 
has any accuracy, might help us understand the excessively high number of 
personnel though to have populated the ROC underground monitoring post. It is 
highly likely that the doctor had been involved in meetings and small scale exercises 
connected with civil defence and, moreover, local authority emergency planning. I 
suggest this is the environment to which the ‘fifteen’ were intended to ‘survive’ as 
that number in an underground monitoring post would make life extremely 
unpleasant. 
 
TRANSITION 
Transitional ROC posts are those that may have had a period of refurbishment after 
initial stand-down (Oct 1968 or Sept 1991) or covert curation but are now in states of 
chaos due to the four aspects of the chaos model I have proposed in chapter 4. They 
tend to be in poor repair above and below ground, have structural components 
missing and are generally unsafe. Although, when visited and access was possible, 
quite a range of material culture connected with the organisation remained below 
ground. Importantly all ROC posts have experienced a period of transition. 
 
 243 | P a g e  
Case Study – W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire 
Post and location history 
Royal Observer Corps Post Avebury (original designation 23/B.2) was opened in 
January 1938 at map reference SU 107695. The post was re-sited to SU 104692 
(designated 14/M.4) in September 1953 and two months later received an Orlit post. 
There is no archaeological evidence for the type of Orlit structure constructed at this 
location although the landscape position of Avebury suggests an Orlit post type ‘A’ 
would have been the most likely choice. The site was moved underground in June 
1961 and remained operational until September 1991.  
Topographically Avebury is located on a small knoll (central point 191.79m above 
O.D.) known as Wadon Hill (fig.7-9). It stands adjacent to a series of twentieth 
century specific features, namely a trig point for the Ordnance Survey and a covered 
reservoir. The post also overlooks the large Neolithic henge enclosure and stone 
circle to the north at Avebury and to the south-south west the large Neolithic mound 
of Silbury Hill. Wadon Hill, along with the ROC post, lies within the central zone of 
the UNESCO designated World Heritage Site. Interestingly the post does not appear 
in the current management literature although certain military remains are noted, 
especially those associated with aviation (Simmonds and Thomas 2014, 141).  
 
 244 | P a g e  
Fig.7-9. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Avebury ROC post (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
Biography of Avebury post-September 1991 
Historiography  
Again there is a reliance on secondary sources to flesh out the activities enacted on 
the ROC post at Avebury and whilst part of an internationally recognised heritage 
landscape, the post receives no statutory protection. Specialist websites do provide 
something of the posts apparent transition from an ordered space to one of chaos. 
When members of Subbrit visited the site the post was generally in good order – so 
much so that technical equipment remained in situ (Subbrit 2/5/2001). By 3/4/2005 
the post was reported ‘vandalised’ and water was making its was into the 
underground fabric of the site (ibid 2/5/2001). The primary visit for this project was 
conducted on 11/03/2012. 
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Baseline Assessment 
The above ground component of the ROC post at Avebury is surrounded by a typical 
ministry fence (concrete posts and wire mesh fence, with a small gate) that is in 
good order. The vegetation inside is unkempt, although a number of daffodils are 
apparent during the spring. 
The structures above ground clearly display some aspects of tension being played 
out at this site. The entrance stack has been the focus of sustained force, damaging 
the structure surrounding the entrance hatch to such an extent that the entire 
assembly, including counterbalance mechanism, has been detached (fig.7-10). 
Interestingly this is now chained and padlocked to the ground zero indicator 
mounting attachment, presumably in an attempt to retain this substantial piece of the 
post on site. Other above ground features are demonstrating light effects of 
exposure to the weather, predominantly peeling paint, but none of the mechanical 
damage present on the entrance stack. 
Fig.7-10. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. The whole hatch structure has been detached from the 
entrance stack. The control room below now fills with water. Beyond the compound fence is 
a reservoir mound, to the top right is Silbury Hill. (11/03/2012 Bob Clarke) 
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Below ground the post has clearly received attention from a number of visitors. The 
sump area is full of water, presumably due to the stack hatch being removed, 
unfortunately the sump pump handle, still present in 1999 (Subbrit 2/5/2001), has 
been broken off, making it now impossible to remove the water accumulating below. 
Subsequently the entire floor of the underground monitoring post is now c.100mm 
underwater (fig.7-11). The only material culture identifiable to the Royal Observer 
Corps is a battery box, the fold down table and the cupboard. A none standard wall 
file organiser remains along with various other wall attachments for cables and the 
like, a folding chair is also present. The underground operations room was insulated 
with a double layer of polystyrene tiles, part of the attempts to reduce the chill effect 
from being underground (Jolly et al 1979), along with a now waterlogged carpet. 
 
Fig.7-11. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. A view looking down the entrance shaft. Water ingress in 
the sump area of the entrance stack. The black is stagnant water. (Source: Bob Clarke 
11/03/2012) 
 
The most obvious interaction has to be the amount of graffiti on all surfaces below 
ground. At least four episodes are recognisable, some institutionalised – executed by 
the observers themselves (Lead Observer 31 May 2016 pers comm) - others by later 
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visitors. The analysis of this particular activity has implications for the interpretation 
of activities enacted on posts in a state of transition.  
 
The chaos of abandonment 
It is clear by the state of the ROC post at Avebury that tensions are at the forefront of 
activities currently being enacted at the site. That said, it does not appear that that 
tension is in response to the National Trust (owners of this landscape), rather the 
symbolic nature of the underground monitoring post itself. Furthermore, it appears 
that there is a specific nature to two of the three identified graffiti periods, both of 
which focus on elements of the Cold War. This should not come as a surprise. 
Wiltshire Council notes on its heritage page: -  
 
A measure of Avebury's uniqueness is its appeal to a wider variety of people. 
350,000 annual visitors are attracted to Avebury, including a large element of 
international tourists. Pagans also visit the site as a place of contemporary 
celebration and gathering  
 
(Wiltshire Council 2016).  
 
Within that visitor cohort are many who were, or are may well still be, members of 
groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or members of the public 
who have an extreme view on the role of the military, especially the continued 
retention of nuclear weapons. It is clear from the surviving evidence that the post has 
been the focus of attention from the destructive visitor. The entrance hatch had, 
utilising the records created by the groups mentioned above, been damaged to such 
an extent that the hatch and surrounding mounting structure was completely 
detached by 2005. This damage subsequently exposed the post to the ingress of 
water; with nearly a decade’s worth of rainfall accumulating in the control room. This 
has, in turn, started the process of decay in all fixtures and fittings extant at the time 
of my baseline visit. 
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Non Standard Material Culture  
Material culture from the wider, peripheral, population outside the closed, secret 
world of the bunker is greatly in evidence. At the bottom of the entrance stack are a 
number of artefacts including plastic drinks bottles, a screwdriver, large plastic paint 
container lid, two pens and a mass of stones. This behaviour is quite common in 
transition phase structures and has certainly been recognised on a range of sites 
utilised in this study. Interestingly at Avebury it possible to sub-divide this deposition 
of material.  
Rocks, by their very nature, do not float. It is therefore reasonable to suggest those 
located at the bottom of the entrance stack lay where they came to rest, with only 
minimal disturbance during visitors transitioning between the entrance stack and 
control room. Bottles, especially plastic drinks ones’ float. Considering this it would is 
more appropriate to suggest the bottle, or any floating object, has been deposited 
‘somewhere’ in the underground structure and has probably drifted to its current 
position.   
The fold out table and cupboard were covered in artefacts that were both ROC or 
peripherally recognisable. A wooden box, originally containing batteries for radios 
stands on the cupboard. The box displays descriptive labels indicating the contents 
and a serial number ‘ROC 13’ – indicating it came from a central store where others 
must have been recorded. The lid has been removed and lies on the same surface. 
A green metal dustpan, laid on the fold out table also appears to be ROC equipment, 
certainly the object suggests order rather than chaos. On the fold out table there is a 
range of material, some of which cannot be discounted as drug paraphernalia. Two 
plastic bags were laid flat, on top were three deep pans, one with the lid fitted, a 
plastic washing up bowl with a red funnel inside, two lengths of rope were wound up 
and positioned near the pans.  
Between the green dustpan and battery box is an eye irrigation bottle containing 
sodium chlorate, a blue plastic bottle with no marking, a tin of car engine oil and a tin 
of ‘Glitto’. Scouring powders such as ‘Glitto’ were routinely used to disinfect toilets 
until fairly recently, certainly tins of ‘Glitto’ are common finds in underground 
structures. There is also a can of multi-grade oil on the top of the cupboard (fig.7-12). 
‘TescOil’ is not on sale today, it is likely that the tin is over thirty years old given that 
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the car depicted on the can is a Ford Capri, the model ceased production in 1986 
(The Capri Club). This might well place the can in the same date range as other, 
observer introduced, artefacts. Clearly then some form of pre - stand-down activity is 
apparent.   
The most noticeable interaction with the site is the amount of graffiti, mostly 
executed in spray paint, that now covers the underground structure. On closer 
inspection there are four groups apparent and all can be phased due using simple 
stratigraphy or the dates provided by the artist. Two groups have been produced 
using red and black spray paint, a third is produced by scratching into the 
polystyrene tiles, the forth using a pencil to write on the structure prior to the tiles 
being glued on. 
  
Fig.7-12. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. The eye wash and ‘Glitto’ (centre) are both standard 
equipment from the ordered phase of the post's life-cycle. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012 
 
Dealing with the earliest visible example first provides us with a date to a structural 
change to the underground space. Executed in pencil is the simple, but most useful, 
type of graffiti ‘Bob 1/12/87’. Importantly this is written on the emulsioned wall below 
 250 | P a g e  
the two layers of polystyrene tiles allowing us to say the insulation of the post was 
carried out no earlier than December 1987 (fig.7-13 below). The primary layer of 
spray paint has been executed in red and comprises mostly Cold War referenced 
statements and words. Secondary to this is the black which introduces a number of 
further statements, plus an additional reference to the ‘Hitchhikers Guide to the 
Galaxy’ (Adams 1979). 
The black overspray’s on a number of red words, suggesting a sequence of 
application. Third are those scratched into the surface of the tiles, these are mostly 
names with dates. They depict two year dates 07 and 09, all are scratched into the 
surface of the tiles probably with a key and both truncate the red spray paint (fig.7-
14). If we accept these dates as fact it is possible to provide a phase for the 
transition of the post from the operational to the transitional phase. Just under four 
years before the structure ceased operations it was insulated with a double layer of 
polystyrene tiles. 
Fig.7-13. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire, The phasing of graffiti south-west wall. Pre-tile phase 
highlighted in purple, red spray paint then black spray paint. (Source: Bob Clarke 
11/03/2012) 
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This was in all likelihood carried out by the observers themselves (although none of 
the crew remembered it being done) and as the wall was being covered up 
somebody wrote their name on it. Then sometime between stand-down in 1991 and 
2007 two episodes of spray paint occurred. Finally, dates were scratched into the 
polystyrene tile surfaces, damaging the spray paint in the process. 
 
Fig.7-14. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. Three levels of graffiti interaction, north-east wall. Red 
overlain be black and scratch over that. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012) 
 
The depictions executed in red spray paint are important, every example found in the 
underground control room appears to make reference to the Cold War. While not 
exclusive to the post at Avebury, this is the most overt of Cold War references found 
in any Royal Observer Corps related structure across the South-West. Whether the 
graffiti is a clear reaction to the function of the underground monitoring post is the 
subject of further analysis below. At this point though the red spray paint has to be 
considered at the very least a latent memory of the period. Very likely manifest 
through the personal history of someone active, via the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament or other such pressure groups, in the Cold War period.     
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Considering the aspects of chaos driven by a post in the transition phase of its life 
cycle it is clear that the ingress of water is a key factor in the continued decay of the 
structure. ROC posts such as Avebury receive substantially more visitors than the 
majority of other posts in the subject area, advancing a number of facets of 
transition. The slighting of the structure, breaking into the secret world below and, 
subsequently reducing the impact of that space by introducing material culture from 
peripheral zones beyond, are further important markers to the transition of such 
structures and spaces. 
Case Study – D-20 Hornscross, Devon 
Post and location history 
Royal Observer Corps post Hornscross (original designation21/B.2) was opened in 
June 1940 at map reference SS 376232. The site was moved to SS 375236 
(designated 20/L.2 in April 1944. In November 1953 the site was in receipt of an Orlit 
post Type ‘B’, the structure is extant. The site moved underground in June 1960 and 
remained operational until the post was closed in October 1968 as part of the 
Governments disbanding of the Civil Defence network and reduction of ROC posts. 
Fig.7-15. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Hornscross ROC post (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Topographically Hornscross is located 327 m south of the cliff edge at Bideford Bay 
and is located centrally to a plateau at 175m above O.D. The site lies just to the 
south of a minor road in its own compound (fig.7-15). Within the confines are the 
extant Orlit post, underground monitoring post and a General Post Office marker. A 
telegraph pole, now reduced, in height, stands on the road side next to the 
compound; this probably supplied the original communication link to the post.  
Biography of Hornscross post-October 1968 
Historiography 
As with the majority of other sites noted in this project, there is a reliance on 
secondary accounts through electronic means to ascertain the current movement 
from order to chaos. The earliest record located thus far was generated by Subbrit 
on 27/4/2001 as part of their general survey of Cold War sites at the turn of the 
century. They note that the compound is already overgrown, although photographs 
from that visit do indicate all, above ground features are accessible (Subbrit: 
27/4/2001).  
 
Baseline Assessment 
The baseline visit to Hornscross was conducted on 11 May 2011.  The underground 
monitoring post has some non-standard aspects. The ground zero indicator is raised 
on a plinth that places the mounting point 1.5m above the ground surface and a 
double step placed next to it for access. Grills are missing from the entrance stack 
and material culture (bunk bed frames) have been removed and dumped in the 
undergrowth. They appear to have been there a number of years as the vegetation is 
substantial in this area. The entrance hatch is deformed, presumably to forced 
access in the past and now does not close properly. It was not possible to access 
the vent stack due to the advanced stage of the vegetation (fig.7-16). 
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Fig.7-16. D-20 Hornscross, Devon. The entrance stack demonstrates a classic example of 
transition. Vegetation has rendered most of the post inaccessible. (Source: Bob Clarke 
01/05/2011) 
 
Access to the underground component was possible. The bottom of the entrance 
stack was partially blocked with material that appears to have been dropped down 
the shaft. The range of the deposit falling broadly into two categories; natural 
material and late twentieth century material culture. There is a layer of well 
decomposed leaf litter across the whole floor, while undulating it has an average 
depth of 70mm. This primary layer covers and, presumably, fills the sump. Partially 
embedded in the primary matrix were three large stones while a piece of concrete 
from the wall of the access shaft also lies on top of the matrix. A number of pieces of 
wood are also later deposits to the leaf litter, two appear to be rotten sectional of 
telegraph pole. The truncated pole standing next to the Orlit post is the most likely 
origin of this, probably discarded on site after being reduced in height. Other, smaller 
pieces, are from the degradation of the internal fittings, specifically doors, driven by 
the amount of water now entering the site.   
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Fig.7-17. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. The sump area of the post entrance. A mixture of leaf 
litter and items dropped down the shaft have fouled the drainage. (Source: Bob Clarke 
01/05/2011) 
Late twentieth century material culture is also present in these deposits, including the 
remnants of a portable television aerial and a substantial length of cable attached to 
it. A Crunchie wrapper and plastic soda bottle with an aluminium screw lid are also in 
evidence. While no date was recognisable on the chocolate bar wrapper, the bottle 
did have a date (30-8-2004) etched into it (fig.7-17). This bottle was clearly above 
the leaf litter deposit suggesting a terminus post quem for the deposit below. This 
said, similar depositions of plastic bottles noted at Avebury (noted above) suggested 
that we cannot securely consider the date of the bottle as a deposition date due to 
the possibility it may have floated there. Although, it does still provide a structured 
deposition marker. The door to the store room was jammed a third of the way open. 
The bottom of the store door was in a very poor state having decayed at least 
350mm up the structure, this decay is likely to originate from water entering the post 
through the unsecured hatch and soaking into the lower deposit of the shaft fill. A 
number of artefacts were in the storeroom including a very poor condition chemical 
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toilet, a large sheet of thick polythene and the remnants of the shelving usually 
supplied as part of the post furniture.  
The control room at the time of the baseline visit was dry and sparse. The rear vent 
and sliding closure plate were in a poor state of repair, both were heavily corroded 
due to the ingress of moisture (fig.7-18). The fixed survey meter instrument mounting 
plate in the ceiling was also in an advanced state of corrosion damage. A number of 
backing battens for cable runs were still in place on the wall, they are in the process 
of losing their painted protection. The only furniture survival here is the cupboard that 
usually forms the instrument bench. This has been moved away from the wall and 
one of the door is damaged. The folding bench is missing although the two mounting 
brackets are currently on the control room floor and are, again, heavily corroded. 
Two duck boards, commonly used to stand batteries on (Observer pers comm) are 
also on the floor (fig.7-19) and two bunk frames are propped up against the wall (a 
third is discarded outside). A plastic bowl lays directly under the ground zero 
indicator mount, presumably intended to catch water as it runs down the tube, it is 
dry and has a substantial filling of wood lice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-18. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. The control room exhibits the effects of damp. Note the 
deterioration around the vent (top right) caused by vegetation encouraging moisture down 
the shaft. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011) 
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An Orlit post Type ‘B’ stands in the north-west corner of the compound. The structure 
has numerous splits in all cast concrete components, specifically where the local 
salt-laden air has managed to penetrated the steel reinforcing bars. The majority of 
fixtures and fittings are missing although the wooden mount for the telephone 
connection and two mounts for the central instrument pedestal remain.  
 
 
Fig.7-19. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. ‘Duck boards’ along with two wall mounting brackets for 
the equipment shelf. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011) 
The chaos of abandonment 
The recording of Hornscross presents a number of opportunities for the order and 
chaos model. As the site was released from service at the end of 1968 forty-three 
years of non-ordered activity has been enacted out on both Cold War structures. In 
that time a number of activities have taken place, all of which have left a marker 
indicating one, or a combination of order and chaos components. They also present 
us with a problem, in so much as most activities are not chronologically specific. 
We know from the records of the organisation that the ROC post at Hornscross was 
closed in October 1968 as part of the Civil Defence drawdown initiated by the Wilson 
government (Wood 1992, 285; Royal Observer Corps, HC Deb 03 May 1968). This 
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provides us with a chronological end to the influence exerted on this small compound 
by a highly ordered entity – in this case the Royal Observer Corps. Identifying that 
end by the material culture discovered on site is difficult, date markers if present at 
all can only be ephemeral in date. What is clear is that there is most definitely a 
recognisable boundary between order and chaos. There is, however, a transitory 
phase in the abandonment process, one that Hornscross currently displays. A 
number of items connected explicitly with the organisation remain. These include the 
chemical toilet, cupboard and bunk beds, although all three are currently 
transitioning from the realm of utilisation to one of redundancy. Indeed, all three 
specific artefacts, indicative of the structure and organisation they represent, are a 
reflective microcosm of the space they were intended to inhabit. 
 
One artefact, discovered in the compound, can be considered an example of the 
contrast between public and secret, visible and hidden or, to a lesser extent, core 
and peripheral. A number of underground monitoring posts were kitted out with three 
beds, two as bunks and a single (Wood 1992, 222). Today those posts overtly 
curated tend to only have two present as the third makes it difficult to move around 
due to the restricted space. At Hornscross two bunk frames remain in the 
underground post, they are corroded, due partly to the damp atmosphere but remain 
recoverable (fig.7-20). The third is located above ground a few metres away from the 
entrance stack. This frame is in an advanced state of decay. Corrosion has reduced 
25% of the frame to oxidised powder, the rest of the structure is severely 
compromised (fig.7-21). Vegetation is growing through the framework and the leaf 
litter is steadily burying what components are left.   
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Fig.7-20. (left) fig.7-21 (above). D-20, Hornscross, 
Devon. The demise of the bunks, an event reliant 
on positioning; exposure to the elements has 
encouraged rapid deterioration. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 01/05/2011)  
 
It is also apparent after analysing the paint used below ground, to state that the ROC 
post has undergone a phase of covert curation. The original paint colours for posts 
usually comprised white or pale blue gloss on all doors, frameworks, furniture and 
cable runs. At some stage in the life of Hornscross all cable runs and door frames 
have been painted white, this has been executed using emulsive paints rather than 
oil based. In the following years this has become damp and started to peel off 
revealing the gloss surfaces below. 
It would appear that only the casual, interested visitor now descends the ladder into 
the world below, others may wish to do so but find the prospect daunting, electing 
instead to drop items down the shaft to aid guessing the depth. It is also likely that 
the more readily available Orlit post might reduce the requirement to explore the 
underground monitoring post, offering a safer although just as exciting prospect.  
The current overgrown state of the compound ensures that any investigation by the 
casual visitor is likely to be undertaken cautiously. Trackways within the compound 
allow us to chart movement through this macro secret landscape and may hint at 
some of the depositional activities recognised on site, something that has been 
increasingly difficult to recognise at the majority of sites investigated during this 
project.  
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The square compound is located to the south of a minor road between the hamlets 
of Northway (600m to the east) and Sloo (200 m to the west) and covers 232.25 
sq.m. The Orlit post stands towards the north-east corner while the underground 
component is located in the south-west quarter. The only access currently is through 
a small gap in the undergrowth from the road.  
 
Fig.7-22 (left) looking south towards the rear of the compound and the underground element 
of the post. Fig.7-23 (right). Looking north towards the road, note Orlit ladder and legs. 
Access in both directions is restricted by vegetation. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) 
 
The only visible sign of the post structure beyond the compound is a truncated 
telegraph pole and the partially hidden vestiges of the Type ‘B’ Orlit. Once inside the 
confines of the compound movement is restricted by the density of the undergrowth, 
dominated by fast growing bramble, nettles and bracken (fig,7-22 and fig.7-23). 
Growth is restricted slightly underneath the Orlit structure, although the ground 
surface is still difficult to access; other areas are only accessible due to casual 
visitors trampling down vegetation, creating a specific route to the underground 
monitoring post entrance stack. It was only when the site was accessed early 
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enough in the growing year (1 April 2013) that it became possible to access the 
ground surface, then a number of aspects of peripheral material culture were 
recognised. 
Transition Reviewed 
Of all the facets recognised during the fieldwork, the markers recognised on sites in 
transition are, by far, the most representative of archaeological site creation. They 
are also the most informative when considering the abandonment process and 
conversion of the ‘secret’ to the ‘public’. The two sites utilised as case studies here 
also demonstrate some of the pit falls when interpreting sites in general. Two 
structures with the same intended utilisation, operated by the same highly organised 
group, display quite different levels of activity. Moreover, it is likely that the level 
those human activities are driven or influenced by other monuments in the 
underground monitoring post’s surrounding landscape. Avebury, as noted above, 
accepts hundreds of thousands of visitors a year, a large majority of whom will 
ascend Wadon Hill to view both the large henge enclosure to the north and overlook 
Silbury Hill to the south. It is not unreasonable to suggest quite a number of those 
who do access this vantage point also interact with the overtly prominent ROC post. 
Hornscross, on the other hand, is located in a tranquil, under-populated area of 
Devon, a landscape unlikely to be visited by those with similar motives to those 
visiting Avebury. Subsequently, there is less interaction with the underground world 
at Hornscross. Those who do venture towards the back of the overgrown compound 
appear to explore the secret world below by dropping objects into the darkness to 
see how deep it is rather than physically enter it. 
Transition appears to have no chronological basis as both case studies have 
different official lifecycles. Hornscross was closed during the rundown of Civil 
Defence services in October 1968 (Wood 1992, 284); Avebury was retained until 
September 1991 (ROC observer pers comm). Impressions out in the field would 
suggest otherwise, the advanced state of decay and attention from destructive 
visitors’ point to Avebury having been abandoned first, when in reality the opposite is 
true. So sites in the transition phase of their order and chaos lifecycle can be further 
categorised when considering their closeness to populated areas or landscapes that 
see large interaction with the general public. Whether the site is hidden from view or 
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overtly placed in the landscape appears to have little bearing on activities enacted on 
them, indeed the more overt the ROC post, the more destructive the activities. 
COVERT CURATION 
Covert curation covers those ROC posts owned by a group whom are not specifically 
educationally driven. The key motivation appears to be one of commemoration 
although ownership is often centred around the needs of the individual or group. This 
aspect of the chaos model is the fastest growing of all those recognised in this 
project, it has implications for the continued survivability of field monuments and, I 
suspect, is partially driven by financial incentives in a number of cases.   
 
Case Study – D-3 Bampton, Devon  
Post and location history 
Royal Observer Corps Post Bampton (original designation 22/X.1) was opened in 
September 1938 at map reference SS 960234. The post was re-sited to SS 973187 
(designation 10/Y.3) as part of the Orlit upgrades from November 1953. There is no 
archaeological evidence for the type of overground post, however a previous 
reference to two legs of a Type ‘B’ did appear on a specialist website in 2000 
(Subbrit 30/09/2000). While the legs were not extant during site visits for this project 
the landscape position of Bampton coupled with the geography suggests an Orlit 
post type ‘B’ would have been the most likely choice here. The site was provided 
with an underground monitoring post in October 1961; the post was to remain 
operational until September 1991. 
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Fig.7-24. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Bampton ROC post 
(©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service) 
Topographically Bampton stands centrally to a small plateau (central point 278m 
above O.D.). Structurally it is a typical underground monitoring post with the 
exception that the ground zero indicator is mounted on a brick plinth (0.75m high). 
The post is 22 metres due west of a road called Vanpost Hill and 2.75m higher than 
it – effectively obscuring the ROC post from the road. Thirty metres to the south-east 
is a small quarry-like scoop out of the verge of the road, large enough to park several 
cars in and likely to have been utilised by the ROC post crew during activities. At the 
northern edge of the proposed carpark are a set of concrete steps with a stainless 
steel handrail, ascending the 2.75m up from the road onto the plateau.   
Biography of Bampton post-September 1991 
Historiography from Secondary Sources 
No official information regarding the transfer of the Bampton ROC post has been 
located as yet however, it is likely the site was offered back to the original landowner 
during the immediate post- stand-down period. Assessing images currently lodged 
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on interest websites it appears that the Bampton post remained essentially intact 
(fig.7-25) until 2003 (Subbrit 30/09/2000). Then, sometime between 2003 and 2008 
the fence surrounding the compound was breached and the north-west concrete 
corner post removed. Soil was then piled onto the post, burying the entrance stack to 
the level of the hatch and completely covering the bomb power indicator and fixed 
survey metre above ground mounts. The ventilation stack was not buried during this 
event. The ground zero indicator plinth had then been pushed over towards the north 
lying on top of the soil dumped on site. The entrance hatch was still accessible, 
although it had been substantially damaged prior to 2008 (fig.7-26). 
 
 
 
 
 
 265 | P a g e  
Fig.7-25. D-3, Bampton, Devon. The post as it appeared in 2002. A decade after stand-down 
the post appears to be in a state of covert curation. (Source:  Robin Ware) 
 
Fig.7-26. D-3, Bampton, Devon. The scene at the post in 2008. It is feasible that this decay 
had started by 2003. (Source: Mark Russell) 
A further line of interaction with the post and the surrounding landscape was initiated 
in 2009 when the post was included in the United Kingdom’s Geocaching Database. 
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Geocaching has become a nation-wide phenomenon over the last decade or so, 
driven by the increased availability of hand-held Global Positioning Systems for 
sports activities and, of course, dedicated online sites covering geocaching locations 
across the British Isles. Interestingly, the current web page describes the post, 
utilising the information from the Subbrit web record, including a photograph of the 
post when still complete in 2001. It then goes on to suggest ‘There is no need to 
enter the field where the bunker is related’ (Geocaching, 11/01/2009) as the cache is 
actually located by the steps with the steel handrail that leads from the road. 
Naturally those who visit the geocache are likely to visit the post too and, may well 
interact with it on a more than passive note.  
 
On 10 August 2010 the ROC post at Bampton was offered for sale, appearing on a 
web page with the domain name http://nuclearbunkersforsale. Blogspot.co.uk/ . The 
sale price is not available, although the post is noted as being freehold and having a 
‘claw-back’ clause of 30% should the land be redeveloped in the next five years. 
Imagery included in the sale document again relies on photographs from the Subbrit 
investigation a decade earlier. 
 
Baseline Assessment 
The first baseline visit for this project was conducted on 27 May 2011. It was clear 
from the outset that some form of human activity had occurred between 2008 and 
2011, the ground zero indicator plinth had been rolled further north until it came into 
contact with one of the extant concrete fence posts (fig.7-27). The north and western 
sides of the entrance stack, especially around the vent had been partially removed. 
This activity had removed spoil material from the very corner of the entrance stack 
indicating intended, rather than animal, interaction. The northern side of the spoil 
heap was also partially removed, this time with the aid of a mechanical bucket. This 
activity had pushed over the bomb power indicator mount although the fixed survey 
meter mount appeared undamaged. The entrance hatch had been removed, 
replaced with a piece of old kitchen unit with the warning ‘DANGER – NO STEP – 
Do Not Remove – STEEP DROP’ marker penned on the upper face.  
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Fig.7-27. D-3, Bampton, Devon. By the time of the baseline survey for this project the 
process of abandonment had taken a positive turn. Soil was being removed and items’ of 
post furniture restored. (Source Bob Clarke 27/05/2011)  
The chaos of abandonment 
Considering the factions of the ‘order and chaos’ model it was clear the ROC post at 
Bampton was suffering destructive visits, exhibiting redundancy and reduction 
processes through the removal of items and destruction of the fence line reducing 
the posts overall landscape impact. All events and activities are components of the 
abandonment process identified in the model utilised in this thesis. The act of 
burying the site is more difficult to interpret, especially since the event did not cover 
the entrance such that there was no access to the structure below. It is possibly that 
it was an act of protection for the monument, covering many of the parts of the 
structure that could be removed. Certainly the indication from the baseline visit was 
that the ROC post at Bampton was in an advance state of ruination, it was 
deteriorating due to the ingress of water, sections had been removed from site, while 
others were damaged and the whole compound was covered in advance stage 
vegetation. What happened next was totally unexpected. 
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An interim assessment of Bampton was planned for the following year, due, in part, 
to the potential for further activity to be enacted during the next twelve months, this 
assessment was conducted on 12 June 2012 (fig.7-28). Two aspects stood out. 
Firstly, the spoil covering the site had been all but removed, only a small amount a 
few centimetres deep remained in the southern area of the compound. Secondly, the 
ground zero indicator plinth had been re-erected on the entrance stack. This refitting 
of a substantial block of brick, concrete and metalwork could only have been 
undertaken with the help of machinery. More activities involved the replacement of 
the temporary board covering the entrance way with a fully functional hatch. There 
was still evidence of destructive acts, specifically, all concrete fence posts, apart 
from the three extant comer posts, had been removed. There was no evidence for 
either the soil or posts close to the site, again suggesting the help of machinery. 
From the evidence above ground it was clear that the structure had moved from a 
state of ruination and destruction to one of adoption and reinstatement, that said the 
lack of public information means post is not currently overtly curated, allowing me to 
place this site in the covert category.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-28. D-3, Bampton, Devon. When compared 
with (fig.7-25 and 7-26) the move back to order is 
clear. The reconstruction of the Ground Zero 
Indicator and refurbished entrance hatch are both 
markers of a covertly curated post. (source: Bob 
Clarke 12/06/2012) 
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Case Study – D-7 Christow, Devon 
Post and location history 
Royal Observer Corps Post Christow (original designation 21/F.2) was opened in 
July 1940 at map reference SX 867800. The post was re-sited to SX 831831 
(designation 21/G.1) as part of the Orlit upgrades from November 1953. There is no 
archaeological evidence for the type of overground post although the landscape 
position of Christow coupled with the geography suggests an Orlit post type ‘B’ 
would have been the most likely choice here. The site was provided with an 
underground monitoring post in September 1960; it was to remain operational until 
September 1991. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-29. Landscape aspects 
in the immediate environs of 
Christow ROC post (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. 
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service) 
 
Topographically Christow stands centrally to a small knoll (central point 255m above 
O.D.) known as Barton Down (fig.7-29). Structurally it is a typical underground 
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monitoring post with the exception that the ground zero indicator was mounted on a 
concrete plinth (1.2m high) 75m to the west of the underground section. Interestingly 
the landscape, especially the visible aspects, is very different today from those when 
the ROC post was first constructed. The 1958 edition Landmark Information Group 
sheet of the Ordnance Survey indicates a structure – interpreted as the Orlit post by 
this project – just a few metres east from a track cutting across the Down and on the 
same position as the later underground monitoring post. Moreover, the terrain within 
the surrounding 400m is depicted as marshland with occasional scrub. At the time of 
the first baseline visit on 05 June 2011 the complete area was covered in dense 
evergreen trees reaching at least 25m. On later edition maps a small layby is 
depicted off the still extant track, at the same position as the earlier Orlit and later 
underground monitoring post.   
Biography of Christow post-September 1991 
Historiography from Secondary Sources 
No official information has been uncovered through a search of records concerning 
the post- September 1991 history of the site. Specialist websites do, however, have 
some detail although much of it overlaps records generated from site visits 
orchestrated for this project. What can be said with some certainty is that the post 
was essentially intact above and below ground when visited on 12/08/00 (Subbrit 
27/04/2001). At this time the ground zero indicator was still standing on its 1.2m 
plinth.  
Christow does allow us to gauge something of the investment now needed to own an 
underground monitoring post; on 10 September 2012 the post was sold by online 
auction. As this particular sale was handled by a specialist estate agent the records 
are substantially more visible than those offered through private sale such as at 
Bampton (above). Advertised by Unique Property, the post also appeared on the 
auction website eBay® ensuring the maximum coverage. Again the sales details 
were a direct lift from the Subbrit web page record of the post in 2000 (Subbrit 
27/04/2001), although the imagery was up to date, mirroring the state previously 
encountered during the final visit to the site on 2 April 2013). What is enlightening 
and surprising in equal measure, is the price the underground structure realised. 
Starting bids were asked in the region of £9000; the post finally realised £17,901 
(Unique Property Bulletin, No.2, 2012). Bearing in mind the vandalised state of the 
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post on two earlier visits (described below) it is surprising so much a financial 
investment was made.  
Baseline Assessment 
The first baseline visit for this project was conducted on 05 June 2011. It was clear 
from the outset that a destructive element of human activity had been on site, 
evidence included the ground zero indicator plinth now lying prone to the east of its 
original position. On the underground site artefacts in the form of ROC magazines 
and highlighter pens had been brought to the surface and lay discarded 5m to the 
north of the entrance stack. 
The entrance stack displayed damage around the entrance hatch such that the 
casting for the hatch had been broken (fig.7-30). This was probably caused by the 
removal of the concrete covering it and the edge of the stack. Internally the structure 
appeared waterlogged – access was not possible due to a scaffolders plank being 
roped to the access ladder – and the louvres on both the entrance and vent stacks 
had been damaged. 
Fig.7-30. D-7, Christow, Devon. The entrance stack at Christow ROC post. Evidence is clear 
that a concerted effort has been made to enter the post forcibly. Note also damage to the 
wooden vent (Centre right) (Source: Bob Clarke 05/06/2011) 
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Interestingly the louvres were manufactured from wood raising the possibility that 
they were post-stand-down additions as original fittings were normally either steel or 
aluminium. The surrounding tree canopy had reduced the light hitting the ground in 
the area of the post reducing much of the undergrowth although there was a 
substantial wood ants nest on the southern section of the post. This active mound 
over 1m high was reducing the magazines discarded on site very rapidly and made 
initial recording unpleasant. The surface features had been painted in black matt 
paint and there was a photoelectric cell adhered to the top of the vent stack with 
wires through the vent down into the structure. 
Fig.7-31. D-7, Christow, Devon. The entrance stack at Christow in the process of 
refurbishment. The hatch has been removed and the hole covered by a multitude of 
metalwork, all padlocked to the first rung of the ladder. (Source: Bob Clarke 12/06/2012) 
 
The chaos of abandonment 
The underground monitoring post at Christow appears to be the focus of tensions 
within this particular landscape. Prior to the baseline visit in June 2011 little is known 
about the site’s history. The report filled by Subbrit on their dedicated website dates 
from a visit in 2000 and further images are only ascribed to 2011 and appear to date 
to a similar time to the first recording visit. Again the destructive visitor appears to be 
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clearly evident although the process of reduction appears to lack specific 
organisation. Damage to the wooden vents on both the entrance and vent stacks 
appear to be acts of destruction rather than attempts at removal. The damage 
around the entrance hatch suggests attempts to gain access rather than remove the 
hatch for use elsewhere. 
A second visit on 12 June 2012 found the site in the process of refurbishment. The 
damage around the entrance hatch was substantially worse, with substantial parts of 
the structure now missing. The hatch had been removed, however access was now 
impossible due to a complex mixture of corrugated tin sheet and re-bar wired and 
padlocked to the steel ladder inside the post (fig.7-31). The damage to the wooden 
louvers on the entrance stack remained although the vent stack had been re-wired 
and a further small photoelectric cell fitted and wired into the bunker below. 
Interestingly the yellow bin that appears in pictures dating to 2000 depicting the 
inside of the post was now on the surface.  
Fig.7-32. D-7, Christow, Devon. The totally refurbished entrance stack. The post was in the 
process of being sold at this point. (Source: Bob Clarke 02/04/2013) 
A further visit on 02 April 2013 presented a different picture again. This time the 
repairs to the vent stack louvers had been damaged again, while those on the 
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entrance stack had been repaired and appeared in a good state of preservation. The 
entrance hatch had been refurbished, sporting both new lock lugs and a new paint 
finish, whilst the concrete around the top of the entrance stack had been repaired 
and repainted (fig.7-32). Furthermore, the entrance hatch now displayed the details 
of the owner, who, when referring to available secondary sources (above), was by 
the time of my last visit, the previous owner.    
Covertly curated sites in context 
Covert curation is, by far, the most multi-faceted of the two components of chaos 
connected to the ownership of ROC monuments. The number of posts changing 
hands at the time of the fieldwork suggests that this phenomenon is on the increase, 
an assumption supported by the physical evidence currently encountered in the 
landscape, indicating there is more than one motive for this interaction. 
I have concluded there is more to this level of interaction than just remembrance. In 
some ways the groups or individuals who acquire ROC posts can be likened to those 
who, three decades earlier, were happy to volunteer their spare time to what they 
considered a greater cause. One could argue that this drive to own sites connected 
to the Cold War is fulfilling a personal desire or requirement for ‘personal’ 
organisation or regementary activities. During the period 1948-68 over 350,000 
civilians were in uniformed voluntary roles with the Civil Defence Corps, Auxiliary 
Fire Service and, crucially, 25,000 of those were members of the Royal Observer 
Corps (Grant 2010, 72). 
Figures for the number of retirements and new starts are unavailable although the 
survey I conducted indicates – via age and attestation profiling - that there was a 
steady flow of volunteers into the organisation right up to the stand-down in 
September 1991.The connections between redundant ROC posts and groups or 
individuals connected with military history and/or re-enactment will be discussed in 
more depth in the next chapter, although it is appropriate here to note that this 
activity is specialist enough to have an impact on the ROC landscape at local, 
regional and national level. To consider the level of impact on the post and its 
transition from order to chaos, requires a reorganisation of the material culture of the 
originator organisation to one more in line with the current ownership regime. 
Physical markers are in evidence; however, it would appear that the search for 
originality is stimulating a behaviour akin to a ‘property boom’ as both posts are 
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artefacts connected with the Royal Observer Corps have risen dramatically over the 
last decade (Facebook Post Restorers Group). 
The following entries are a direct result of the following question I posted on the 
group page (noted above) on 13 May 2016. A number of pieces of equipment 
feature, although the Bomb Power Indicator is clearly a difficult item to obtain (fig.7-
33): - 
 A general question for you all. Has the increase in bunkers under restoration 
forced an increase in the cost of original equipment and fittings. Best wishes 
Bob. 
Comment. 
Definitely Bob. Back in 2008 I was able to get a GZI, BPI, probe rod and FSM 
dome for £800. You'd not get that now! 
Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:44pm 
Comment. 
yep, as well as the intrest [sic] in all things cold war 
Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:44pm 
Comment. 
Like NAME REMOVED has already said, there has been a marked increase 
in the price of equipment which started around 2009. Since then the price of 
even the smallest item has trebled, in part due to the amount of restorations 
and new collectors. 
Like · Reply · 1 · May 13 at 5:48pm 
Comment. 
Cost of bunkers has gone up too. My local one, which was bought for a 
couple of K back in the 90's sold for 22,500 two years ago. Sadly, he's not 
done a thing with it, it's all overgrown, it's been broken into and it's filling with 
water 
Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:54pm 
Reply 
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Bob Clarke Hi NAME REMOVED, thanks for that. Do you know if the 
post reverted back to the landowner after stand down? 
Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:56pm 
Comment. 
I believe it did 
Unlike · Reply · 1 · May 13 at 6:01pm 
Comment. 
My first bpi cost thirty quid. smile emoticon:) 
Like · Reply · 2 · May 13 at 10:09pm 
Comment.  
increase in price is one main reason I have made so many replica items. I 
would rather drop a £30 fake than a now £1K original bpi for example 
Unlike · Reply · 2 · May 13 at 11:20pm 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-33. A Bomb Power Indicator – on loan 
from the ROC Museum (now defunct) to 
Great Bedwyn post. As the respondents 
noted (above) this item is now worth £1000. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 26/05/2012) 
 
 
Looking beyond the two case studies used for this category a number of other posts 
in the Devon dataset display covert curation. ROC post Modbury demonstrates 
tensions between the landowner and the restoring group. The post has a 
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photoelectric cell attached to the ground zero indicator stack and indicates repairs 
have been undertaken in the vicinity of the entrance hatch. However, this evidence 
of restoration is in sharp contrast to the steady erosion of the post immediately 
beyond the structure's footprint. The compound concrete posts have been pulled up 
and dumped on the central section of the underground monitoring post (fig.7-34) and 
the radio securing mounts are also out of place. Ploughing has reduced the footprint 
of the post and compound dramatically, a lynchet is recognisable along the west and 
north side of the site indicating the original position of the compound fence line.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-34. D-27, Modbury, 
Devon. The central area of 
the ROC post at Modbury is 
covered in the debris of the 
compound fencing. 
Ploughing also continues to 
erode the site. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 02/04/2013)  
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Fig.7-35. D-9, Drewsteignton, Devon. The area inside the compound is now being filled by 
trees and shrubs. This activity is increasing the visibility of the post on the skyline. 
(03/04/2012 Bob Clarke)  
 
At Drewsteignton a completely different approach has been taken. Here the 
compound remains intact however, a number of trees have been planted inside the 
fence line (fig.7-35). A notice near the gate declares ‘nothing valuable inside’ and 
provides a telephone number; to date no successful contact has been made via this 
number. The modification of the landscape in this location is obvious, trees both 
seclude the post from view, naturalising the landscape, while simultaneously 
removing the one activity the post was intended to act out in war – observation of 
phenomena connected with nuclear detonation.  
 
Post restorer numbers are in such ascendance that they now have a large online 
presence, although requests to join or solicit a response have been met with silence 
in the most part, mirroring the early efforts of this project; during the initial year of 
research proved difficult to engage any former members in conversation about the 
organisation to which they belonged. This ‘secretive’ element has eased somewhat 
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recently as members of distinctly separate groups slowly coalesce removing barriers 
as they do so, so much so that I have been initiated into a group specific to post 
restoration on Facebook (Facebook Post Restorers Group), enabling a dialogue to 
be constructed over covert curation. 
 
The key problem with ascribing ROC posts to an activity suggested to be ‘secret’ or 
covert is how we actually recognise a site is covertly curated. I suggest certain 
markers/activities are recognisable; all manifest themselves on the ROC posts 
utilised in this study and that fall into this type, although some are obviously subtler 
than others. While this method of interpretation may not be 100% accurate applying 
it has allowed me to increase the accuracy of this proposed behaviour.  The 
behavioural markers and motivations demonstrated as an increase in covertly 
curated sites, including the effect it is having on the, now officially abandoned, ROC 
landscape, is the focus of the following chapter.  
 
OVERT CURATION 
Overt curation is a point in the lifecycle of the ROC post that indicates a specific 
group, usually the last Royal Observer Corps members to inhabit the space when 
operational, now maintain the post. The activities are specific with motivation to 
educate the public at the top of the group agenda. Moreover, the sites are publicised 
as a form of living museum, hold open days where the public are encouraged to visit, 
encounter the ‘secret’ world below and experience the conditions under which an 
observer would work during wartime.  The following two case studies are examples 
of overtly curated posts. 
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Case Study – W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire 
Post and Location History 
Fig.7-36. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Great Bedwyn ROC post 
(©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
The Royal Observer Corps post at Great Bedwyn (original designation 23/B.3) was 
opened in January 1938 at map reference SU 278648. It was a typical pre-World 
War II structure comprising a watching and instrument area surrounded with railway 
sleepers and earth mounded up as extra protection, late in the war a shed for the 
crew to shelter in was also built (Observer 15 post account 30 August 2015 pers 
comm).  It appears the post was retained and regenerated in the 1947-8 rebuild of 
the Corps. The post was re-designated in November 1953 (14/l.4), although no 
evidence has come to light as to whether an Orlit structure was provided. The post 
was moved in September 1959 and provided with an underground monitoring post in 
August 1961. It remained in operation, as 15 post reporting to Winchester, until 
stand-down in September 1991 (Wood 1992, 316). 
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Topographically Great Bedwyn underground monitoring post is unusually placed. 
The primary activity of the post crew was to monitor the direction, height and power 
of the nuclear blast, all essentially observational activities. The post at Great Bedwyn 
is located next to a water pumping station, in a valley running north-east/south-west, 
overlooking a railway track and the Kennet and Avon Canal. The lowest point of the 
valley is 110 above O.D. with the post located at 123.8m above O.D. To the north 
the ground rises to 176m O.D. in less that 800m, while to the south it reaches 157m 
above O.D. in just over 1000m. Effectively the post can only monitor two directions – 
interestingly those areas include Oxford to the north east and Salisbury, with high 
concentrations of military stations and bases in the close vicinity. While no actual 
reason for the ROC post's move to the current location has been identified the 
landscape position of the underground monitoring post and its restricted view-sheds 
have to be suggestive of intentional placing. The post stands in a compound 24 by 
12 metres (fig.7-36), contained within is the underground monitoring post and a large 
concrete base, the site of a timber hut until 2006. Access to the compound is through 
a substantial metal gate capable of accepting a vehicle, a sign declaring the owners 
as the Ministry of Defence hangs on the gate. 
 
Biography of Great Bedwyn post-September 1991 
Historiography  
When the Government stood-down the Royal Observer Corps posts in September 
1991, Great Bedwyn post was retained as part of Crown Estates until disposed of in 
January 2012 (Marlborough. News 24 January 2014). The current owners are 
Ramsbury Estates, a subsidiary of a landholding firm in Luxembourg. The ROC crew 
have been renovating the site for display since 2004 and the post now opens for pre-
booked groups (fig.7-37) and once a year for a fund raising barbecue. The annual 
cost of renting the site is currently set at £500. 
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Fig.7-37. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. Devizes Museum visit to Great Bedwyn post 
26/05/2012. A donation was made of £50 to help the upkeep of the post. (Source: Bob 
Clarke) 
 
Many posts are situated in isolated areas, often far from populated areas, this is not 
the case for 15 post. It is located next to a busy, if minor, road and with the continued 
exposure of many posts on the internet, especially when still full of expensive to 
replace equipment, the crew are justifiably nervous of potential break-ins. 
Accordingly, the crew regularly request any images of their post on the internet are 
removed, interestingly this was how I made contact with the group as they were quite 
anonymous at the time of the initial work for this project. According to the lead 
observer the post had only been broken into once and that had been during the early 
1980s when the post was operational. Then the only damage was the wooden door 
to the monitoring room and the wet weather gear was stolen. Interestingly Group  
headquarters , on learning of the incident, suggested the crew leave the door 
unlocked from then on in – presumably to save on repairs (Lead Observer 15 post 
28 March 2016).   
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The Chaos of Abandonment 
An initial visit to the site on 8 February 2012 revealed above ground features in 
pristine condition, no corrosion and a layer gloss green paint in good condition; the 
compound and grounds it contained were also in good order. This is deceiving. A 
team from Subterranea Britannica visited the post during their recording of Cold War 
sites across the United Kingdom, they paint a very different picture, describing a site 
in decay rather than curation. The online record dates the visit on 9/10/1999, just 
over a decade after the ROC post was closed. It reports that the concrete around the 
top of the entrance stack was damaged, there was a substantial timber hut at the 
western end of the compound – used to store car parts – and four Citroen cars were 
parked between it and the underground post (Subbrit 02/05/2001). By 2006 the hut 
had burnt down and a year later the remnants had been cleared, compound grass 
cut, a new gate (with MoD sign) fitted and the post restored.    
Since the current restoration team, comprising original members of the post crew, 
have rented the site it has been maintained to a very high standard. The casual 
visitor is presented with a monitoring facility that looks, to all intense and purpose, 
like a site still operational, and that is the intention (fig.7-38) – ‘hence the sign on the 
gate that mirrors the original that was on the gate when we actually were operations’ 
(Lead Observer 15 post 30 August 2015 pers comm).   
Fig.7-38. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The restored interior of the underground monitoring 
post. The majority of equipment seen here was retained at stand-down, other pieces are 
either manufactured or bought from internet sites. (Source: Bob Clarke 25/05/2012) 
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Case Study – C-17 Veryan, Cornwall 
Post and Location History 
The Royal Observer Corp post located at Veryan, Cornwall (original designation 
20/T.2) was opened in January 1940 at map reference SW 913388. In 1953 it was 
re-designated 11/F.1 at the same location however, I have been unable to 
substantiate whether an Orlit post was provided at this time. The ROC post was re-
sited to SW 920375 in September 1962 – operating out of a redundant World War II 
‘Starfish’ control room until the post was provided with an underground monitoring 
post in July 1963 (Observer 67 post 18 October 2012 pers comm). The post 
remained in operation until stand-down in September 1991. 
 
 
Fig.7-39. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Veryan ROC post. Note 
interaction with remnants of World War II Starfish site (©Crown Copyright/database right 
2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
Archaeologically the current ROC post is just a few meters from the cliff on Nare 
Head overlooking Veryan Bay, providing almost unequalled views in 360° (fig.7-39). 
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The underground monitoring post is just one component of a twentieth century 
military landscape in this area. This particular landscape was formally used as a 
decoy site for Plymouth in the Second World War. Although very little is recognisable 
today the control centre remains extant, being used briefly in 1962-63 by the ROC. 
The centre is currently covered by a large heap of soil although suggestions have 
been made to the current owners, the National Trust, that is should be uncovered 
and presented to the public as part of a wider passive defence landscape that 
includes the ROC post (Observer 67 post 18 October 2016 pers comm). The 
underground monitoring post is of a standard type with no additions. Access to the 
post is via a long track originally connected to the earlier World War II decoy site.   
 
Biography of Veryan post-September 1991 
Historiography  
In 1994 the Truro Branch of ROCA [Royal Observer Corps Association] 
decided they wanted to acquire a post, do it all up and equip it as a small item 
of ROC heritage. We attempted to buy Penryn ROC Post but were outbid. We 
then looked around at leasing and found that the National Trust owned 
Veryan Post. We entered into a peppercorn rent lease and repaired the post 
and opened it up as a museum in 1996. 
 
Extract of email from Lead Observer Veryan post: dated 10/06/2011 
 
At that time the post opened as a museum all Health and Safety, public 
liability insurance and maintenance was the responsibility of the post crew. 
The required revenue was generated via donations when the post was open 
to visitors. By 2004 the insurance premiums were far more than the post 
generated in revenue and it looked like the site would have to cease public 
visits. Negotiations with the National Trust resolved the situation through a 
transfer of responsibility. We [The post crew] terminated our lease, allowing 
the post and, subsequently, the liability for insurance to revert back to 
National Trust control. We then joined the National Trust and signed up as 
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volunteers thus negating the need for separate Health and Safety and public 
liability arrangements. 
A précis of a conversation with the Lead Observer on 18 October 2012 during 
a National Trust Open Day at the post 
The post is now opened at certain times of the year, often coinciding with other 
natural history or conservation initiatives (fig.7-40). This particular open day (18 
October 2012) was part of the ‘Rosedale Festival’. Since Veryan post has been open 
as a visitor attraction it has enjoyed the patronage of c.1600 visitors. All are pre-
booked, however, people do arrive unannounced whilst the post is open. The Royal 
Observer Corps post members elected to maintain a presence at 67 Veryan Post 
and where possible educate the public regarding the organisation that they were 
justifiably proud. To date there had only been one attempted break in – that was 
unsuccessful. 
 
Fig.7-40. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. Members of the public being briefed by the Lead 
Volunteer Observer on the function of the Ground Zero Indicator. A unique solution to the 
management of this site has ensured the post remains as an important educational asset. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2012) 
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The chaos of Abandonment 
The opportunity to recognise any impact on the ROC post due to abandonment is 
difficult, primarily because of the restoration work carried out by the Veryan team. 
Certainly the post had been all but abandoned after 1991, although it was kept under 
a watchful eye by a few of the former observers who lived locally. Five years on from 
stand-down the process of restoration started, apparently the biggest issue was the 
corrosive aspect of being very close to the sea. The post now receives regular anti-
corrosion inspections and is protected by a thick layer of gloss green paint. One 
aspect that could quite easily be overlooked is the lack of a fence around the post. 
When this small piece of landscape reverted back to the National Trust the fence 
was removed along with the concrete posts, thus neutralising an obstacle to physical 
encounters. While this event was not intended as attempt to make the post less 
visible in the landscape (National Trust Warden 18 October 2011 per comm) it 
probably helped reduce the number of destructive visitors to the site. 
Overtly Curated Sites in Context 
Overtly curated sites present a number of complex activities, not least the tensions 
between those who wish to commemorate the efforts of the Royal Observer Corps 
and those intending to enter the underground world without permission. Clearly 
visibility is a key aspect of how people interact with both sites. At Great Bedwyn the 
post crew employ an authoritarian approach, maintaining a high security fence, 
replicating original signage suggesting military ownership and policing (fig.7-41), 
where possible, imagery and information that appears on the internet or in published 
works. This approach creates a rigid dichotomy between ‘public’ and ‘secret’ – 
reinforcing the conditions to which the Great Bedwyn post was originally established 
and in so doing promote an atmosphere of control and covert activities even though 
the post is now promoted as an educational resource.   
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Fig.7-41. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The intention at Great Bedwyn, is to provide an 
impression of MoD ownership and continued operation. The sign presents an air of 
permissive entrance for the public. (Source: Bob Clarke 4/08/2012) 
Veryan post appears to have a far more liberal approach to how interaction with the 
public is managed. The above ground components of the monitoring post are fully 
exposed to all aspects of the chaos component although, position in the landscape, 
closeness to settlement, roads and the use of the surrounding landscape all play 
their part in determining the severity of each aspect. What the post does not do is 
promote itself as a military installation, the removal of the fence reduces the visual 
impact and lends to the benign appearance of the entrance and vent stack (fig.7-42). 
Thankfully it would appear that the tactics employed on both sites have, thus far, 
gone some way to ensuring destructive visitors are few and far between.  
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Fig.7-42. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. The National Trust has removed the traditional barrier to 
entry – the fence – reducing the landscape impact to a far lower level (compare with Fig.7-41 
above) (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2012) 
 
Is this Chaos? 
Overtly curated sites offer different interpretation of ‘chaos’ as a state. The secret 
world of the nuclear monitoring post, when penetrated by the public, brings with it a 
form of chaos not readily visible, the secret space is now no longer controlled. Where 
once only the initiated signatories of the Official Secrets Act were allowed now the 
uninitiated are provided unconditional access. As post crews describe their craft to 
those now encased in the concrete-lined subterranean control room, they are 
inducting visitors into a world they had until visiting, only been partially aware. And 
this is the key reason for the curation of both posts. In the Royal Observer Corps 
online survey for this project the question was posed ‘What made you want to join 
the Royal Observer Corps?’ Of those who completed this section 26% cited a will to 
help community and country, it would appear natural then that a number of former 
members would be interesting in promoting the organisation today especially when 
considering the humanitarian aspects of air raid and fallout warning. Overt curation is 
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not the only curatoral activity enacted on ROC posts. It is to the more complex 
phenomenon of covert curation that we now turn. 
THE EFFECTS OF SCHEDULING ON THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
Applying such a rigid framework thus far takes no account of those sites that are 
under official protection, the scheduled sites. Between the construction of any given 
ROC post and the subsequent decommissioning of the post (be that 1968 or 1991) 
the owner/operator of the whole network was, as introduced previously (chapter 3), a 
highly ordered organisation. Any major deviation from that highly ordered path could 
render the post, in times of crisis, useless. Beyond stand-down the fate of each post 
has been radically different, as demonstrated above, although one specific activity – 
that of national legislative preservation – appears to have no bearing on the state of 
preservation actually encountered on site. Why that might be is complicated, 
although this is a valid and important aspect of this study as the situation has 
implications for the sustainability of a valuable educational and social resource going 
forward. 
A number of ROC posts nationally are subject to statutory protection through 
scheduling, within those monuments visited and recorded for this project four are 
under that legislation. They are wide spread and all except one, Skipsea post, North 
Yorkshire, are implicated in the notice via other monuments in their immediate 
landscape. Beyond Skipsea (Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post 
and World War II visual spotting post, 200m north of Southfield House, List No. 
1021192) no other ROC post has been included in the scheduling system in England 
purely on its own merits. A brief look at Historic England’s records indicate 23 ROC 
posts noted in scheduling, an extremely small representation if we consider the 
number of posts built in Devon and Cornwall during the underground phase of the 
organisation.  Basically 6% of the total of underground monitoring posts in Devon (52 
by 1965) are currently scheduled. No structures in Wiltshire (24 constructed) are, to 
date, protected and of those ROC posts structures visited across England for this 
project (33), only one more was encountered (Pickering post, North Yorkshire, 
described in chapter 5). 
A Resume 
Utilising the four states of preservation I have developed to classify aspects of the 
abandonment process referenced as chaos it becomes immediately apparent that 
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scheduling has little effect on the state of preservation. Indeed, the state of other 
attendant monuments noted in the scheduling does in some cases have influence on 
the later contemporary archaeology. 
ROC post D-6 Berry Head, Devon 
The Royal Observer Corps landscape at (D-6) Berry Head, overlooking Torbay, 
underpins this assumption. The following extract from the scheduled notice (Berry 
Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, List No.1017322) notes the site 
specifically. However, as the site was first scheduled on 9 November 1950, long 
before either the Orlit or underground monitoring post it is clear a judgement of value 
implicitly connected to the monuments of the Royal Observer Corps has to have 
been made later. It is likely that the ROC monumental landscape was added at the 
last amendment incorporated on 14 March 2000. 
Berry Head figured again in the 20th century defence of Britain with the 
erection of a Royal Observer Corps post within the monument during World 
War II and the construction of an underground Cold War monitoring post in 
1959-60. 
Berry Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, List No.1017322 
Fig.7-43. D-6, Brixham, Devon. The multi-phase site at Berry Head components of a noted 
scheduled landscape. The emphasis here is in public education. (Source: Bob Clarke 
25/05/2011) 
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The site, owned by Torbay Council, maintains the ROC structures to a high 
standard. The underground monitoring post is empty; however, it receives regular 
maintenance above ground. With the fence removed the public now have direct 
access to the post, including the opportunity to climb on the entrance and vent 
stacks; signage indicates the structure's intended use. The World War II and 1950s 
Orlit posts have been reused as a bird watching point, again maintaining the 
structures intended role, and in so doing, maintaining the structures themselves. 
Public access and education is the key driver for the curation of the whole of Berry 
Head, information boards and a visitor centre enhance the learning experience for 
those who visit (fig.7-43). The attendant ROC posts form another tangible link with 
the military’s continued use of this specific landscape and are incorporated as such. 
The maintenance of the ROC structures falls into the health and safety remit of the 
council, who has an obligation to its visitors, hence the post being well maintained 
(Torbay Berry Head Warden, pers comm 25 May 2011). The signs describing the 
role of the ROC in this landscape place this post into the overtly curated group. 
 
ROC post Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire 
The multi-phase landscape connected to the ROC at Pickering was first entered on 
the schedule on the 22 March 1962, although it is the most recent amendment, 
dating from 07 July 2000, that included the ROC itself (Beacon Hill ringwork siege 
castle and Royal Observer Corps post, List No. 1019091). A substantial generalised 
description covering the development of the landscape from World War II to the end 
of the Cold War, along with structural descriptions of all ROC monuments is included 
in the notice. Interestingly the notice also includes the following: -  
 
A wooden fence extends around the Orlit and underground posts, defining the 
area originally under military control. This fence and all the other remains of 
Royal Observer Corps posts are included within the monument. 
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Beacon Hill ringwork siege castle and Royal Observer Corps post, List No. 
1019091 
 
Fig.7-44. Y-3, Pickering, North Yorkshire. Both the Orlit post ‘A’ and underground monitoring 
post form part of the scheduling of this site. Note the post and rail fence, also part of the 
scheduling notice. (Sources: Bob Clarke 01/11/2014) 
 
This is not the usual pattern of fence utilised when defining an area for a post, 
indeed it was placed around the site just after stand-down (Pickering site owner pers 
comm) and one wonders what brought the monument inspector to the decision to 
include it in the notice (fig.7-44). The post itself has received the attention of a post 
restorer over the last six years, he holds the lease on the structure from the current 
landowner, but was unwilling to share details of the arrangement. Furthermore, I 
enquired as to how the current occupier deals with the restoration of a scheduled 
ancient monument given the constraints, “– the repairs was [sic] like for like so they 
did not affect the monument in any way.” (Pickering site owner pers comm). 
Currently the post is painted bright green, parts of the Orlit post also displayed this 
colour, fresh paint raises the awareness of the site being in some form of 
‘ownership’, although no external information is present to indicate either the use or 
the history of the site. This post is clearly currently a covertly curated site.  
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ROC post D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon 
The landscape in which an underground monitoring post stands is an ancient one. 
Known as Raddon Hill, monuments include a causewayed enclosure, Bronze Age 
enclosures and field systems and a small univallate enclosure from the Early Iron 
Age. The site was first scheduled on 23 December 1997 after a series of excavations 
demonstrated the national importance of the site (Raddon Hill: A Neolithic 
causewayed enclosure and later hillfort, List Number: 1016259). 
 
Situated near the centre of the causewayed enclosure is an underground 
monitoring post of the Royal Observer Corps. The post, now decommissioned, 
was Station 20 of the ROC Exeter 10 Group, Stockleigh Pomeroy. It survives in 
good condition and is included in the scheduling. 
 
Raddon Hill: A Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later hillfort, List Number: 
1016259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7-45. D-41, Stockleigh Pomeroy, 
Devon. The weather and lack of 
maintenance is adding to the overall 
degradation of the site.  (Source: Bob 
Clarke 01/04/2013) 
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The ROC post at the time of the baseline visit on 26 May 2011 discovered a site in a 
state of disrepair. Situated on top of Raddon Hill at 217m O.D. the post is totally 
exposed to the elements and, fourteen years after initial scheduling is now in a poor 
state. Corrosion around all ferrous metal is in an advanced state and a combination 
of rain and frost is reducing the integrity of all concrete joints, most noticeable being 
the step for the entrance stack. The entrance stack had been modified to prevent 
access to the control room below. This required a steel band, 2.54cm wide, being 
bent over the hatch and secured on both sides to the concrete structure, this had 
been cut allowing access once again, although, only once the hatch had also been 
deformed by forced entry. Around 60% of the compound fence posts were extant, 
with remnants of wire mesh still visible between a few uprights. The general state of 
this post, far from being in ‘good condition’, has moved into a transitory phase (fig.7-
45).  
 
ROC post D-39 Sharpitor, Devon   
The Royal Observer Corps landscape of Sharpitor has already been introduced 
through the case study presenting posts in a state of ruined or destroyed (above). 
Here I focus solely on the implications of scheduling, and in this case the dichotomy 
it presents. The scheduling notice includes the following:- 
 
The structures and buildings associated with RAF Sharpitor were dismantled 
after operations ceased, but enough remains to provide an insight into this 
unusual and significant military base. The civil defence bunker provides a 
further dimension to this site and is one of a comparatively small number to 
survive intact. 
 
Prehistoric coaxial field system and cairns, an historic enclosure and part of 
RAF Sharpitor, situated on and around Peek Hill, List Number: 1020238 
 
At the time of the baseline study (11 May 2011) all above ground features had been 
removed to the level of the mound surface although still visible in the case of the 
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vent and entrance stack. When the inspector visited the site, the date first scheduled 
is recorded as 11 February 2002 so presumably visited sometime in 2001, there is 
every possibility that the structure was indeed, ‘intact’. The online record created by 
Subbrit places their record to 27/04/2001, the post had been destroyed by that date 
according to this, leaving just the underground portion of the structure extant. The 
question is whether the inspector visited the site in the window between extant and 
destroyed or not, I suggest the post was still complete at the time as the remnants of 
the post are clearly in a ruinous state, something I am sure would have been noted 
at the time.  
Fig.7-46. D-39, Sharpitor, Devon. The earth mound surrounding the semi-sunken structure 
of the underground monitoring room. The removal of all surface features has rendered the 
post a difficult to interpret site in an already multi-phase landscape. (Source: Bob Clarke 
11/05/2011) 
 
It is likely the decision to remove the above ground structural elements was partially 
driven by the pressure being exerted locally to return the site to moorland, removing 
all aspects of the military incursions into the landscape. Clearly the remains of recent 
conflict are the subject of tension, redundant military structures, especially those 
from the recent past (post World War II especially) are difficult to demonstrate that 
they have a value. Considering the politicised history of RAF Sharpitor (presented 
above), it is perhaps surprising that anything remains of the underground monitoring 
post (fig. 7-46). The interesting point here is that the ROC post at Sharpitor is a 
reflection of the wider military landscape in which it sits – a landscape of military ruin. 
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Comparing this with the very different situation at Berry Head, where the series of 
posts are considered both an integral part of the military landscape and an 
educational resource, it is clear to see why the scheduling of the two sites can only 
be considered on their own merit. 
 
A ‘Scheduling’ Pattern? 
It is clear from the observations made during this project that the imposed legislation 
applied when a scheduled notice is served appears to make little, or no difference, to 
the state of preservation encountered on site, moreover, the landscapes to which 
each site is attributed is often complicated by wide archaeological diversity. Key to 
the continued upkeep of ROC monuments appears to be how the surrounding 
landscape is valued, interpreted and presented. A post is more likely to receive 
statutory protection if it can be linked to similar land usage as is the case at Berry 
Head. A military application demonstrates longevity of activity, especially if this has a 
250 year or more chronology. It follows then that if that military landscape is 
disrupted then the ROC monument might also be in a similar state as at Sharpitor.  
Considering Cold War structures generally, they are, by their very nature often 
subtle, unobtrusive sites in remote or difficult to access locations. That said, 
scheduling does have wider implications for the preservation of an appropriate 
number of monuments for future generations, the challenge is how we encourage 
the upkeep of such contentious monuments, especially with landowners who have 
inherited such structures through land return. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND NARRATIVES – A BRIEF SUMMERY 
In this chapter I have sought to present the results of the fieldwork in such a way that 
a number of distinct facets to the chaos side of the ‘order and chaos’ model was 
recognisable. Considering the results at face value it is clear there are aspects that 
can be explored. Currently the four blocks utilised here, overtly curated; covertly 
curated, transitional; and ruined or destroyed appear to have weight. Overtly curated 
sites are slowly in ascendance as the value of a number of posts is recognised by 
both small groups of often ex-observers, and perhaps more importantly, national 
bodies. So do these posts represent or accurately reproduce the operational status 
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of the post during the Cold War? At first sight this is true, although the real 
experience for the public must be that opportunity to descend into a dark and secret 
world where once volunteers awaited the end of the world. This phenomenon is one 
of the foci of the next chapter. 
 
Covertly curated sites are increasing (as the online groups being formed attest to), 
indeed they appear to be causing something of a boom in the exchange of both 
material culture connected with the organisation and the bunkers themselves. This 
too has implications for the survival of other posts further down the life cycle post- 
stand-down. Although it is not enough to suggest the reduction processes through 
the removal of fixtures and fittings should be restricted to, or be considered to 
indicate, the recovery of material culture to furnish other sites or be for material gain. 
The number of artefacts abandoned in or near the posts attest to that. Occasionally 
artefacts become pawns in the activity being enacted at the time and are summarily 
discarded in a casual manner at the cession of activities. 
 
Those sites in the transitional stage of their life cycle are clearly moving towards total 
destruction and ruination, however, as I discovered at more than one post, there is a 
possibility of reprieve from the inevitable. That reprieve is clearly due to the 
escalation of the value of the post itself. The physical fabric of the post at a number 
of locations now appears to be changing hands at ever increasing prices. What and 
why this is appears to be a mix of ex-observers who wish to maintain that link with 
the activities they once performed. Moreover, those who would have joined the 
Royal Observer Corps, had it still been in existence, also fall into this category. The 
motives offered to join the Corps are now played out by ownership of a post. This is 
not restricted to the ROC, any number of military enthusiasts are extant in the United 
Kingdom, the number of re-enactors testifies to that. Not everyone aspires to own a 
bunker. Old tensions, when connected to sites connected to mass destruction do 
attract the archaeology of opposition. The graffiti is especially useful in this case, 
suggesting more of a reaction to the structure than society at large. 
The real question is can we accept gaps in site histories of a decade at a time. And if 
we do are we able to provide a reasonable narrative in which different behaviours 
can be recognised? A large part of the ROC estate, especially immediately post- 
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abandonment, has no recognisable narrative or historiography. That said, I do feel 
the chaos model does flesh out some of these gaps. One thing the bunkers offer is a 
metaphor for the Cold War itself. These structures provide perceptions of survival 
underground that are compounded by the slow rates of decay found inside the secret 
world, although when viewed now they are heterotopian worlds, landscapes of 
survival that had no halcyon end for those inducted into the ROC. 
The next chapter places the results under scrutiny demonstrating the importance of 
such considerations when studying building with contentious histories. It also seeks 
to validate the results against a theoretical framework concentrating on the 
processes of abandonment and the motives behind the volunteer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 300 | P a g e  
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that a range of diverse activities are being 
played out at monitoring posts connected to the Royal Observer Corps. These are, in 
the main, radically different to the activities expected to be carried out at the posts 
during their operational phase. The question is, do these activities tell us anything 
new about the behaviours, attitudes and values of those who now interact with the 
ROC posts? This author believes they do. In the chapter that follows justification will 
be made for the conclusions drawn already, futher it will demonstrate why this study 
should be considered a new direction for recent and military archaeology, one that 
has implications for the study of the recent past. 
Why The Royal Observer Corps - A Summary? 
In the last chapter I demonstrated how it was possible to recognise differing states of 
preservation of similar structures via a mix of fieldwork and engagement with those 
who operated and inhabited them. A number of key chronological factors were 
required to devise a testable model, one that could act as a framework for mapping 
the abandonment process. With the date of every underground monitoring post’s 
construction, opening and closing, known, the Royal Observer Corps was clearly an 
appropriate medium to test out aspects of the project. The study was expanded to 
include the earlier Orlit post series, meaning all field monuments designed for the 
ROC, although exclusively connected to the Cold War, were brought into the study. 
That said, the sample of Group Headquarters structures available for study was too 
small (two Bath and Exeter) to provide any meaningful contribution. The  
headquarters structures, while appearing in this project as part of the archaeological 
study, were not monitored for behaviours.         
The ROC had a national footprint and even though there are only two types of 
monument attributed to the field operation (Orlit and underground monitoring post) of 
the organisation, the number of structures was still in excess of 2000. The 
abandonment of each ROC post forms part of national, organisational and personal 
archives; the organisation was in operation during living memory and a substantial 
number of its group members are still available for comment. This extends to 
members of the public who also lived through the Cold War. The records of the 
Royal Observer Corps could be interrogated (if extant) and, probably most 
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importantly, the organisation was, in the main, a voluntary organisation opening up 
the possibility to discuss behavioural activities focussed on motivation. 
ABANDONMENT 
Considering all the attributes and chronological milestones the ROC offered, I 
decided this organisation would be a good vehicle on which to test out a number of 
theories connected with the abandonment process. The process of abandonment is 
well served in the current range of literature, indeed, one could argue that all sites 
studied through the process of archaeology are the study of abandonment as no site 
is predominantly an account of current activity, more the study of the remnants of 
evidential aspects of a process, activity or event separated by chronology. 
Contemporary archaeology allows the researcher the opportunity to combine a range 
of humanities based disciplines with the historiography of the same site, through 
contemporary records and personal accounts it should be possible to achieve a 
blended outcome (a combination of all routes of investigation), providing better 
fidelity due to the reduced timeframe offer by the contemporary nature of the group 
under study.  
Most prominent in this field is probably Michael Schiffer; with a number of 
publications and papers on the subject of site formation, he takes an almost 
manifestoed stance on the way formation processes should be investigated (Schiffer 
2010, 31) demanding the principles of the process ‘– could and should be explained 
through – ethnological processes’ (ibid 2010, 31). If a domestic site is the focus of 
investigation then this would seem obvious, even within an industrial or 
military/authoritarian setting, ethnographic evaluation and comparison would serve 
the researcher well. With a highly ordered group such as the Royal Observer Corps, 
ethnography takes on a new dimension.  
The archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps, like any other organisation, presents 
material culture specific to that organisation. This material culture is interwoven with 
both artefacts from outside the organisation and the activities enacted by those who 
populate this secret landscape. To understand the formation process demanded by a 
study of abandonment one first has to strip down the observations made during 
investigation. This basic premise drove development of the order and chaos model 
that has, with refinement, been utilised in the interpretation of all fieldwork results in 
this project. 
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Utilising the new model, it has been possible to reorder the landscape in a way that 
makes the secret, or invisible, visible to the wider populous. Schiffer suggests the 
abandonment process connected to activities beyond the initial purpose of a given 
structure, especially ‘-when reuse is uncommon, materials in the archaeological 
records abound’ (2010, 34). Attempts to explain the cultural material left on site and 
build scenarios from that material is standard archaeological practice and supports 
Schiffer’s comments when taken at face value. Unfortunately, the premise that the 
last occupant of a site or structure leaves material ‘abound’ is not correct when 
considering sites of high order - especially those of militaristic in form. Often little, if 
anything, is left behind when military sites close down. All equipment is accounted 
for and returned to storage, often leaving only the infrastructure of the site, its 
buildings and fittings (light switches, door handles, coat racks, cupboards and 
chairs). These have no overt identity marking them out from those items found in 
wider society. From a point of study this means that initial encounters with ROC 
posts are a complex subject, however, this does help with the order and chaos 
model.  
The equipment list, layout and any subsequent modifications to the structure (such 
as the fitting of radio to create master posts) is well represented in the archival 
record. This has allowed a greater confidence to be placed on the results this project 
has demonstrated. Results have, subsequently, much greater detail, allowing for a 
number of new recommendations from this study. Further, it has implications for re-
enactment and remembrance, both forms of ordered activity undertaken alongside 
normal daily routines, and the demonstrable worth of representative sites from the 
Cold War to both the academic community and wider public at large. 
The Importance of Abandonment in Contemporary Archaeology 
The place of abandonment, or the recognition of it, in the archaeological record is 
key to the understanding of site development. Although, the further back into 
antiquity one goes the more difficult it becomes to place a specific activity 
chronologically. For example, a Romano-British farm standing empty might show 
evidence of later ‘squatters’ lighting a fire in the room that once had a mosaic floor. 
Pottery may date the abandonment of the structure to the early fifth-century, the 
burnt floor may have no direct evidence, placing the event ‘sometime after 
abandonment’ (Price 2000). My issue is that that might be one hundred years 
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afterwards, especially since both events are not precisely dated. In the case of 
contemporary archaeology one would not expect this to be much of a problem, 
especially if we are considering the twentieth century and the records available. 
However, this is not the case, especially when the work is concerned with the military 
or highly organised groups of a clandestine nature. Records, while more copious 
than in previous periods, are still incomplete. Moreover, archives covering many 
subjects bound by the Official Secrets Act also remain closed to scrutiny under what 
is known as the ‘thirty-year rule’ (Schofield 2005, 38) 
Archives and Oral Histories 
With the written archive lacking much detail, we need to rely on more living human 
subject methods of investigation. I have noted throughout this project that the Royal 
Observer Corps were a mainly volunteer force; this is important as joining the 
organisation was a structured activity requiring background checks, signing of the 
Official Secrets Act and commitments of both time and effort through promotional 
exams. While records, if they are extant, should hold basic personal details, a copy 
of the Official Secrets Act as signed by the volunteer and a service record (posts 
stationed on; courses attended; promotion and awards); it does not allow for 
personal motivation, reasons for joining and belief systems of the individual. The only 
way to access these aspects is through dialogue with those who were members of 
the organisation. This is a phenomena available only to the researcher concerned 
with contemporary archaeology. Work in this specialised field has included an 
archaeological and oral survey of RAF Spadeadam, Cumbria (Wilson 2007) and 
Second World War commemorations in Devon (Walls and Williams 2010) as well as 
the project presented here. 
Utilising the hard-won information from the Royal Observer Corps members has 
provided this project with an extra dynamic. Accounts covering the various facets of 
the day-to-day activities/duties enacted out on the ROC posts have served to place 
the observer in both a landscape and taskscape context (Ingold 1993). They also 
open to wider debate the concept of managing mass destruction rather than stopping 
it, usually through arms control, as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
demanded. The validity of capturing oral testimony as a research tool for 
contemporary archaeological research is not in question here, and certainly the 
returns utilised here have been most useful, they also allow a wider, more balanced 
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view of the Cold War period, especially across voluntary activities such as the ROC 
and CND. 
 
THE ABANDONMENT MODEL  
A primary objective of this project was to develop a model that could provide a 
framework on which to place observed activities recorded through fieldwork. Now at 
the end of this work was the order and chaos model a valid proposition? I consider it 
was. The next section provides justification of the conclusions drawn from the 
fieldwork results, providing further context for the Royal Observer Corps posts and 
the implications for further study in this area. What follows is a discussion 
surrounding the concept of order up to and including the initial abandonment of the 
Royal Observer Corps network of nuclear monitoring posts across the United 
Kingdom.     
Order 
The regime covering what is recognised as order has been extensively covered in 
Chapter 4; suffice to say organisations run along militaristic lines, heavy in ritual, 
regulation and obedience, and with a specific material culture linked to both task and 
belief leaves potential markers in the archaeological record. Often such groups have 
their own architecture and landscape presence such as security fencing, all 
reaffirming heterotopic worlds beyond the visible. Interpretations of activities and size 
by those not initiated into the organisation can be wide of the mark, usually driven by 
other disenfranchised groups - in this case the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - 
all exacerbated by signs threatening offences under the Official Secrets Act.    
So why a heterotopic view? Michel Foucault suggested six states or levels of 
heterotopias, primary to this was an activity born out of crisis and deviance (1967); a 
place or location where those non-initiates are excluded (Scham 2001, 187). If we 
take the two terms literally then ‘crisis’ is reference, in this case, to the Cold War, 
while ‘deviance’ covers nuclear warfare, something the majority were excluded from 
controlling. I would suggest we also consider the underground monitoring post as an 
object of specific material culture, itself displaying crisis and deviance via restricted 
access, while unfamiliar or contentious activities are undertaken in the secret world 
below. 
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Narratives of Order and Stand-down  
If the whole idea of joining a highly organised group is to carry out instrumentalist 
activities (repetitive training for a common goal), then the personal histories captured 
through singular accounts should contain views of the same; encouragingly the 
results revealed much more than a rigid narrative along Royal Observer Corps lines. 
The personal accounts from those who returned questionnaires supplied a wealth of 
information covering motives for joining, attitudes towards nuclear warfare, their view 
of protest groups and what they would have done had war broken out. None of this 
would be available through official channels.   
Contextualising the Royal Observer Corps routine activities allows behaviours to be 
recognised in the life-cycle of the organisation; more importantly the accounts 
suggest that even a highly ordered organisation has a chaotic element. 
Subsequently, when considering the actual abandonment of underground monitoring 
posts, one cannot be certain of the level of equipment removed, nor the material 
culture from the organisation that was left on site.  
The point is, we have, through archives, both national and private, the date of the 
stand-down of all 1,562 underground monitoring posts across the British Isles. The 
official ROC history provided to each observer during training, notes 686 posts were 
closed in the 1968 Civil Defence Review (ROC 1989, para 162), while the remainder 
closed on 30 September 1991 (Wood 1992, 240). A visit to an ROC post in the 
landscape cannot, on structural form alone, ascertain which date the site was closed. 
As I have already stated, from personal experience, the close down of any militaristic 
establishment is managed with the same efficiency as when the site was in 
operation. Only material culture not expected to hold value or reuse is left on site. In 
the case of the underground monitoring posts this is usually furniture. Interestingly, 
any material introduced by the observation crew is also left behind.  These two 
points need expanding as they are important to the interpretation of behaviours both 
during and after operations, defined here now as order and chaos phases. 
ROC Material Culture as Indicators 
Military equipment and buildings are owned by the government, although, the 
responsibility for their upkeep, especially being ‘fit for purpose’, is often devolved 
down to lower ranks. Having an ‘inventory’ is part and parcel of any Highly Ordered 
Entity and service life in general (I had several in my time in service). Naturally, when 
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the ROC underground monitoring posts were closed all equipment had to be 
accounted for and returned to a central point. How much of it actually was returned is 
not available for scrutiny, although, taking into consideration the amount of 
equipment that passes through online auction sites, I would suggest it was clearly 
not 100%. Schiffer developed a model investigating the life-cycle of ‘durable objects’ 
in 1972, it still holds validity when considering ROC posts during the crossover from 
order to chaos. 
A member of the public encountering an ROC post today would struggle to interpret 
the subterranean space without prior knowledge of the organisation who created and 
inhabited it.  They would, however be able to differentiate between what the 
Ordnance Survey often noted as a ‘covered reservoir’ and a space designed for 
human activity. This is because, on the whole, a number of artefacts specific to the 
design of the post are abandoned on site. These include bunk bed frames, wooden 
cupboards and shelves and the chemical toilet. Such items have little value outside 
of the control room and, as such, are left in situ. This abandonment of infrastructure 
was suggested by Binford (1979, 264) to often represent low cost, bulky items, a 
case that certainly explains those items encountered on sites post stand-down. What 
is unfortunate for this study is that the types of bulky items left in the underground 
monitoring posts are identical - there was no change in type or pattern across the 
life-cycle of the ROC, so this type of material culture can only be ascribed specifically 
to the organisation, it cannot provide a period when the site was abandoned (1968 or 
1991). There is, however, one piece of equipment, or rather the wooden crate that 
contained the equipment, that does help; the hand operated air raid siren. The siren 
was a standard piece of equipment for all underground monitoring posts, intended to 
be used to warn the local area around the ROC post of air attack. Interestingly five 
crates, minus the siren, were discovered in posts investigated for this project, all had 
a refurbishment date of 1972 on labels; all were in posts that were in operation until 
1991. While no record of a re-equip of the sirens has been so far found, it would 
appear that sirens collected in from the stand-down of either the Royal Observer 
Corps posts or the Civil Defence Corps in 1968 were refurbished and then re-issued. 
The point is, we do have a marker that differentiates between 1968 and 1991, as 
long as that piece of ROC material culture remains in the structure. As the siren is 
missing the crate has little value and thus conforms to Binford’s suggestion on the 
abandonment of low cost, or bulky items (1979, 264). I suggest we can now 
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complement this by suggesting items of little, or no, intrinsic value can also be added 
to this list. 
Evidence for Observers 
Evidence for human interaction beyond the chemical toilet also remains in a large 
number of posts; this is often a mixture of issue, and non-issue, material. Looking at 
one specific piece, the observer mirror, allows us to look at an aspect of the lesser 
researched aspects of the Royal Observer Corps. Mirrors were present at W-1 
Alderbury; W-2 Avebury; W-5 Great Bedwyn, all in Wiltshire and C-0 Veryan, 
Cornwall. The question must be, what need is there for a mirror in an underground 
bunker? Well primarily the Royal Observer Corps was a uniformed service and as 
such had its own requirements located in AP 3306: Regulations for the Royal 
Observer Corps. The relevant aspects of the dress code were extracted and placed 
in all training material and included ‘Patterns of Uniform for Observers’ (Chap 3, para 
64) and ‘Badges of Rank for Observers’ (Chap 3, para 65). Furthermore, AP 3306: 
Appendix ‘B’: Code of Discipline paragraph 1. Code of Offences against Discipline 
states ‘K. Loss or damage of clothing or personal equipment - (1) Loses, or wilfully or 
negligently damages, or fails to take proper care of any article of clothing or personal 
equipment - ‘. Suddenly the need for a mirror makes more sense. In a highly ordered 
organisation the mirror plays a part in the maintenance of appearances, an 
extremely important part in the visuality of members, intent to follow orders and 
maintain a task-focussed activity. Interestingly, the mirror's also hides an act of 
remembrance. 
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Fig.8-1. An observer mirror at W-
1 Alderbury, Wiltshire. Note the 
Air Ministry monogram with the 
King's Crown burnt into the 
frame along the bottom (Yellow 
Arrow). (Source: Bob Clarke 
17/07/2013) 
 
The reverse of every mirror has, stamped into the wooden frame ‘A and M’ with a 
depiction of the Kings Crown in between (fig.8-1, above). This item clearly has earlier 
origins than the underground monitoring posts, it also pre-dates the construction of 
the Orlit post network in 1954/55. Taking that into consideration there is a very real 
possibility that the mirrors that were used in underground monitoring posts, 
presumable issued through the late 1950s and early 1960s, were war stock. They 
are also missing from any equipment lists or post inventories so far located in the 
records that survive. More than one observer noted, through conversation, the 
mirrors link with the war (Veryan and great Bedwyn).  
This is important. It demonstrates a simple, but effective, method of remembrance, a 
time when the Royal Observer Corps had a far less contentious role to play in the 
defence of the United Kingdom. It also serves to legitimise the nuclear reporting role 
through connection with past observation duties. Legitimacy is a requirement of all 
highly ordered organisations; outwardly the entity projects an impression of 
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essentialness, ‘The men and women of the Royal Observer Corps have a vital part 
to play in the network of services planned to protect our nation against the results of 
an attack’ (ROC 1985). Inwardly, the ROC maintained their traditional aircraft 
reporting tests and competitions, links with the RAF and specific uniform, even 
though none were relevant when the nuclear reporting task forced the observer 
crews underground. Furthermore, the history of the Royal Observer Corps and the 
part it played in the protection of Britain was an intrinsic component of the training 
system for new members.              
Beyond the issued material culture of the Royal Observer Corps lies a backdrop of 
items that reaffirm the wider society that the ROC sought to serve. Such items are a 
product of the peripheral aspects of the world beyond the highly ordered heterotopic 
world of the underground monitoring post. They serve as a reminder to both the 
researcher and the observers as to why they are members of such a highly ordered 
organisation. These items include soft seat cushions and, more representative of the 
military ethos instilled in all those who serve, a teapot, kettle and other drinks-
brewing paraphernalia. 
Non-conformity on Site 
One of the key factors driving the choice of the Royal Observer Corps and its field 
monuments for this study was the organisation's inherent requirement for 
procedures, rules and regulations. It has been suggested that the role of the 
volunteer observer was one of functionality, the adherence to regulations with an 
almost obsessive focus on ‘doing ones’ duty’. Utilising Tim Ingold’s theoretical 
taskscape (1993), I have been able to illustrate a process-led activity base, utilising 
specialist instrumentation, to perform specific tasks involved exclusively in the 
monitoring of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The material culture of the 
organisation provides this information in structured detail through the printed material 
now lodged in official and private archives. Interestingly, the observer as an entity is 
far removed from the process, almost to the point of an automaton. 
The reality is that people are a key part of the operation. The organisation relied 
totally on the behaviours and attitudes of volunteers and their training and adherence 
to rules and regulations. If the monitoring posts did not provide the correct 
information, in the correct format, then the whole national network would effectively 
descend into chaos. It should not, then, come as a surprise that even though the 
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operation of an underground monitoring post would be expected to run at peak 
efficiency in times of crisis, elements of personal modification and non-regulation 
equipment is, sometimes, discovered on posts. The assessment of W-2 Amesbury, 
Wiltshire demonstrated material that was clearly involved in the running of the post 
during the operational phase of its life-cycle that was neither non-issue, nor 
standard, equipment (fig.8-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.8-2. W-2 Amesbury, 
Wiltshire. This object is clearly 
‘home made’, that said, it has 
a task focussed purpose. The 
three holes align with those to 
mount the ground zero 
indicator, as do the four points 
of the compass. The actual 
use is unclear. (Source: Bob 
Clarke 27/07/2016)   
 
Considering the examples above, I suggest that when investigating the period prior 
to abandonment of any highly ordered organisation's facilities a number of points 
need to be considered. The more obvious statement is a knowledge of the group, its 
processes and means of carrying out its tasks. Beyond that, consideration must be 
given to the wider aspects of the society to which the organisation serves as material 
from this will enter the enclosed space of the group; more importantly, this is likely to 
be left on site at the point of abandonment as it often has no intrinsic value, or use, 
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beyond the person who introduced it onto site in the first place. Fixtures and fittings, 
including furniture, often remain; again they are low cost items and in the main are 
specifically manufactured for the underground monitoring post, negating any real 
opportunity for reuse. In the case of highly organised groups with multiple sites 
across the landscape a recognition of official equipment becomes easier to identify, 
primarily due to the lack of pattern change throughout the organisation's life-cycle. 
This has especially been the case one ROC posts. 
I now move on to the point of abandonment and beyond, bringing the ROC 
underground monitoring posts up to date by formalising the chaos aspects of my 
model. 
CHAOS 
Chaos as required by the current model is considered to be a state where by 
activities of a natural or human nature interact with a given site in an unstructured 
way. Indeed, Sandra Scham noted: -  
Searching for difference and diversity in congruence with the loss of fixed 
points implied by the postmodern agenda, however, may create something of 
a chaotic situation for many archaeological interpreters. 
(Scham 2001, 185)  
 
It is clear that rather than follow set procedures, activities follow individual agendas, 
introducing both change to the site and material from the peripheral area surrounding 
the once secret ROC post. The justification for the model (fig.8-3) by discussing the 
‘transition’ stage of the theory first; this stage influences all other states and one that 
all ROC posts have passed through since their stand-down. 
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Fig.8-3. The order and chaos model, demonstrating the paths a structure can take during its 
life-cycle. (Source: Bob Clarke) 
The Transitional Path 
In my categorisation of chaos and the formalisation of a framework allowing for the 
different strands of abandonment, I suggest all ROC posts enter a state of ‘transition’ 
after initial abandonment. This places the ROC posts in the landscape in a kind of 
limbo, a state where maintenance is withdrawn but the secrecy surrounding the post 
remains. The compound usually becomes overgrown, with weeds at first, although it 
does not take long for more substantial growth the take hold; within three years the 
site quickly becomes obscured from view, reinforcing the air of secrecy surrounding 
the post and the function it once performed. As long as the structure remains un-
compromised, attrition from most components of chaos (animal, vegetation, 
meteorological) have little effect in the immediate abandonment process. What really 
causes damage, leading to the rapid deterioration of the operational space below 
ground, is the removal of vent covers on the surface and damage to the entrance 
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hatch, especially through forced entry (fig.8-4). This damage led deterioration can 
only be caused by human interaction.   
 
 
Fig.8-4. D-47 Whitestone, Devon. The hatch at this post has been damaged to such an 
extent it will not close beyond the point illustrated here. (Source: Bob Clarke 03/04/2013) 
When categorising ROC posts in a state of transition it should be remembered that 
the structure concerned may have been through a number of overtly and covertly 
curated stages as well. Clearly then, transition is neither final, nor is it a one-off 
event. Transition appears to be the central part of the abandonment process when 
connected to highly ordered organisations; from here other states are launched. 
Transition, in my view, is also the key to understanding the bridge between secret 
and non-secret. It is here that interactions are at their most diverse; often with 
recognisable activities overlapping, sometimes over a number of years.   
Mapping Abandonment - Some Physical Markers 
Clearly it is not enough to simply point out that some form of human interaction has 
occurred between the time of a ROC post's official closure and the baseline survey 
(and subsequent) visits undertaken for this project. It is also unwise to try and imply, 
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from condition alone, that levels of interaction encountered on a site visit belong 
specifically to that location, or that those posts in the poorest state have been 
abandoned the longest. The fieldwork clearly demonstrated that location had, at 
least, a hand in the level of interaction displayed by the ROC post fabric recorded 
across the project area, but that location needed other areas of public interest in its 
environs, especially landscapes and historical/archaeological sites. How this 
additional involvement is mapped, and interpreted, is important as it currently 
appears a level of disenfranchisement (Scham 2001, 190), most notably 
demonstrated in the Cold War period by the mass membership of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), might still be visible in a small number of cases. 
Pre-1991 Operational Phase 
Typically, nothing remained of any of the acts of destruction carried out during the 
Cold War itself - suffice to say posts were often tampered with. Of those ROC 
members canvased for this project 22.8% reported damage to posts during the 
nuclear reporting task (Phase Two monuments); one favourite activity appears to 
have been to glue up the locks on the posts, although more extreme activities 
included the complete destruction of posts by setting them on fire. Indeed: 
It was felt at the time that C.N.D did not understand the R.O.C role in U.K defence 
role, and as such "They" felt that we (The R.O.C) were an enemy. I had heard stories 
of C.N.D pouring petrol and such items down our bunkers when personnel were 
inside and on duty and threatening the Crew to set the bunker and them on fire. 
These stories may have been propaganda against C.N.D but it totally changed my 
former opinion of C.N.D being a friendly organisation. 
(ROC#57, 17 Group, North Wales) 
Whatever the level of subjectivity and inferred organisational ‘propaganda’, 59.6% of 
correspondents to the Royal Observer Corps survey provided a negative view of 
CND’s actions. To date it has been impossible to disentangle any activities of CND 
from that of the ROC that date earlier than September 1991 (The final ROC post 
abandonment phase). The reason for this is simple. As a highly ordered organisation 
the ROC outwardly transmitted an aura of control - especially when connected to the 
immediate landscape of the underground monitoring posts - any vandalism or graffiti 
was quickly repaired or removed. The story of the ‘hot war’ between the ROC and 
CND appears to survive, in the main, in the personal histories of those involved at 
the time. Beyond the control of the ROC the story is a little different.  
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What can we deduce from interactions after stand-down in 1991? Do any ROC posts 
display evidence of activities driven by a memory of the Cold War 25 years after its 
end. The results from two posts do, indeed, have markers indicative of the Cold War, 
however, one of these, W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire, is also in a landscape of high visitor 
interaction. With substantial numbers attracted to the Avebury Henge site nearby, it 
is likely that the depictions in the underground monitoring room are Cold War in 
essence, although, it would be unsafe to suggest they were a direct reaction to the 
secret space they inhabit. D-47, Whitestone, Devon, by comparison, has a simple 
depiction of the CND Peace Symbol, in among a number of more rudimentary graffiti 
illustrations. I believe this is more important than the mass of overtly Soviet 
orientated graffiti at Avebury. Unfortunately, this singular convincing symbol is a long 
way from suggesting an act of remembrance for the Cold War; Avebury is also so 
clearly directed towards remembrance of the Soviet Union that it too is unlikely to 
represent a memory of the Cold War, it is more than likely a reaction to the 
underground space. Graffiti in this context (former military buildings) has been 
discussed previously and it is worth re-visiting that here. 
Harrison and Schofield suggested recently that ‘art also represents a form of 
reconfiguration after military and other closed and inaccessible sites are abandoned’ 
(2010, 190). In essence this is true, many spaces are subject to graffiti, probably the 
most recognisable Cold War site being the Berlin Wall. Here the monolithic 
appearance and oppressive height of the structure was relegated to a mere 
backdrop by the artistry that was placed on it (Baker 1993; Dolff-Bonekämper 2002). 
This is, however, an exception. The Wall was a symbol of the ideological struggle 
between East and West, its overt presence in not only the city but also in the 
memories of people who were entering their late teens in that period, underpinned 
everything they experienced afterwards (Schuman and Rogers 2004). 
It is not appropriate to accept that graffiti should be considered merely as a way of 
resetting a space once enclosed by a highly ordered group. Granted, graffiti is now 
an accepted aspect of the urban landscape, indeed, it actually holds a value in some 
circumstances (Banksy in Bristol and the South-West being a point in question). 
Graffiti is more opportunistic than that. To suggest the activity is in some way 
disrupting a space once connected to order is also unsafe. As noted previously, 
those acts of graffiti executed during the operational phase of the Royal Observer 
Corps are now lost, they demonstrate a period of intent, a decision process intent on 
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challenging the organisation or authority. To consider the same ‘intent’ when 
investigating sites in later periods of the structures life-cycle is unwise. At W-3 
Avebury, Wiltshire, the overtly Soviet leanings of the symbolism depicted are 
interesting, whether they are a reaction to the space is still unclear, and likely to 
remain so. One thing is clear, there is a social and interpretive value to recording 
wall art, both contemporary to periods of operations and any period of abandonment 
(Schofield 2005, 76). The problem is graffiti only survives in underground monitoring 
posts that are in a transitional phase, and when it does there is no clear direction of 
interpretation, save to say the act is both a symbol of non-regulated activities and a 
marker of the sites life-cycle that signals decline and chaos (fig.8-5).   
 
Fig.8-5. W-7 Sutton Veny, Wiltshire. This graffito is a classic example of a non-regulated 
activity. Note there are at least two phases of graffiti inside this structure. The text at the rear 
is below the rust stain - in this case making the deterioration mapable. (Source: Bob Clarke 
07/07/2013) 
The Unknown - Interaction with the Secret 
If interaction through graffiti is considered to be neither specialised, nor planned then 
can we recognise anything that does indicate a behaviour that is generated by the 
underground monitoring post. It is worth remembering before we investigate the 
post- stand-down world of the ROC that structures connected to weapons of mass 
destruction were the subject of wild interpretation during the Cold War too;  
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On one occasion during a weekend exercise in Northern Ireland I was 
dispatched to a monitoring post that was besieged by a throng of CND 
protestors. While talking to them the post hatch swung open and they all flung 
themselves to the ground, apparently convinced that a missile was about to 
be launched from the 'silo'.  
ROC#14, Bath  headquarters  and a post in Birmingham 
The phenomenon is not isolated to this project, others have encountered such in 
their work, Strange and Walley noted during their research on Cold War monuments 
in Yorkshire that ‘- we have encountered hostility, incomprehension and accusations 
of poor taste in response to our attempts to discuss the heritage value of Cold War 
sites,’ (2007, 159). Clearly, there are many facets of interpretation when considering 
Cold War monuments, interestingly, I suggest what Strange and Walley encountered 
was as much to do with the political landscape at the time of their work, just as the 
recollection from ROC#14 was of the 1980s. Today, tribute to those who fell during 
military action in the Twentieth century focusses the national psyche on 11 
November and the annual remembrance parade. Conflicts have a beginning and an 
end (although, facets of a conflict are often amorphous) and with an end comes acts 
of remembrance. Monuments are raised to the dead, while battlefields become 
increasingly the focus of thanatourism (Schofield 2005, 89; Baldwin and Sharpley 
2009, 186; Walls and Williams 2010, 50; Schofield 2011, 49; Carman 2013, 98). The 
Cold War, especially when remembrance is the focus, is a step change beyond what 
has gone before. The issues surrounding a 43 year ‘conflict’ are discussed later in 
this chapter, however, it is important to briefly explain the reason for that ‘step 
change’ here.       
A War Too Long 
World War II, as fought by the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth, is, as an 
event, recognisable, still relevant as living memory, is a component of personal or 
family histories; is nationally commemorated and has become well catered for 
through museums, sites and acts of remembrance. Chronologically, it is well defined 
within one decade (1939-45) and is further punctuated by a number of high profile 
engagements (Dunkerque; Battle of Britain; North Africa; D-Day) and those in turn 
can be reduced further to specific actions as identified by the researcher or the 
public as required. The Cold War follows a similar path in all but length. The 
beginning and end is well known from 1948-91 (although, there is debate over what 
constitutes the actual end date) and there are a number of recognisable points 
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(Korean War; Hungarian Uprising; Berlin Wall; Cuban Missile Crisis; Vietnam). What 
differs, in the United Kingdom, is the lack of tangible evidence available for study, the 
continued use of many military sites until very recently and, most importantly in my 
opinion, the fact that 43 years is just too long for contemporaries to visualise. 
Underpinning all this is a distinct lack, in the United Kingdom at least, of evidence 
traditionally linked to ‘conflict’ (death, memorials, damage). The only thing keeping 
the Cold War in the public eye was increasing acts of civil disobedience by public 
pressure groups and, confusingly due to the political leanings of the Soviet Union, 
the Labour Party. Basically, publicity and exposure enacted by the disenfranchised.   
Out in the Field 
Encountering a Royal Observer Post, either phase one (Orlit) or phase two 
(underground monitoring post) in isolation in the landscape is problematic unless one 
is familiar with the organisation or purpose of the structures. As previously noted, the 
Orlit post - especially a Type ‘B’ - draws a fairly universal interpretation connected 
with observation. Interestingly, a number of encounters with the public found that 
these sites are also always interpreted as being connected to World War II rather 
than the Cold War.  
The interpretation of the underground monitoring post is far more complex. 
Notwithstanding the deception, intended or otherwise, through depiction on the 
Ordnance Survey, the post gives away little in the way of intended function from the 
above ground structures. Often surrounded by a fence, forming a barrier between 
the sparse concrete structures and those outside, and in so doing reaffirming the 
map depiction (if one exists) of a utilitarian function (Ingold 1993); the site inside the 
fence is heterotopic in interpretation - a reservoir, underground, water, danger, 
prohibited access - all feature. Of course a number of these assumptions are correct 
and while ‘assumption’ has been suggested to be a key part of ‘- the post-use 
interpretative process.’ (Schiffer 2010, 31). I believe it should only be accepted as a 
last resort.   
On more than one occasion material was evident at the base of the entrance shaft 
that had clearly been dropped from above. At W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire, a substantial 
amount of loose concrete in blocks, along with other material, had been introduced 
into the structure. The fieldwork has demonstrated that this activity, the dropping of 
material down the entrance stack, informs two interpretations. Firstly, the 
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heterotopic, or secret world below, is clearly viewed with trepidation. If the visitor has 
no light, or understanding of the structure, caution and curiosity become the more 
likely motivators. To drop stones down the entrance allows a level of investigation 
without risks to be played out. Secondly, the fact that this material, plus other items, 
remained in situ for the majority of my site visits across a number of ROC posts, 
indicates a site in transition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.8-6. W-3 Amesbury, Wiltshire. Debris dropped from the entrance hatch above mixed with 
items of material culture from the operation of the underground monitoring post. The fire 
blanket and green bucket were both standard issue to the ROC, the drinks can, water bottle 
and small tin of paint are not and have been introduced from outside the secret domain. 
(Source: Bob Clarke 27/07/2016) 
Transition Reviewed 
Royal Observer Corps posts in states of transition are, by far, the most 
representative of archaeological site creation; they are also the most complex to 
understand. The taphonomy of the material culture left on site, and introduced 
through later visits, does allow a lose chronology to be built. That said, the 
movement of objects is not always clear. The underground monitoring post, D-20 
Hornscross, Devon, is just such a case. The post was introduced as a case study in 
Chapter 8; it has had a complex history, being open for just eight years (1960-68), 
before closure as part of the Civil Defence cuts that year. From there the post has 
had at least two states of transition and one of covert curation. The ROC landscape 
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includes an Orlit post (type B) as a forerunner to the underground structure. Material 
found within the suggested taskscape (Ingold 1993) for this structure is a mix of 
abandoned and decaying ROC material culture and that introduced from outside the 
organisation, more representative of the curious visitor than a destructive one. 
 
  
Fig.8-7. D-20 Hornscross, Devon. The abandoned chemical drums located within the 
compound. Note the metal pipe to the lower right of the drums. This is the drain pipe from 
the entrance stack of the underground monitoring post. This would require significant force 
to remove. It is now 20 m from its intended location. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) 
The post stands in an extant compound, close to a minor road. The last visit to the 
site on 1 April 2013 noted an assemblage of recently introduces material into the 
compound; furthermore, the compound under, and around, the Orlit post had been 
disturbed, revealing more evidence for activities during episodes of transition. The 
material included five 25 litre plastic drums of ‘Pre-Dip’ chemicals supplied by Evans 
- Livestock Management. The supply date for all five was 2010, however, the drums 
did not appear until a minimum 27 months later. Interestingly, the drums had not 
been emptied and dumped in the compound; one demonstrated damage consistent 
with being shot with a shotgun - presumably this happened during the 27-month 
period. This can be reduced somewhat as the previous two visits did not note the 
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drums; this allows us to consider involvement in the compound to be trimmed down 
to an 11-month window of deposition. The presence of the drums allows for quite a 
tight date to be ascribed, indeed, this follows Schiffer’s basic flow model developed 
to demonstrate the life history of an artefact (2010, 22), with one exception Schiffer 
does not cater for re-use in a totally different direction to that of the primary intended 
use. At D-20 Hornscross, an artefact has been manufactured for a primary use, in 
this case liquid containment, before entering a secondary use, that of a target. This 
‘transactional’ activity is important as it demonstrates the diversity of uses that can 
be recognised through the study of modern material culture. I suggest artefacts have 
a ‘secret life-cycle’, a period where the physical aspects of the object attest to 
something additional to the original functuality. In the case of the five barrels, only 
one has shotgun pellet damage, yet all five are dumped at the site; can, or should, 
we infer an association between the life-cycle of all five drums? I consider this an 
appropriate direct in cases as obvious as this, it is likely both damaged and 
undamaged drums have a similar life-cycle - the damaged drum is likely to have 
been on top of the rest at the time of the shot.  
Where the situation becomes infinitely more complex is when material of a specific 
nature is discovered on site, that is completely devoid of connection to the structure 
itself. At D-20 Hornscross, a deposit of pornographic material was discovered. It 
comprised a badly decayed Club magazine and a DVD cover, also from Club. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain a date for either item as they had both 
been damaged by water. This opens up an interesting avenue of research. The 
literature concerned with the deposition of such material is very sparse indeed, 
although, as Jane Juffer noted in 1998 ‘porn [is] still defined mainly as a male genre-‘ 
(1998, 170); if that is the case then what we encounter on site must be 
predominantly ‘male orientated’ too. Whether this is the case or not is difficult to 
support with the current project, it does, however, point to an interesting avenue of 
research, post this work. 
One last example from D-20 Hornscross is a drinks can. Drinks cans present us with 
a modern dichotomy. Mass produced on a daily basis, drinks cans are among the 
most prevalent of modern deposition indicators, their appearance across the 
landscape and subsequent modifications, are well known. Unfortunately, they are 
another, under investigated archaeological indicator. Papers are extant, although, as 
must be the way with any modern artefact still in production, are dated by the 
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production and design of the time. In 1993 D.B.S. Maxwell noted in his paper Beer 
Cans: A Guide for the Archaeologist: - 
 ‘beer cans are of potentially great value for dating both later historic sites and 
intrusive components in prehistoric sites. Changes in beer can morphology 
and design are well documented, meaning that determining the age of a beer 
can to within a few years of production is a distinct possibility.’ (Maxwell 1993, 
91). 
Nearly 25 years later Maxwell’s hopes of a datable sequence have been exceeded. 
This is, in part, a direct consequence of the modern obsession with understanding 
where food stuffs are produced, packaged and distributed. Mass-produced items 
such as drinks cans might appear to be simple clones of one another, in reality each 
one is different. The uniqueness can often be found on the base of a can, or in the 
case of plastic drinks bottles, etched around the shoulder of the bottle.  
The can found within the compound at Hornscross was a 440 ml can of ‘Cider: 
Specially selected by Spar’. On the base of the can was a batch number L8157/2, 
below this was a best before date BBE 06/07. This information has the potential to 
provide a manufacturer, the date of manufacture down to the second, and the likely 
period in which it was consumed. Furthermore, the can has a singular opening fixed 
tab, this would also help with dating if the rest of the label on the can was illegible. 
The point is, that just one ROC post in a state of transition has a wide range of 
activities enacted in its confines. Hornscross provides just one example of the 
diversity that can be implied utilising material culture from the wider social group. 
Below ground it is a similar story. Beyond the damage-led deterioration I have 
introduced above, there is also the interaction with the space created below ground. 
Those who venture into this world are often surprised as to how small the 
subterranean aspects really are (conversation with a group of visitors to C-1 Veryan, 
Cornwall on 18/10/12 and W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire on 04/08/13).   
A post in the transitional state is a dangerous thing. Often they contain water, usually 
due to hatch damage, this is often stagnant, contains dead animals and probably 
human waste too. The material dropped down the shaft creates a very real hazard if 
the wrong footwear is worn and, unless a torch it taken, the control room is pitch 
black. The interesting point is, it does not stop people entering the ROC posts and 
the evidence suggests they do this multiple times. The most prevalent of non-Royal 
Observer Corps finds is the humble tea light, a small candle (2.5cm in diameter) 
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contained in an aluminium foil tray. Over 80% of underground spaces accessed for 
this project had tea lights in the reporting room, I suggest these demonstrate clear 
intent to investigate and, for a short while, occupy the once secret space below.      
Towards a definition of Transition 
So do Royal Observer Corps posts in a state of transition display evidence of a 
segregation between order and chaos?  Unfortunately, the existence of a noticeable 
change in condition, material culture and human interaction is not readily obvious. 
Psychologically, there is a boundary between the world of the secret, with activities 
dictated by rules and regulations, and the processes of the peripheral, or 
surrounding society. This boundary is indistinct, as material introduced by the 
observers themselves often remain after the strip out of equipment at stand-down. 
Unless this material can be accurately ascribed to the organisation who created the 
space under investigation, accurate dating of a deposit is often frustrated. The length 
of time a ROC post has been in a state of transition, or abandoned, cannot be 
ascertained from the organisational material culture extant on site as the same, 
bespoke, pattern of low-cost, bulky furniture, was utilised across all sites. Using the 
deterioration of ROC posts and their subsequent state, post stand-down, is also an 
unsafe route to building a sequenced and chronological account of activities. What 
makes transition a valid proposition is the gulf between order and chaos.  
An organisation that is highly ordered, runs on military rules and regulations and is 
instrumentalist in its training regime aims to influence the operation space it inhabits. 
Records survive that demonstrate how the control was to be executed and who was 
responsible for which part of the process enacted on the site. The state of transition 
is one of disorder - or chaos. Interactions are spurious, unplanned and often 
destructive, all aspects unrecognisable in the ordered world of the Royal Observer 
Corps. So there is a tangible way of recognising the transitional phase of chaos. 
Ruined or Destroyed 
Of all the phases of chaos I have proposed ruined or destroyed is the most final of 
activities. It is here that the majority of posts have finished their life-cycle. It is 
important to remember that posts that are now, not visible in the landscape may still 
have a subterraneous presence. They may also have elements of the primary 
function in the immediate landscape including, carparks, pathways and remotely 
placed ground zero indicators. If the former post was located on grazing, moorland 
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or a managed site there is also the potential for the site to be discovered remotely, 
the most successful technique so far appears to be LiDAR. 
LiDAR            
Fig.8-8. Chippenham, Wiltshire. A noticeable scar remains where the underground 
monitoring post once was. (© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2015. All 
rights reserved.) 
Fig.8-9. Bere Alston, Devon. This landscape demonstrates the complexity that can be 
encountered. The yellow circle indicates a Type ‘A’ Orlit post, now used to shelter livestock, 
while the red circle indicates the location of the, now demolished underground monitoring 
post. The northern edge of the compound is the linear feature running east-west. (© 
Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2015. All rights reserved.) 
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As the two sites above demonstrate, it is possible to ascertain the landscape position 
of, at least some posts, utilising LiDAR; although, this is not a given for all sites. The 
first consideration has to be the extent of LiDAR cover. Currently the Environment 
Agency owns the largest selection of results, all are available through ‘open public 
access’ offering resolution from 25cm to 2m. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom is 
not totally covered as the surveys so far carried out were originally undertaken to 
map areas susceptible to flooding. Furthermore, the remnants of an underground 
monitoring post could have been completely erased, especially if the ROC post was 
destroyed in the mid-1990s and the land is under plough. 
The Geophysical Angle 
Beyond LiDAR the use of geophysical survey can also produce encouraging results 
when studying Cold War subterranean sites. In 2010 a team from Durham University 
surveyed the castle headland at Scarborough, North Yorkshire. Over 3ha of the 
outer bailey, an area containing a wide range of monuments - from the prehistoric to 
the twentieth century - was surveyed, this included the position of a destroyed Royal 
Observer Corps post.  
 
Fig.8-10 Geophysical survey of the outer bailey of Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire. In 
the second block from the bottom right is a Roman signal station. To the top left of the forth 
central block from the bottom is the ROC post (large red circle in central image. (Source: 
Durham University 2010, report 2378) 
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The location of the ROC post was well known at the time of the survey, what is 
interesting is the sheer amount of material around the site, presumably from the re-
enforcing bars within the structural concrete.   
A particularly large and intense magnetic anomaly (m11) near the northern 
limit of the survey area almost certainly reflects a structure which was too 
deep to be detected by the particular resistance probe configuration used in 
this instance. This structure is almost certainly a 1960s Cold War bunker used 
by the Royal Observer Corps (ROC). 
Durham University 2010, para 6.6. 
 
Fig.8-11 Extract of magnetic survey 
at Scarborough Castle. The shape 
of the underground monitoring post 
is clearly visible inside the white 
circle. A higher reading on the 
bottom right of the post shape 
(indicated by the red arrow) 
suggests the metal ladder is still 
extant. (Source: Durham University 
2010, report 2378)   
 
A Definition of Destroyed 
The term 'destroyed', when used in conjunction with the order and chaos model, 
relates to a Royal Observer Corps structure that has no above ground component 
still visible in the landscape. This constitutes the majority of underground monitoring 
posts, certainly this was the case for 39 ROC monitoring posts in Devon. As noted 
above, other evidence for the sites former existence can, occasionally, still survive. 
However, the most effective way to locate such sites is through remote sensing 
techniques. 
Ruination 
Ruined status is a point at which the post is unlikely to recover. A point where 
destructive activities include the removal of surface features through vandalism of for 
re-use at other posts. To reach ruined status a set number of specific criteria must 
be met. These are; all surface structures to be devoid of vent covers; at least one of 
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the two instrument fixture points removed (either fixed survey meter or bomb power 
indicator) and the entrance stack or vent stack are missing. Crucially, there has to be 
some vestige of evidence left at the post's location. 
The ruined structure D-39 Sharpitor, Devon (discussed in the case studies in the 
previous chapter) has lost all four points of the visible surface structures (entrance 
and vent stack, bomb power indicator and fixed survey meter point), however the 
post was a semi-sunken construction due to the granite geology. Subsequently the 
monitoring room is buried under a 1.5m high earthen mound that remains extant. 
Moreover, while the surface structures have been removed they still have a visibility 
on the surface. These set points indicate that the post can be classified as ruined.  
The post at Sutton Veny, Wiltshire is a classic case of a post in a ruined state. The 
post was closed in 1968 as part of the Civil Defence reduction in October that year. It 
is a semi-sunken structure located at the end of a small track. The entrance stack is 
damaged around the hatch and both vent grills are missing. Both the fixed survey 
meter and bomb power indicator mounts are removed, as is the vent stack in its 
entirety. The subterranean space below is devoid of nearly all vestiges of the original 
fixtures and fittings except, strangely the frame of the bunk beds and the sump area 
has a number of large rocks lying in it. 
My point is that from this scene of chaos one can still partially interpret the site. 
There is no annotation on the Ordnance Survey map indicating a post or ‘covered 
reservoir’, even though it might appear so as it is semi-sunken. The hatch now 
locked, must have been unsecure at one time as the debris suggests at the bottom 
of the shaft. I suggest that the site was probably accessed at the same time, 
dropping stones indicates a depth and the absence of water. In the nuclear reporting 
room there is the remains of a bunk (one part is assembled) along with a few 
introduced items (a sheet of corrugated tin and a sheet of asbestos) there is at least 
two phases of graffiti. The ROC post then is interpretable; the ladder suggests 
access is a part of the function and it has evidence of material culture displaying 
extended periods of habitation. Whether the solitary visitor interprets a pseudo-
military purpose or not in the first instance is not the issue here, the fact they can 
connect it to subterranean activity, involving extended periods of shelter is more so.      
Ruined or Destroyed - A Justification 
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The category ‘ruined’ is self-evident. Physical markers remain at the site and still 
allow a level of interpretation and the site is often recorded on the Heritage 
Environment Record (HER) (certainly this is the case for Devon and Wiltshire). With 
access to archival material it is possible to ascertain the type of feature and its 
purpose. Those structures classified as ‘destroyed’ open up a specific debate on the 
continued recognition of structures, or sites, no longer extant. Before continuing, I 
should note that the positions of all underground monitoring posts that are devoid of 
surface features, are recorded on the Wiltshire and Devon HERs. So as this is the 
case does it not negate a demand for any further research involvement? I believe it 
does not. 
Put simply, the Royal Observer Corps primary function was the reporting of aircraft 
(in phase one activities) and, later, nuclear reporting and monitoring (phase two). No 
post worked in isolation, each became part of a group of two to four posts, those 
posts reported to a group headquarters, who, in turn, reported to sector 
headquarters and the Home Office. We must accept that there were 1,563 
underground monitoring posts built across the British Isles; what is critical is that we 
continue to regard the Royal Observer Corps network as just that, a network. If we 
do not, then any narrative of organisations such as this become disjointed. As an 
example, any investigation of a railway route, or branch-line, would necessarily note 
the position of all stops, junctions and stations, along with any other features 
connected to that narrative. This would be further expanded to note passenger 
numbers and population areas close to, and utilising, the railway network. Similarly, 
any work on pillboxes from World War II cannot discuss features in isolation, to do so 
leads to miss-interpretation as they, like the ROC posts, are designed and placed in 
a specific landscape position. It is not enough to simply record the position of a, now 
removed, feature. To adequately discuss the landscape of a highly ordered 
organisation (both the examples above are such) one has to understand the entire 
network. In chapter 5, I investigated the reasons why an Orlit post type, ‘A’ or ‘B’, 
had been built in a specific location. The choice of post was dictated not by how far 
the observer could see, but what the immediate topography around the post was, 
coupled with a consequence of the relatively new tactic of aircraft flying low and fast. 
The point is, not all Orlit posts are contained on the HER, indeed I have to date, 
found no evidence as to how the distribution of both types was finally carried out. 
This provides an incomplete picture of the landscape in 1955, a critical point of 
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change in the British Cold War landscape (discussed in detail later), subsequently 
any account of the early reformation of the Royal Observer Corps in their final years 
as an aircraft reporting organisation, receives little attention, as a number of 
accounts suggest (McCamley 2002; Cocroft et al 2003, 175; Osborne 2004, 189). As 
part of the order and chaos model the ruined or destroyed status is a valid 
proposition.  
COVERTLY CURATED POSTS 
Covertly curated posts, that is posts that are in private ownership but still promote an 
air of secrecy and low information, are a growing phenomenon. During the fieldwork 
for this project a number of sites have changed ownership, while a few (D-3 
Bampton; D-7 Christow; D-19 Holsworthy; D-27 Modbury, all in Devon are known 
examples) have undergone refurbishment or more accurately, restoration. 
Interestingly, this type of activity appears to be on the increase however, motives for 
such behaviour was difficult to ascertain, however, the increase in ROC post 
restoration sites on social media have started to shed light on such behaviours. 
Hiding in Plain Sight 
This category of the order and chaos mode presents us with a problem. By its very 
nature the owners of sites classified as covertly curated must reveal as little about 
the post as is possible, especially the physical appearance of the post above ground. 
This was juxtaposed with the field work which required at least one physical marker 
to demonstrate that the ROC post was being curated. A number of tactics have been 
employed across the network, intending to continue the air of an abandoned space 
while attempting not to draw attention to the site; unfortunately; attention, often from 
destructive visitors, is becoming more of a regular occurrence.    
Tactical Hiding  
The range of methods employed on site, and noted in the survey for this project, to 
reduce the possibility of damage took many forms. At one end of the scale D-27 
Modbury, Devon, had had the compound fence removed and all the supporting 
concrete posts uprooted and dumped in the area between the entrance and vent 
stacks, across the three visits undertaken by this project the vegetation was allowed 
to grow through this material, steadily reducing the shape of the physical aspects of 
the post. This removal of the compound fence to reduce the physical attributes is 
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employed on at least one site in the overtly curated category (C-17 Veryan, 
Cornwall, discussed in the previous chapter), it certainly reduces the visibility of the 
ROC post. What indicated the site was covertly curated was a substantial padlock 
and chain through a pair of non-standard, heavy duty, brackets attached to the 
entrance stack; there was also a photoelectric plate attached to the ground zero 
indicator location point, with a wire passing through the vent nearby and down into 
the post. Presumably this was charging a battery of some sort, that would power the 
12 volt lighting in the nuclear control room.  
A further post in this category, D-7 Christow, Devon also had the fence removed, the 
surrounding vegetation was allowed to flourish, hiding the post from a track that ran 
nearby, and it too had a photoelectric cell fitted, this time on the vent stack. On the 
baseline visit it was clear the post had been broken into, and fairly recently as the 
smashed casting around the entrance hatch was still partially attached and debris 
from the top of the hatch was extant at the place of damage. The next two visits 
chronicled a blocking of the entrance to deter visitors and then a complete 
refurbishment of the hatch and its attachments. The owner then painted contact 
details on the hatch top. Initially, this was considered a way of negating the damage 
being caused - it was actually because of a change of ownership eight months 
earlier. To date no email or phone call has managed to make contact with the 
owners. 
Covert Behaviour 
Understanding the physical markers of ROC posts that are covertly curated is clearly 
important, however, other aspects also require interpretation. What attracts an 
individual, or group, to the possibility of owning and/or restore such a specialised 
structure, especially one connected so implicitly with such a contentious subject? 
And what effect and meaning does this have on the landscape? Taking the second 
point first, it is important to establish what a landscape of defence actually means, 
especially in the context of the Royal Observer Corps. The organisation during the 
Cold War was a passive defence force - that is it reacts to threats and attack from 
other, non-British, forces; it has neither the capability nor orders to take the 
offensive. Moreover, when considered as part of the wider defence landscape they 
‘can act as containers for rich social and cultural life’ (Gold and Revill 1999, 235).  
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To answer the question of ownership we should first understand the essential 
aspects of the ROC staff tasking prior to stand-down. Considering the Royal 
Observer Corps specifically we can conclude that the organisation during its life-
cycle was both low risk to volunteers, although it still offered a rich historical 
narrative, coupled with a sense of belonging through the wearing of uniforms. 
Equally important was the groups continued links with the military, specifically the 
Royal Air Force. A point that was specifically highlighted through recruiting literature. 
Michel Foucault suggested we might also view such needs as a ‘block of capacity-
communication-power’ (1982, 787). Moreover, he proposes a state where power 
exerts a range of processes, essentially ‘enclosure; surveillance; reward and 
punishment; the pyramidal hierarchy’ (ibid 1982, 787), basically a match for the 
highly ordered organisation.  
 
Noting this, there are clearly benefits between the needs of the individual and the 
needs of the organisation - neither would function if either participant were not 
prepared to adhere to strict policies of operation. The volunteer, or spare-time, 
observer was, in all likelihood, a person who requires a formal structure to the 
organisation they are joining. This trait was identified by Wardell, Lishman and 
Whalley when asking the question ‘Who Volunteers?’ as part of study into 
community care. With formal structure comes structured training, structured activities 
and structured time on duty. That the organisation attracted the right sort of applicant 
is demonstrated by the number of respondents to the ROC survey that spent many 
years in the Royal Observer Corps (graph.8-1).  
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Graph.8-1 A demonstration of the length of service given by observers as researched in this 
project. The results show nearly 80% of respondents provided more than a decade of 
service and of those 30% were more than two decades. (Source data from ROC survey to 
be found in the appendices)  
The majority of those who now own and covertly curate ROC posts conform to, at 
least some of, the traits mentioned above. The point is, the organisation may have 
been disbanded, however, the history, structures and material culture survive and 
are, in the main, still accessible to those who wish to ‘belong’ to such an activity. This 
belonging, or more accurately, remembrance of a highly ordered group, through re-
enactment, is nothing new, indeed, following in former military footsteps has been 
more a spectacle in the United Kingdom for decades, it is also, unsurprisingly, an 
activity that ‘spans diverse history-themed genres’ (Agnew 2004, 327). 
‘Secret’ a Viable Activity? 
What is clear about re-enactment in the United Kingdom is the rich diversity now on 
offer for public consumption. Vanessa Agnew suggests the rise in popularity of re-
enactment (certainly through the last decade of the twentieth century) is ‘coupled to 
a ‘broader public interest in history’ (2004, 328). Clearly we have moved away from 
this in the last 15 years. Re-enactment, or living history, has taken on a new 
dimension, one that follows the commercial trajectory of heritage ‘authorities’, 
especially The National Trust and English Heritage. English Heritage, as a 
government entity, was divided on 1 April 2015, the legislator arm becoming Historic 
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England, while English Heritage became a charitable trust, responsible for the 
management of over 400 historic properties (English Heritage 2014). It is this arena 
that the commercial value of staged re-enactments now playout. The size of 
historically based re-enactment events and their attendant visitor numbers 
demonstrate something of the commercial viability of such proceedings. The point 
here is that the majority of re-enactment is carried out under the public’s gaze, is 
publicised as accessible and promoted as spectacle, those who covertly curate 
Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts are, in the main, the complete 
opposite. 
What Went Before 
I suspect we should not consider those who now inhabit the space once dominated 
by rules, regulations and secrecy, as re-enactors, more as custodians. The key point 
here is that of those ROC posts recognised as, or suspected of, being covertly 
curated, are not outwardly promoted or publically accessible. An enquiry on the 
Royal Observer Corps Facebook page brought few, although significant responses. 
Twenty-two people responded to the question ‘What is your motivation to restore old 
posts?’ After removing the general, off topic chatter often generated on social media 
(eight), five cited nostalgic reasons; a further two were interested in locational values 
(likened to a garden shed or ‘coolest den’) while seven noted the preservation of 
sites for historical or heritage purposes. Clearly this is not enough of a sample to 
provide any real, auditable or manipulative data, although, the generalities are 
interesting; remembrance of the organisation now gone, followed by a remembrance 
of one’s personal history appear, in this small instance, to be key elements.  
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Graph.8-2. The reasons for joining the Royal Observer Corps who were canvassed for this 
project. (Source data from ROC survey to be found in the appendices)  
The survey completed by those who were members of the ROC enquired as to why 
correspondents had elected to join the organisation. A substantial number (36.6%) 
responded that they were doing their duty; a further 6.6% indicated specifically that 
they liked the idea of joining a secret organisation. The rest cited links with the 
military, interest in aviation and family membership as their primary motivations 
(table.8-2 above). On the whole it appears that an altruistic outlook was one of the 
key reasons for joining a highly ordered group. We should not be surprised that at 
least one third of ROC members considered membership to be duty. It would also 
appear that those who now covertly curate monuments also see it as their ‘duty’ to 
preserve historical aspects of the past, of those who responded as such, only two 
noted this was for educational purposes. Clearly more research is needed, although, 
I am prepared to suggest that similarities are apparent between both groups. The act 
of protection for the United Kingdom allows for a personal feeling of worth and 
provides reward (Wardell, Lishman and Whalley 2000, 238). I propose we consider 
protection of the nation and national heritage a similar activity. This is a culturally 
based behaviour, where the overarching activity is the preservation of national 
symbolism, often through the continuation of past histories, both national and 
personal.  
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So Who Are The ‘Modern’ Observers? 
The modern observers are those, I suggest, who would be the potential volunteers 
for that group, had the Royal Observer Corps survived into the twenty-first-century. 
Opportunities for such activities, or more importantly the groups which were available 
to join have been substantially reduced since the end of the Cold War. By 1991, the 
ROC had stopped taking in new members; the reserve aspect of the main British 
Forces was also put on hold as numbers of full time regulars were cut through ‘The 
Strategic Defence Review’ published in 1998. Furthermore, the range of 
opportunities offered by the Territorial Army changed dramatically. What had once 
been a fairly safe bet (deployment around the United Kingdom and parts of Europe, 
mainly Germany) changed dramatically.   
176. The Review has also identified scope for some wider organisational 
improvements and efficiencies. The Army's administrative structure in the UK 
will be reshaped. The administrative structure of Territorial, Auxiliary and 
Volunteer Reserve Associations will be adjusted to match that of the Regular 
Army. This will produce a closer linkage between the administration of 
Regular and Reserve forces as well as some running cost savings. We will be 
consulting widely on these and other changes to the TA. 
Strategic Defence Review (1998) para - 176. 
Aligning both Regular and Reserve forces actually meant that those who were in a 
reserve occupation could now expect to be deployed into Afghanistan and Iraq on 
six-month tours, the same as the regular forces. This was to have a major impact of 
those ready to enlist.   
The slump has bolstered claims that potential recruits have been put off by 
the controversy over the Iraq war and by the Government's new strategy to 
give the TA a greater but riskier role in frontline fighting. One-10th of the 
British military personnel sent to Iraq have been TA, with several killed. 
The Independent.  Sunday 27 March 2005 
I am not suggesting that joining the Royal Observer Corps during the Cold War was 
a ‘soft option’, I propose that one reason for joining the Territorial Army during that 
conflict was to protect the British Isles, its institutions and fabric through defence of 
the mainland. The possibility of ‘going on the offensive’ required a completely 
different military ethos to be constructed. Certainly, the wars the United Kingdom has 
been involved in since the end of the Cold War have been a major contentious 
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issues, with public opposition and vocalisation reaching national proportions (fig.8-13 
Below).     
 
Fig.8-12. A Stop the War protest in central London on 22-2-2007. Notice how a number of 
issues are represented here, an indicator that this protest has anti-establishment leanings 
too. (Source: Bournemouth University)  
While the potential lethality of nuclear warfare was, throughout the last half of the 
twentieth century, rallied against, in general terms it also found a sort of equilibrium - 
an accepted component of European life. Those who were born in the 1950s and 
60s, were born into a world already divided between East and West, aligned and 
non-aligned countries, communism vs capitalism. These contentious situations 
appear not to be as dangerous to those who did not experience the build-up of 
tension over them. Of course they do feature large in the life of those who were 
around at the time. This is another example of recollected memory, phenomenology 
and age not only being linked, they may also influence choice moving forwards 
(Schuman and Rogers 2004). 
Drawing this all together, I suspect that if we look at the ages of the majority of covert 
curators that we would discover a group, at least partially dominated by people who 
remember, through their early teens, the early to mid- 1980s and the protests 
connected with the deployment of cruise missiles at two bases in the United 
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Kingdom, the decision to replace Polaris with Trident missiles, and the build-up of 
Royal Air Force aircraft.  
As the Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts were stood-down 
(September 1991), as were other spare-time activities in the quasi-militaristic world 
of the British establishment, a whole outlet for those who were interested in engaging 
with such activities was discontinued. As Michel Foucault noted appropriately:  
Discontinuity …the fact that within a space of a few years a culture sometimes 
ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other 
things in a different way. 
Foucault 1972, 50  
It appears likely that those posts that are increasingly taken into covert curation are 
likely to change hands regularly, especially as they now have a monetary value too. 
This is an aspect of Foucault’s suggestion (above). What was once an outwardly 
looking defence structure aimed at warning and monitoring is, today, a financial 
consideration involving such activities as financial profit, investment and gain; with 
that comes protection of assets, secrecy over those assets that are remote and 
curation of authenticity, usually through the acquisition of material culture connected 
to these endeavours.  
It is the opinion of those who look after posts that this activity has inflated the price of 
once redundant equipment, indeed, any material culture once connected to the 
organisation (see chapter 7 for a detailed discussion surrounding this subject) 
appears to bring premium prices on internet auction sites. This level of material 
acquisition also has an effect on the current Royal Observer Corps landscape. While 
the chance of discovering anything inside any of the underground monitoring posts 
that can be classed as salvageable is extremely remote now, some architectural 
features are vulnerable. The removal of entrance and vent stack grills and in some 
cases the hatch and counterbalance mechanism is now forcing posts from a state of 
transition to one of Ruin and if left unchecked, possible destruction. At least two post 
restorers have verbally described removing steel vents from other ‘old posts’, so the 
practice is being enacted out on the posts.  
The activity brings forward a dichotomy, if we consider the activities of those who 
own/restore underground monitoring posts as ‘curatorial’ surely the act of removal of 
material from other sites contradicts this suggested behaviour. We can view this in a 
number of ways, are we seeing a new aspect of the life-cycle of the ROC posts? 
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One not originally catered for when they were first constructed? Certainly the ROC 
post landscape was familiar with abandonment prior to stand-down in 1991 as the 
reduction of their numbers in 1968 has already shown. What is new here is that no 
new material culture from the organisation is being maintained or manufactured. Of 
course Schiffer has already noted the existence of ‘lateral-cycling’ in a systemic 
context, involving heavy focus on recycling or material reuse (2010, 22). This activity, 
I suggest runs a little deeper than simple reuse.  
Those that are not directly involved in the restoration of posts are also, in the main, 
curators through their own personal history. A large amount of material must still 
reside with ex-observers, especially the ephemeral aspects, (ID cards, Log Books, 
Training Notes, Local and Group Orders, Recruitment Material, Photographs, 
Uniforms) indeed the majority of official material used in this project has been gifted 
to me on the understanding it will be passed, on completion, to the Royal Observer 
Collection at the RAF Museum Cosford. The reasons for this are interesting. Just 
why do people keep mementos from previous associations with highly ordered 
groups, and what are the implications for this study? 
The answer lies within the memory of the individual, not the ‘existence’ of the artefact 
in question. In 2011, Zachary Beckstead et al, investigated the process of 
remembering through war memorials. They demonstrated that an object that has no 
intrinsic value can, through cultural processes, acquire a high value to certain 
individuals (2011, 194). This sentiment echoed another paper, also published in 
2011, by Nicky Gregson et al, where the ongoing social lives of material culture, 
especially that generated by the military, can pass through many ‘value regimes’ 
(2011, 301). What is critical to this project is the understanding that alongside 
aspects of memory regeneration, personal histories and belonging must now come 
intrinsic value. Indeed, ‘value’, as included in both papers talk specifically about 
memory value, rather than financial - unfortunately, we must consider this too. What 
is clearly a conduit to another time, a tangible reminder of past deeds, must also be 
seen as something that blurs the boundary between order and chaos, destabilising 
the boundary between civilian and military life (Gregson et al 2011, 305). Returning 
to my original question - Who are the covert curators? I suggest we can now start to 
identify their traits, interpret some of their activities and demonstrate an impact on 
the landscape.   
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Covertly Curated - Fact or Fiction?         
The influence of those involved in the renovation of underground monitoring posts, in 
a state of covert curation, are influencing how the monuments that remain in the 
landscape transit between one state and another. The activist in this category is 
altruistic in character, although the activities undertaken at Royal Observer Corps 
sites are more than often an investment opportunity as much as an act of 
remembrance. The number of posts currently passing through various hands via 
both internet auction sites and estate agent offices, before and after restoration, 
suggest this trait is on the increase; just as Gregson et al suggested (2011, 301) 
there is a value regime, this is one such driven by the restorers themselves. This is 
not the case for those who overtly curate posts for remembrance and educational 
purposes, it is to this final aspect of the order and chaos model I now turn. 
OVERTLY CURATED POSTS 
Overtly curated underground monitoring posts are the most straightforward of sites 
to interpret. Two sites within the project area, W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire and C-1, 
Veryan, Cornwall, both case studies in the previous chapter, are currently the only 
known posts to be overtly curated, that is promoted openly in media outlets as being 
available for inspection by the public. I suspect this will change over time as more 
posts become established through the covert curation route and networks of co-
operation are built.  
So What Makes Overt Curation Different? 
A key aspect of overtly curated sites is to make the 'secret' accessible and by so 
doing, enhance the visitors’ knowledge about both the Royal Observer Corps and 
the real dangers faced by the entire population throughout the Cold War period. This 
contentious issue lives on in the personal histories of a large majority of the adult 
population. The tensions between those who operated the Royal Observer Corps 
network and other, defence orientated functions was played out across the media of 
the day; the most recognisable being the women’s peace camp at RAF Greenham 
Common. As discussed in chapter 3 of this project, the arbitrary stand-down of the 
ROC caused the once secret organisation to become completely disenfranchised 
(74% of those who returned questionnaires viewed the Stand-down in 1991 in a 
negative light).  
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What is important here is that those who elected to refurbish and open their posts to 
public scrutiny were the same observers who had operated the same posts during 
the Cold War. While covertly curated posts still exude an air of secrecy, probably 
linked to protection of an investment coupled with a number of egotistical and 
requirements of the owners, overtly curated ROC posts open to the public do not. In 
the previous chapter I noted this classification does employ tactics to deter the 
destructive visitor (signage and removal of compound fences), although, the site of 
the post is readily advertised through a number of media formats and as such is not 
secret in any way. 
Interestingly, the rise of the Cold War site as public history follows Wayne Cocroft’s 
original set of parameters concentrating specifically on Cold War Structures and their 
preservation (2001). Indeed, 20 Group Headquarters structure at York, North 
Yorkshire, was one of the first Cold War sites to be scheduled, the designation going 
through in May 2000 (Emerick 2003, 46). Since then a number of sites have become 
‘available’ for public consumption, culminating with the opening of the National Cold 
War Museum at Royal Air Force Cosford, Shropshire in February 2007 (RAFM 
30/11/2016).    
Public Re-Alignment? 
The results of the public survey provided an interesting situation regarding the 
question ‘For over 40 years successive British Governments spent millions of 
pounds building 'nuclear bunkers' around the country. What do you think was the 
true purpose of these structures?’ from 178 returns the overall division was 87 
positive answers; 88 negative and 1 no answer. When the results took age into 
consideration, using Schuman and Rogers collective memories principle (2004), the 
results remained fairly static - generally a 50% split on whether a structure was 
altruistic or egocentric towards the population.  
 341 | P a g e  
 
Graph.8-3. The Cold War survey indicated that the correspondents were divided equally 
over whether the bunker had a good or bad purpose (Blue positive reason/use; Brown 
negative reason/use). (Source data from Cold War survey to be found in the appendices) 
What the data above tells us is that there are a lot of people who are clearly still 
sceptical about the function of one of the archetypal structures from the Cold War 
period. This makes the role played by the ROC posts that are aimed at education 
even more vital. I believe we have reached a watershed, especially when it comes to 
Royal Observer Corps posts. That a number of ROC posts will prevail beyond the 
life-cycle of the observers themselves is not in question; the opportunity to present a 
more balanced view of the period as experienced in the British Isles will become far 
more problematic.. 
The Disenfranchised View     
It appears the effect of the stand-down on a good majority of the Royal Observer 
Corps members had a lasting effect. It is probable that the reasons for ex-observers 
re-manning their original posts has something to do with way their organisation 
appeared to be promoted after stand-down. In fact it appears a lack of visibility and 
recognition was the main motivation for both overtly curated posts in this project 
being brought into the public arena. Now those who decend into the secret world of 
the Royal Observer Corps can experience first hand what an underground monitoing 
post would have looked like during the organisations operational phase. They are 
also inducted into a world that, if the samples from the survey are anything to go by, 
they clearly considered was constructed for the perpetuation of the 'select few', 
rather than for any public good. 
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Graph.8-4. Of those who indicated they were serving at the time of the 1991 stand-down, 
74% had only negative things to say about the event. It has to be remembered that this 
survey was conducted over 20 years after the stand-down event. Clearly, the effect still has 
an impact on the ROC psychology. (Source data from ROC survey to be found in the 
appendices)   
Order and Chaos as a Workable Model 
From the outset of this project I believed there was potential in the Royal Observer 
Corps to demonstrate that a certain set of behaviours could be recognised in the 
extant landscape. Initially this comprised a structure aligned the familiar core and 
periphery model so often used to describe the introduction and usage to coinage to 
Iron Age Britain (Cunliffe 1981). In the event, although the core and periphery model 
has potential, it is a very basic tool; however, it does allow for certain aspects of 
highly ordered groups to be separated out.  
Subsequently, in chapter 4 I described the layout of the two facet system when 
applied to large landscapes (airfields), the size allowing for easy recognition of 
activities both sides of the security fence. Beyond the fence lay a series of areas 
were specialist, organisationally reliant, activities were both contained and 
performed. These activities are linked to the overall mission of the site under 
Disenfranchised
74%
Accepted
5%
No Comment
21%
Were You Serving at the Time of the Stand-
down?
Disenfranchised Accepted No Comment
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investigation. Dependant on the position and activities enacted these increase, or 
decrease, in level of control of the individual. Using an airfield landscape it is 
possible to recognise areas of complete conformity to rule, regulations and military 
ethos; these activities are classified as highly organised operational space. Other 
areas move through lower levels of control until activities are almost 
indistinguishable from those enacted outside the security fence, in wider society. 
What is important is how the material culture of both the core and peripheral aspects 
interacts. If we revisit the diagram demonstrating the facets of order, linked to 
material culture (fig.8-12) it is clear to see the closer to a highly ordered space one 
becomes, the more rigid the activities prescribed and the less complex the material 
culture and attendant deposition. In the natural order of things, the areas where 
aircraft operate should have no primary archaeological record indicating that was the 
case.    
Fig.8-13. The flow of complexity when matched to highly ordered operational spaces. 
Note the level of complexity reduces the close one gets to total control. (Source: Bob 
Clarke) 
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The challenge was to apply the model to sites that were a) abandoned and b) 
smaller and more numerous in the landscape. This is why the Royal Observer Corps 
underground monitoring posts became the focus of this project. I believe the choice 
of structures was a fortuitous one; core aspects provided a uniform structural type in 
all locations, a known narrative life-cycle of the organisation and a large number of 
observers still available for comment. Utilising this the chaos part of the proposed 
framework was developed. The results of this development work allows me to 
suggest that the order and chaos model appears to hold validity. The model has 
been effectively applied to the ROC posts, bringing much new information about the 
last 25 years of the organisation's field monuments, those who still interact with the 
posts and the behaviours they display. Following this project, it is intended to return 
to the airfield landscape in an attempt to refine the framework for larger, infinitely 
more complex, sites. 
Technology or Historiography 
Alongside the study of the process of abandonment, which is the main focus of this 
project, I decided the Royal Observer Corps and other organisations from the same 
chronological period might have something to offer the study of the monumental 
composition of the contemporary landscape. Subsequently, the fifth research 
question set the goal to ‘Construct a more appropriate chronology of the Cold War, 
relying on the archaeological record currently extant in the United Kingdom.’ My 
reasons are simple, currently the archaeological record does not mirror the current 
accepted view of a multi-phased political period. I consider it to be far more 
appropriate to recognise a landscape and monuments driven by technology; its 
influence is much more notable than the political periods suggested through 
leadership challenges, agreements on arms control and political posturing through 
armed conflicts via proxy such as Vietnam (1955-75) and Afghanistan (1979-89). 
Some, especially Afghanistan, had far reaching consequences; two Olympic Games 
were substantially effected as first Governments from the West boycotted the 
Moscow Games in 1980 (Jefferys 2012), then in a classic display of Cold War ‘tit-for-
tat’, Eastern Bloc countries boycotted the Los Angeles Games four years later, 
indicating that ‘chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria [was] being 
whipped up in the United States’ (Burns 1984). Considering just these few events, it 
is easy to see how the historiography of the last half or the twentieth century has had 
the potential to be driven by rhetoric and propaganda. Especially since the 
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landscape of the Cold War was neither open or discussed outside the closed 
heterotopian world of the organisations who presided over its continuance. 
Interestingly, the boycott of Olympic Games is unlikely to leave any archaeological 
marker attributable to the Cold War; the stadium and venues were built and the 
games went ahead. Granted, some level of record through the material culture of the 
Olympics will survive, although, one would have difficulties recognising ‘boycott’ 
within any analysis of the material now. Observations, through field visits and the first 
public survey, conducted for this project, suggest we are at an impasse, one that 
should be considered an attribute of recollected memory, phenomenology and age 
(Schuman and Rogers 2004).  
The Public Results 
The first round off public engagements were described, along with the question set, 
in chapter 3. The initial findings proved disappointing with no revelatory information 
coming forwards. Once the analysis had been conducted it became clear that a 
connection between events and age was visible. Schuman and Rogers suggest that 
experiences of large events during 'adolescence or young adulthood' have a lasting 
impression on the personal histories of any individual, this they consider is the 
'critical period' (2004, 218) (graph.8-5).    
 
Graph.8-5 Schuman and Rodgers 'Critical Period'. Those who remembered the Civil 
Defence Corps (1948-68) clearly follow the trend of adolescence or young adulthood at the 
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time the organisation was in operation. (source data from Cold War survey to be found in the 
appendices) 
 
 
Graph.8-6. Here the results for the Berlin Wall being erected and removed are juxtaposed. 
These results are from the same survey and demonstrate again the alignment of results 
when considered with Schuman and Rodgers 'Critical Period' (2004). (source data from Cold 
War survey to be found in the appendices) 
Interestingly, Wayne Cocroft suggested in 2001 that ‘- it is helpful to split the Cold 
War into a number of chronological periods.’ This was followed in 2003 with an 
assertion that at least three periods were recognisable - a first Cold War; a period of 
equilibrium, or détente after the Cuban Missile Crisis; followed by a second Cold War 
- covering a period of 43 years (Cocroft et al 2003, 9). Unfortunately, I do not think 
this process of dividing the Cold War into chronological periods dictated by the 
historical narrative adequately describes the archaeological landscape. Furthermore, 
different organisations have their own life-cycle and in a conflict that lasts as long as 
the Cold War we must accept that the archaeology is necessarily multi-faceted.  
A Correct Chronology? 
When consider the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps two types of 
monuments are extant in the field. The Orlit posts, interacting with a skyscape, 
visually recognisable, overt and familiar, described as phase one monuments in this 
thesis. And the underground monitoring posts, subterranean, subjects of subterfuge, 
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secretive (and difficult to interpret), phase two monuments. The decision to move 
underground was taken after the publication of the Strath Report in 1955. This, in 
turn, described the very real horrors of the new 'H-bomb' and its attendant 
radioactive fallout. The Strath report is the watershed between phase one and phase 
two monuments. From here on in the ROC posts were increasingly operated from 
below ground. 
Other organisations were also affected by the report. Indeed, a number of high 
profile operations we disbanded at this time, including Anti-Aircraft Command and 
the War room network. Other complex organisations were brought into being at this 
time, specifically the Regional Seats of Government, although they too underwent 
substantial transformation and location changes until the end of the Cold War 
(Clarke 2005). My point is, we should consider groups in isolation, with their own 
monument life-cycle, rather than try and structure a chronological framework for Cold 
War monuments that is driven by the political landscape. A key perimeter of the 
order and chaos model is the understanding of the organisation's historiography from 
the outset. It is only following the recognition that a technological change, in this 
case the development of the Hydrogen Weapon, forced a change in the landscape of 
the Royal Observer Corps that the correct chronological framework can be 
recognised.  
Summary 
In this chapter I have made the case for the development of a new, detailed, model 
intended to inform the researcher, through fieldwork, about aspects of the 
abandonment process as experienced at a specific type of Cold War monument. I 
believe the framework developed has potential in a number of areas and should be 
accepted as a tool for the investigation of contemporary and twentieth century 
archaeological sites. The model relies on a known level of organisational history and 
an awareness of modern material culture. Once these parameters are known the 
observation of behaviours out in the field can be used to explain the actions 
recognised on site, producing a much more structured and detailed account of the 
life-cycle of the monument.  
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions 
I have, through this project, identified a number of tangible lines of investigation 
connected to the abandonment process. The work has centred on the field 
archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps and the organisations, purpose-built, 
structures of the Cold War period. It has become clear through this project that we 
cannot simply say a structure is abandoned without first knowing something of the 
primary group who inhabit the space a building creates. This covers all types of 
organisations; in this case I utilised a group that operated along military lines, 
although, it relied heavily on volunteers to operate efficiently. Those same volunteers 
are available for comment, as is a large body of incomplete archival material, some 
of it official, other parts in private and personal historical contexts. The subject matter 
‒ nuclear warfare and Government sanctioned mass destruction ‒ are contentious 
issues and still cause tension twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War. 
Utilising a number of research avenues, I have been able to demonstrate the validity 
of the order and chaos model I believe this does, with further refinement, have the 
potential to influence the way we view organisations that follow instrumentalist 
activities.  
The initial concept of order and chaos was intended to demonstrate a two-tier model, 
or more accurately, framework on which to base the transition from the highly 
ordered world of nuclear reporting to the ultimately more random activities enacted 
on Royal Observer Corps posts once the primary usage had been abandoned. This 
proved to be a naïve concept; it became clear through fieldwork and engagement 
with the public that the ROC landscape, both pre- and post-abandonment, was 
infinitely more complex than this.  
'Ordered' Order? 
The project discovered the concept of 'order', that is a site, or location, utilised by a 
highly ordered group as part of an activity bound by rules and regulations, cannot be 
considered a singular activity. Over the period of the Cold War the Royal Observer 
Corps underwent a substantial change in its operational outlook. Importantly here, 
this changed both the landscape monuments and the recruitment tactics, suggesting 
that organisations that have a rigid structure still require a degree of flexibility in their 
overall policy. The years of 'order' experienced by the ROC were actually punctuated 
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by substantial developments in the craft of the Cold War. Subsequently, tactics, 
equipment and, ultimately, the volunteer experience, underwent dramatic change. 
A level of change management was expected from the outset; however, the effect 
this had on recruitment and the ways in which the service was promoted were not. 
Suffice to say technological advances impact the field archaeology of the 
organisation, this is nothing new. What is new is the way in which the government 
retained aspects of redundant practice in an attempt to attract volunteers. It would 
appear that even in rigid organisations there is an opportunity for chaos; there is 
often a dichotomy between actual purpose and information outwardly projected ‒ in 
this case a tangible link with aviation and the skyscape ‒ although the actual task 
was ultimately underground. Furthermore, once a human is introduced into an 
environment, personalisation of that space will occur, regardless of rules or 
regulations. Indeed, this should be considered a universal concept.   
'Moving' to Chaos 
The move to understanding an abandonment of a structure challenged a number of 
pre-conceived concepts, especially those discussed by Michael Schiffer. Once the 
field results were analysed it became clear that the chaos of human activity did 
actually display a number of set patterns. I proposed four main streams of interaction 
with underground monitoring posts ‒ human, animal, meteorological, and vegetation 
‒ all types can work in combination or singularly. Considering human activity, I 
initially proposed a level of visitor ‒ curious or destructive ‒ although, this did not 
adequately explain many observations nor did it explain the material culture 
discovered during field visits. The realisation that chaos has a number of structured 
elements has provided a greater level of fidelity to be achieved. 
Through the application of the chaos side of the model I have been able to 
demonstrate that an expected life-cycle of a Royal Observer Corps underground 
monitoring post is not straightforward. A given structure passes through a number of 
states, although, this is not a linear path. The four states and their primary routes of 
interaction are demonstrated in the simplified diagram below (fig.9-1). 
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Key Findings 
To summarise the model: all structures, once the intended structure is removed 
enter a period of 'transition'. This has no chronological implications, although, 
through interaction and the deposition of non-organisational material culture, that is 
items not associated with the function of the Royal Observer Corps, it is the most 
complex of the states archaeologically. From this point ROC posts either enter a 
state of 'ruined or destroyed', although I have demonstrated that even a 'destroyed' 
post will leave some evidence of its former landscape position. A post might also 
enter a period of covert curation, that is an occupation of the underground monitoring 
post by an individual, or group, who, in the main, are egotistical in their outlook and 
probably financially driven. It is important to note that the fieldwork discovered sites 
moving from transition to covert curation and covert curation to transition. Again, this 
has no chronological marker. 
Those ROC posts that are overtly curated are, in the main, likely to remain in a 
curated state for the foreseeable future. It is here that the most authentic experience 
is offered to a, still sceptical, public. It occurs to me that there is also the potential for 
covertly curated posts to move into the public arena in time, more work is needed 
here. The final classification ‒ statutory protection ‒ contains posts displaying all 
other levels of classification. Interestingly, the state is connected to the surrounding 
landscape ‒ basically the more modern the landscape, the better preserved and 
maintained the ROC post. There is clearly a management issue being played out 
here; again more work can be undertaken in this area, and not just on twentieth 
century monument preservation. An assessment of a given landscape to include all 
monuments, including those from contemporary periods, would benefit the 
management plans in the future, and in so doing slow the attrition some sites are 
currently suffering. 
Engaging with The Public 
A key part of the research for this project involved the engagement of the public, 
primarily to ascertain their perceptions of the Cold War. The first, paper based, 
survey, was in hindsight, naive in its question set. That said, utilising the process 
devised by Schuman and Rogers (2004), it was possible to recognise formative 
memory and world events. This turned out to be fortuitous as I was able to calibrate 
following question sets using this theory. The results in certain areas proved useful 
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and I consider this an essential part of any investigation into subjects of a 
contemporary nature.    
The ROC survey provided extremely useful material, covering attitudes and the 
minutiae of operations across a broad spectrum of the groups Cold War activities. 
The important aspect here is that a number of activities were uncovered that would 
never be apparent through the official record. This led to the conclusion that, as 
mentioned above, even the most regimented of organisations can have a chaotic 
element to them, an important point when studying such groups. 
Why is the Order and Chaos Model Important? 
Utilising the order and chaos model has demonstrated that research linked 
specifically to groups who are highly organised in their practice has the ability to 
provide much more detailed accounts of that group. This is achieved through a 
structured approach to field monuments, noting specific non-organisation material 
culture that are likely to be missed by high-level narratives. Beyond this, a study of 
the extant archives, the organisations own history and, more importantly, the 
personal histories of those who enacted the tasks dictated by the governments 
should be considered a key part of the model. To contextualise such highly ordered 
groups with the memories of those who 'fought' in the Cold War is to demonstrate 
the activities of three generations and places them in a specific taskscape (and 
skyscape).  
The monuments out in the field are now the focus of a multitude of activities, some 
natural, although the majority are the direct or secondary consequence of human 
activity. Utilising the four-tier abandonment model of chaos it is not only possible to 
discuss the process-led life-cycle of a specific monument type from the Cold War, it 
also allows the movement of same to be followed through multiple usages, often in 
the same location. What is recorded on the majority of Heritage Environment 
Records is simply a statement of highly organised use; from stand-down very little, if 
anything, is noted. The order and chaos model has allowed me to substantially 
complement the record, far from still being considered a secret the ROC 
underground monitoring posts are now much more in the light. 
What Now? 
Developing the model around such a limited sized structure (the underground 
monitoring post) was a risk. The findings relied, to a certain point, on the concept of 
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core and periphery, both separated by a security fence, which could have struggled 
to demonstrate differentiation between public (outside) and secret (inside). In the 
event the order and chaos model demonstrated that a high level of detail can be 
ascribed to such a scenario. 
The next step is to apply the same research concept, tactics and methods to a multi-
phase military site. With multiple uses being displayed throughout the life-cycle of the 
majority of structures and areas on an MoD airfield the challenge will be to select the 
most appropriate routes for the characterisation of periods, operational connection 
and interaction with the surrounding landscape.  
Last Words 
I submit the concepts and models I have developed in this thesis to scrutiny, 
acknowledging that a number of aspects are modifications of current academic 
thought. The structure of the order and chaos model, utilising a multi-faceted 
framework aimed at specific organisations, their former members and the activities 
enacted both prior to, and after, abandonment is something new. I am convinced 
choosing this direction has greatly increased the possibility of recording a more 
balanced, detailed, inclusive life-cycle for a group of poorly understood monuments 
of the Cold War. It is simply not appropriate to describe such monuments in the 
context of their past, intended, life-cycle; they remain a feature of the British 
landscape, interaction continues in and around them. We must be prepared to 
understand that post-organisational aspect of our military landscape if we are ever to 
face the reality of our destructive past. I believe the order and chaos model is one 
such vehicle, continued research will develop the concept for additional sites.   
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ABSTRACT 
This project covers the development of a model framework intended to allow 
researchers of the archaeology of the Cold War to recognise a range of behaviours 
played out on military sites. The order and chaos model developed and utilised in 
this thesis introduces a heterotopian landscape populated by the Royal Observer 
Corps. Through a process of archaeological fieldwork a number of behavioural traits 
are recognised and discussed here for the first time. The group in question is fully 
researched, providing a historiography of the practice played out during the groups 
life-cycle. The landscape archaeology is discussed and contextualised by narration 
from the volunteers who once operated the posts. A range of case studies are 
introduced confirming the validity of the order and chaos model and potential for 
application elsewhere. Finally, the findings are discussed in detail and a proposal for 
the next step in the research are revealed.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
Anti-Aircraft Operations Room 
A central control where a number of automatic guns in an area known as a 
Gun Defended Area were operated. The structures are semi-sunken, two 
storey blockhouses. They were operated by Anti-Aircraft Command, a 
component of the Royal Artillery. The organisation was disbanded in March 
1955.  
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
A network of three powerful radar stations intended to detect missile launches 
from the east and compute their trajectory and intended target. The site in the 
United Kingdom, RAF Fylingdales, gave rise to the phrase ‘Four Minute 
Warning’. 
Bomb Power Indicator 
A visual indicator located in the control room of every underground monitoring 
post, operated by a baffle plate at the surface. Standard equipment the BPI 
measures the blast force of the pressure wave as it passes over the post. 
Carrier Control Point 
The United Kingdom had a network of 250 carrier control points - usually in 
police stations - each fed by information from the ROC and other government 
sources. From here it was possible to initiate over 7000 powered air-raid 
sirens and 9000 over warning devices nationally. 
Civil Defence Corps 
The Civil Defence Corps was a mainly voluntary organisation funded by 
Central Government between 1948-1968, although organised on a county 
level and the responsibility of that unitary authority. It comprised a number of 
specialist departments including warden; ambulance; rescue, control and 
welfare. By the early 1960s the organisation had over 300,000 members. 
Defence of Britain Project 
The Defence of Britain Project was a long running recording project managed 
by the Council for British Archaeology. The initial concept was to record all 
military remains in the United Kingdom. Eventually the task became so 
massive the project was downgraded to just those sites from World War II.    
Fixed Survey Meter 
An electronic instrument capable of recognising the ionisation of the 
atmosphere and subsequent radiation from a nuclear weapon once 
detonated. Standard equipment on underground monitoring posts. 
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Ground Zero Indicator 
A drum-like device used to capture the direction and height of the nuclear 
flash. Operates like a pin-hole camera. Standard equipment on every 
underground monitoring post. 
Gun Defended Areas 
An air defence network operating heavy anti-aircraft, and later, missiles. The 
United Kingdom was divided into thirty-three Gun Defended Areas. The 
structure was disbanded in March 1955. 
Home Defence Region 
The United Kingdom was divided, during the Cold War, into eleven Home 
Defence Regions. This form of decentralised government reduced the country 
to a number of self-controlled regions managed from two control centres by 
an appointed junior minister. The key purpose was to maintain the machinery 
of government had central government become incapacitated.   
Orlit Post 
The Orlit post was an overground observation point for aircraft reporting. It 
was constructed using pre-cast concrete panels manufactured to a design by 
Messrs’. Orlit, Bedfordshire. 
Rotor Project 
The Rotor project was the regeneration of the radar network post- World War 
II. In several phases the construction phase of Rotor was the biggest capital 
works for a generation.  
Underground Monitoring Post 
The form of post used by the ROC during the nuclear reporting role. It 
comprised a control room, utility room and entrance stack with steel access 
ladder. The whole structure was buried at least 10ft (3.04m) below ground.  
United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation 
The government organisation responsible for warning the public and 
authorities of air and nuclear attack. The ROC fed information to it during 
phase two of its Cold War life-cycle.  
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APPENDIX 1: DEVON ROC POSTS 
 
The following section comprises a catalogue of those Royal Observer Corps posts that were 
assessed as part of this thesis.  
How to use this section 
A yellow masthead signifies the start of a unique record. Each Royal Observer Post is 
presented with geographical information, including original post numbers. A pictorial 
description of the constituents of each structure, followed by a record of observations on 
each visit. The relevant aspects of the condition of the structure are assessed against the 
order and chaos criteria, and an assessment of the material culture encountered is 
undertaken. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS9736818758 Site Code D-3 
Height 
 
285 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72150 
Geology 
 
Exeter Group (EXE) Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
(D-3) Bampton, Devon. The post at Bampton has recently undergone refurbishment moving 
it from a transitional site to a covertly curated one. (Top Left) Depicts the entrance stack at 
the baseline visit, before refurbishment. (Top Right) Depicts the entrance stack post-
refurbishment.  (Bottom Left) is a general arrangement of the, now refurbished, post. 
(Bottom Right) Shows the location of the extant steps to the site. Note the telegraph post 
above, this was connected to the post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An 
Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open September 
1938 
Post 
Number 
22/X.1 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Org. 
Group  
No.22 
Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
 Yes Post 
Number 
10/Y.3 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 
Group 
Exeter  
Underground 
Monitoring 
Post 
Open October 
1961 
Post 
Number 
9/E.3 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.9 
Group 
Yeovil 
Amalgamatio
n of Groups 
11 & 10  
    Group 
1973 
No.9 
Group 
Yeovil 
 Close September 
1991 
 No at 
Closure 
32 (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.9 
Group 
Yeovil 
 
(D-3) Bampton, Devon. The post at Bampton has recently undergone refurbishment moving 
it from a transitional site to a covertly curated one. The landscape also contains a set of 
concrete steps up from the road to the field above. Although now overgrown, they still have 
the stainless steel handrail attached. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the 
course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
27 May 2011 
D-3 is a fully-sunken ROC post. It stands inside the remnants of a 
concrete posted fence and close to a set of concrete steps, inc. a 
hand rail, that the observers would use from the road to access the 
site, a traverse of c.5m. The Structure has been buried. This was 
not recent as the material is well compacted. Also it must have 
covered the hatch as the inner walls of the ladder shaft are stained 
red. The percolation of water through the soil cover has caused 
this. Some areas have, recently, been re-excavated, this appears 
to be planned interaction, not animal activity. The hatch is missing, 
however it would have been in place on burial. The GZI is a tower 
type, it has been dislodged and lies next to the entrance stack. The 
vent tower is also partially buried, no attempt has been made to dig 
it out as yet. It looks like this site is in an advanced state of 
abandonment with parts of it missing or destroyed and the site 
open to the elements. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 27 May 2011 
Human Land use currently arable. The fact the compound 
fence is extant (apart from the section where the re-
excavation has been undertaken) suggests that since 
closure the site has not been considered an 
obstruction. Although the ROC post has, in the past 
been used as an area to dump soil. The extended GZI 
has been toppled and the original hatch cover has 
been removed. So we could be seeing three different 
activities, including systemic deposition through the 
recycling of the hatch, the destructive visitor and an 
attempt to remove the site from the landscape by 
burial. 
One side of the soil overburden has been partially 
removed – presumably by machine as the BPI pipe is 
bent towards the centre of the site following the slop 
cut into the soil. Further the partially buried entrance 
stack has been dug out by hand. 
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological The key problem with this site is the lack of hatch. 
Currently a board bearing the warning “Danger No 
Step – Do Not Remove-Steep Drop” is the only cover 
for the entrance shaft. No entry was attempted 
however, it was evident that the site contained water. 
Vegetation Overgrowth encroaching on site, currently just weeds 
but has the potential to become thicker. 
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Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
12 June 2012                   
D-3 Bampton ROC post was visited in June 2012 – one of only four 
assessed that year. The baseline visit established that the site was 
under threat, primarily by neglect but some parts of the structure 
had specifically been removed. Further the site inside the ROC 
post had been almost completely buried by soil.  
Surprisingly the situation had changed dramatically between visits. 
The GZI stack was back in place, a refurbished hatch had been 
fitted and the site overburden had been dug away.  
 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012 
Human The ROC post does not show any destructive 
elements, although a level of order has now been 
restores. It is likely that the site will attract a little more 
attention now it has been fully exposed making it more 
visible. 
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological Nothing outwardly visible however, the step has a split 
between it and the entrance stack (this was masked by 
soil on earlier visits). There is also a crack in the 
concrete that holds the hatch outer frame on top of the 
stack. Frost action could remove this. 
Vegetation Only light vegetation. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                   
D-3 Bampton appears to have had little interaction between visits. 
Some slight damage has occurred, although this is more likely the 
effects of weather than any human activity. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 April 2013 
Human The ROC post does not show any destructive 
elements. It is likely that the site will attract a little more 
attention now it has been fully exposed making it more 
visible. The missing section of concrete now offers an 
opportunity to try and access the site. 
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological The crack on the entrance stack has now become a 
fracture, with the loose material now missing. This has 
exposed the steel frame in one corner. As this 
corrodes it will start to lift further sections of concrete.  
Vegetation Only light vegetation. 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original 
compound) 
The standard four point layout, remnants 
of the compound & gate are evidence. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) Investigation of the underground aspects 
of the ROC post were not investigated 
during the baseline visit due to the depth 
of water noted. Further attempts have 
been frustrated by the locked hatch. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
A set of steps from the road up to the site 
survive, along with a aluminium handrail. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SX9446256534 Site Code D-6 
Height 
 
65 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 42876 
Geology 
 
Berry Head Member 
(BHD) 
Status Scheduled: SAM 1017322 
 
 
 
 
(D-6) Brixham, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Bottom Left) World War II 
observers post, now partially below ground (behind grass bank and wall), on top an Orlit post 
Type 'A'. (Top Right) underground monitoring post. (Top Left) general arrangement of all 
three ROC posts. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 
1940 
Post 
Number 
21/G.3 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
 No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/No No   Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Underground 
Monitoring 
Post 
Open Nov 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/K.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamatio
n of Groups 
11 & 10. 
    Group 
1973 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close Sept 
1991 
No at 
Closure 
57 (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
(D-6) Brixham, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post within 
scheduled area, note Victorian Fort details at bottom centre and top middle. Taskscape 
element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could 
inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
25 May 2011 
D-6 is a semi-sunken UGMP. The structure was once surrounded 
by a fence however this has been removed to allow access for the 
general public. The general condition of the structure is good – it is 
well maintained, a covering of grey deck paint protects the site 
from the elements and stops those who wish to explore the ROC 
post from injuring themselves. Some areas of metalwork, 
especially the louvers on the vents, do show some signs of 
corrosion, although considering the exposed nature of the site and 
its proximity to the coast, the damage is slight. Close by is a WWII 
Observers Post and 1953 Orlit Post type ‘A’. All three structures 
are provided with interpretive signage for visitors. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011 
Human The area has a high number of visitors annually and the 
site is located on the edge of a large population area. 
Berry Head is a popular place in the landscape with many 
coming to walk dogs across the peninsular. There is a café 
located just 150m to the west of the site, placing the ROC 
post in clear view of park warden staff every day of the 
week.  
In one hour 69 people walked past the site, 24 of whom 
wandered off the path to look at the structure, read the 
notice board and/or climb on the ROC post.   
Animal Slight attention by rabbits. 
Meteorological Due to the fact the site is maintained regularly the is little 
evidence of degradation of the concrete elements of the 
structure. However, some of the metalwork – especially 
that manufactured from ferrous metals -  is showing signs 
of corrosion. 
Vegetation The area is well-maintained ensuring vegetation is not 
effecting the ROC UGMP. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
2 April 2013                    
The site appears to be in similar condition to the base line visit (25 
May 2011). There are no additions or removal of features. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on 2 April 2013 
Human Someone has placed a brick on the entrance cover of the 
ROC post. This activity has been noted on other sites. 
In one hour 47 people walked past the site, of whom 15 
left the path and investigated the site. Most just read the 
notice board whilst 3 physically interacted with the ROC 
post. 
Animal Slight bare patches through the turf due to rabbits. 
Meteorological There is an increase of corrosion on the metal vents on 
both the entrance stack and vent. Otherwise in the same 
condition as 25 May 2011. 
Vegetation No discernible increase in encroachment. 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Beyond the standard four point layout no 
further material culture is evident. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) As the ROC post is closed down and locked 
-  and following a protracted discussion with 
Torbay Council as to access and H & S 
concerns (confined space etc.) – I have 
decided to take the word of the wardens 
that the ROC post is completely empty. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
22m to the south of the Underground 
Monitoring Post is a multiphase monument 
spanning the entire period of ROC aircraft 
reporting. An Orlit Type ‘A’ post from 1953, 
is built on top of a 1941, pattern ROC Post. 
The Orlit has been modified to become a 
bird watching facility. The wartime structure 
is constructed of local stone along the east, 
south and west faces although the north 
face is breeze block. The entrance is 
protected from the weather by a 
breezeblock wall, presumably built in 1990 
as ‘ROC 1990’ is incised into a large piece 
of concrete in the enclosed area. Phasing is 
visible on the side elevation. The pre-cast 
concrete lid of the early WWII structure is 
clearly evident at the eastern end of the 
site. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SX8292482972 Site Code D-7 
Height 
 
267 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72189 
Geology 
 
Trusham Mudstone 
(TTMU) 
Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
(D-7) Christow, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Centre Left) The detached 
ground zero indicator plinth. (Top Right) underground monitoring post. Note the vent stack is 
almost obscured by undergrowth. (Bottom Right) Steps down from the track to the 
underground monitoring post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
21/F.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
21/G.1 – 
10/V.3 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open September 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/F.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group  
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 11 
(Truro) & 10 
(Exeter). 
    Group 
1973 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close September 
1991 
Post 
Number 
at 
Closure 
32          
(Wood 1992, 
xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
25 May 2011 
D-7 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands in an area of 
dense managed woodland, it has a number of dispersed features 
and is – despite the efforts of a number of private owners – is in 
poor condition.  The Ground Zero Indicator is 35 metres to the 
west, concrete steps allow access to the site from the adjacent 
track. There is evidence of forced entry on the entrance stack with 
c.50% of the concrete securing the hatch missing and the casting 
securing the hatch is broken. The louvers on the entrance stack 
are a non-standard wooden type, probably part of a later 
refurbishment of the ROC post. Material, presumably from inside 
the structure, is spread around the site.  
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(D-7) Christow, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post within 
scheduled area, note the ground zero indicator is not located with the post. Taskscape 
element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could 
inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011 
Human The local settlements are small – Christow is only 820 
strong at the last census. However, there is evidence of 
sustained efforts to entre the site by force. The entrance 
hatch is partially detached and the louvers, which appear 
to be a later addition (they were always steel in those that 
remained in use), are smashed. A number of artefacts are 
spread around the site – presumably from below – these 
include magazines & papers, a highlighter pen and a other 
writing material.  
Two levels of agency are present here. Firstly, the site is in 
the curatorship of individuals or a group who recognise the 
history of the site. That would account for the paint 
scheme, replaced louvers and photoelectric panel on the 
top of the vent stack.  Secondly the destructive visitor 
category. The site has clearly received the attention of a 
group or number of individual's intent, and clearly just prior 
to this visit successful, in gaining access to the ROC post. 
Interestingly there was no evidence of the material culture 
of drinking (soft or alcohol).  
Animal There is a massive wood ants nest a few metres to the 
west of the site. It was so big I had to vacate the site after 
just 15 minutes as they objected to my presence. 
Meteorological There is evidence of corrosion on a number of the ROC 
posts ferrous structural members. The damage around the 
hatch is allowing excess water into the structure, causing 
degradation of the rendering inside the access shaft and 
adding to the water that is ingressing the sub-terrainian 
aspect of the site.  
Vegetation The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although 
bracken is also in evidence. 
 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
13 June 2012                   
The site is an a worse state than when the baseline visit took 
place. More material and an attempt to cover the damage across 
the top of the entrance stack. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012 
Human More material has emerged from the ROC post and is 
spread in the immediate area. Everything noted in the prior 
visit, apart from the remnants of magazines and papers 
has been moved or is no longer evident. 
Clear tensions are displayed here by the conservers and 
the destructive visitor. That tension manifests itself through 
acts of destruction countered by acts of defence through 
the re-securing of the entrance lid. Currently the original 
hatch has been removed and a rather elaborate set of 
steel ropes, corrugated tin sheet and, reinforcing steel bar 
is padlocked to the steel ladders in the entrance stack. 
Animal Wood ants are still there – but not in such large numbers 
thankfully. 
Meteorological Difficult to ascertain, however the hatch whilst impossible 
to remove, is not a snug fit, water could easily ingress the 
site. 
Vegetation The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although 
bracken is also in evidence. 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
2 April 2013                   
The site has been refurbished. No damage is evident on the 
entrance stack and other areas have been repainted. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013 
Human This visit discovered that the site had been refurbished. 
Clearly the act of curation, and possibly remembrance, is 
strong in the group that owned it. The entrance stack had 
a new hatch and supporting structure cemented into place, 
the louvers had been replaced and repainted and rubbish 
had been cleared away. Although the material used to 
cover the entrance at the last visit lay just 15m to the 
north.  
The hatch now has a request to respect the site and some 
contact details (which have not returned any requests for 
information). There was also a small stone placed in the 
hatch lid. 
Animal No ants nest. 
Meteorological Non-evident.   
Vegetation The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although 
bracken is also in evidence. 
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Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Non-standard layout. Ground Zero Indicator 
(GZI) is located away from site. There is a 
lot of material movement across the site. 
Most of it appears to be non-standard issue 
equipment or materials used in the 
securing/protection of the site from 
destructive visitors.  
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) As the site is curated it is likely that a 
number of original features remain in the 
UGMP. As yet I have been unable to raise a 
response from the details written on the 
hatch. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
As noted above the site is non-standard in 
its layout. The GZI is located within the 
100m radius. 
 
 
Activity Recorded at the Entrance Stack.  25 May 2011 – 2 April 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 May 2011 13 June 2012 2 April 2013 
 383 | P a g e  
Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SX7122190919 Site Code D-9 
Height 
 
278 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72236 
Geology 
 
Meldon Shale (MS) Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
(D-9) Drewsteignton, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. The post is prominently 
located and is visible from the road. This might account for the current owner planting trees 
and shrubs inside the compound. Unfortunately, if this is the case it appears to have had the 
opposite effect. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
21/F.3 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
No Post 
Number 
10/O.4 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open August 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/F.1 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 11 & 
10. 
    Group 
1973 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close September 
1991 
No  at 
Closure 
30 (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
(D-9) Drewsteignton, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. The post is prominently 
located. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the 
general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An 
Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
26 May 2011 
D-9 Drewsteignton ROC post is a fully-sunken site.  The compound 
and ROC post are in good order – the site is curated. The site stands 
on top of an elevated area and is clearly visible on the sky-line. 
There are a number of intentionally planted saplings across the site 
and a mature juniper is growing central to the compound. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011 
Human This site is curated.  There does not appear to be 
much destructive activity on the site, although it is 
possible the sign with the current owners contact 
details alludes to problems in the past. The statement 
‘nothing valuable inside’ tends to back this up. 
Intentional planting of trees will, in time, change the 
appearance of the site.  
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological There is a crack in the concrete that holds the hatch 
outer frame on top of the stack. Frost action could 
remove this. 
Vegetation Naturally encroaching vegetation was not recognised, 
however the trees recently planted could cause long-
term problems to the structure. 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                   
3 April 2013                   
The ROC post has changed little from the visit two years ago. The 
site is still curated – all external features have received a coat of 
paint recently. There appears to have been no destructive 
interaction. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 3 April 2013 
Human No destructive interaction visible. The site has been 
repainted recently – including the removal of slight 
surface corrosion – a plant pot has been placed over 
the FSM, presumably to stop the ingress of water. 
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological There is a crack in the concrete that holds the hatch 
outer frame on top of the stack (noted on last visit). 
Frost action could remove this. 
Vegetation Naturally encroaching vegetation was not recognised, 
however the trees recently planted could cause long-
term problems to the structure. 
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Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Standard layout. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) Unable to raise a response from the 
owner, although the fact it is curated 
suggests a number of features are 
present. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
None. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS3499103859 Site Code D-19 
Height 
 
165 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72298 
Geology 
 
Bude Formation (BF) Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
(D-19) Holsworthy, Devon. (bottom right) The Orlit post type 'A' not rotten door bottom 
caused by the cattle that graze in the field. (Top Right) a general shot showing the position 
of the Orlit post in relation with the underground monitoring post. (Middle Left) the entrance 
stack. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open June 1940 Post 
Number 
21/K.1 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
No Post 
Number 
20/L.3 – 
11/B.1 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1953 
No.11 Group 
Truro 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open September 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/C.3 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 
    Group 
1973 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close September 
1991 
No at 
Closure 
10 (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
(D-19) Holsworthy, Devon. Holsworthy is an elevated, multi-phase site contained within a 
compound. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
1 May 2011 
Two phase site (UGMP and Orlit Type 'A'. both in a state of 
transition. Compound visible, but damaged. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011 
Human Nothing visible 
Animal Cattle have pushed over the fence and are disturbing the 
ground around the structures. 
Meteorological Corrosion is at an advanced stage on some metal surfaces 
and the FSM is corroded through. 
Vegetation Grass - kept down by grazing. 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                  
State similar as previous visit.  
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013   
Human Again no obvious interaction. 
Animal More cattle damage 
Meteorological none 
Vegetation none 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) A type 'A' Orlit post survives on site. The door 
is rotten and stiff to open. Some cables and 
wooden mounting features survive. The 
instrument mounting plinth survives but is 
badly damaged. Underground monitoring post 
is in average condition. As noted previously 
the fixed survey meter mount is badly 
corroded. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No access - welded shut. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
Non noted. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS3752623607 Site Code D-20 
Height 
 
190 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 57763 
Geology 
 
Bude Formation (BF) Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
(D-20) Hornscross, Devon. The whole site is almost consumed by undergrowth. Although, 
there enough visitors to the site, probably to access the Orlit Post, to keep open a gap in the 
hedge. The underground monitoring post is open and chaotic. The site has been in a 
covertly curated stage at some time in its life-cycle. Currently it is in transition. (©Crown 
Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open June 1940 Post 
Number 
21/B.2 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
No Post 
Number 
11/A.1 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1953 
No.11 Group 
Truro 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open June 1960 Post 
Number 
11/A.1 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.11 Group 
Truro 
 Close October 
1968 
Post 
Number 
at 
Closure 
11/A.1        
(Wood 1992, 
xi) 
Group 
1991 
 
 
 
(D-20) Hornscross, Devon. Due to the overgrown nature little of the site can be safely 
accessed. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied 
service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
25 May 2011 
A compound containing an Orlit Type 'B' and an underground 
monitoring post. The compound is very overgrown, making it 
almost impossible to reach all the above ground structures. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011 
Human It is clear this site attracts investigators/visitors. There is a 
path worn between the road and the entrance hatch. 
Material inside the structure indicates work after 1991 has 
taken place including at least one coat of white emulsion. 
The Observer Room door and bunks being arranged as 
they are supports this.  
 
Animal Animal  
No obvious animal damage was noted however the 
remains of a rabbit were in the Observer Room.  
 
Meteorological Meteorological 
Currently the site is dry although there is a substantial 
amount of material at the bottom of the entrance, the sump 
is full of leaves and the hatch is broken and will let in 
water. 
Vegetation Vegetation  
Vegetation is the main threat hear. The entire compound it 
extremely overgrown. The corrosion evident in the vent 
and FSM cannot be investigated due to the cover.  
Meteorological The site is close to the coast but is well 
protected by the vegetation 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
13 June 2012                   
The site continues to disappear in the undergrowth. This is, in turn, 
starting to damage the entrance stack. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012 
Human Light material is being left at the site (cans etc) but no 
damage appears to be happening. 
Animal None visible 
Meteorological Water ingress into control room. Corrosion below. 
Vegetation Growth - especially ivy, is starting to pull off rendering. 
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Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
2 April 2013                   
Pornography and chemical drums have been dumped on site. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013 
Human Just material as noted above. 
Animal None noted 
Meteorological Light deterioration 
Vegetation Very dense towards rear of compound now. 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) The compound fencing survives around the 
whole site. As does a stub from the 
overground telephone system. The Orlit 
Post Type 'B' is in good condition, including 
the ladder and a few aspects of the wooden 
fixtures. The Underground monitoring post 
is difficult to reach and the vent sack now 
impossible. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) Below ground the furniture, and a number 
of other, low cost items are still present. 
Someone has repainted the structure in 
emulsion. This, since becoming damp, has 
started to peel back off the walls. The door 
frames are rotten at the bottom, suggesting 
periods stood in water. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
Nothing noted. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SX6766854690 Site Code D-27 
Height 
 
172 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72305 
Geology 
 
Mid-Devonian 
Limestone (MDVL) 
Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
 
(D-27) Modbury, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1000. Location of post in rural area. 
(Bottom Left) Entrance stack with raised ground zero indicator plinth and steps to it. These 
steps appear unique in the south-west. (Bottom Right) Vent stack with master post 
attachments. (Top Right) General shot of the post, note the fence posts uprooted and 
dumped on the underground monitoring post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An 
Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 
1940 
Post 
Number 
21/H.1 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/No Yes Post 
Number 
10/R.1 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Underground 
Monitoring 
Post 
Open Sept 
1959 
Post 
Number 
10/E.1(Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamation 
of Groups 11 
& 10  
    Group 
1973 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close Sept 
1991 
 No at 
Closure 
50 (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
 
 
 
 
(D-27) Modbury, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post in rural area. 
Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general 
public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
26 May 2011 
D-27 Modbury ROC post is a fully sunken UGMP. The site is 
curated although the compound and above ground environs are in 
a state of disrepair. The ROC post stands in an area of arable 
farming which appears to be ploughed regularly, this has started to 
develop a lynchet on both sides of the compound. The compound 
concrete posts have been uprooted and dumped on the site. The 
ROC post has a number of ‘non-standard’ features. 
 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011 
Human An interesting dichotomy. On the one hand the ROC post 
is in curatorship, presumably by someone who has an 
interest in the ROC. Whilst on the other hand the 
landowner is steadily removing evidence of the 
surrounding compound and ploughing as close as possible 
to the extant features. The vent stack fixtures demonstrate 
D-27 was a master post. No evidence of any guide rope 
fixtures for the aerial were noted, presumably they have 
been removed.  
Animal Nothing noted 
Meteorological All above ground features appear a little frost damaged. 
This will get worse if not attended to. 
Vegetation It is now difficult to remove vegetation off the site as the 
dumped compound posts are in the way. This will cause 
problems in the future. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
2 April 2013                   
D-27 ROC post has changed little from the baseline visit. The 
above-ground structure outer paint is steadily deteriorating. The 
surrounding landscape had been recently ploughed exposing the 
radio mounts. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013 
Human There appears to be little in the way of external interaction 
beyond that of the two agents already identified. Currently 
the removal of evidence from the surrounding area is 
continuing. What started as removal of most of the 
compound now includes the mounts for the master post 
aerial. One mount has been removed from its original 
position, now lying with the up rooted posts. A further 
mount is still in location but has been damaged by the 
plough. 
Animal None recognised 
Meteorological Rain and frost action continues to degrade the site. 
Vegetation As noted previously, if not cleared encroaching vegetation 
will become a problem. 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original 
compound) 
A four point layout with some additions. 
The GZI is elevated by what can only be 
described as a local modification. It is so 
poorly constructed the instrument mount 
is built up to make it level. A series of 
four steps allows the observer access to 
the GZI. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No access has been gained. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
One aerial mount is still in place. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS 9288111613 Site Code D-37 
Height 
 
241 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 72343 
Geology 
 
Crackington Formation 
(CKF) 
Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. (Bottom Right) an 
Orlit post Type 'A'. The structure has been modified, new roof and double doors fitted. The 
structure does not fit with the suggested layout this project has discovered. It is suggested 
that the Orlit is from another location. (Top Right) Vent Stack (Top Left) Entrance stack, note 
lack of grills and reflectors attached to structure.. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. 
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. (Bottom Right) 
General arrangement of site (L) Orlit type 'A' (C) Radio Shack (R) Entrance stack. (Top 
Right) Radio Shack. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA 
supplied service) 
 
Chronology 
A/C Post Open August 
1940 
Post 
Number 
22/X.4 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Org. 
Group 
No.22 Group 
Yeovil 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
10/X.2 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open August 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/X.2 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 Close October 
1968 
No at 
Closure 
   
 
 
 
 
 400 | P a g e  
 
(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. The site is a mixture 
of original underground monitoring post, relocated Orlit type 'A' and new radio shack plus 
attendant aerials. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty 
and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 
2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
25 May 2011 
D-37 ROC post was closed in 1968. From the mid-1970s it has 
been home to a local radio ham club. Subsequently some 
modification has occurred on site. An ‘A type’ Orlit post stands in 
the corner of the compound. It has had the roof line raised by 
around 20cm. A large timber shack is also on the site – potentially 
a clubhouse – and the ROC post is utilised as an aerial stand. A 
further aerial has been erected in the corner of the compound.   
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Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011 
Human The site has been taken over by a local radio ham club. 
They have modified areas of the compound and both 
extant structures. The UGMP appears (above ground) to 
be is fairly good condition considering this was one of the 
1968 abandonments. The Orlit post has been extensively 
modified to provide a store for the site. Originality is 
probably less that 50%. There is no evidence of the BPI. 
The entrance stack has a number of reflectors stuck to it. 
Presumably this is to help cars on the site see the 
structure. This might also explain the big chunk of concrete 
missing from the corner facing the entrance. 
The new use of the site means’ currently, the ROC post is 
maintained, however, it will also attract visitors. That said 
no vandalism was noted on this visit. 
Animal None noted. 
Meteorological None noted. 
Vegetation The compound is well maintained with little evidence for 
vegetation encroachment. 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                   
The nature of the structures have changed little. The Orlit and 
shack have received a new coat of paint and disabled access has 
been laid in from the road into the shack. The aerial masts have 
been moved. The one attached to the FSM looks, to all intense and 
purpose, redundant. A new extendable mast is anchored into a 
large concrete pad next to the entrance stack. The aerial in the 
corner has gone.   
 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012 
Human No outwardly destructive visitors appear to have been on 
site since the last visit. The Radio club is modifying 
aspects of the site, erecting aerials and laying in new 
paths. 
Animal None noted. 
Meteorological As noted previously. 
Vegetation As noted previously. 
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Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Standard four point post. Orlit Type A, and 
compound in good condition. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No access. Have tried to engage the club in 
conversation for last two years – no reply. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
Nothing noted. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS8854403156 Site Code D-41 
Height 
 
217 metres HER Ref. Devon HER:  
Geology 
 
Cadbury Breccia 
(CYBR) 
Status Scheduled 1016259 
 
 
 
(D-41) Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Left) Entrance 
stack with vent stack beyond, not poor state of compound fencing (Top Right) entrance stack 
showing damage to hatch and, now broken, metal band attempting to close off the entrance. 
(Top Right) Vent stack showing master post fitting and pavement slab on top of stack rather 
than the shallow eves lid. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
 21/D.3 
(Wood 1992, 
285) 
Org. 
Group No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
10/X.3 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open June 1959 Post 
Number 
10/D.2 (Wood 
1992, 285) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 11 
(Truro) & 10 
(Exeter). 
    Group 
1973 
 
 Close September 
1991 
Post 
Number 
at 
Closure 
20  (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
(D-41) Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Location of post 
within scheduled area. Note the structure is depicted as a 'Covered Reservoir' here. 
Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general 
public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
25 May 2011 
D-41 ROC post is a fully sunken structure. The structure stands 
relatively exposed to the elements in an are of pasture. The post 
and its compound is in poor condition even though it stands inside 
a scheduled area and is noted in the schedule. 
Extract from scheduling notice:- 
Name: Raddon Hill: a Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later 
hillfort  
List entry Number: 1016259  
‘Situated near the centre of the causewayed enclosure is an 
underground monitoring post of the Royal Observer Corps. The 
post, now decommissioned, was Station 20 of the ROC Exeter 10 
Group, Stockleigh Pomeroy. It survives in good condition and is 
included in the scheduling’.  
The exposed nature of Raddon Hill has ensured very quick 
degradation of the structure. A local modification to the entrance 
stack has been made to try and keep people out of the UGMP. 
Both it and the copper straps on the vent stack for the master post 
aerial earth have been snapped. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011 
Human It is clear from the damage on the site that a level of 
interaction beyond the ‘interested’ visitor is in progress. 
The snapped steel strap on the entrance stack and breaks 
through the Master Post earthing straps must have taken 
some effort, they are certainly not a natural event. The 
ROC post is situated on the top of the highest hill in the 
area and is silhouetted against the sky – making the 
location visible from a good 5km away.  
Animal The area is routinely grazed and this is having an effect on 
the monument. The concrete pad surrounding the 
entrance stack is exposed and undermined in a number of 
areas. 
Meteorological The exposed nature of the site and lack of repair to the 
rendering is starting to have an effect on the structure, the 
continual rain and freeze cycle is beginning to loosen 
structure in a number of areas. The step has lifted away 
from the main structure. 
Vegetation The area is grazed so vegetation id confined to short 
grass. 
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Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                  
Very little change to the ROC post. The entrance hatch has been 
secured down by tying bailer twine across both locking lugs. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013 
Human Beyond trying to secure access to the ROC post there 
appears to be no further involvement from visitors. 
Animal The area is routinely grazed and this is having an 
effect on the monument. The concrete pad 
surrounding the entrance stack continues to be 
exposed and undermined in a number of areas. 
Meteorological The exposed nature of the site and lack of repair to the 
rendering is starting to have an effect on the structure, 
the continual rain and freeze cycle is beginning to 
loosen structure in a number of areas. The step 
continues to split from the main structure. 
Vegetation As noted previously. 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Standard four point layout with master post 
fittings and aerial anchor points. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) Access on baseline was not attempted as 
site was under water (c.2m). water still 
present in 2013.  
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
Compound with extension extant, however 
little of wire retained. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS5306224049 Site Code D-46 
Height 
 
164 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 55066 
Geology 
 
Cracklington Formation 
(CKF) 
Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500.  Left) Entrance stack, note 
amount of material strewn around and non-standard gate to compound. (Right) Entrance 
stack to underground monitoring post, note the overgrown area behind obscuring the vent 
stack. (centre) Location of a ministry pattern fencepost suggesting the original compound 
was much bigger at one time. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
21/B.1  
(Wood 1992, 
286) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 
Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
11/A.3 (Wood 
1992, 286) 
Group 
1953 
No.11 
Group 
Truro 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open October 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/A.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.11 
Group 
Truro 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 11 & 
10  
    Group 
1973 
No.10 
Group 
Exeter 
 Close September 
1991 
Post No 
at 
Closure 
  11        
(Wood 1992, 
x) 
Group 
1991 
No.9 
Group 
Yeovil 
 
(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Position of underground 
monitoring post at Torrington, a mainly rural location Taskscape element depicts area that 
observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. 
(©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
1 May 2011 
D-46 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands on the 
boundary of two fields and 50 metres off a minor road. The 
compound is extant, although the fence is probably not original. 
The area inside the compound has been used to store/dump 
various implements of farm machinery, broken telegraph poles 
(presumably once connected to the site) and various other as yet 
unidentified objects. The compound is also densely overgrown 
towards the vent area of the ROC post.  
All metal surfaces show signs of corrosion (just surface), the step 
into the entrance stack has moved and the BPI is missing. All 
louvers are steel and extant, as is the FSM. 
 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011 
Human There does not appear to be much destructive action on 
site. However, it is clear the compound is a convenient 
place to dump material, maybe for this reason the 
compound fence is maintained. All material appears to be 
agriculturally related. 
Animal Very little evidence for animal action on site. Some rabbit 
pellets on the concrete surround of the entrance stack. 
Meteorological Structurally the site appears quite sound, the ROC post is 
not too exposed and corrosion, whilst evident, does not 
appear too advanced. 
Vegetation The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very 
mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of 
the structures on site. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                   
D-46 ROC post appears to have changed over the last two years. 
No further material has been dumped on the site. The vegetation 
noted at the far end of the compound is extant, ready in a few 
weeks to take over the site again. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013 
Human Little additional interaction is noted. No material 
dumped on the site previously has been moved or 
added to. 
Animal Nothing beyond the attention of passing rabbits. 
Meteorological Condition appears broadly the same as previously. 
Slight corrosion and flaking paint but that is it. 
Vegetation Vegetation much as before just earlier in the growing 
season. The vegetation cover comprises course 
grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, 
destroy the integrity of the structures on site. 
 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Standard four-point layout within 
compound. Non-standard gate fitted. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No access 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
At least on concrete post demonstrating a 
probable vehicle park. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS5306224049 Site Code D-46 
Height 
 
164 metres HER Ref. Devon HER: 55066 
Geology 
 
Cracklington Formation 
(CKF) 
Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
 
(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500.  Left) Entrance stack, note 
amount of material strewn around and non-standard gate to compound. (Right) Entrance 
stack to underground monitoring post, note the overgrown area behind obscuring the vent 
stack. (centre) Location of a ministry pattern fencepost suggesting the original compound 
was much bigger at one time. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance 
Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
21/B.1  
(Wood 1992, 
286) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 
Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
11/A.3 (Wood 
1992, 286) 
Group 
1953 
No.11 
Group 
Truro 
Undergroun
d Monitoring 
Post 
Open October 
1960 
Post 
Number 
10/A.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Group 
1968 
No.11 
Group 
Truro 
Amalgamati
on of 
Groups 11 & 
10  
    Group 
1973 
No.10 
Group 
Exeter 
 Close September 
1991 
Post No 
at 
Closure 
  11        
(Wood 1992, 
x) 
Group 
1991 
No.9 
Group 
Yeovil 
 
(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Position of underground 
monitoring post at Torrington, a mainly rural location Taskscape element depicts area that 
observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. 
(©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
1 May 2011 
D-46 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands on the 
boundary of two fields and 50 metres off a minor road. The 
compound is extant, although the fence is probably not original. 
The area inside the compound has been used to store/dump 
various implements of farm machinery, broken telegraph poles 
(presumably once connected to the site) and various other as yet 
unidentified objects. The compound is also densely overgrown 
towards the vent area of the ROC post.  
All metal surfaces show signs of corrosion (just surface), the step 
into the entrance stack has moved and the BPI is missing. All 
louvers are steel and extant, as is the FSM. 
 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011 
Human There does not appear to be much destructive action on 
site. However, it is clear the compound is a convenient 
place to dump material, maybe for this reason the 
compound fence is maintained. All material appears to be 
agriculturally related. 
Animal Very little evidence for animal action on site. Some rabbit 
pellets on the concrete surround of the entrance stack. 
Meteorological Structurally the site appears quite sound, the ROC post is 
not too exposed and corrosion, whilst evident, does not 
appear too advanced. 
Vegetation The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very 
mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of 
the structures on site. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                   
D-46 ROC post appears to have changed over the last two years. 
No further material has been dumped on the site. The vegetation 
noted at the far end of the compound is extant, ready in a few 
weeks to take over the site again. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013 
Human Little additional interaction is noted. No material 
dumped on the site previously has been moved or 
added to. 
Animal Nothing beyond the attention of passing rabbits. 
Meteorological Condition appears broadly the same as previously. 
Slight corrosion and flaking paint but that is it. 
Vegetation Vegetation much as before just earlier in the growing 
season. The vegetation cover comprises course 
grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, 
destroy the integrity of the structures on site. 
 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Standard four-point layout within 
compound. Non-standard gate fitted. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No access 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
At least on concrete post demonstrating a 
probable vehicle park. 
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Geographical Information 
 
NGR 
 
SS6199809435 Site Code D-48 
Height 
 
168 metres HER Ref. Devon HER:  
Geology 
 
Bude Formation (BF) Status Not Listed/Scheduled 
 
 
 
(D-48) Winkleigh, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Bottom Left) General view 
showing complete compound. (Top Right) Entrance stack showing general poor condition of 
weatherproofing paint (scales 1m & 2m). (Bottom Right) Vent stack with fittings indicating 
that Winkleigh was a master post with radio fitted. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. 
An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 416 | P a g e  
Chronology 
A/C Post Open July 1940 Post 
Number 
21/C.2 (Wood 
1992, 284) 
Org. 
Group 
No.21 Group 
Exeter 
A/C Post 
Relocated 
Yes/N
o 
Yes Post 
Number 
 10/M.3 
(Wood 1992, 
284) 
Group 
1953 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Underground 
Monitoring 
Post 
Open November 
1962 
Post 
Number 
 10/C.2 
(Wood 1992, 
284) 
Group 
1968 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
Amalgamatio
n of Grps 11 
& 10  
    Group 
1973 
 
 Close September 
1991 
Noat 
Closure 
15     (Wood 
1992, xi) 
Group 
1991 
No.10 Group 
Exeter 
 
 
(D-48) Winkleigh, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Note the underground 
monitoring post is north of the main wartime runway. Taskscape element depicts area that 
observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. 
(©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service) 
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Visit Profile 
Baseline Visit 
Overview                     
26 May 2011 
D-48 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands just12 metres 
from the northern edge of the east-west runway on the former site 
of Royal Air Force Winkleigh, North Devon. The compound fence is 
extant, as is the gate and all ROC post features (entrance stack; 
GZI mount; BPI mount; ventilation stack and Fixed Survey Meter 
mound. Generally the condition of all surface features is good; 
slight corrosion is evident on some features. The airfield is now an 
industrial and residential site. Material is already being dumped at 
the site – it is only a matter of time before the visibility of this site 
becomes obscured. 
 
Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011 
Human The ROC post is remote from major population centres, 
although industrial and domestic development on both the 
airfield site and associated village is likely to impact the 
ROC post in the next few years. The post was constructed 
just 3.5 years after the closure of the station (December 
1958), following a trend noticed predominantly in Wiltshire 
where three are located on RAF Station. Detritus ranging 
newspapers to an old tyre were noted on this visit. The 
ROC post probably does attract the odd visitor although 
there is little evidence that they are ‘destructive’ in intent. 
Animal No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this 
visit. 
Meteorological A small amount of rendering and splits in the concrete 
structure are noted – presumably frost action – this will 
continue to increase in impact if no mitigation work is 
undertaken. 
Vegetation Vegetation is very much in evidence with considerable 
grass/weed overgrowth. There are also a number of 
blackberry’s in evidence, these will cause problems if not 
checked. Grass is growing in the joint between the step 
and main entrance point – again this will continue to open 
the joint if not checked. 
 
 
Visit Profile 
Visit Overview                  
1 April 2013                   
The ROC post inside the compound appears a lot tidier. The grass 
has yet to start growing in earnest but clearly material noted on the 
last visit has been removed. 
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Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013 
Human It now appears the site is in curation. There was little 
indication of this last time, however the compound has 
been tidied up, with most of the material noted last time 
removed. Immediately outside the fence of the compound 
heaps of tyres are growing. They are unlikely to encroach 
on the site as there is a large expanse of concrete to fill – 
much easier. 
Animal Nothing noted 
Meteorological Some splits in the rendering of the structure are noted, 
paint is also peeling badly. The GZI is badly corroded but 
the entrance hatch is in good order. 
Vegetation Once it gets into the growing season the site might well be 
totally obscured. 
 
 
Material Culture of the ROC 
Above Ground (within original compound) Traditional four points. Compound extant. 
Master post although no examples of aerial 
points visible. 
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only) No Access. 
Additional Material Culture (within 100m 
radius) 
None noted. 
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APPENDIX 2 - PUBLIC COLD WAR SURVEY RESPONSES 
 
The following section comprises the responses made, via the internet, to the Cold 
War survey prescribed during this project. Each section comprises two questions. 
The whole responses set is also provided as a spreadsheet in Appendix 4. 
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Entry Id For over 40 years successive British 
Governments spent millions of pounds 
building 'nuclear bunkers' around the 
country. What do you think was the true 
purpose of these structures? 
The development of an independent 
nuclear deterrent was promoted by 
successive Governments as essential to 
maintaining the British way of life. Was 
this a justified claim?  
1 Government protection - cirtainly not ours! Well we didn't have nuclear warfare so I 
suppose it worked. Didn't stop all the 
other wars around the world though.  
2 To appease the public in thinking the Govt. 
were doing something. In reality it was just 
gesture politics. NOTHING could have 
helped if Mutually Assured Destruction was 
initiated.  
I think we (British) (politicians) wanted to 
pretend we were on the world stage. In 
reality, in the depths of the cold war, it 
was CCCP and USA. 
3 To keep themselves safe so they could 
carrying on ruling us (even if most of us 
would be dead).  To provide a 
communications system if above ground 
facilities were destroyed in a large scale 
attack.  To protect military equipment, 
such as aircraft, rockets, etc. and to store 
medical equipment, emergency food 
supplies, etc. for civilian use. 
Apart from giving our Government (the 
illusion of ??) a degree of status in 
international affairs we probably no 
longer deserved it had no military value 
as such because we could never have 
used it without the Americans say so.  
The cost far outstripped the value to us. 
4 I can't speak for the Brits, but I remember 
when a number of Americans built bomb 
shelters. Most Governments think it's their 
obligation to do something and a majority 
of the time it solves nothing at tax payer's 
expense. 
In my view it prevented WW3 and 
slowed the spread of socialism. Without 
the nuclear deterrent, the soviet would 
have invaded Europe. 
5 To provide a hiding place for a privileged 
few who would aim to co-ordinate the 
efforts of those dying outside. 
Completely. 
6 To create a survivable self contained 
network infrastructure from where the 
country could be run and controlled in the 
aftermath of a nuclear attack 
It created the arms race that ended in a 
kind of stalemate and forced the treatise 
that we have in force today 
7 To keep local administration going after 
nuclear war 
Not at all, any deterrent effect would 
have come from the US stockpile of 
weapons 
8 The purpose was to provide safety for 
people  in the event of a nuclear attack 
taking place. The bunkers were 
underground and built to resist radiation.  
Some bunkers were built only for 
important people such as royalties and 
politicians.  whilst spending millions of 
pounds, the ordinary man on the street 
would have been very lucky indeed to have 
access to a nuclear bunker. 
I think it was successful as Great Britain 
and its population did not suffer from the 
devastation of a nuclear attack, that was 
being threatened. 
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9 To preserve some sort of functioning 
government, and to enable some form of 
'community' to emerge post conflict and 
rebuild a society. 
Well, haven't yet had a nuclear conflict, 
(except 1945 in Japan) looks like there's 
still time though - Iran??? - si I guess we 
still need that requirement to fire back 
10 To give shelter so that after an attack, 
Government/Command and control 
systems could still function 
It ensured that if the war did turn 'hot' 
then it was pretty much guaranteed 
everything would have been destroyed, 
so no-one wanted to really start anything 
11 To maintain the existing government, 
protect the rulers. Certainly not for the 
'little people'. 
Very little as we wained in influence.  It 
was a pissing contest where size was 
important and we only had a weenie. We 
were always Runway 1 for the Yanks.  
(mind you I ran a 'shoot a yank for Ho Chi 
Minn week' whilst at uni) Probably illegal 
to try that now. 
12 To provide secure radiation proof 
structures for the war time emergency 
government, regional councils and the 
UKWMO to operate from in the event of a 
Nuclear war.  
As it was never used it is difficult to tell. 
However, the fact it was never used is 
perhaps an indication of its success !  
13 To save the elite government flunkies and 
their families while the rest of us peasants 
died a long horrible death from radiation, 
lack of water and food 
It worked we are still here, although the 
nuclear bombs are still about 
14 Supposed to be command and control 
centres for the local area, could also be 
used to house members of the local 
Masonic lodge in times of crisis! 
Haven't seen any mushroom clouds 
around so must have done the job! 
15 Control of the country post-nuclear strike In terms of there being no significant 
threat from Russia and the lack of 
nuclear warfare since WWII, completely 
successful. In terms of keeping out other 
cultures that are a threat to our way of 
life, the deterrent deterred no muslims. 
16 In the event of war using nuclear weapons, 
the survival of various individuals and our 
way of life was paramount. People who 
had a socially valuble position such as 
Government, military doctors, chemists, 
farmers and the like would be able to: 1) 
Orchestrate a retaliation and 2) Begin to 
rebuild. Bunkers would also be used to 
house commodities associated with 
survival and objects that would represent a 
potential social record. Similar to housing 
works of art during the blitz... 
The British way of life exists, hence the 
deterrent was successful. The 
subsequent question, "Would the British 
way of life have been challenged if no 
nuclear deterrent were present?" would 
be more revealing. If we didn't posses a 
nuclear deterrent, would the Eastern 
block come knocking? I think it's a vital 
part of our evolution. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis illustrated that. Nuclear arms 
continue to decline. It's the real madmen 
that are the concern now....   
17 Air Defence I don't believe anything done by the 
Britsih Government in the global sense 
had or has any deterrent impact. 
18 for key personnel to survive a nuclear 
attach 
Must have worked since we havent been 
attacked 
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19 1. Protect and provide base for those 
tasked with managing the recovery of the 
nation post strike. 2. Provide protection for 
resources (food, water comms) required 
for regeneration. 3. Provide protection for 
armed forces required to defend against 
attacking forces. 
1, Successful in that it was not used (and 
hence a deterrent).  2. Successful in 
generating the prestige associated with 
those countries holding nuclear 
armaments. 3. Successful in enhancing 
the credibility of NATO. 4. Successful in 
avoiding the release of nuclear weapons 
through the threat of mutually assured 
destruction. 
20 Royal Observer Corp Posts, ROTOR 
stations, Regional command centres, all to 
keep the country infrastructure upheld in 
the event of nuclear conflict. 
Mutual Assured Destruction means to me 
that we were kept in a state of stalemate 
with other superpowers. We all mutually 
forced each others hand, and I don't 
really know if things could have 
happened any other way. 
21 To ensure the continuing abilility of the 
government to govern.  To ensure 
communications, both military and civilian.  
To afford protection to selected people.  To 
make sure something was left behind! 
Well, it worked....didnt it?  Although, I 
often think that  it wasnt so unllike the 
postures adopted by the major powers 
before WW1, building vast armies and in 
so doing deterring an attack. However, 
after actually seeing and meeting 
Warsaw pact personnel in tthe flesh and 
seeing their equipment I do wonder how 
credible the threat was. 
22 To protect the chosen few from nuclear 
fallout 
Unknown really, was never used, but I 
doubt it would have stopped the USA and 
the USSR trying to destroy each other.... 
23 To protect citizens in the case of nuclear 
warfare from enemy countries 
Successful- we have never had a nuclear 
attack in Britain 
24 To command and control activity 
after/during a nuclear war. 
Essential. Once created you can't de-
invent and we need maximum threat to 
deter use 
25 At the most basic level, I guess the purpose 
was to protect some people, assets, 
information or wealth from nuclear attack. 
Which people, assets, information and 
wealth is the interesting question. The 
bunkers are obviously not large enough to 
protect and sustain the entire population, 
so a choice would have to be made. One 
would hope for a cross section of the 
community, import historical artefacts, 
assets that would be essential for 
rebuilding? But I am sure that in reality the 
average man with his family would never 
see the inside of a bunker in the event of 
an attack! 
It’s better to have a gun and not need it, 
that to need a gun and not have it. 
26 To maintain government control and 
civillian life throughout the period of 'fall-
out' following a nuclear attack. 
Less successful than the US Air Force 
bases spread throughout the country 
(such at at Greenham Common). 
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27 To provide a shelter for council and 
government officials so that law and order 
could be maintianed after a nuclear attack 
very successful 
28 As far as I'm aware to offer some 
protection to local dignatories, Councillors, 
certain military personnel VIP's etc 
For me very important as well as 
successful as we had to present a country 
and its people who weren't going to give 
up their way of life. I suppose many 
younger people who aren't familiar with 
those times will probably think it wasn't 
important.   
29 An attempt to ensure that some semblance 
of authority would remain to direct our 
response in the event of a nuclear attack. It 
was also done as an attempt to convince 
the USSR that we were prepared for any 
attack. 
Difficult to say. We didn't have a war, so 
you could argue that it was a factor. 
However, the major factor was certainly 
the US's nuclear deterrent. Would the 
USSR have attacked UK if we hadn't had 
our own deterrent? I believe it is 
extremely unlikely given the presence of 
so many Americans and American 
military facilities on UK soil (eg the early 
warning system at Fylingdales). 
30 Local command and control centres from 
which the surrounding area could be run in 
the event anyone survived a nuclear strike. 
We are still here! 
31 Command and control, esp. political after 
the bomb. 
In no way what so ever. I do not belive 
the situation would have been any 
different.  
32 Protection against decapitation strikes Totally 
33 To protect the population in the event of 
nuclear attack. 
About as successful as the deterrent of 
other nuclear nations. 
34 I knew of civil defence shelters that 
claimed to protect against radio-activity 
from the fall-out of nuclear weapons, 
bombs or missiles. Were shelters and 
bunkers the same item? This question 
could be revised to include approximately 
or even precisely how many nuclear 
bunkers were constructed and for what 
precise figure, rather than just "millions", 
which in retrospective sounds minor. On 
the other hand, /bunkers/ suggests 
protection for elites only, not for the 
masses, while /shelters/ might serve a 
different public. 
The enemy (namely, the USSR) eventually 
collapsed when it tried to match NATO's 
military productivity. That was the 
required outcome and the deterrent 
achieved it. Communism went down the 
plug-hole and the whole world was done 
a favour.The point of an /independent/ 
deterrent was to signify deterrence to a 
redundant degree. The redundance was 
positive. 
35 As places that people 'higher in society' 
(politicians, councillors, landed gentry) 
could shelter in the event of a nuclear 
attack. 
I'm not sure it really made any 
difference. 
36 To 'protect' themselves and others in the 
event of nuclear war. 
Well, there was no nuclear war so I guess 
you could say it worked, but whos to say 
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it was the deterrent or whether noone 
would have used them anyway. 
37 They were for government ministers, MPs, 
civil servants and others deemed too 
useful to die in the open in the event of 
nuclear war. 
It may have been succesful for a time 
(there was no alternative test case, i.e. 
no nuclear deterrent) but recent desires 
for nuclear weapons/programmes in 
North Korea and Iran, suggest the 
problem has not gone away!  The British 
way of life has no value when set against 
the deaths if millions. 
38 Their purpose was to maintain the 
structures of government in the event of a 
nuclear war, and to form a basis for any 
possible recovery after it 
It worked: we're still here 
39 Regional Centres of Government and 
Military control and communication 
centres, 
Very ~ it kept the USA under control [ at 
least before we relied on them for the 
weapons] 
40 To fuel paranoia Errr - it can only be judged as 'successful', 
ie it helped maintain the Britishway of 
life, if you accept that that was genuinely 
the primary reason for developing 
nuclear weapons (your use of the phrase 
'nuclear deterrent' is not without 
problems here, of course). Personally, 
the idea that possessing nuclear weapons 
'maintained the British way of life' is 
nonsensical. 
41 To provide somewhere for the those in 
power & deemed "VIPS" to shelter in the 
event of a nuclear attack.  Although (thank 
goodness) this has not happened, I do 
believe people really believed it was a real 
threat during the cold war, irrespective of 
whether or not that was actually true. 
Difficult question!  I suppose given the 
fact that during the last cold war nuclear 
war was averted would suggest it was 
successful.  However, there are new 
powers today with uranium enrichment 
programmes and I think the world is 
more unsettled now than ever before.  
As far as maintaining the "British way of 
life" there are many other things that 
have led to wholesale changes in our 
society over the last 20-30 years - and 
not for the better sadly.   
42 To offer domestic reassurance of 
preparedness against the brinksmanship 
policy of a global nuclear deterence.  
Irrelevant, the opposing superpowers 
held the balance of power. UK's 
independent contribution was a post-
Colonial posture to  diminished influence 
in foreign affairs. 
43 Bunkers were bult for various reasons: 1 To 
ensure that the governmental 'machine' 
survived a nuclear strike to be achieved 
through constructing bunkers to house a 
series of regional seats of government 
(local bureaucrats, heads of emergency 
serices  etc). From which attempts to 
coordinate reconstruction, food and fuel 
I think the fact that the Soviet Union and 
the West never directly engaged in 
hostilities speaks in favor of the policy of 
Mutual Assured Destruction. 
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supplies would be based. 2 To ensure the 
survival of central governemt authority 
(PM etc). 3 To house the Royal Observer 
Core who would monitor airbursts & plot 
fall out. 4 To act as munitions dumps. 
44 Protecting civil servants and local 
government and police from nuclear 
strikes on towns and cities. A system for 
local administration was designed and 
would have been run by protected 
individuals in aftermath of nuclear strike 
from such nuclear bunkers. On any rational 
analysis this was a farce, and when people 
found about them they were seen as 
farcical.  
In my view the nuclear deterrent did not 
help maintain the British way of life, and 
those western European countries that 
did not develop an independent 
deterrent were not compromised. The 
point of the nuclear arsenal was to 
maintain British standing in world affairs 
and relations with the USA, and helped 
perpetuate what was essentially a 
delusion about british world standing.  
45 To accommodate Regional Seats of 
Government in the event of nuclear attack. 
The use of mutually assured destruction 
worked well, the Second World War and 
the devastation that brought with it were 
still clear in the minds of many - 
repeating that tenfold was not an 
attractive option for any of the opposing 
sides. 
47 To protect people neccessary to run the 
infrastructure of the country in the event 
of a nuclear attack. This included National 
and Local Government officials. 
You can look at it two ways either it was 
successful because we have never had a 
nuclear war or it was unneccessary 
because we have never had a nuclear 
war. Neither view can be proven it is just 
one of those things! 
48 reassurance impossible question to answer! 
49 to maintain civil authority and therefore 
control of the country 
It was never used so some would view 
that as a success. In truth it was about 
power and Britain's place in the world 
50 Survival of essential personnell; 
government, scientists, forces 
Unsuccessful given the rise in alternative 
methods of war - terrorism for example.  
Successful in that there were no large 
scale nuclear wars.  
51 To allow government to continue during 
and after a nuclear attack 
The fact that western powers other than 
the USA had nuclear weapons may have 
helped control the worst extremes of US 
policy 
52 To protect high level government officials 
and the upper classes and store food for 
them etc in the event of nuclear war 
Well we didn't have a nuclear war 
however, now we have pandas in 
Edinburgh Zoo perhaps that will stop 
Scotland from being over run by 
pandas??  Who knows? 
53 To protect government officials and other 
from direct nuclear attack. Other buildings 
(such as ROC posts) helped to forewarn 
and detect attack 
Not so successful, deterrents are hard to 
compare when you don't know what 
your neighbour/enemy has up their 
sleeves! 
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54 Survival of the chosen few! Not. 
55 As command and control centres so that 
some kind of civil authority would be 
maintained if there ever was a nuclear war. 
It is all part of maintaining Britain's 
illusion that it is still a great power. The 
suggestion is that 'the independent 
deterrent kept the peace for 40 years'. In 
truth this asumption is highly 
questionable:  Britain's 'independent' 
deterrent could not have existed without 
the USA. Russia's post-war defence 
strategy was probably based on their fear 
of another invasion fron the west, and 
the belief that they needed satellite 
states (inclusing Germany) to their west 
to protect them. It probably never 
intended to invade Western Europe    
56 To allow the continuing functioning of 
government and services in the event of a 
nuclear attack. 
I don't think we can tell, as there is no 
way to test its success. I think that the 
standard answer would be that we didn't 
end up having a nuclear war, so the 
deterrent worked. In addition, I think 
there was a need to not be seen as a 
client state. 
57 To protect civil administration / 
government in the event of any mass 
destructive war 
Confused question.  The deterrent 
worked: it forced the USSR to spend 
more than its capability to equal the 
west.  Our society evolved peaceably, 
democratically over 45 years while the 
Soviet society imploded in 1989 and still 
hasn't fully developed out of 
authoritarianism. 
58 Some were military command bunkers, 
some were national and local government 
emergency bunkers, some were built to 
protect stored nuclear missiles, some were 
for launching nuclear missiles, some were 
for monitoring hostile missile attacks.  As 
far as I'm aware none were for protecting 
the civilian population from attack! 
A tricky philosophical question!  The 
British Isles weren't attacked, so some 
would say that the deterrent was 
successful...I would prefer to say that this 
was down to diplomacy, the role of the 
UN, the dwindling influence of Britain as 
an international power, relationships 
with the US and membership of NATO.  
However an independent nuclear 
deterrent doesn't seem to have been a 
factor in the invasion of Granada or the 
Falklands!  
59 To provide places of refuge for key 
personnel. EG. government and military. 
In the middle ages the biggest and 
strongest guy was the chief. The cold war 
was mainly about USA and Russia trying 
to assert that they were the biggest and 
strongest. 
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60 To allow the elite to shelter and continue 
to govern.  However.... experience of more 
limited destruction in WWII suggests that 
they couldn't rely on the 'excluded' to carry 
on regardless...  Supposed secret but all 
related to 'bombproof' microwave tower 
links - where they grazed earth was where 
bunkers were!  Also persistent rumours 
(now increasingly admitted) of 
underground shelter in Box tunnel - fast 
train from Windsor and near Bath (Defence 
decentralisation centre) 
Well - we didn't have a total war (nuclear 
or potentially escalating to nuclear) 
61 To shelter regiononal and national 
government, and the armed forces, in the 
case of a nuclear attack. 
Completely useless.  The British way of 
life changed significantly over this period, 
and in many ways for the better.   
62 To protect high ranking government 
officials and for seats of administration in 
the event of nuclear attack. 
 
63 if the government really believed there 
was a nuclear threat it was to preserve the 
powers that be in safety. If you believe that 
nuclear weapons were there to threaten 
countries in the communist system and 
prevent it spreading further, then it was 
either paranoia or propaganda 
This question is badly framed. If you 
mean how sucessful was the deterrent in 
terms of the implied propaganda 
function you seem to be making in your 
first sentence, then, yes it was. I assume 
you don't mean deterring the Soviets 
from annahilating us? 
64 To allow local (and national) government 
officials to carry out their work in the event 
of a nuclear attack. Communications, 
distribution of food, etc. 
It was MAD, but it worked, because you 
would have to be MAD to have tried 
anything agauinst another nuclear armed 
power. 
65 To prevent blast and radiation damage to 
key workers and infrastructure increasing 
the viability of retaliatory action so 
reducing the utility of nuclear strike upon 
Britain. 
About as successful as windmills are at 
reducing global warming.  In other words, 
mass scares like this are often driven by 
astute marketing people who stoke up 
fear to create a demand. Like Nuclear 
war, there is a real threat from CO2, but 
this has been vastly exaggerated by 
various groups using this for their own 
ends.  All governments have to say 
policies were a success ... they therefore 
post rationalise it in terms of something 
nebulous like "preserving a way of life" - 
in reality it was a practical response 
blown up. 
66 I think these were primarily for 'important 
folk' such as those directly tasked with 
organising life after a nuclear attack.  The 
bunkers were supposed protected from 
nuclear attack/fallout and the designated 
people would be directed there in the 
event of an attack.  They would then carry 
out their work from these bunkers. 
At the time it could be seen as very 
successful as nuclear war was averted (it 
was seen as a real threat). 
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67 To allow government/civil service to 
retreat to them in the event of a nuclear 
attack to keep the country running 
(although if the public weren't allowed in, 
would there have been any nation left to 
run?) 
Well the British way of life was 
maintained - there has been no 
immediate threat of invasion of mainland 
Britain since World War 2. But then the 
Argentinians weren't put off invading the 
Falklands so they obviously didn't think 
the British would use their nuclear 
weapons. 
68 The Cold War was a non-event centering 
on fear and perception arising from an 
ideological struggle of two superpowers. 
Doing somethng concrete (pun intended) 
soothed cognitive dissonance of the public 
pertaining to the  the futility of surviving a 
nuclear event. This was the purpose of 
promoting the idea of nuclear survivability 
and building of shelters for the public. 
Very. It kept the Cold War cold for 40 
years and limited the hot wars like Korea 
and Vietnam to conventional weapons. 
69 To provide a safe space for essential 
government structures, institutions and 
personnel (e.g., Kelvedon Hatch) - I would 
imagine that they were emphatically NOT 
intended to protect ordinary civilians. 
I have a fundamentally different 
perspective on world politics. While 
some state and non-state actors may 
have been deterred, Israel wasn't, India 
and Pakistan weren't, and the US remains 
the only state to have used nuclear 
weapons in anger. And it is entirely 
plausible that other states sought nuclear 
defences themselves because of the 
nuclear capabilities of countries like the 
US and the UK (cf. the October 1962 
Missile Crisis) 
70 To preserve a network of 'seats of 
government', plus other critical 
infrastructure, to run the country after 'the 
bomb' dropped. 
Well, we're all still here, so I guess the 
principles of Mutally Assured Destruction 
worked ... but I'm not convinced that it 
wasn't more by luck than good 
judgement in the end! 
71 Supposed protection for government 
officials, the military, and ruling elite 
Look at Britain now! Being undermined 
by human rights stuff, Brussels directives, 
and liberal attitudes 
72 National command structure survivability. 
What a silly question. 
Eminently, as witness that we are 
discussing it freely, and not in American 
English any more than in Russian. 
73 The purpose was to allow key 
governmental  structures, offices and 
personnel (civil and military) to survive in 
case of a nuclear attack in order both to 
coordinate a military response by using 
British nuclear capability and to lead the 
reconstruction of the country after. 
Partially successful. It had a psychological 
role in preserving a certain degree of 
independence for Britain in the field of 
foreign affairs. Moreover, it had positive 
spin-off on the civil nuclear industry. But 
it is questionable the fact that large sums 
were appropriated to a nuclear deterrent 
which, in fact, could not be used if not in 
combination with the one of the USA. 
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74 The government and civil service were 
going to go into them in there was a 
nuclear attack - there's been a Peter 
Hennessy book about it recently. I don't 
know what the point would have been of 
going down there because there would 
have been no people left to govern over 
and not even the land would have been 
worth living.  
We can't tell - don't know what would 
have happened if we hadn't had one. In 
that it convinced British politicians, 
media and much of the public that we 
were a first rank world power when 
actually we'd stopped being one very 
shortly after WW2, it had a very 
detrimental effect - we'd have done 
much better if we'd accepted that we 
were equivalent to Scandinavian states 
or Canada in foreign policy terms and 
focused on building a fairer society at 
home. 
75 To create secure facilities for and after 
nuclear attack, to be used by the 
government and other establishment 
elements. 
It's impossible to say-they were never 
used so it could be argued they did deter 
a nuclear attack...on the other hand, it 
didn't stop the Falklands being invaded. 
76 To maintain government in the transition 
to war and in the month long post-strike 
phase, when living above ground would be 
difficult. Also to protect key members of 
the populace and keep them in useful 
groups for tackling the management of the 
surviving populace post-strike. 
Hard to say, ultimately we came very 
close to annihilation during the Bay of 
Pigs. That was averted by diplomacy not 
bombs. MAD may have been good for 
the British way of life, but the American 
hegemony over us politically affected us 
dramatically culturally, and in the case of 
less powerful states the Cold War was 
shifted from the West into being played 
out in smaller client states as a "hot war". 
77 To maintain continuity of government and 
to preserve the way of life of the privilaged 
few post apocalypse. IN the eyes of some it 
might have appeared to be a way of 
preserving the British way of doing things 
and British cultural identity. 
Some success, but much acquiesence to 
the American way of life. 
78 Maintenance of central government 
elements, in some form or other, 
depending on who or what survived. Also 
the survival of elements of Local 
Government.  
100% We 'won' didn't we? I mean, 
there's no soviet union now. But there's 
still over 17,000 warheads out there. It is 
an allusion to this that this aspect of the 
'cold war' is simply not there anymore.  
79 Civial an Military admin and command   very as there were no major conflicts 
directly between the major nations in 
volved 
80 To allow some form of government to 
continue; also to monitor radiation, to 
provide storage for records, and in some 
places to provide HQs for command of 
forces (not least the R class boats) and of 
civil power. 
I have no memory of any government 
proposing that it helped the British way 
of life. They did propose that it might 
help prevent us being invaded by Soviet 
armies, but the truth of that is very 
dubious. It certainly gave us a seat at the 
top table, not least in UN, and ensured 
that UK and France were at least 
informed by USA. And probably helped 
purchase intelligence sharing. Also of 
course the ability of UK to survive a first 
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strike and still allow the US to operate 
planes might have been significant. 
81 To protect the upper echelons or at least 
allow them to die in a more structured 
fashion... 
We're still here... 
82 To provide protection against nuclear 
weapons for core teams of civil 
government personnel, and some military 
liaison staff, who would be responsible for 
governing their regions following a nuclear 
attack. 
As we didn't suffer a nuclear war in 
Europe I'd say it was totally successful.  
Although Britain had a close alliance with 
the United States there is a strong 
chance that the US would not protect 
Europe against a Soviet nuclear strike, 
instead allowing Soviet domination of 
Europe to protect the US homeland. 
83 Some of them were military command 
posts to ensure the survival of a retaliatory 
capability.  But mostly, I believe, they were 
"regional seats of government" in which a 
cadre of local civil servants and worthies 
were supposed to survive to administer the 
smoking remnants of the country after the 
nuclear exchange was over. 
Totally.  The Cold War lasted 40-odd 
years and at the end of it our way of life 
had been neither overthrown or 
destroyed. 
84 They were intended to ensure government 
and administrative functions survived any 
nuclear attack, however I doubt their 
effectiveness; either the shelters would 
have been targeted, or there would have 
been nothing left worth governing anyway!  
It always seemed strange to me that 
county councils and similar were regarded 
as being worthy of these levels of 
protection.  Guess the politicians who held 
the purse strings though they were 
important enough to justify building the 
bunkers. 
We did not have an independent 
deterrent, we were and are still too 
reliant on the USA; semi-independent 
maybe.  Was it effective?  Possibly.  We 
went to the brink (Cuba 1962) and 
possibly it was fear of mutual destruction 
that kept fingers off red buttons!  When 
the documents are released in 100 years 
time we may know the answer to this 
question.  I think the deterrent was a 
qualified success. 
85 The bunkers provided "hardened" secure 
locations from which it was hoped that 
regional government could operate 
following a nuclear strike on the UK. In 
exercises I worked from one in Lancashire 
and one in Fife (now a museum). 
We didn't have a nuclear war and cold 
war never turned hot so- yes - it was 
successful. 
86 Some were Regional Centres of 
Government, some munitions/armaments 
related, some were civil defence stores. 
Perfectly! 
87 To provide a refuge for some in the event 
of nuclear attack, based on an assumption 
of sufficient warning. Also politically it was 
What 'british way of life' was envisaged? 
Nuclear devastation would surely have a 
negative if not final impact on any human 
lifestyle. I suppose we still don't have 
 431 | P a g e  
a gesture: government looks after the 
civilian population. 
much evidence as to whether the 
deterrent did deter, or whether other 
external factors were more significant. I 
really don't know. 
88 To maintain systems, monitor the 
environment and to save lives in the event 
of a nuclear strike. 
Very. 
89 Multiple purposes. Military, command & 
control. Includes radioactive monitoring 
(ROC posts) . Civil defence inclu. provision 
for national & local Govt. Communications. 
Storage - inclu. Govt held supplies inclu. 
food stocks etc.  Private - small number of 
purpose built 'private' shelters; also some 
industry & factory based.  
At the time this seemed ridiculous and 
still does to large measure. At the same 
time, in retrospect, there is a feeling that 
perhaps there was after all an element of 
truth? 
90 
  
91 To theorectically allow government both 
national and local to exist if the worst 
should have happened. 
Our deterrent was more for maintaining 
national self restpect during the post 
ww2 empire decline.  
92 to protect people who where deemed as 
worthy of saving in the case of nuclear war 
and protect the establishment 
very limited as a deterant it did however 
give the uk a sense of importance and 
later a slight sense of indipendance from 
the USA 
93 to allow those who thought they were 
more important than the rest of us to last a 
little longer after the bomb dropped. 
Faurly 
94 To protect people in case of nuclear war 
breakout 
Yes, we needed to have a detterent so 
we weren't taken adavantage by of those 
who have nuclear threats 
95 To give protection in a nuclear war to 
people important enough to get a spot in 
the bunker. 
Yes, as by all having nuclear weapons, 
there is a deterrent from fighting wars 
the scale of WW1 and WW2 again 
because the escalation of conflict will 
bring the likelyhood of nuclear war 
higher. 
96 To protect the Cabinet and high ranking 
officials in the event of a nuclear attack, 
allowing continued governance of the UK 
and not a degradation in to a Mad Max 
style apocalypse. 
Britain's nuclear deterrent was probably 
unnecessary given the protection the 
United States granted the UK with its 
much larger nuclear arsenal. However it's 
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nice to have just in case we get a chance 
to use them. 
97 I think the true purpose of these structures 
was as launch sites for nucleur missiles and 
to protect the rich & important people 
I dont think so. as To me the british way 
of life doesnt mean having a nuclear 
deterrent. It just seems like an excuse to 
me to have a WMD. 
98 the true purpose of the 'nuclear bunkers' 
well i honestly dont know. i would guess 
that a few were actual bunkers to protect 
people (starting with the rich/powerful and 
infulentional) some of the other structure 
could have been places to store/hide 
nuclear weapons or for detection 
equipment. 
again i dont no, because the british way 
of life has changed and evoled into what 
it is now, and i have no way of truely 
what it was like back then. i would 
assume to somed extend that the claim 
was justified, the world was moving 
forwards and england needed to get 
nuclear weapons to stiil be taken as 
worth force, how ever this may of not 
been the right course to take. we dont no 
what would of happened if good old 
britain tried not to get involved. 
99 To store data and records for the British 
Government in case of a nuclear war, it 
could contain all the history and laws etc. 
To protect important people of society 
such as the Royal Family and the Prime 
Minister. The bunkers would be used to 
sustain life for a long enough period for the 
fallout to reduce. 
Yes i believe so. If Britain did not keep up 
and develop Nuclear weapons then other 
countries may have seen them as a weak 
target (our army is smaller than most 
countries as it is) and we could have been 
invaded. However with nuclear weapons 
any threat could be matched equally or 
greater in scale so it is beneficial to have 
this deterrent. Prevention is better than 
cure. 
100 to protect people from nuclear warfare 
and to show other countries that we were 
ready if someone was to strike  
 
101 The purpose of the nuclear bunkers in my 
opion was a a diterent to show our enimies 
of the time that if they were to strike, we 
could contuine our day to today life and 
that we have the possiblity to strike back. 
This is a justified claim, if we didnt have 
the nuclear deterrents then we could 
have been scared into following the 
comminst way of life or even on the flip 
side the yanks way of doing things, so it 
was a justified claim. 
102 To show that Britain could take anything 
that could potentially be thrown at them 
and readily back the americans if needed. 
The bunkers could also be used as storage 
too. 
No a nuclear deterant is not essential to a 
british way of life as the British got on 
fine before hand and there is no real 
need for nuclear wepons. 
103 To relay where/when nuclear weapons 
stuck and triangilate which cities were 
struck. Also to measure fallout etc. 
At the time, yes, due to the placement of 
so many US bases in the UK, it would be a 
prime target for pre-emptive strikes from 
the USSR.  
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104 I feel they were built for national security 
primarily, but this was most likely not the 
only factor. popularity among voters would 
be another factor and boosting the 
economy with the construction industry 
would be another advantage. this would 
also help win votes. 
In the context of the cold war, with the 
contant threat of nuclear war a deterent 
for a country like Britain seemed 
necassary. But since the end of the cold 
war and a seriously reduced nuclear 
threat a nuclear deterent seems like an 
expensive, outdated carry over from the 
paranoia of the cold war.  
105 Local councils used funding to make 
massive new offices for tiny bunkers under 
them other then that for I assume for 
protect from nuclear bombs. 
I reckon it was used more for staying 
envoled in world events. Which as a 
declining empire you could say it was 
maintatining the brittish way of life as we 
still saw our selves as a world world 
power though in day to day life no really. 
106 defensive/dissuasive Probably, yes, in the context. 
107 I have absolutely no idea! Sorry! Don't know! 
108 I don't know about these bunkers - if they 
exist then one presumes that they are to 
protect officials in event of nuclear attack. 
If we weren't a nuclear power then we 
wouldn't be encouraging others to be a 
nuclear power. However without nuclear 
power we are probably a greater target 
in the event of nuclear war. But define 
what you mean by 'British way of life', I'm 
unsure if this elusive concept is 
maintainable by anything - or even if it 
exits.   
109 Hard to say. It probably started as a 
genuine response to a perceived threat, 
but then became one of those things no 
government could be seen to be cutting 
back on... 
No, other than in so far as the 'British 
way of life' seems to include regular 
foreign wars or disputes. 
110 To alleviate people's fears and concerns; 
propaganda that if the worst should 
happen, the UK would be safe 
Hindsight is so easy! We can all say No it 
wasn't, because we've not been in the 
situation where we've had to activate the 
threat. Yet. 
111 To allow for certain select survivors to run 
the country as best as was possible after 
nearly everyone else had been wiped out 
in a horrific nuclear armageddon. 
No so much specifically a "British" way of 
life as much as a deterrent again western 
civilisation being wiped out by the 
communist east. Also, given that the US 
was pretty much the west's superpower, 
the UK's development of nuclear 
weapons could be seen as a way of 
promoting itself as a viable superpower, 
even though its days as an imperial 
power were over. So as much for 
propaganda as anything.  
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112 to look after themselves and their families 
and those in positions of power 
In some ways yes, as people need to 
know that the country can fight back if 
attacked and given Britain's position in 
the world (it has a few enemies) this does 
seem a necessary tactic. If Britain was to 
become less involved in world affairs 
then it would be better not to have any 
weapons, thus presenting itself as a 
peaceful state which would also 
hopefully deter attack.  
113 To maintain critical national infrastructure 
nodes in the event of a nuclear attack - so 
as to better ensure an effective retaliatory 
capacity, nuclear or otherwise, and therby 
help enforce the initial effects of 
deterrence. It clearly also had a 
psychological effect too - giving off a signal 
as to the immanent, daily seriousness of 
nuclear warfare to the populace, and to 
suggest that Britain is not vulnerable to 
potential enemies, that it is prepared . 
Yes, Britain, rightly or wrongly, formed 
part of a nuclear umbrella that did 
provide a deterrent effect against the use 
of nuclear weapons, particularly in the 
earliest and final stages of the Cold War. 
Whilst the Immediate justification had to 
be a defence of the British way of life, 
this would only be achieved as part of an 
interlocking set of deterrence structures. 
Whether the claim that the deterrent 
was "independent" or not, in light of the 
this context, is clearly up for debate. 
114 To ensure the survival of particular 
individuals, mostly government officials, 
and - perhaps optimistically - try to ensure 
the continuity of government. 
Yes, in so far that Western powers as a 
whole generally did not want to build a 
sufficient conventional force to resist 
Soviet convetional forces and a nuclear 
deterrent was a 'cheaper' option. 
Likewise having an independent 
deterrent was worthwhile unless one 
wanted to rely upon American 
willingness to suffer damage to their own 
homeland to ensure the independence of 
Western Europe. 
115 I think they were genuinely to protect 
people and organisations, but only those 
regarded as 'important'. There was very 
little if anything for the common person. eg 
if you visited Finland at that time everyone 
knew what to do in case of a nuclear attack 
and had mini bunkers and protected rooms 
associated with their housing. So the 
British government merely tried to protect 
'important' things and people - which of 
course leads to endless discussion of who 
and what was classified that way ! 
It may be difficult to put oneself back 
into that time. However as I am an oldie 
and lived through it I can confirm that in 
the 1950s and 1960s particularly we 
thought a nuclear attack was imminent at 
any moment. There had been the Cuban 
crisis etc. Many of us marched to 
Aldermarston to try to promote 
disarmament, but it needed both sides to 
disarm, so the British govenrment did a 
good job of trying to persuade us that the 
Russians never would disarm, and so we 
needed ours. 
116 To give the public confidence. As someone who worked in the navy in 
the cold war, it felt that this was a 
justified claim. 
117 To provide shelter for citizens from the 
immediate effects of a nuclear attack from 
the USSR. But your question: 'true purpose' 
indicates to me that you are suggesting 
As it turns out, it was. The danger was 
not only that the USSR might use the 
arsenal or that a nuclear war might be 
started by accident, but also that a 
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there may have been other, ulterior 
motives. 
nuclear USSR could be emboldened and 
belligerent if unopposed.  
118 To protect key members of the public and 
government who would need to survive a 
nuclear attack. It seems unlikely that 
everyone would survive, so the 
government must have built them to 
protect those they needed to prioritize. I 
was also not aware that such bunkers 
existed.  
I am uncertain about this, but this is 
probably more due to my own lack of 
knowledge of Britain during the Cold 
War, but I would have thought that an 
unprovoked nuclear attack upon the UK 
was very unlikely, and that if such an 
attack ever occurred, that the NATO 
allies would have provided a swift 
response/retaliation.  
119 I don't know.  In their thinking, probably a 
mix of wanting to be seen to take on the 
enemy and be seen to be needed; also a 
genuine fear of nuclear attack. 
I can never decide. 
120 To provide shelter for people in case of a 
nuclear attack. Or perhaps to store nuclear 
weapons in.  
I don't think it is possible to argue that 
nuclear weapons are essential to 
maintaining the British way of life. I think 
it probably felt, in the time of the cold 
war, to be an essential element of 
national security but I think this is an 
overstating of the extent of nuclear 
tensions at the time in reality.  
121 To provide shelter for a selected elite in 
the event of nuclear conflict. 
We will never know. But the truth is 
despite the bay of Pigs and a number of 
other less famous stand offs, nuclear war 
did not happen. On a pragmatic level 
therefore, the policy may have been 
deemed to work.  The maintenance of 
the British way of life however may have 
been adversely affected by a policy that 
involved our citizens being complicit in 
behaviour which may have led to the 
destruction of humanity. The role of the 
CND marches and later, the Greenham 
Common protestors in highlighting this 
also set a sobre tone.  
122 To protect the elite, govt, royalty, national 
secrets. 
At the time, this may have seemed 
reasonable.  Britain has always seen itself 
as a major player although it was the USA 
that found itself in a stand off with Russia 
in the early 60s.  Looking back it seems 
ridiculous. 
123 Protect the national infrastructure and 
send a message that we intended to 
prevail. 
Well, there was no nuclear war so maybe 
you could claim it was successful. 
However, only once weapons have been 
completely disposed of can we say that 
with any confidence. 
124 To protect themselves and key 
documents/equipment if the worst was to 
happen. 
Not sure 
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125 Protecting government, so as to exercise 
control on a chaotic situation outside. 
I would question its independence.  My 
understanding is that the US has (had?) 
an effective veto on its use.  Its purpose 
is more a political one of making sure the 
UK 'punches above its weight', 'sits at the 
top table' etc. 
126 Storage of weapons we will need in the 
future. Nuclear war is unavoidable and the 
more bunkers we have the better it looks 
in defending ourselves and our allies, War 
is war and it will never change, having 
these bunkers helps research and 
development in multiple fields, such as 
science and tech, helping us progress as a 
country for the future. 
Yes, if we did not have a deterrent, things 
could've gone awry. (They still could) 
127 To be used as command and control points 
for a nuclear war/outbreak should one 
arise. Also to allow the Government to 
have a safe place to continue operating 
from so that the UK didn't fall into 
complete chaos in the event of Nuclear 
War. There were also a network of 
monitoring stations built designed to 
detect a nuclear missile launch/detonation, 
and these would all be communicating 
with the larger command and control 
bunkers. 
Yes I believe this was a justified reason 
for an independent nuclear deterrent as 
having a nuclear capability makes the UK 
a more threatening target, therefore 
would be safer as the Eastern Block 
wouldn't want to attack a country with a 
Nuclear capability, as the retaliation 
could be fatal. Even though there was an 
essence of preparing for war, and a 
mutual feeling of adversity, there was 
also a mutual feeling of not wanting to 
launch a weapon for the sake of their 
own nation. 
128 Personally I would like to believe that the 
bunkers were initially designed to house as 
many individuals including civilians as 
possible however to a degree I believe that 
the bunkers were only truly designed to 
house government figures and people 
considered important to the wants of the 
authority figures as opposed to regular 
civilians.  
I believe that while other nations have 
nuclear weapons it is essential that we 
have some as well, however I would like 
to believe that we will be able disarm at 
some point in the future. At the time of 
the cold war it was essential to have a 
nuclear deterrent while other countries 
did as well. 
129 in the event of an attack they would 
contain supplies technology and select 
people to restart which would be pointless 
really. 
if the British way of life is annoying the 
Russians and still being able to to it 
because of MAD then yes. however we 
could easily live our life without them 
such as almost every other country 
currently does. 
130 To provide a increased nuclear deterrent 
capability in response to the soviet union 
and the iron curtain. Pressures from our 
allies ( USA and NATO) to show support 
and strength against the soviets would also 
provide a catalyst for building such 
structures all over the country.  
A difficult one, I believe it was due to the 
complex world we live in where 
unfortunately a nuclear deterrent in my 
mind was needed after that period of 
uncertainty.   however we are not alone 
with our allies - NATO,USA,EUROPE - I 
don't now whether we can justify 
spending billions on nuclear with such 
finical problems we are in?  
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131 I believe they were for, housing/protecting 
important individuals, monitoring the 
country in the event of a nuclear attack 
and as a storage facility 
Yes, without the nuclear deterrent we 
put ourselves at threat from attack from 
a nuclear armed country. they are an 
essential part of Britain's defence force   
132 Government self preservation. Well i would suggest it has worked so far. 
133 Any government has a duty to protect the 
population - to the best of its ability. An 
important consideration is ensuring that 
there is some form of effective 
administration which will survive any 
attack. The Cold War was 'fought' very 
much in the dark as we had only two 
practical examples of nuclear attack to use 
as a baseline. The RSGs were an attempt to 
ensure that at least a few would survive to 
provide a skeleton administrative system. 
Whether it would have worked was 
fortunately never put to the test. 
It was essential to justifying a place on 
the UN Security Council. I don't 
remember it being used as being 
required to maintain the British way of 
life. 
134 To provide a safe place for local 
government officials. 
Yes.  
135 Maintaining power structures in the event 
of nuclear attack, and providing a sop to 
the idea that nuclear conflict was 
survivable 
No 
136 Provide safe shelter for important people 
(eg: Queen, politicians) as well as serving 
as safe military command posts in the 
event of a nuclear strike. 
Given the circumstances, yes, however 
moving away from the cold war I feel this 
is less important (although still probably 
needed to some extent) 
137 To provide an area of relative safety; if any 
nuclear payloads were ever dropped on 
British soil.  
If there ever was a threat towards Great 
Britain we could use the nuclear 
deterrent as a deterrent towards any 
opposition countries. 
138 To protect government officials, military 
personnel and other VIPs in the event that 
nuclear weapons were launched, allowing 
the UK to continue to retaliate even after 
most of the population had been killed, 
and to allow those in the bunkers the 
possibility of surviving after the nuclear 
war. They also likely contained supplies 
such as food, medicine, clean water (or 
ability to clean water) weapons and ammo 
to be used either in the case of nuclear 
war, or be used to create a resistance 
movement should the UK be taken over by 
a hostile force. 
Yes, as many counties were developing 
nuclear weapons, we needed to make 
sure there was a reason for them not to 
launch nuclear weapons at the UK, 
however I don't believe it was necessary 
to create as many weapons as we 
currently have, since one is enough to do 
massive damage and hence only a few 
would be needed to act as a deterrent, 
more than one would be required so that 
they could act as a deterrent to multiple 
nations.  
139 To make people FEEL safe. Yes because we haven't been attacked by 
anything nuclear since. No because we 
may never have been attacked. 
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140 To protect the British government, and the 
population in the event of a nuclear attack 
form the soviet union. Also the strategic 
placement of government / military 
bunkers would ensure if one is destroyed, 
another sector would be able to control 
that sector and the rest of the country.   
To a degree but after 1945, America 
stopped sharing this technology with 
England so it was a competition to prove 
to America that England was a nuclear 
equal and could be trusted with this 
technology and that great Britain was still 
great. But the major force behind the 
development was to have a nuclear 
weapon to stop Russian aggression.  
141 To provide a safe environment for a 
government to operate from and also for 
essentila services workers. Water, Power, 
telecomms , broadcasters etc   
Yes, we needed and still do need an 
independent  nuclear deterrent. 
Otherwise we could be defenceless if the 
USA decided to abandon the UK in the 
event of war  
142 I believe that the main purpose of these 
structures was to show Britain's 
independence in the arms race alongside 
the defence against and development of 
the nuclear weaponry. In showing 
independence Britain kept itself on the 
map so to speak. As well as this, in 
coalition with the American Government, 
Britain could be used as a West to Mid East 
war platform, moving the nuclear frontline 
closer to potential threats from both the 
Mid East and Russia. 
I don't believe that it was essential to the 
British way of life, Britain could have 
functioned without the independence of 
our own nuclear power however, I 
believe it was essential for Britain to be 
taken seriously and was a good way of 
not becoming reliant on America for 
protection - placing us on a stronger 
standing in international affairs. 
143 Primarily for those in government to be 
able to state that they were doing 
something (regardless of its efficacy), but 
also to provide a base for any post-attack 
"rebuilding", and to create a base from 
which any post-attack society may be built. 
No. Britain's nuclear deterrent was never 
particularly credible. Barring Polaris, the 
means of delivery was ineffectual, and 
the numbers of Polaris were irrelevant 
once NATO was established. 
144  the ones here ( NI) were left derelict at 
Stormont, with the odd covert security 
meeting held, though the Ballykinler ones 
were used for much more sinister reasons 
by 'security' forces during the 70s. Mostly, 
as far as I can see, they weren't used, at 
least the civil service ones. 
No. It was a political 'keeping up with the 
stars and stripes Jones's. 
145 Preservation of a selected few.  Bit of posturing that did give us a little 
credibility.  
146 Part solution to regional paranoia about 
post disaster control. 
Difficult to answer in view of hindsight 
complexities, but in short fear/paranoia 
can be a more significant factor than any 
realistic  threat, the further one goes 
back then the more justifiable becomes 
the clinging to a perceived deterrent. 
147 To reassure the public and those in power 
that a nuclear war could be survived 
No. The military expenditure kept the 
economic structure favouring the military 
as it had done for some time, which 
could be argued furthered the British 
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Way of life, but the 'deterrent' was a 
provocation, not a defence  
148 To protect a selection of the community to 
be safe and survive in the event of a 
nuclear attack.   For observational 
purposes - look out for potential missile 
threats. 
yes, at the time the country was being 
threatened with nuclear attacks. In order 
to,protect the nation and people of the 
uk, I believe a deterrent was essential .  A 
means of non feeling powerless. 
149 To protect the chosen few from neuclear 
attack , to monitor the safety of the 
environment afterwards and to re 
populate the planet . 
Since we didn't descend into a neuclear 
conflagration one might assume so . 
150 To provide a nucleus of command posts to 
control the assumed anarchy of a post 
nuclear war while incidentally giving 
themselves refuge 
probably not, but need to look at other 
nations perceptions. Policies based on 
perceptions not facts 
151 To maintain government and military 
operations. 
Yes. 
152 I imagine they were designed to maintain a 
government structure, a military function, 
and ensure some form of population 
survival in the event of a nuclear war. 
I have no opinion on this at this time, and 
will probably quiz you on it next time we 
meet!  On a serious note, I would need to 
take an 'essay' approach to this question 
and would look for evidence for and 
against the statement - this would 
probably be related to the extent and 
nature of the perceived threat.  Having 
had some personal experience of AWRE 
Aldermaston, I would say that the ability 
to conduct a nuclear test, for perceived 
threatening countries to detect, is 
essential for the deterrent to be 
effective. 
153 To provide a refuge for the chosen few, 
corrupt politicians and the rich. 
No it wasn't.  The deterrent gives us a 
lever to make potential adversaries think 
twice however, you just need to take a 
look around to see that the British way of 
life is being rapidly eroded quite 
successfully by successive weak and 
spineless governments who are too 
scared to stand up for the British people. 
154 To house those they thought would be 
beneficial to run a survivor government  
Yes 
155 Regional Seats of Government. To create a 
secure housing for government in the case 
of a nuclear attack, so that the country 
could continue, with some leadership. 
Too philosophical for me. Probably- not 
going naked into international debates 
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156 The significant planning and expenditure 
reflected the Government's desire to 
preserve national identity and to survive - 
whatever the latter meant. 
With the benefit of hindsight, I think yes. 
It was essentially a conflict between 'us' 
and 'them'. Irrespective of whether it 
worked or not, it was imperative to have 
a strategy that hinted at continuation.  
157 To try to allow a coherent government to 
remain in the event of such a war, with the 
aim of directing recovery (if possible!) after 
the fact. Also to allow military staff to 
exercise command and control over the 
country's response to any attack. 
Probably not. It was done as 'feelgood' 
propaganda, to show that the 
Government was taking the Soviet threat 
seriously and, of course, it allowed our 
politicians to be involved at the highest 
levels in NATO and the UN. 
158 Shelter, should nuclear war happen. Not 
sure they would work though.  
Not really. If anyone fires a nuclear 
weapon, we're all stuffed.  
159 To save their own asses. Certainly not for 
the population as a whole. The idea was 
for local government etc to run on for a 
few short weeks post bombing... 
No, the USA will bomb any in retaliation 
in the event of a nuclear war. The reality 
is the the UK will be paying for it for 
years to come. 
160 Fear and self preservation with a dis-regard 
for the rest of the population. 
Yes, it was part of a line of deterrents 
created to counter act the perceived 
threat from Russia. 
161 Certainly in the 80 ' s we really did this no 
there was a threat from the Russians.   The 
country was split even then as to the best 
way to deal with it.  We lived near the 
Peace Camp at Molesworth in 
Cambridgeshire and knew the people at 
the camp protesting about the storage of 
Cruise missiles there.  We felt we were just 
a launching pad for the Americans and 
joked about the last party we'd have when 
the warning went off. Pretty black humour 
a lot of the time and a real sense of danger. 
It may have been.   We didn't feel the 
cruise missiles made us independent.  I 
was a member of CND  but am not so 
sure now.  On balance I think it helped 
and I still think there is no trusting the 
Russians.  Look at the way they are 
behaving now. Saying one thing and 
doing another. But I don't think there are 
the worry as far as nuclear stuff goes. 
And having an independent deterrent 
isn't going to help against nutter 
terrorists. 
162 Provide shelter for key persons in order to 
ensure some structure of government after 
a conflict.  
No. Britain enjoyed the privilege of 
protection from the USA during the post 
war period and an independent 
deterrent wasn't necessary but was 
desirable to ensure our continued 
position in the world order, ie one of the 
allied victors.   
163 In the event of a nuclear attack officials 
and others would be able to maintain some 
contact, intelligence, and control and 
monitor situations and conditions and 
events from a secret location. 
To protect the British way of life, I 
suppose so yes. 
164 From what I know about these, which isn't 
that much, I'd say they had various 
functions. Some seem to have been 
designed to ensure at least the short-term 
survival of specific people in the case of 
nuclear attack, others to serve as 
information-gathering stations to help 
It was justified in the terms of the time, 
when attitudes and knowledge were 
rather different. I don't think it would be 
possible to justify such a decision without 
room for doubt, simply because it relies 
on risk assessments and judgements 
about things that never happened - so 
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manage retaliation and confirm casualties 
and impacts without much emphasis on 
the health of occupants. 
we can't be sure if any of those 
assessments were accurate or not. 
165 As part of the nuclear deterrent - to prove 
to our enemies that we were prepared to 
fight - and continue to operate after a 
nuclear attack.  If we had not built these 
structures the enemy would have doubted 
our resolve to actually launch or retaliate 
using our own nuclear devices. 
I think it did  (and to a certain degree stll 
does) kept the UK at the top table.  I 
think it ensured our independance but at 
the same time because of SIOP did bring 
a degree of risk that we could be 
targeted because of America. 
166 Secure structures where the selected few 
would be able to survive. 
Yes, I believe so 
167 To house weapons and protect key 
personal from a nuclear attack.  
Yes, as if we did not have we were more 
at risk. Having these weapons does act as 
a deterrent to other nations.  
168 To allow the UK Government to govern, 
police, communication and survive a 
limited nuclear attack.  There would have 
been regional control allowing a nuclei of 
centres from which a more normalised 
form of command and control would be 
able to develop...assuming they have not 
all been targeted! 
Initially yes as we were not fully aware of 
the forces and effects of nuclear 
weapons. However over time it became 
clear that an 'overkill' retaliatory defence 
was not required, but this was not 
filtered down as there was political 
ground to be held by promoting an overly 
strong "defence". 
169 to preserve their power in the event of a 
nuclear war.   
no.  if we'd all stop killing each other and 
live and let live, there'd be no need for 
mutually assured destruction. 
170 To create a sense that 'something was 
being done' (for the ones in Yorkshire I 
know of), so I suppose partly for 
propaganda purposes 
Not in my opinion, no  
171 To reassure people with the (false) 
possibility that nuclear war was survivable. 
No 
172 To protect those who would run the 
defence effort 
Not really, if they ever had to use it then 
its purpose as a deterrent had failed 
173 To create a network of communications 
and protective spaces to allow thoughs 
chosen for the task to direct and monitor 
action leading up too and following a 
nuclear threat or attack 
Given what was going on in the rest of 
the world, it was probably the best 
option available at the time 
174 To protect civilians in the case of nuclear 
attack 
Yes 
175 To house local and central government 
authorities to co ordinate administration 
and control following a nuclear attack. It 
may be worthwhile to note that the 
government also held stockpiles of food in 
depots across the country to help feed the 
On balance yes. One could have 
sheltered behind the US enormous 
nuclear capability, but this would hardly 
have been supportive of the western 
liberal democratic alliance. 
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population, in the event of a breakdown of 
supplies, following a nuclear attack. 
176 To protect the government, administration 
and the monarchy. the rest of us would 
have perished. 
Probably, but mutually assured 
destruction was madness. Better dead 
than red! 
177 To prop up an elite. however temporary 
the design use of the structures collectively 
they would have played a part in keeping 
communications and awareness open for a 
select few.  
Possibly, it kept many in work, although 
rental of said devices is purportedly paid 
to the US. In what way was it considered 
independent? All allies had a vested 
interest, surely? Instil fear & maintain 
control (& collect taxes!) 
178 To protect members of the government in 
the event of a nuclear  attack. 
No, providing we can share a nuclear 
deterrent. 
 
 
Entry Id The Cold War dominated four decades of 
British life; in that time a vast defence 
orientated manufacturing industry 
developed. Many communities relied 
heavily on the defence industries for work. 
Do you think reliance on such industries, 
both here and abroad, perpetuated the 
Cold War? 
Did you or your family play any part in 
the Cold War (civil or military service; 
volunteer groups (WRVS, CDC, Royal 
Observer Corps etc.)? And if so could 
you describe what the activity was? 
1 today it is destruction financially - i'd be 
tempted to say money drives everything - it 
is our ideological heritage after all!  
Royal Air Force. Working on aircraft 
mostly in the UK. 
2 I think there were benefits to the world 
from the cold war. A derivitive, "The Race 
for Space", Soviet vs US superiority brought 
many innovations and benefits. 
None, but subsequently have surveyed 
sites. 
3 Not sure I would agree with the word 
prosperity - we spent a lot of money but got 
little value from it.  We have only ever 
actually used conventional forces and we 
probably spent too much on these given our 
relative size as a nation. 
Not that I am aware of apart from being 
slightly concerned at times like the 
Cuban missile crisis that a nuclear war 
might kick off 
4 Yes I was in the USAF stationed at 
Burtonwood during the Berlin Airlift and 
later served 16 months during the 
Korean War. Worked as an Aerospace 
Engineer on a number of missle 
programs 
5 This question does not make sense to me. No 
 443 | P a g e  
6 It was necessary as it showed the world that 
little old britain could hold it's own in this 
time of threat, and it enabled great leaps 
forword in technology development. 
Both my parents moved to Swindon 
from London to work at Plesseys guided 
weapons division(Mr Turner one of the 
bosses was a relative/uncle of dad i 
think) where dad was a design/planning 
engineer and mum worked on assembly. 
My dad also after the war and before 
moving to Swindon worked for the 
government in covert operations to do 
with designing and field operation of spy 
location devices and the such, we are 
still trying to get further information 
about these activities. 
7 I dont quite understand this question. I 
wonder how much the investment in 
weapon systems acted to boost the 
economy. Was this even a part of Govt 
economic strategy? 
None that I know of 
8 yes, whilst we felt the threat was real , 
industries almost bloomed in preparation,  
shipping, forces, and the military were 
supported by additional funding, which in 
turn meant employment to many people 
and posperity. 
No,  although I do remember watching 
the TV with news reporting on 
Greenham common, and nuclear war 
heads being hidden or transported.  so 
we were not actively involved but 
understood the implications of what 
was happening. 
9 Yes, pity we don't still have the industry and 
jobs 
Yes - ROC observer in 1960's 
10 I think so, although it would have all been in 
vain if the war did turn 'hot'. as everything 
would have been destroyed.. 
Not that I know of 
11 Sorry do not understand the 
Question??????????????? I followed the 
Beatles and Stones 
My father was in the airforce. I went to 
Hong Kong during the Korean War. My 
very first memories are of the Kowloon 
ferry. Later I hear (divorce) my father 
went to Christmass Island and  my half 
brothers say he got his cancer there. 
Died in his early 50s I think. 
12 Up to a point. In order to maintain the 
"deterrent" and protect the public at large it 
was necessary to spend large amounts of 
money. This country never had the 
capabilities of say, the USA who spent (and 
still do) almost obscene amounts on 
Defence and deterrence. However, the 
threat from the Warsaw Pact was real and 
potentially deadly and to have spent 
nothing would have been morally 
reprehensible. 
I served in the Territorial Army (1st bn 
The Wessex Regt) from 1978 to 1981 
and could have been called on to fight in 
the frontline in Germany if the ballon 
had gone up.  I also served in the Royal 
Observer Corps (Avebury Post) from 
1982 to 1991 and likewise, would have 
had to leave family and home to serve in 
an underground monitoring post if the 
need had arisen. I also worked for the 
MOD at RMCS from 1977 to 1979 and 
for Vickers Plc (Defence contractor) 
from 1979 to 1987. 
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13 I think it did, we are very good at building 
for the defence industry, after the cold war 
ended we lost most of the manufacturing 
employment in this country 
Myself, my brother and 5 other relatives 
in the military 
14 Economic prosperity is always a good idea, 
we could do with sending the bombers over 
again and crippling European production! 
Defence just about covers it! 
15 Yes. RN Officer 1973 - 1993, Fleet Air Arm 
from 1978.  Father worked for Bristol 
Siddley/Rolls Royce on Bloodhound and 
Tornado. 
16 Absolutely. War is the mother of invention. 
When threatened, innovation becomes 
highly valued. New and inventive ways to 
kill one another is instinctual, bred into us; 
bound to our DNA. We don't have a choice. 
When threatened, biology teaches us that 
we flee, freeze or fight. We fight to survive. 
Economic prosperity is a positive by 
product. 
No. 
17 I suspect this is a rather simplistic question - 
many other things impacted on economic 
propserity and the cold war threat was 
perhaps a part of it.  In terms of 
justification, there probably was a threat - 
so 'yes'. 
I was a British citizen - so 'yes'.  Also I 
spent 9 years in Germany located in 
Germany as part of the UK military 
'occupation'; 5 of these years were 
spent around 10 km from East German 
border.  Our advice on seeing a band of 
Russians was to 'move eats with a bottle 
of vodka' 
18 it certainly fuel'd it no 
19 In  2005 the proportion of the defence 
budget spent on the independent nuclear 
deterrent was between 2 and 4% - this 
doesn't seem unreasonable.  
3 years service in 1 (BR) Corps. 
20 To a certain extent the defence industry 
was just reacting to a potential threat. 
Things like TSR2 brought the potential for a 
lot of work for people, but I don't know that 
the knock on effects to the economy were 
all that great. I don't know much about it 
though. 
My Grandfather was head of Cine 
Photography at an experimental 
establishment airbase, responsible for a 
lot of the filming and still photography 
of many experimental aircraft, including 
V bombers and TSR2 during testing. My 
father, mother, maternal grandfather 
and paternal grandmother all worked at 
the same airbase. 
21 Again, referring back to my last answer I do 
sometimes wonder just how credible the 
threat actually was.  However, there is no 
doubt that the 'threat' was a good deal for 
our defence and the associated industries.  
I joined the RAF in 77.   We wewre stioll 
very much 'fighting' the cold war.  
Exercises concentrated on beating off 
attacks by the Warsaw Pact.  I can also 
recall at least 2 occassions when we 
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May I quote Ocean Colour Scene: 'Profit in 
Peace' 
went to ' 1 step away' from an actual 
war footing. 
22 I don't knpw My father worked at GCHQ, at first as a 
radio operator, he didn't tell us much 
about what he did, in fact I picked up 
more from other people employed by 
them in the pub.  As far as I know when 
being a radio operator he listened to 
morse code being transmitted by the 
russians 
23 It is difficult to know for sure if things would 
have been different if the money had not 
been spent 
Not that I am aware of 
24 Yes I served as part of the BAOR in Germany 
for 12 years 
25 I don’t think I fully understand the question 
(my knowledge of the subject is next to nil). 
If you mean that the threat stimulated 
industry and this was a good thing, then I 
agree and think that is one good side effect! 
There will always be a challenge for 
humanity – war, famine, disease, 
environmental change etc. Humans seem to 
work best when threatened – hence all the 
innovations during times of war.  
None 
26 Not sure. No. 
27 Probably....it kept mant peolpe employed No 
28 I believe the threat justified economic 
prosperity as it offered work to millions, 
also many people would have remembered 
how leading up WW2 Britain had relaxed its 
military manufacturing capability hence it 
was fully justified.   The prosperity of the 
British people was essential to my mind in 
helping moral. Was the average British 
worker consious of the threat of 
destruction? Surely his main concern was 
providing for his family. 
My father did not have any direct role 
but played a very small part by 
attending civil continguency local 
planning meetings. 
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29 Probably. It certainly allowed many UK 
defence industry and allied manufacturing 
companies to develop a lot of equipment 
which they also sold across the world, 
thereby helping the UK's economy. Indeed, 
that often seems to have been the telling 
factor in the placement of many defence 
contracts, when superior (usually American) 
equipment was ignored in favour of the 
offering from a UK company. These days, 
European and worldwide anti-competitive 
legislation is supposed to prevent this. 
I was an Fighter Controller in the RAF 
and responsible for controlling UK 
fighters when they flew to intercept any 
USSR aircraft that attempted to 
penetrate UK airspace. Another role, 
allied to that, was the identification of 
all air traffic approaching UK airspace in 
order to produce what was called the 
Recognized Air Picture. Towards the end 
of the Cold War, I was stationed in West 
Berlin, where we monitored and 
analysed East German and Russian 
aircraft manoeuvres over East Germany. 
30 War is always good for the economy, 
especially if you win it! 
My father did national service in the 
1950s. Ahem, ahem... 
31 Not quite sure of what you mean by 
economic prosperity. it was useful to line 
the pockets of the businessmen and thier 
tame politicians. 
My father was in the army (Pay Corps) 
as was I (Royal Greenjackets). I spent 2 
years in Berlin in the mid 70s, in what 
was the largest (if war happened) POW 
camp in the world. 
32 Yes No, apart from emotional support 
33 It justified the prominence of manufacturing 
and defence industries, which led to 
economic prosperity. 
No, we played no part. 
34 The alternative was disarmament, which, if 
it had been unilateral as the delusionists of 
Greenham Common had wanted, would 
quite likely have provoked the attack that 
the deterrent deterred. (The preamble to 
the question is inaccurate: the Cold War 
began in 1945-46 and wound down after 
the Soviet collapse. That's a few years more 
than four decades. Doesn't accuracy 
matter?) Further, the threat of nuclear 
destruction didn't end with the end of the 
Cold War. 
Anyone who was alive then played a 
part, even those who never knew there 
was such a war as the Cold one. You 
need to revise your question in favour of 
the specific. 
35 I had actually never thought of this link, 
sorry. 
If it counts: I was not a paid up member 
of CND but went on marches a few 
times. 
36 The government could have invested the 
money in other manufacturing industries 
instead. Creating at least as many jobs and 
much less fear. 
I wore my 'nuclear power, no thanks' 
badge and went on one or two 
demonstrations. 
37 No. No. We lived in a small village, 
peacefully, but my husband was worried 
during the Kennedy/Gorbachev 
confrontation over Cuba and suggested 
stock-piling essential foods and taking 
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refuge in a railway tunnel if the situation 
worsened. 
38 It's not a simple relationship: recovery from 
the austerity of the late 1940s also played a 
large part, as did increasing globalisation. 
Like the 'space race', spin-offs from Cold 
War industry were extremely important in 
the rise of prosperity 
No. We were simple peasants in 
Somerset. 
39 A good explanation of this cycle can be 
found in 'The Year of the Angry Rabbit' by 
Russell Bradon. Governments cannot find 
money to support peaceful production but 
it can always find the cash to support wars [ 
look at current activities] 
Old friend[now deceased] worked at 
Maralinga in Austrasli when they were 
performing 'safety tests' on nuclear 
devices.  
40 It also dominated political life, and many 
other things too. I'm not sure where you get 
'economic prosperity' as a result of the Cold 
War from. 
Eh? We read the newspapers, watched 
the news, and probably joined in the 
general anti-soviet bloc sentiment for a 
while. 
41 Not quite sure what you mean here.  Yes I 
suppose a side effect of the decision to 
maintain certain defences was the creation 
of employment within our country.  Are you 
suggesting that the reason for saying we 
needed such defences was to create work?  
I don't know whether that's true or not.   
No 
42 The threat existed independent of the 
industrial policy, but was a political 
convenience for expanding the UK post-war 
economy. 
None. 
43 Was it a period of economic properity? I beg 
to differ: Britain was still subject to 
rationing until 1953. I admit that there may 
have been a brief period of prosperity in the 
1960s and mid 1980s but on the whole 
Britain suffered economically in the 1970s 
and the recession of the early 1980s.  
No. 
44 Not sure there is a direct connection in the 
way posited between spending and the 
threat of destruction.  
No direct involvement. I was involved in 
protest movements against Cruise and 
Trident missiles, and in favour of nuclear 
disarmament. 
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45 Firstly I would say that the Cold War began 
after the Russian Revolution, but that is an 
asides.  I would say the threat of destruction 
did justify the prosperity - it was a fact, it 
was happening and it had to be dealt with. 
Not that I am aware of. 
47 That argument could be taken for any 
industry connected with producing things 
for war. We still produce weapons, vehicles, 
technology for the purposes of war, some of 
it we sell abroad. Is conflict around the 
world being perpetuated because of these 
industries? probably it is, but to what 
extent? again we will never know.  
My parent were peace activists, part of 
CND, does that count? 
48 people want to perpetuate things they get 
used to so yes, but perhaps not deliberately 
not that I know of 
49 No, but it did have an effect on what work 
the government gave the defence 
industries, and the political factors about 
jobs in defence industries play a huge role, 
e.g. the Clyde shipyards from the 70's 
onwards 
No 
50 Business always preys/profits/uses on 
current fears; in the same way screening 
equipment - for travel hubs etc - is a growth 
industry now.  It was probably 
understandable that there would be 
another 'growth industry' following the end 
of WWII - and the way in which the war 
with Japan ended.  
My father was in the Air Force and we 
lived in Germany for a while.  I do vividly 
remember the public information 
leaflets about what to do in the event of 
a nuclear attack. They were very scary 
for a child.  
51 No No 
52 Probably I don't know.  My father worked for the 
MOD for some of this time but obviously 
I don't know what he did.  He moved 
side ways into Forensics and laterly the 
Health and Safety Exec cos he didn't 
want to spend his life working on bigger 
and better ways to kill people. 
53 Perhaps, in a post WW11 world, it did. 
However this was the norm for Brits for 
years before, the Cold War seems to 
essentially been a carry on for those who 
may have been out of work after the wars. 
Nope! 
54 No. Protest through CND. 
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55 Yes. Eisenhowber warned of the danger of 
the 'Indusrial-Military Complex' back in 
1961. Now that Communism is no longer a 
realistic threat, a new one 'militant Islam' 
has been devised to to keep it going.  
No. 
56 Not in Britain, but I think it might have in 
other parts of the world.  
No. 
57 No.  And yesterday's defence industries 
have laid the foundations for today's world-
beating technical industries like Rolls-Royce, 
BAE Systems, Vickers, Qinetic. 
Yes, my father helped to build the Mid-
Canada Line, which was a radar doppler 
trip-wire system to detect soviet 
bombers flying in from the Arctic.  We 
also saw the B52 bombers from the SAC 
base at Duluth flying over us to their 
Greenland station. 
58 I think that the powerful UK armaments 
industry was actively lobbying ministers and 
influencing government policy, so may well 
have had an impact on perpetuating the 
Cold War, however I think that the US and 
Soviet governments were the drivers, not 
the British government.  The rapid collapse 
of Soviet power in the Warsaw Pact 
countries in the late 1980s was a clear 
indicator that the Cold War was a political 
construct. 
Only as potential civilian targets!  I was 
active in CND as a young adult and took 
part in protest marches in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  As a student a number 
of friends were actively involved in the 
Greenham Common peace camps. 
59 Yes. That said it did promote considerable 
opportunies for product development and 
created employment opportunites.  The 
British econamy arguably was enhanced by 
the cold war. 
Not that i am aware off. 
60 Yes. I am especially reminded of the 'Lucas' 
incident, where Unions produced a detailed 
(and workable) plan for re-orienting activity; 
onley for it to be rejected out of hand... 
Only as potential targets - though one 
distant relative didserve in the Observer 
Corps 
61 To a certain extent, yes.  However, post-CW 
defense has shown that we are perfectly 
capable of identifying other threats, such as 
'the war on drugs' and 'the war on terror'. 
I, and my husband, have been involved 
professionally with the heritage of the 
cold war. 
62 Very likely.  None 
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63 Badly framed question. Should be in two 
parts. One - did the industrial and 
commercial interests that developed, eg 
arms manufacture and technology, then 
yes.  2) Of course communities relied on it 
for employment, but  foreign policy is never 
made in the interests of working people and 
their communities. However no doubt this 
employment would have been the basis for 
political support of the cold war and nuclear 
weapons in various communities and the 
labour movement. 
No.  
64 Yes, especially in America and the USSR. 
Perhaps less so as far as the UK was 
concerned - but BAe still focused on military 
work. 
no - we thought there was little point in 
planning on living in a nuclear winter. If 
it happened we would be part of what 
was atomised. 
65 Yes. But so too did the political elite and 
NGOs like green peace.  Compare and 
contrast the response to global warming 
and nuclear war (indeed look at the nuclear 
winter for a direct connection).  Both are a 
massive socio-allergic reaction to a small 
stimulus with a massive allergic type 
reaction that far outweighs the actual 
problem. Both have capitalists raking in 
huge profits from spreading fear. Both are 
doomsday scenarios and both have been 
proven to have been "overdone".  But at 
least nuclear weapons were made in the UK 
-- windmills are built abroad!!!  
My father was a director of the rocket 
station in Woomera and went on to 
work at GCHQ. I was always comforted 
knowing we would be the first place to 
get a direct nuclear hit and therefore 
never worried about the nuclear winter 
(the ideal cure for global warming!) 
66 I don't know, it could have done.  i don't 
know enough about the economic/political 
reasoning at the time. 
No. 
67 No, didn't the Cold War continue until 
communism in Europe ceased? I don't think 
people at the time could envisage a world 
where those countries weren't under Soviet 
rule so I don't think British leaders 
consciously thought/planned to undermine 
reform there just to keep home industries 
going. I don't want to be that much of a 
cynic! 
Not directly. My parents left Hungary in 
1974 as they did not want to bring their 
children up under communism. I am 
sure they did not expect the regime to 
fall apart 15 years later - after all it had 
been in place almost all of their lives. 
68 While the public relied on Civil Defence for 
salvation, the military relied on steady 
investment in the technological imparative 
(using technology to gain advantage at any 
cost). This perpertuated the Cold War and 
the military-industrial complex. The Cold 
War ended when the Soviet were bankrupt 
Everyone alive that feared Soviet 
domination played a part in the Cold 
War.  I participated with Duck and Cover 
drills at school. 
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and unable to keep up with western military 
spending. 
69 Yes. More than that, they also influenced 
our ways of life - we are led to believe that 
these industries are honorable and 
essential, not militaristic, violent and 
environmentally catastrophic. 
My parents were teachers - my mother 
[West] German, my father British. So 
they 'played a part' - in terms of cultural 
relations between former enemies now 
both part of the West - but not in what 
might conventionally be implied by such 
a question. 
70 Yes, I'm sure it did to some extent. Not directly no, although my parents 
both grew up in the shadow of 'the 
bomb' and it definitely had a profound 
effect on the first three decades of their 
lives, which has had a small knock-on 
psycological effect on me - it's subtle, 
but that 'you never know what might 
happen in the future' doomsday-
thinking is there nevertheless. 
71 Same as in any `war` No - although my parents voted for 
successive govs with the weaponry.  
Actually my (fantastic) uncle was a 
Morse Code operator - very hush hush! 
72 No. The sodding Soviets perpetuated the 
Cold War, full stop. 
We're traditionally a Service family, and, 
additionally, my uncle was a civil servant 
during the period. To that extent, we 
were as involved as every British subject 
was, but no more so, really. 
73 No at all. While there were communities 
and groups living off defence expenditure, 
Cold War was essentially an exogenous 
phenomenon for Britain. This is testify by 
the rapid shrink of defence expenditure 
after 1989. 
I was too young to play any role. My 
family was left wing and supported anti 
nuclear campaigns.  
74 Almost certainly - no politician wants to 
close a plant in their constituency - and 
there's enough evidence of corruption and 
kickbacks between Westminster and the 
defence industry to suggest that the links 
were a lot deeper and higher-level too.  
Not that I'm aware of - my aunt and 
some of my mum's friends used to go on 
CND marches (so you could say they 
were involved in the Cold War in terms 
of protesting against it) but didn't have 
any organisatonal role, as far as I know.  
75 No, politics perpetuated the Cold War; the 
defence industries were a byproduct. 
My father worked in one of the defence 
industries; other family members were 
active in CND. 
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76 Yes, the military build up (similar to the 
1980 and 90s build up of the financial 
sector) skewed the economies of the 1960s 
and 70s, and their ultimate downsizing and 
regulation was seen as counter to the 
previous Zeitgeist  - but had to happen 
because of an economic rebalancing which 
saw the financial toppling of the Soviet 
Union at the end of the Cold War. The West 
the only needed wars in Cold War client 
states of the middle east to also topple its 
economy  (2006-11) during following 
hubristic Gulf Wars. 
My mother was a Greenham common 
woman. 
77 I find this very difficult to resolve. In some 
ways I suspect it might have, butg on the 
other hand the threat appeared to be very 
real. However, this perception probably 
owed something to defence industry 
propaganda. 
No. Just worried about it! 
78 Again, quite do you think the Cold War was 
about. The defence industry has always 
been something of a self perpetuating 
beast, why do you consider that during the 
cold war this aspect of it is any different to 
it is now. If you are asking the question to 
ask was this a pressure in prolonging the 
Cold War then that is plainly a leading and 
erroneous question. In short, no. 
N/A 
79  No    I was in the Army 
80 You say it dominated life; it didn't much feel 
like that. It was simply a condition. We 
didn't, except for a few luvvies, spend our 
days wondering about the fourminute 
warning. There is really no evidence that 
British armament had any serious effect on 
the Cold War at all; though it certainly 
provided work.  
Yes I did, and no I can't. Suffice to say I 
was a member of the Royal Naval 
Reserve, 1960 - 1983, ending as 
Lieutenant Commander. 
81 Could well have been a factor. Some people 
presumably became very rich on the back of 
all this fear... 
No 
82 No, I'd say it was vice versa. Yes, father in Royal Navy. 
83 To some extent yes, but I don't think it was 
the principal influence in perpetuating the 
Cold War. 
I was a member of the Royal Naval 
Reserve and was prepared to be 
mobilised in the event of a possible 
attack. 
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84 No.  Once the Cold War ended, if the 
defence manufacturing industry was so 
important to the UK a reason would have 
been found to keep it going.  Also, major 
defence cancellations at the height of the 
Cold War (eg TSR2) would not have 
happened.   
Yes, but I'm still bound by the Official 
Secrets Act!  I think I'm allowed to say I 
worked at Royal Ordnance Factory 
Burghfield (for about two years in a 
clerical capacity) where warheads for 
Polaris and Chevaline missiles were 
manufactured.  My Father played a role 
as an MoD Policeman, notably at 
Greenham Common, and also at 
Orfordness in Suffolk. 
85 No. The cold war perpetuated heavy 
investment in defence. Once the threat 
receded the expense has subsided. 
Yes. I was a regimental NBC officer in 
The Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, 
trained at Winterbourne Gunner. My 
operational role was Reconnaissance 
Squadron Leader in 51 Highland Brigade 
and my troops observed Russian 
Spetznaz deploying into Scotland from 
the west coast. When not serving in the 
TA I was a physics teacher. 
86 No. Political tensions prolonged it. Father was a GPO Telephone Engineer, 
also Royal Corps of Signals TA 1946-62. 
One cousin also GPO. Two uncles Royal 
Corps of Signals for National Service. 
Two cousins in RAF early '70s One 
cousin in RN early '70s. 
87 The argument about defence and 
employment appears before and after the 
CW period. Perhaps such communities did 
perpetuate it in government thinking. 
Personally, it passed me by. 
No. 
88 No. No. 
89 Possibly. Some communities and politicians 
clearly did place great store on what were 
generallly 'high tech' industries providing 
major local sources of employment. Even 
so, the end of the Cold War took most by 
surprise - it was so swift, so unexpected and 
so wholesale, & as such precluded any 
attempts by lobbyists to perpetuate.   
No - apart from living through it and 
being scared by it at the time! 
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90 Have not a clue.  But the way that you ask 
the question leads to the answer that you 
are wanting. 
no 
91 Jobs equals votes, so perhaps a large 
defence industry helped perpetuate the 
cold war. Soviet Russia on the other hand 
didn't need peoples votes..... 
My father was in the Royal Signals 1947-
1949 and worked in telecommunications 
for the the G.P.O. thereafter. I 
remember him telling me about working 
with radar and listening stations along 
the grampian coastline. 
92 yes but not as much as in the USA which is 
in effect a war time economy 
member of the armed forces and the ta 
during the cold war, I later met many x 
Warsaw pact mebers on digs and traded 
stories this was very intresting as the 
simlarties out did the difrances 
93 No idea. Ask your tutora bout the Official Secrets 
Act and who it applies to - it really does 
include you. 
94 No people will always try to take control be 
it of another country or another person so 
the war was inevitable 
N/A 
95 It would not have perpetuated it if it was 
one sided, but the two sided arms race 
made it logical at the time to build the 
industry, giving a vicious circle. 
Parents grew up during Rhodesian Civil 
war, a cold war proxy conflict. 
96 The need for manufacturing orientated 
economies to continue developing new 
products forced the arms race through both 
free market growth and a military need to 
not be outdone by the Ruskies.  The 
continued production of war materials 
forced nations to compete, requiring 
greater levels of production to pay for it all, 
resulting in a spiral of military power. 
They were alive during it. 
97 Possibly as people both here and abroad 
could have been preparing for the cold war 
and, in their minds, Assuring themselves it 
was going to happen. I think if everyone 
relied less on the denfense industry it may 
have been a different story. 
No. 
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98 yes probably no they didnt (as far as i know) 
99 i don't believe so. I think it was such a side 
effect of the cold war. Increasing tensions 
are what caused the cold war to continue 
with increasingly bold moves such as Russia 
moving missiles into Cuba. These moves 
meant the countries needed more weapons 
and munitions so there was more 
production. The production didnt lead to 
the cold wars continuation. 
No i don't think so. 
100 possibly as some communities would have 
relied on the war to survive and if the cold 
war had ended these industries and 
communities might not have been able to 
survive  
not sure  
101 I believe, the world as a whole should 
remove all nuclear war heads from 
readiness and scale back their deterrrents 
as there is no need at this moment in time 
or ever, as it would cause total destruction. 
Rather spending money on nuclear warfare 
prepration, the goverment should spend 
the money on improving infrascture. 
Not that i know of. 
102 Following the cold war many countries felt 
the need to keep up the defence industry 
for both nuclear and non-nuclear incase any 
future attacks came from other countries 
such as Soviet Russia or terrorist 
organisations. The uses could also be used 
as scare tactics if threats occured. The 
Tridant programme was due to be scrapped 
recently but they were overturned as it 
could leave britain without long range 
nuclear misslies. 
No 
103 Having a constant state of fear is almost the 
same as a perpetual war in regards to 
consuming human labour and commodities. 
This kept people in jobs until the later eras 
when people wanted a higher state of 
living. So to some extent, war was good for 
business and good for governments.  
One grandfather was in the Navy on 
HMS Unicorn during WW2 & the Korean 
war, and moved to the RAF until the late 
50's.  Other grandfather was in the Army 
until the 70's and one grandmother was 
a radar operator during WW2 up until 
the late 50's.  
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104 While I feel it may have been a motivator 
for the continued tension of the time, I dont 
feel that that succesive governments would 
all adopt this strategy without using it to 
critisise each other or risk the scandal. I also 
feel that governments would not put 
national security at risk for short term gains 
in the economy.  
None of my family played any particular 
role in the cold war. 
105 To an extent yes Granddad was working on anit air 
misseles in cyprus Dad bases in germany 
in the 70's in the RAF 
106 Yes, but it was not the only/main factor. Not as far as I know! 
107 Maybe! No 
108 Maybe - it's not like I can have a look at 
Defence records to work that out and have 
an opinion. 
Don't think they did. 
109 Undoubtedly - and continues to accelerate 
British and American involvement in foreign 
adventures. (Though having said this, the 
fact that the arms race effectively 
bankrupted the USSR means that our large 
defence industries also contributed to the 
Cold War's ending...)   
Other than being alive in the 80's no... 
110 I have no idea, sorry None that I know of, though I wouldn't 
be surprised if my sister took part in 
CND rallies 
111 No. Every war had benefits for certain 
industries, but I don't believe any war would 
have been perpetuated whilst it was 
ongoing as the threats would have 
outweighed those benefits.  
No. 
112 No, like most wars it is a positive side affect, 
but is very much out-weighed by the 
negative affects of war. 
no 
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113 Yes, these industries became a key part of 
national life and they established 
sociocultural patterns that normalised the  
permenant preparation for war - this inertia 
undoubtedly lengthened the conflict. 
None. 
114 Insofar that the cold war ended with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and it's 
Communist dictatorship, that would be a 
no. If anything the defence build up 
beginning under Carter and during the 
Reagan years accelerated that process. 
I and my immediate family were simply 
mainly alive during that period. My 
grandfather had some involvement 
being a fluent Russian speaker, but hard 
details are lacking. 
115 I don't think so, simply because vast arms 
manufacturing and large-scale employment 
in the arms industry continues to this day. 
So at the end of the cold war the customers 
merely changed slightly but the activity 
didn't. So I don't think of itself it particularly 
perpetuated the Cold War. 
This question is not clear and far too 
wide ! Do you mean officially in some 
way ? If you mean were we involved in 
arms manufacture or GCHQ or 
something - well we won't answer that 
!! We all payed a part in one way by 
being alive at the time ; and by working 
anywhere the Cold War could be 
relevant. eg as a student I organised a 
group to help support Czech students 
who were marooned outside their 
country when the Russians marched into 
Prague. Does that count ? 
116 Only if you believe in conspiracy theories. Yes. I was a WRNS Officer from 1972-
1978. I was a cryptographer. 
117 Yes, I do. Vested interests certainly played a 
part.  
No. 
118 I certainly think that such subsidized 
communities were more likely to support 
the Cold War, since their own livelihoods 
depended so heavily upon those incomes.  
My family are from Spain, a part of 
NATO but not a key player in the 
conflict, so I doubt any of them played 
any role in the Cold War aside from 
being simple and passive supporters of 
anti-communism and anti-Sovietism in 
general.  
119  I am sure these economic and technological 
aspects had a role, which quite like ly 
eclipsed 'ideology.' 
No direct part to my knowledge 
120 Yes. I think The Cold War became a habit. 
The initial threat of nuclear war subsided 
reasonably quickly but the perceived threat 
or the lingering sensibilities remain for 
much longer. Taking all this into account, 
continuing the employ people in such work 
seemed like a reasonable thing to do.  
No. 
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121 I think the military/industrial complex 
created in response to the tensions 
generated by the cold war was so huge that 
ending it or changing its direction was 
inevitably a very slow process. Given its 
massive influence in relation to economic 
performance, political capital and power 
relationships on either side of the iron 
curtain, it must have fought for survival long 
after its actual value to the societies 
sponsoring it had diminished and eventually 
disappeared. 
I was directly involved in CND and as a 
student, joined marches and 
demonstrations against nuclear 
armament.  
122 Research and development will have had a 
knock-on effect for general manufacturing 
industries eg teflon from space research. 
The argument about job creation could be 
used for coal mining but that didn't stop the 
govt destroying the mining industry for 
political reasons.  I think reliance on arms 
trade is still going on today and is not just 
an aspect of the cold war.  There is an 
argument that if President Kennedy had 
lived, the cold war and relations with Russia 
may have taken a different turn for the 
better. 
No. 
123 Yes to a cirtain degree. MPs with large 
manufacturing and defence industries in 
their constituancies must have lobbied to a 
level. 
no 
124 Possibly, hadn't thought about it before No 
125 I think the UK was and is a relatively small 
player in this, but the military/industrial 
complex in the US certainly had a role. 
No 
126 Yes and No, relying on it for work is good for 
jobs and as a career but it also helped stoke 
the rumours of WW3, the only things that 
made people nervous was the military 
exercises that had all of the defence 
companies shipping all of the deterrents 
and weapons to a number of places as if 
they were actually going to war, the façade 
of war scared people but exercises were 
essential in understanding how good our 
defences and reaction times could be. 
I think so, Stationed in Germany for 
support if anything kicked off. 
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127 The Cold War was going to happen 
regardless of whether or not defence 
manufacturing was there or not. 
Heightened tensions after the Second 
World War were what sparked the Cold 
War, and events afterwards were just 
occurrences due to the tensions between 
the nations there after. Yes, military 
production and capabilities were a major 
part of the Cold War, however there 
would've been tensions with or without the 
arms race, however it goes without a doubt 
that military production didn't help matters 
during this period. 
My Grand Father was a MOD Policeman 
at the RAF Munitions Depot Chilmark, 
where certain weapons and bombs were 
stored and sent out from, to keep them 
safe from persons not authorized to see 
them.  My Grand Mother worked on the 
admin team at RAF Chilmark and signed 
the munitions in and out as they were 
distributed out to the air stations.  My 
other Grand Father was in the Royal 
Navy. 
128 Possibly. Unfortunately I do not know 
enough about the subject to have a truly 
informed opinion, however I do believe that 
simple arrogance and childish actions 
promoted the cold war and a need to out 
do each other.  
My family were not involved in defence.  
129 yes of course. people worked in defence 
and so talked about what they did and why 
they did it. they would want to keep their 
jobs and believe they are doing right and 
this goes forward into politics to invest 
more and more in defence provoking a 
response 
no not that I'm aware of 
130 Yes I believe it would have sustained the 
cold war with a number of financial and 
social reasons from this prolonging it even 
more. Businesses   
Not that I am aware of NO 
131 Possibly but I don't know enough about the 
topic to properly comment 
I did not have family in any of the listed 
groups 
132 I would imagine so. ROC - ON A SMALL UNDERGROUND 
POST. 
133 The perceived threat from the Warsaw Pact 
necessitated a minimum level of military 
commitment by the NATO membership. It 
only maintained a force level sufficient to 
ensure a defensive capability that would 
make the losses inflicted on a WP attack 
unacceptable. The West could only cope 
with the scale of WP forces by developing a 
qualitative superiority, which helped sustain 
and develop our high-tech defence 
industries.   
British Army. Mostly committed to 
NATO European theatre. 
134 No.  Father was in the RAF 
135 Absolutely.  It still is the case, as jobs are 
used to justify the expense of perpetuating 
the expense on a British nuclear force. 
Some members of my family were 
involved in the intelligence services 
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136 Yes, war (or the threat of war) = profits for 
all parties involved. The escalation of 
tensions would have only amplified this. 
To my knowledge, no member of my 
family was involved in the cold war. 
137 I think that the dependency upon the 
defence industry did perpetuate the Cold 
War, as communities saw little alternative 
to replace their reliance upon this industry. 
I do not know of any input that my 
family had in the Cold War. 
138 Quite possibly, since each nation perceived 
the others as having large defence 
industries and hence perceived this as a 
very war like stance, meaning that they 
were reluctant to begin cutting back on 
their own industries for fear that this would 
leave them open to attack. However I don't 
believe this dependence was solely 
responsible for the perpetuation of the cold 
war, I think it was in part due to a paranoid 
attitude towards other nations which made 
everyone believe that this defensive 
industry was required.  
Not to my knowledge. 
139 yes My father was in the RAF from 1960 to 
1980. 
140 Yes without the advancements from each 
industry the cold war advanced from 
different stages from attacks from a 
propeller aircraft,  to ICBM's where bombs 
could be launched in minuets with out 
these development the competition 
between the western world and Russia 
would have stopped. But since 
developments came bombs got bigger and 
the threat increased, the cold war would 
continue to get more heated and more 
deadlier.  
My father was a technician in the RAF, 
but dropped out early due to medical 
reasons. But he did some construction 
work on a American Strategic Air 
Command base and he was watched 
24/7 under machine gun guard by 
military police. Even though its a small 
part its still part of the war effort in 
building the infrastructure.   
141 I am sure that elements of the deference 
industry perpetuated the Cold War by 
perhaps overstating the threat 
No 
142 I don't know enough about this part of the 
Cold War. I can see that it would have 
pushed the war on in that with more 
armaments the fighting intensified and was 
able to spread further. Of course this would 
have a knock-on effect on communities 
where the priority of work would change 
and also no doubt the war effected 
economies adversely in this time and as a 
result required more business (in this case 
war related) to bolster what had been 
taken.  
Don't know a lot about my family history 
unfortunately. 
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143 Undoubtedly. This is still going on, with the 
manufacture of defence products totally 
unsuited to what we are now told is the 
enemy (see, for example, Jeremy Corbyn's 
disagreement with trade unions on Trident, 
and the unions' justifications). This was 
particularly true in the United States, where 
fear is a major electoral vote winner. (I 
don't see this as a grand conspiracy theory, 
more just a slight disconnect between 
business ethics, goals and the end products 
of that business) 
Yes. Father was in BAOR (was stationed 
in Berlin through Able Archer), mother 
was WRVS. Brother and two uncles in 
army. I was in the Royal Naval Reserve. I 
left shortly after I joined CND. 
144 Most certainly. Though it was a parasitic 
relationship between weapons 
manufacturers and attitudes of workers ( 
ref Bombardier/Mackeys/Shorts here) 
No, unless CND counts :P 
145 Does appear with hindsight that the 
investors behind the arms industry were 
prolonging matters for a profit at any price.  
If it moves salute it, if it doesn't move 
pick it up, if it's too big to pick up, paint 
it.  
146 In a broad sense how could it not? (Sorry, 
bit of a cop out my tea is ready!) 
No. 
147 Yes. Even now, people defend military 
spending on the basis of the communities 
that it supports, rather than any actual 
benefit it provides. 
My grandmother, my mother and I were 
all active protestors  
148 maybe.  Whilst work was generated for 
many people, I would not like to say 
whether this actually perpetuated the Cold 
War.  Maybe it did I, maybe it didnT. 
no 
149 This is certainly a point of view which may 
have some credibility, however having lived 
through it I can assure you there was 
nothing 'phoney' about the concern and 
fears of the public at large . 
No , but many people were part of the 
civil defence movement , and regularly 
had training in first aid etc . 
150 If all the technology and money had been 
devoted to harness tidal or wave energy we 
would be a lot better off now. But I expect 
the arms manufacturers would not have 
made so much money. We deplore war - 
hot or cold - while trying to get contracts to 
sell fighter planes and complaining about 
job losses 
Some as members of CND, you did not 
ask if the part played supported it! 
151 Almost certainly, without an arms race 
there can be no industry, without the 
industry there can be no arms race. 
Father National Service followed by 
37yrs with MOD. Myself and 2 x 
brothers in RAF. Myself 30+yrs in MOD.  
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152 Another interesting question and one I can't 
answer without data. I know that some 
unions today oppose the scrapping of 
Trident because jobs are at risk, so i would 
not be surprised if economic pressures did 
help to prolong tensions during the cold 
war.   
No 
153 Yes - the cold war was good for the defence 
industry. 
Military service -  Royal Marines, Royal 
Air Force - Fortress Germany, RAF 
Laarbruch and Bruggen 
154 No  Yes served with the army as crew of a 
main battle tank  
155 Difficult to say. Russia was not friendly to 
the west and probably needed standing up 
to/facing down 
I went on a CND march from 
Aldermaston to London. This is a point 
of view that is not really represented in 
your questionnaire.  
156 No. The fear of destruction and the desire 
to survive and/or win was paramount. 
Everything else - industries included - 
sprang from that. 
No 
157 Yes. When a large proportion of your GDP is 
tied to the production of military hardware 
and munitions, as is particularly the case for 
the US (even today!), it is very likely to sway 
political decisions. Also, because of their 
strength at that time, the defence industry 
companies were able to bring greater 
pressure to bear on the civil servants, 
military personnel and politicians involved 
in decision making. However, a beneficial 
bi-product has been more and quicker 
technological advances. 
Both my spouse and I served in the 
Royal Air Force as Ground Defence 
Fighter Controllers and were also 
involved with the software 
maintenance, development and 
procurement of various air defence, 
radar and aircraft computer systems. 
158 Yes.  Not unless camping at Greenham to 
protest nuclear weapons counts.  
159 I believe the munitions industries have paid 
into government and encouraged warfare 
for their own enrichment.  
None, I am a pacifist. 
160 Industry and capitalists always benefit from 
wars, either actual or possible. Perpetuating 
the possibility maintained the need, 
therefore maintaining the industry. 
No activity, but being born in 1950, I can 
remember life during this time. 
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161 No. Rather a slanted question.  Of course 
the communities relied on the ordinance 
factories.   As they did on the coal and steel 
communities. But no one has saved the 
latter. 
CND. and we were there when Hesletine  
came in with the tracked vehicles and 
put up the razor wire at Molesworth.  
162 The Cold War was almost a self fulfilling 
prophecy in that the governments on both 
sides promoted the apparent danger from 
our enemy to justify the spend on defence.  
However, military spend is often the best 
value in terms of driving development and 
technology forward in the country, so yes, I 
guess it did perpetuate the Cold War. 
No. 
163 The Cold War was a technological race as 
well as industrial, contributed to capatilism 
the space programme was built around 
defence.  Secrecy, lack of trust yes I think it 
did  is my answer. Everyone benefited in 
some way and we all grew suspicious of 
each other. 
Spouse based in Germany at end of Cold 
War and used to base excersises on an 
invasion from Russia for example 
164 Yes, but I am not sure this ever became the 
deciding factor in its continuation. From 
what I have read, the political climate was 
key throughout. 
Not that I know of. 
165  Not in the uK.  I believe it did especially in 
the US and Soviet union.  I think US 
scaremongering did, and still does 
perpetuate Cold war industries/defence 
such as keeping redundant Missile silos 
operating just to appease politicians in the 
states concerned.   
Father and Brother were in the Civil 
Defence   I was a member of the ROC 
from 1981- 95 I served in a monitoring 
post at Ashbury 3/45 Post as the post 
instructor before transferring to 3/38 
Post Buckingham as the Chief Observer. 
When the posts were stood down in 
1991 I transferred to the Nuclear 
reporting cell at High Wycombe. I was 
the Chief Observer/Team Leader until 
final stand down in 95  During most of 
this time my civilian occupation had me 
working at RAF Fairford, Greenham 
Common, High Wycombe (Daws hill ) 
and RAF Upper Heyford. 
166 No, I think the reliance on weapons 
manufacture still continues, people will 
always seek out a threat to their national 
security. 
Probably, but nobody would have been 
told what the activities were. 
167 Yes, as more people were involved in the 
action via this  
No  
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168 No.  It was perpetuated by politics and the 
need to let people think that there was an 
'immediate' threat.  Yes there was a threat, 
but it would have been much more limited 
in its retaliation. 
Yes.  ROC RAF (Inc HQC&C + BRIXMIS)  
169 It certainly played its part, you can see the 
way they're sparring round each other now 
that they're desperate to get it all started 
again, mainly because they think there's 
money to be made. 
think my dad helped design some of the 
weaponry as he worked in pcb design. 
170 I dont think I know enough about this - but 
certainly, as now, there is more money in 
war for arms makers, than in peace 
No 
171 Yes. I also think wiser job creation options 
should have been pursued. 
No, not that I'm aware of. Some of my 
family survived the Holocaust though. 
172 Yes,  No 
173 No, not at all, I dare say that there were 
thoughs who had a vested interest 
financially to keep political tensions high 
purely for profit and gain, but I think that 
with time the ways of the world changed 
both politically and financially with the 
inevitable decline in the industry the cold 
war suported 
Yes my father worked in 
communications, developing and 
installing radio and listening stations in 
thhe UK and mediteranean areas for 
foreign office research & development 
establishment(f.o.r.d.e), government 
communications & wireless 
service(g.c.w.s), GCHQ and then the 
Plessey company at various locations in 
uk. 
174 Potentially No 
175 Maybe. The argument that jobs may be lost 
is still being made in relation to the debate 
on whether to replace Trident. The need to 
preserve jobs cannot be the basis  for the 
continuance of the possession of weapons 
of mass destruction, although there may be 
other valid reasons to have a nuclear 
capability. 
My father did national service after 
WWII, in addition to his wartime service. 
I had a minor role in relation to the 
winding up of government buffer stocks 
of food.  
176 It meant that there was greater support for 
the policy amongst the general public so did 
contribute to the policy carrying on for 
longer in the absence of meaningful 'peace' 
talks. 
No, but I did go on a Greenham 
Common march. 
177 Of course. Every single state in the US has a 
stake in the arms industry, which 
perpetuates votes & maintains the fear 
factor. 
Civil in radio communications. 
178 Possibly. No 
 
 465 | P a g e  
Entry Id Is too soon to investigate the Cold War? 
Some think we should be protecting sites 
now as they force us to confront the 
period both personally and nationally. 
What do you think? 
The Cold War is currently a taught 
component of a number school 
qualifications. Do you think we should 
a)teach it in a worldwide context; b) 
concentrate on the British story; c) not 
at all? Please give some context to your 
answer. 
1 I think we should look at the period from a 
British point of view and start now wjilst 
there is still the oportunity to speak to 
those involved. 
On the British view. There were great 
advances in technology, I think taking 
the global view loses the personal 
aspects of the period. 
2 This was a part of the history of Mankind. I 
vehemently believe that Cold War sites 
should be classed (archaeologically) 
alongside other site that have the 
classification of "Ancient Structures" 
Bob, I've taught it to Primary Year 6 (10-
11 year olds) they love it, Space Race, 
Spying etc. I concentrated on US vs 
Soviet, with a little of British 
involvement. China etc. I overlook. 
Children seems to like the tit-for-tat 
propaganda.   
3 We should investigate now because already 
a lot of evidence and sites are being lost.   
Concentrate on the British experience 
but within a Global context.  The things 
that children are most likely to be able to 
see and experience will probably found 
in their local area or in museums. 
4 Scholars too often love to rewrite history to 
suit their individual political views. I'm not 
sure there is any value in maintaining relics 
of past events. People tend think "we're 
not that dumb" proceeding to make equally 
dumb mistakes. 
I would teach it as a world wide event 
with emphasis on the context of the 
thinking at the time. Unfortunately, too 
many events are looked at in the context 
of today's thinking(heavily influenced by 
the individual professor's view) applying 
today's idea of right and wrong. 
5 I think we should protect and preserve at 
least some of the material.  I don't have 
enough idea of the scale to have an opinion 
on how much of it we should preserve. 
If we choose to teach it - there is a lot of 
competing stuff - it should be in a 
worldwide context.  Two reasons.  It was 
probably impossible (then) to have a 
'small' nuclear war.  I'm not sure it's 
possible now.  In either case radiation 
would certainly affect many other 
countries, if not the whole world. 
6 I think investigation sooner that later is 
advisable as it will stop the remaining sites 
and infrastructure from being let to fade 
away and information about this era from 
being swept under the carpet 
I think it should be taught in a worldwide 
context as it will put the efforts made 
in/by this country into perspective, 
especially when students can see and 
compare what other countries friend or 
foe also invested during these times. 
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7 We should be recording and preserving 
now, before things disappear. We should 
be able to identify 'iconic' sites and types of 
monuments to be preserved. We can 
concentrate resources / expertise on a 
small number of site that can be chosen as 
being 'representative' rather than leaving it 
to chance. Perhaps we can also choose 
examples that can be made sustainable. 
a - has to be in a worldwide context. 
Particularly as a part of the strategy was 
to bankrupt the USSR - making the arms 
race as difficult to win as possible 
8 The cold war is part of our history and 
should be investigated. over time history is 
lost through inaccurate accounts of failing 
minds,  or crumbling buildings leading to 
lack of actual evidence.    People are still 
alive today who can offer real and valid 
accounts of life and work during this 
period.   Personal recollections are 
important alongside national agenda and 
evidence of structures.  History needs to be 
retold as accurate as possible to the 
younger generations so they can learn from 
past historical events. 
World wide history in order for children 
to understand the wider picture of 
nuclear attacks- to include what other 
countries  had in the way of weapons, 
why GB felt under threat  ?    Then 
looking at how Britain managed this 
period in history to include bunkers, 
voluntary services,  and also look at any 
structures within their locality that may 
have survived the period of time. 
9 No time is to soon, lets get it recorded, 
stuff disappears much quicker these days 
with the rush for redevelopment 
Yes and in a global context, it was a 
global conflict 
10 I think it's worthwhile time to be 
investigating it, With the current instability 
in the middle east over nuclear weapons its 
a pertinent time. Plus many of the buildings 
and stories from people who were around 
at the time are being lost 
I think both a and b, the British story is 
not one normally covered in much detail 
when compared to events such as Cuba 
or the proxy wars in Vietnam etc 
11 Depends  I think the regional bunkers 
should be kept The big listening posts also 
but smaller ugly concretebits should be 
allowed to be reused as land fill.  For me 
the greatest benefit of the end of the cold 
war is that The Romanoffs are now saints 
and Mother Russia is again becoming Holy 
Mother Russia.   I had a Russian TV crew 
(on Stonehenge) in my bungalow two 
weeks ago.    (I have only ever voted Liberal 
(once Commie). 
A as that still has influence today. Now 
that China will dominate us all (I am 
reading my Mandarin now). It would be 
good to see the cold war taught through 
the surrogate wars/Africa. 
12 If we leave studying the cold war for future 
generations there is the danger that their 
interpretations will be second hand so to 
speak and based on subjective ideas and 
political correctness. It is vital that as much 
as is possible is recorded and protected 
now to ensure that an accurate record is 
made, that cannot then be "re-
interpretated" in the future.  
Whilst it is important for there to be 
global overview, in order for the subject 
to be studied in its proper context, I 
think the main emphasis should be on 
how the Cold war was played out in this 
country and how it affected every 
section of society as a whole. I think your 
book "4 Second Warning" should be the 
basis of the standard school text book on 
the subject ! 
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13 If we wait any longer what is left will have 
been destroyed, Why wait until all there is 
is a best guess when we can have 
conclusive evidence  
I would start with a would wide context 
and then focus it down to the British 
story, that will be more relavant to the 
students. Thats how I did history and 
there was nothing wrong with that. This 
way will also allow the student to aquire 
useful demo tools from family and 
friends that were involved. 
14 These sites are historic and interesting and 
give an unusual view at government 
thinking and deserve protecting! 
A, the cold war was the major formative 
event that has led us to where we are 
now, the political coming and goings 
need explanation so the same clanger 
isn't dropped again! 
15 It may be too soon but what time scale is 
correct?  We should protect a 
representative selection of sites. 
It can only be relevant in the broad 
context of world history. 
16 Everything is history. Everything should be 
recorded. Valuable lessons are supposed to 
be learnt aren't they. If there's no record 
then it's easy to suggest it never happened, 
or easy to forget. It's a valuable teaching 
tool to pass knowledge on to future 
generations. If knowledge weren't retained, 
we wouldn't have had the Cold War in first 
place.  
The is a unilateral question. It should be 
taught in the context of world history. It 
marks a point in evolution (post WWII) 
where man had the power to 
exterminate himself (he still does). It 
marks a transition from fear to a dawn of 
greater communication and potential 
understanding. 
17 History starts today History in Britsih schools is initially too 
global; important to get a sense of British 
history first then plave it in European, 
then global context.  The 'Cold' War is a 
bit of a misnomer though as I don't 
believe there was any period with no 
actual conflict taking place. 
18 All history should be preserved to teach 
other generations what happend whether 
right or wrong outcomes were acheived  
I think it should initially be taught at 
world wide level to get an overview then 
contentrate on the British element. this 
will enable students to get a fuller 
picture and for them to form their own 
opinions on the subject 
19 Example sites should be preserved for 
educational purposes as the Cold War is 
now history for the majority of UK's 
inhabitants. The sites are unlikely to ever 
achieve the heritage status of other historic 
buildings as they will never provide an 
entertaining family day out as a medieval 
castle might. 
Worldwide context as the ideologies 
behind the opposing sides must be 
appreciated to understand the subject. 
 468 | P a g e  
20 These bunkers and other sites are no more 
or less significant to the history of warfare 
in the UK than the average castle ruins, and 
should be affected the same protection. 
Why they are not proper heritage sites I 
will never know. 
To teach it with regards to the british 
would bring it home to the children, and 
hopefully mean its a bit more "on the 
doorstep" than more remote and distant 
events like the building of the pyramids. 
However I think seeing how America and 
Russia were coping during the cold war 
would provide good balance even if it 
wasn't the main focus. 
21 In my opinion, we dont deal enough with 
Modern History.  As we take lessons from 
the past I feel that the lessons we can draw 
from the more recent past are far more 
pertenant. 
Definatley in a Worldwide context.  As 
our role on the world stage diminishes I 
feel that it is important to show that 
once, in the recent past, we were pretty 
big hitters on a worldwide stage. 
22 It would be good to preserve some of the 
things....  It might help us to discover some 
of what went on..... 
A) there really is no reason to tell it from 
a British point of view, or an allies.  I 
believe that the USSR had just the same 
fears as we did.  In the end there were 
no winners or losers. 
23 Its not something I have considered before 
and don't feel I know enough about it 
Worldwide context- it is important that 
history is taught not just from a British 
perspective if we wish our students to 
become critical thinkers 
24 It's essential to keep at least a few 
examples restored for historical reference 
It should be included in the history 
curriculum. I think a view of all sides with 
a lean toward why we acted as we did 
25 There is no doubt, the cold war will be one 
of the most important periods in history. 
Why would you wait until the history 
deteriorates and knowledge is lost?  
It is a mistake to narrow learning to a 
single perspective. To not tell the whole 
story is an outdated idea. We (as a 
society) tend to look down on countries 
that employ information control and 
have a ‘minister of information’ lurking 
whenever we pay a visit!! We pride 
ourselves on freedom of speech and free 
press, this is no different. Of course 
highlight Britain’s role, national pride is 
important, but the big picture is the 
primary focus. 
26 Historically we've been too quick to rid 
ourselves of controversial, secret or 
industrial built heritage. I think it's essential 
to see it, explore it, teach and learn about 
it, and to address it face on in an honest 
manner. 
It may be easier to identify with 'British' 
Cild War history. Being able to visit sites 
of interest would be useful. But teaching 
within a 'vacuum' of the global story is 
only half the real story. 
27 Archaeology starts yesterday. more 
reseacrh sgoudl be done whilst it is still in 
the memorty of those who took part  
The world wide contect. Th eimpact on 
global and Europen politics through the 
50s and 60 s shoudld be talk together 
with the legacy that we still live with  
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28 I think it is important we should remember 
this period in our recent history and 
therefore protecting & preserving sites is 
worthwhile in helping recall that period to 
future generations 
I believe we should teach it in a 
worldwide context in order that future 
generations realise the suffering that 
went on in Eastern Europe and Russia.  
Not forgetting the important part played 
by USA in the cold war especially the 
Cuban crisis 
29 As a keen archaeologist, I believe it is never 
too soon to protect any site of significance 
for future generations. 
a. You cannot do the topic justice 
without a worldwide context. By all 
means give greater emphasis to the UK's 
involvement, but the major protagonists 
were the US and USSR, so anything less 
than worldwide would be meaningless. 
30 People are your best resource, the people 
who served and the people who suffered.  
Sites are good but they make a lot more 
sense after you have spoken to the people 
who used them, especially as they will have 
been cleared of any sensitive hardware by 
the time most of us get to look at them! 
A world wide context with British case 
studies, after all, they are generally the 
closest sites to visit. 
31 we need to be recording them now, while 
they are still intact and the people who ran 
them can give oral records. 
Like all history we need to give it in a 
wider context so it can be seen in the 
round, with a closer look that how it 
effected Britian.  
32 It is not too soon to investigate, provided it 
is done objectively.  Classification of sites is 
totally warranted 
A. British Cold War history is too narrow. 
Context is everything 
33 I don't think it's too early to investigate the 
Cold War, and anything that can be done to 
help us better understand the Cold War, 
such as protecting these types of sites now, 
should be considered. 
A. Teaching it in a worldwide context 
within Britain will inevitably include the 
British story. The teaching of all types of 
history is necessary.  
34 The collapse of the USSR and the ditching 
of Communism was the great under-
reported and neglected story of the later 
C20th. Since the collapse, some, not all, 
communist state archives have opened up. 
Some have since closed again. Some 
scholars have already seized the 
opportunity to access these temporarily 
opened archives and published their 
findings on that basis. If all former 
communist state archives open and remain 
open, the investigation can continue. But 
remember that the present-day 
independent states of Communist Eastern 
Europe are now beyond the formerly 
centralized control and have not closed 
their archives. What the situation requires 
Context: I hadn't heard that it is a new 
subject. Can anyone explain why it would 
be new? Then again, since the majority 
of people during the Cold War years 
lived their lives as if there were not any 
such thing as a Cold War, even though 
coastal cities were within 12 minutes of 
submarine-launched missiles, it's no real 
surprise to hear that the Cold War is 
either a forgotten subject or someone's 
idea of a new one. Question (A), 
answered affirmatively, would subsume 
(B). Question (C) is in line with Henry 
Ford's "History is bunk." 
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is an investigation and spotlighting of what 
former communist state archives are open 
and where, country by country; in short, an 
inventory. I can't imagine what scholars are 
so timid as to suggest that the world should 
wait. 
35 I think it's extremely important to 
investigate: to explore how far propaganda 
is actively used to promote government 
aims and wishes even when it isn't totally 
apparent, how far populations can be 
manipulated into believing certain 
situations and how far 
propaganda/manipulations begin to take 
on a life of their own.  I'm speaking with 
reference, of course, Iraq/WMD, Al 
Quaeda, the Muslim "threat" etc etc. 
I think it should be taught in a world 
wide context - or it has no context!  
Perhaps with some emphasis on the 
British story as familiarity can help 
engage students in learning - but yes - it 
needs to be taught within the context of 
world wide post war politics. 
36 I don't think it is too early. There is already 
a new generation or two who have grown 
up without the alleged threat of nuclear 
attack and there are still many people alive 
to tell them about it.  
We should definitely teach it in a 
worldwide context.  The attacks we were 
scared of would have come from outside 
the country and it was mainly the USA 
and USSR who were the main 
protagonists. 
37 I think we have to confront all periods of 
conflict in order to teach us to avoid, if 
possible, such situations. So, sites should be 
protected. However, they are generally not 
aesthetically pleasing like castles and 
hillforts, a lesson in itself. 
I think, as someone interested in 
prehisory and the medieval period 
including warfare then, that too much 
about recent dreadful events e.g. the 
Holocaust is taught; however I recognise 
the importance of this teaching, which 
includes the years of the Cold War. It 
should be taught in a worldwide context. 
My personal views are coloured by 
knowing, living through and reading 
about these events. Everyone should 
know about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The terrible destruction of these 
communities is the only lesson we have 
of the effects of nuclear weapons,  
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38 Of course we should be (and are) 
protecting Cold War sites now. While often 
unsightly and unpreposessing, the 40 year 
military stand off in the 20th century is a 
huge part of our cultural heritage. We (in 
North Somerset) are currently recording a 
(minor) naval weapons development site of 
Cold War date: I don't necessarily expect 
the general public to appreciate the 
importance of these sites now, but if we 
don't protect some, they will never have 
the opportunity. 
The Cold War, and all its offshoots like 
the proxy wars in Africa, the space race, 
the tensions between China and India 
(and the USSR and China) all formed the 
backdrop to 20th century life. Although 
the threat has been replaced with that of 
ecocastrophe, it was still a political and 
general driver of national life. Yes, the 
British story should be told in schools, 
but set in the context of the global story. 
39 Rewriting history is more difficult than 
demolishing Cold War [ or subsequent] 
military instalations. If it came to a choice 
preservation should take precedence over 
investigation although how you can do one 
without the other I dont know 
In simple terms yes but I would have 
thought there needs to be an 
international context before the british 
story can make sense.  Biggest fear is 
who will do the teaching ~ the last thing 
we need is an Irvin holocaust denial type 
spin with a left wing apologist approach 
to the threat coupled to a imperialist 
coulored view of the response. 
40 Investigating the cold war isn't necessarily 
the same as 'protecting sites'. In any case, 
invesitgating and protecting 'sites' gives a 
false picture of what the COld War was all 
about. It wasn't about places as such. 
Please give some context to your 
questions. Of course it should be taught, 
but if this questionnaire is anything to go 
by, I'm concerned about it being taught 
in too simplistic a manner. How can the 
Cold War be taught purely froma British 
perspective? 
41 It isn't something that should be ignored - 
theoretically we're supposed to learn from 
history although ironically history shows us 
that we don't seem to! We should be 
protecting sites now as even if they're not 
investigated now, they should be there for 
the future to make sure it isn't a period of 
history that's forgotten. 
It should be taught in a worldwide 
context as it was a global issue of which 
Britain was a part.  To teenagers today it 
is already "history" and something they 
can't remember themselves.  
Unfortunately history is not taught well 
at schools in general these days and as 
this is very recent history, it would take a 
really good unbiased teacher to give 
pupils/students the opportunity to think 
about it and form some independent 
opinions.  The other thing is that it can't 
be taught in isolation - to understand the 
events and why people thought and did 
what they did, you need to understand 
what happened before the cold war.  
This is the same for anyone studying 
WW1 or WW2 or pretty much any 
19th/20th century history in particular.   
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42 Significance of Cold War sites can be 
determined now, at a time when issues of 
vulnerability can be strategically managed. 
Distance of time won't change significance, 
but could result in the loss of structures 
that might be worth preserving.  Should be 
pro active in conserving structures that 
demonstrate the paradox - folly of UK 
policy and the brilliance of technical 
innovation. 
 a) and b) together. Without the 
worldwide context the particular 
character of the British story is 
meaningless. The British perspective is 
essential if understanding is to be 
relevant to a British audience. 
43 It is important to study and protect these 
sites now while we can still obtain 1st hand 
accounts of what went on. A lot of Cold 
War sites are vulnerable, some to 
derelection and demolition as they were 
built with a specific purpose in mind and 
therefore are difficult to adapt to other 
uses. Other sites such as former airfields 
suffer the same issue but also suffer from 
the threat of redevelopment as business 
parks. Therefore we must act now to 
record, study & where appropriate 
designate sites for protection.  
The Cold War should be taught in 
schools in a British & worldwide context. 
It is an important part of what still 
influences political decisions and policy 
in both east & west. Learning about the 
arms race, MAD and the nuclear hair 
trigger upon which both sides exisited 
for 40 years will help to ensure that the 
past does not repeat itself. (It cold be 
argued that old Cold War posturing and 
attitudes are making their way back into 
Russian & US politics). 
44 It is never too soon to investigate an 
historic event, and I would be amazed if 
that was the view of modern historians.   
The point about the sites is a different one. 
Some sites should be preserved, but they 
need to be interpreted and put in context.  
It need to be taught in a worldwide 
context, otherwise it would be a bit 
pointless in my view.  
45 I would support the latter opinion.  It is too 
easy to pass off the Cold War and its 
infrastructure as being a time we don't 
want to remember. But it has shaped the 
world we live in today, much more than 
any other period of our past.  
Only on a worldwide context - we need 
to teach the whole story - not just about 
the 'goodies' and the 'baddies' which 
unfortunately is all too often the way the 
Cold War is perceived. 
47 Lets investigate, but I would say that I am 
an archaeologist! 
Definitely a, you cannot teach a 
worldwide subject focussing on one 
country. I think it would be fair to 
highlight the British story but it would 
need to be placed in it's context. I have 
seen how Americans teach the history of 
the space race in American High Schools 
and it is very misleading only showing 
the American view. 
48 the same issues are present in the world 
today, yes we definitely need to protect 
sites and think about what they mean 
a - worldwide is the only way to 
understand (most things) 
49 The cold war is over but it had an effect on 
buildings, infrastructure and people. It is 
therefore vital to record and in certain 
cases protect and learn from surviving sites 
A and B. Its a worldwide event with 
particular British issues. It therefore 
should be about the geo-political power 
play and focus on issues relating to the 
UK  
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before the people who worked there are 
lost. 
50 I think some sites should be preserved; 
many have already been destoyed or 
converted to alternative uses.  Physical 
remains are a very important way of 
learning and remembering.  
It should be taught and it is possible to 
teach both the British and worldwide 
perspectives - it was a global event so 
needs a global perspective.  
51 I think we should be protecting sites in 
order that there is something to study in 
the future 
The cold war needs to be taught on a 
world wide basis.  It is important as 
many contemporary problems have their 
origins in the Cold War 
52 The early warning stations in Shetland are 
already being lost and some were quite 
interesting in the landscape.  Some are 
currently in the process of being scheduled.  
In a Shetland context that is important as it 
was part of life up here. 
In a worldwide context not a Thatchers 
Britain context - although the whole 
thing around how it brought down Neil 
Kinnock and the Labour Party is quite 
interesting too 
53 ABsolutely - protect sites now, we are well 
within the 30 year rule for most. I may be 
biased (did my dissertation on cold war 
bldgs and also have done research into the 
area for Historic Scotland) but these 
buildings WILL be lost if we don't do 
anything soon. 
A & B. You can't understand the Brit 
position without knowing the greater 
context, what was happening all over the 
world. It would be like teaching canadian 
history and missing out on the who 
native thing. 
54 Select key sites for protection and 
document the rest. 
I taught it 30 years ago in secondary 
schools in England and Germany. I still 
think its a vital part of C20 history and 
don't see how you can do b without a! 
55 It is never too early to re-examine historical 
events, and to question the assumptions of 
the recent past. It might even prevent 
similar mistakes being made in the future. 
Its a worldwide topic so it should be 
understood in that context 
56 I think that we should be protecting sites 
and also recording the stories and thoughts 
of people involved (on both sides of the 
fence). Too often we have assumed that we 
don't need to consider recent events 
because 'everyone knows about that', 
except that they don't. Especially when the 
sites were secret. We need to understand 
the context in order to understand why 
people made the decisions they did. 
I think we should teach it in a worldwide 
context, whilst allowing people to see 
how and why that context affected 
Britain. Tis allows to understand past 
decisions and reflect on whether the 
context has changed to the point where 
we can make different decisions. 
Examples of decisions now and in the 
near future could relate to the retention 
of Trident and to nuclear power. People 
who grew up during the Cold War were 
constantly told of the destructive 
capability of nuclear warheads and I 
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think that this has been developed into a 
fear of all nuclear uses.  
57 Some scholars should take a running 
jump... You can investigate and protect 
whatever you like, provided you set out 
intersubjective research criteria. 
a) Yes, see Q4 above; b) how can you 
understand the British story without the 
context of the USA story, which provided 
the bulk of the impetus, funding, 
hardware, technology transfer, etc? c) 
Are you really suggesting that we don't 
study modern history?? 
58 I agree that it's too important to ignore and 
indeed this is a citical period for 
investigating and understanding the Cold 
War in Britain. The dismantling of many 
Cold War military bases has been underway 
for some time and we are in danger of 
loosing the local knowledge of what went 
on at a number of sites.  The fragility of the 
protest camps and of other traces of 
political protest should also be an 
important consideration. 
I think that it's important to understand 
both the international context and the 
national and local story.  The Cold War 
impacted on everyone who lived through 
it in a broadly similar way to the Second 
World War; as we loose the generation 
who lived through the Second World 
War, direct and personal experiences of 
the Cold War will become more 
important as a way of engaging school 
children in making the connection 
between world events, politics and 
individual people's lives.  
59 
 
It is very important that we learn from 
the cold war and apply these lessons to 
our day to day and future plans.  
60 It is importnat to conserve some physical 
artifacts before all destroyed - we are only 
just beginning to appreciate this with 
respect to WWII structures. E.G. Caerwent 
WWII propellant factory became US 
depository for Nukes when De Gaulle 
kicked US/NATO out of France - special 
structures erected for storage. 
Need to be careful to avoid EITHER 
slanted history OR airbrushing out. (C) 
would count as airbrushing, to my mind. 
Difficult to talk sensibly just looking at 
UK role (as advanced platform for NATO 
missiles?) 
61 Undoubtably, access to records and other 
resources (such as oral histories and sites of 
significance) will change over time, with 
some becoming available, and others 
closed - the new resources will facilitate 
new interpretations.  Using historical and 
archaeological approaches to 
understanding can be confrontational, but 
also can facilitate change, and bring 
closure.  
Definitely worldwide: all history post 
1600 (or so!) is in a context of global 
networks and global issues, such as 
colonialism and post-colonialism, 
commodification, and capitalism.  
Children should be taught the big picture 
as one of a number of frameworks, and 
also to practice history and archaeology 
at the family and community levels. 
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62 I think we should protect a representative 
sample of sites.  
I think it needs to be taught, and both in 
a worldwide context and showing the 
'British, story. 
63 Scholars and historians have of course been 
investigating the cold war, thats an odd 
question. If you narrow your question to 
what you're saying about protecting the 
sites, then yes they should be preserved, its 
part of the historical landscape. But I don't 
think its about forcing people to confront 
the period personally! would academic 
historian or archaeologists really want to 
do this? They might want to enable people 
to think critically about this period, present 
an interpretation where people can see 
what evidence they cite for it etc. 
Is it? I thought people were complaining 
all kids learn about is Stalin and Hitler. 
However, yes, it should be taught. a) of 
course, howe on earth could it not be 
taught in a world wide context. It was 
the policy of the USA primarily and 
Britain, now fatally weakened as an 
imperial power followed on its coat tails.  
64 Kids these days seem to know very little 
about the C20th. Many know nothing of 
the Falklands conflict ( a mere 25 years 
ago). The learn about WW1 as part of the 
national curriculeam, but what stop at 
1939? 
context is all important - no-one did 
anything in isolation. The cold war only 
makes sence when you look at the global 
view. 
65 Is it too early to investigate the archaeology 
of windmills?  Having gone to Denmark to 
investigate early windmills, I can hardly say 
that investigating something as ancient as 
the cold war is too old. 
See below 
66 I think it is an interesting period, and by its 
very secretive nature much of it is 
completely unknown to most people.  I 
think it is too soon considering all the other 
stuff that could be protected. 
I think it should be taught in a worldwide 
context as the whole idea of a nuclear 
deterrent was based on what the 'other' 
country had or didn't have, and this 
would give children a better 
understanding of the issues involved 
both for this country and abroad. 
67 We should be protecting sites now. It is 
difficult to assess the significance of recent 
history so perhaps some sort of temporary 
designation may be appropriate, i.e. 
protect now and reassess in 30 or 40 years, 
but it may not be practical. 
We should teach it - a worldwide context 
would be best as the actions of 
successive British governments only 
make sense (or not) in relation to what 
was happening in other countries at the 
time.  
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68 We have been continually investigating the 
Cold War since it began in 1946. It opened 
itself to analyisis immediately because it 
was based upon fear and perception and 
these elements naturally open themselves 
to introspection.  The question of 
preservation is a management issue after 
they have been identified. Identifying them 
through investigation cannot wait as many 
have already been demolished. 
It has to be taught in a worldwide 
context. Concentrating on the British 
narrative perpetuates the ideology of the 
Cold War by isolating it to one 
perspective, one perception. That 
reinforces fear. 
69 We should investigate and confront sites, 
discourses, representations, beliefs, 
practices and materials from this era as we 
would any other. We should certainly not 
brush it under the carpet, assume that we 
were the good guys or assume that we 
'won' the Cold War 
Teach it in a worldwide context, 
otherwise its significance as a North-
South set of conflicts (as opposed to the 
hegemonic 'East-West' narrative) can 
never be fully exposed. Pupils are mostly 
already immersed in 'British' cultural 
discourses about world politics - this is a 
chance to break them out of such habits. 
In any case, the 'British' story would have 
to include, for example, decolonisation 
in Africa and Asia - both because of UK 
intervention in those regions, but also 
because children in British schools are 
from these regions, so it is a crucial part 
of how they ended up in the UK and how 
and why the UK is as it is today. 
70 Protect, protect, protect.  Quite apart from 
the fact that it's NEVER too early 
investigate our past, I fear for the future of 
many of these 'ugly, concrete carbunkels'. 
What possible right does this generation 
have to summarily decide that an entire 
category of monuments are, effectively, 
too ugly and useless to be worthy of 
preserving? What treasures are we robbing 
from the next generation?  This type of 
thinking happens with every generation, 
who struggle to see the value in their 
parents' history but have no trouble in 
valuing their grandparents' history - just 
look at how hard Sir John Betjemen had to 
work to preserve St Pancras station, a 
towering monument to Victorian neo-
gothic architecture that would outrage the 
general public today should it be torn 
down... 
a - teach it in a worldwide context.  War 
these days is global, and the lessons 
learnt from the Cold War are relevent to 
modern geopolitical situations too.  The 
British response is a subset of that story, 
and we should focus on that in schools 
too else pupils will feel that the subject is 
detached from our modern lives - you 
need to root the subject in the 'little 
stuff' that's close to home to make it 
come alive i.e. to make that direct link 
between the weird concrete carbunkel at 
the bank of the local park to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis et al. 
71 History is now as well as before - 
everything should be studied 
World wide - especially USA with its 
McCarthy era etc 
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72 No legitimate historian ever says 'it's too 
soon to study' something; it may well be 
too soon to reach quite all the eventual 
conclusions. Equally, this candy-floss 
language w/r/t 'confronting the period' 
sounds like redbrick socialist balls to me. 
It can hardly be taught without context. 
Concentration upon the British context 
seems necessarily obvious. Mind, if the 
usual leftish idiots are to teach it in the 
state schools, it might be best to give it a 
miss altogether. 
73 I do believe that Cold War can be studied 
now. While some aspects of that 
experience will become evident in the 
future decades, this does not mean that a 
lot of research can already be done now. I 
am strongly in favour of protecting sites 
related to Cold War to allow both historians 
and the general public a better grasp of 
what Cold War represented for Britain and 
British people. 
I do believe that it is legitimate to study 
Cold War using both an international and 
a domestic approach. While many 
phenomena related to Cold War can be 
regarded as "exogenous" from a British 
point of view, they interacted with 
British realities and produced specific 
trends and realities.  Specific research 
questions can be addressed with a more 
narrow approach, obviously. But, for the 
sale of eaching, I would regard a mix 
approach as the most worthwhile to 
develop a general grasp of the topic. 
74 The 1990s are already a different historical 
era so of course the Cold War is one... 
In a worldwide context. Young people 
need to know the things the British 
governments and governments of other 
capitalist states acquiesced in in the 
name of protecting the freedom of 
generatons who were yet to be born... 
75 The longer we leave it before we start 
preserving sites and investigating the Cold 
War, the more evidence (both physical and 
personal) will be lost. 
It makes sense to place it in a worldwide 
context, however the national story and 
how it effected the UK also needs to be 
told 
76 It is imperative to protect and understand 
this legacy not only because it is reminder 
of the history of the period, but also toe 
explain the legacy of the Cold War 
politically today as it still shapes world wide 
politics. The Cold War was a hot war as far 
as many countries were concerned, as the 
influence of the super powers still shapes 
nations, their policies, who their rulers are, 
and ultimately their fates. 
a and b, the world wide story is essential 
to understand how we put ourselves in 
such an extreme position. The local story 
tells of the psychology of the Cold War 
on individuals. e.g. the postmaster who 
is prepared to leave his wife and children 
to die in order to man an ROC bunker - 
which he does often without telling his 
family. 
77 We should be protecting sites now to 
preserve evideence for future analysis. 
These are the hillfort remains for the 
future. 
It should be taught in schools within a 
worldwide context. Only in this way, can 
Europe's dependence on American 
military might and know-how be fully 
appreciated. 
78 Do they?? Have you told Peter Hennessy 
this? or perhaps asked at the numerous HE 
establishments running courses on the 
subject? It's growth area! 
In a worldwide context with an emphasis 
on our National and Local preparedness. 
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79  we should be protecting the sites now 
while we still have the people who maned 
them around and can help with the right 
interpretasion of them and small bits if kit 
be it manuals hard wear and equipment 
will come to light 
 worldwide as with all wars if we push 
them under the carpet and forget them 
we are doomed to make the same 
mistakes time and time again 
80 There is a major difference between 
investigating the Cold War and preserving 
sites. Heritage is process not product! And I 
am not sure at this waving of a national flag 
yet again, it was an international matter. 
Lowenthal would remind us of the need to 
forget. But presumably stirring it all up will 
get lots more British schoolchildren to hate 
foreigners, and buy the Daily Mail. 
Certainly in a worldwide context, or at 
least a European context. Indeed I am 
shocked that such an option does not 
occur to you. Be aware that I was taught 
the Geography of Europe at 3 points in 
my education, but never east of the Iron 
Curtain. But for my parents Europe was a 
single place. As my father said as he was 
dying and I told him that Poland was 
free, he gripped my hand and said, 'I 
went to war for Poland'. The Poles call it 
the 50 years war, 1939-89. 
81 The sites are an important part of our 
heritage and should help us to remember 
and hopefully learn lessons from our past. 
a) Important to understand how it came 
about and what impact it had on those 
generations of people involved. 
82 It's never too early to record and 
investigate any subject. The lack of 
documentary and archaeological records 
about WW2 sites in Britain, including 
contemporary social history, illustrates the 
need to do this work as soon as possible.  
About the Cold War specifically,  there are 
two parts to any investigation - gathering 
information and interpreting it.  Some may 
want to leave the interpretation for a while 
until the period can be viewed objectively, 
however the earlier that the information 
gathering process begins the more chance 
it has of collecting relevant facts.  
Concentrate on the British story.  This 
does not mean minimise the worldwide 
context, however the British story will 
probably be more interesting to students 
and encourage them to learn about the 
Cold War. 
83 Preservation of Cold War relics and 
structures is important, but not for the 
reasons advanced above. 
Mainly (b) but, of course, that can only 
be done really effectively with a bit of 
(a). 
84 The Cold War played a huge role in our 
history and as such it needs to be 
impartially studied.  The relics of this period 
are as historic as any other site built but 
not used for its intended purpose (eg the 
Palmerston Forts) and are as deserving of 
protection.  Their recent provenance does 
not reduce their historical importance. 
The Cold War was worldwide; it should 
therefore be taught in a worldwide 
context.  One area cannot be studied in 
isolation.  Britain's role is mainly that of 
the 'US aircraft carrier off Europe'; our 
forces were a valuable adjunct to those 
of the USA, but the real war (sometimes 
hot, sometimes cold) was between the 
USA, Russia and China. 
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85 Our response reflects the assessed threat 
level and our capabilities. We are where we 
are because of the assessed threat and the 
state of our national finances. I would be 
quite happy to see the cold war topic 
included in contemporary history and we 
are still  one of the few world nuclear 
powers. 
Competition for curricular time is hotly 
contested. I think the inclusion of the 
cold war is certainly worthy of a mention 
alongside WW1, WW2 and other recent 
conflicts. 
86 I agree with the latter point as a military 
archaeologist. 
It was taught in Modern Studies in 
schools in the late 1970s! I did both O 
level and Higher Modern Studies in that 
period. The Cold War was taught as a 
world-wide phenomenon then, and 
should be now. 
87 It's certainly not too soon (how old are 
those scholars?) Sites do need to be 
preserved, but on a basis of rational 
selection. If this is not done, they will be 
lost. So much relatively recent material has 
gone that we have a better representation 
of Roman and medieval military sites than 
civil war or WWI defences. 
I favour a), but that applies to history 
generally: some national emphasis to 
relate to, but within the bigger picture. 
Any such addition to the curriculum 
should NOT be designed by politicians or 
their cronies. Personal context: Alevel 
'modern' history tentatively reached the 
1920s; CW was not mentioned. As a '60s 
teenager and keen newspaper reader I 
had no awareness of it in any historical 
sense. 
88 The Cold War deserves as much attention 
as any other part of the historic 
environment, and the physical remains 
should be recorded, protected (designated) 
where appropriate, managed and 
interpreted / promoted to raise awareness 
and understanding.  Oral histories should 
be recorded. 
Should be taught from the British 
perspective in a European context. 
89 It's never too soon to try and better 
understand the C/W and its legacy.  As such 
we should be investigating and protecting 
now.  
A & B together. It provides a vital context 
for today - both in terms of the UK and 
the world.  
90 
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91 It must be preserved as a lesson to what 
extremes polical and national mistrust can 
be taken to. 
It need to be taught in a world wide 
context so the pupil can understand why 
a relatively small country such as ours 
went to such great extremes in wepons 
production and troop deployments. 
Europe until the 2000's, the far and near 
east up to the late 60's. 
92 I think that while they are an important 
part of our past and they should be 
protected that the denial of the post war 
period and britians decline is endemic in 
offical circles and shows up in lack of 
funding for conservation of not only these 
structurs but more noticably in our lack of 
concern of our industrial heratige.  
the cold war is a world wide event ( 
which is not yet over) and as such while 
we should exmine british history of the 
event it should be exmined as part of a 
globel conflict which will give persective 
to britains part. 
93 Depends what you mean by protect. Save 
them in an archaeological sense, or keep 
them available for tr-use? 
Definitely c. the average teacher has too 
much difficyulty getting to grips with 
historymeven at the mosr basic level, 
and this is a complicated subject. 
94 No it was never to early as we could find 
out how communication between the 
countries broke down in such a way that a 
war was needed 
teach it from a worldwide  context with 
special focus on the british story behind 
it 
95 Never too soon to investigate past events. 
Nothing wrong with confronting important 
issues. 
Broadly worlwide, with a focus on the 
things that influenced the British actions. 
It needs to be taught as otherwise 
96 It's never too soon to investigate the truth 
of what has happened.  
A worldwide context. The story of Britain 
alone would be pretty uneventful. "Sat in 
the middle, woefully underprepared 
economy and military, didn't do a lot." 
97 I think the sites should be protected so we 
can study what happened and what could 
have happened in depth. This could lead to 
a better understanding to avoid anything 
like this happening again. 
I think that the cold war should be 
taught in schools from a worldwide 
perspective with emphasis on the british 
story as we know more about it and 
children in schools can relate more to 
britian than other countries. this gives 
them a view on what happed worldwide 
but gives them something they can 
relate to in more depth. 
98 yeah it couldnt hurt, we have saved other 
war sites from history, why not embrace 
and learn from the cold war 
teach them all the facts about it 
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99 I think it should be investigated. We do not 
want to forget what happened (such as 
ww2) because it allows us to learn from the 
mistakes and realise it did actually happen. 
If we confront it now we can see how it all 
escalated and how it can be prevented in 
future, e.g. instead of intimidating others 
with weapons they can discuss issues 
diplomatically and sort out their 
differences.  If we forget about it there is a 
danger it may happen again, the cold war 
has set an example, a precedent. 
a) History needs to be shown from both 
sides so that the reasonings behind it can 
be seen. If there is only one side shown 
this will lead to being Biased, and this 
will result in biased views, which is one 
of the main factors that contributed to 
the Cold War! Seeing things from other 
peoples views is what is needed in 
politics and diplomacy which will 
hopefully prevent any future tensions 
like the Cold War. 
100 i don't think its to soon to investigate the 
cold war  
i think we should teach it in a world wide 
contex to show the reasons why other 
countries got involved and not just the 
uk's view on it  
101 Its never to soon, to investigate a war 
because the longer we leave it, the harder 
the truth will be to find out amd we will 
never work out if it was ever worth all that 
money. 
I beleve we should teach it, world wide, 
all the stories from all the diffent point of 
veiw. This is a resent subject and a 
relivent one to our way of life so it 
should eb taught in great depth as it will 
give children an idea of early 20th centry 
life and it covers a great varitey of 
subjects, that can be taught, I.E. nuclear 
science, geography and the changes in 
society. 
102 It is not too soon to investigate the cold 
war as it is a major part of history where 
the world could have been on the brink of 
destruction, therefore should not be 
forgotten but possibly not all the sites at 
they are often ugly derelict buildings. Some 
should be protected and have artifacts 
from the period but some could be made 
usable again to make the most of space. 
We should teach the cold war in schools 
because it can show the economic and 
psycological effects it had on the nation 
as well as how close the war was to 
escillating out of control changing the 
face of the earth as we know it. I the cold 
war is taught in schools it could be used 
to prevent anything similar happening 
again or to be used to spot warning signs 
of anything like this happening again. 
103 We should definitely protect sites as 
learning from history stops us from making 
the same mistakes again. 
a) As it's one of the most fascinating 
periods of history, as it's a relatively 
recent event, school children can learn 
first hand from people who lived through 
that era. It was one of the most well 
documented periods in history, and can 
lead to other subjects such as: The 
Apollo programme (and the off-shoot 
inventions). Communism v. Capitalism. 
Literature. The berlin wall/airlift. The 
Stasi. How current political tentions 
came about. The formation of Israel. The 
West/East's involvement in arming sides 
in The Yom Kippur 
war/Vietnam/Afghanistan etc. The 
advancement of technology & science 
etc.  
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104 I feel it is necassary to protect as many 
major cold war sites as possible because 
these allow a generation of people who 
never experienced the tensions of the time 
to experience what it was like and see the 
political and social context of the terbulant 
period of history. I also feel that 
investigating the cold war is necassary now 
because it is important to study the 
mistakes and acomplishments of the era so 
that the future is made better. It is also 
important to study it while the information 
is relativley fresh so that there is plenty of 
detail for future generations to learn from. 
I feel that it should be learned about in a 
worldwide context because it was a 
period that affected most of the world 
and sparked numerous conflicts 
throughout the world. Britain was not 
the only nation affected by the tension. 
105 We should, though it will be embrassing for 
all nations envoled. 
A) I studied it at college and  and it gave 
me a good understanding to world 
politics, Brittish politics and a basic 
understand ideology. It is easier to say I 
can't think of any cons of learning it. 
106 It's not too soon to investigate it, obviously 
as time goes by perspectives will change 
but it is certainly time to start preserving 
some of the key sites, or else it might be 
too late. 
a) Teach it in a worldwide context, 
definitely (maybe look at foreign 
propaganda, how it was reported in the 
press etc.). Not just the standard 
US/British view, but also the Soviet 
Union perspective, and tensions within 
the two big blocks. How it affected 
worldwide economy and cultures. 
107 It is never too soon to start investigating 
any historical event. 
Teach it in a worldwide context 
108 No - investigate away if we are able to gain 
access to records/ sites.  If someone did 
then I might be able to answer the 
questions above more fully! 
It depends upon what we are excluding 
from the curriculum in order to include 
this. If taught, it should probably be from 
a worldwide perspective to enable 
budding historians to appreciate history 
from a wider viewpoint.  The cold war 
probably shaped national identities and 
perceptions of national identities today 
so it doesn't seem an unreasonable 
subject to include, especially as there is a 
wide variety of fiction on the subject 
which may well distort understandings of 
the most probable historical narratives. 
109 Never too early to look at things in detail. 
Some representative sites would be worth 
preserving. 
Definitely should be taught, and should 
be widely contextualised. I went to 
school in Germany in the 80s, so the 
narrative was more complex than I 
suspect presented in Britain - the 
division of the country, the fall-out of 
WWII etc.  Evenso, there was a big gap 
between WWII and the cold-war; the SE 
Asian wars mostly ignored, the 
continuous narrative from WWI to the 
Cold War not established etc. I do think 
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history should be presented in terms of 
long narratives, rather than separate 
episodes, and certainly a narrow or 
national focus is inevitably simplifying. 
110 Never too soon to investigate, but 
implementing findings should be sensitive. 
Anything we teach should be taught in 
context of the impact on the world. Only 
giving the British impact is biased and ill-
informed. We can be forgiven for 
concentrating on our own history, as 
long as it is all put in context (e.g. 4 
lessons for UK, 1 lesson for world). But 
then, I am a social scientist! We should 
also ensure we give an honest viewpoint:  
Not everything that Britain does is right 
Not everything which Britain does 
incorrectly is done for wrong reasons  
What else was going on at the time to 
affect the decisions?  Teaching history is 
so complicated because it is never black 
& white; how far back in history does 
one have to study to determine the real 
cause of a war, for example?  
111 The Cold War is already history and as 
much as possible of its remaining artefacts 
and architecture should be preserved 
and/or recorded. We are in a position to 
choose how to present that period of 
history to future generations rather than 
them relying on whatever random bits of 
archaeology survive. I don't think that 
"confronting" that period is an issue; rather 
the ugliness of its remains and the recency 
of the period are a barrier to people 
thinking that Cold War remains deserve to 
be preserved. 
Yes it should be taught, but then there 
are hundred of other topics just as valid. 
But certainly I'd say the teaching of it as 
part of an overview of the 20th Century 
is more valid to British school kids than 
studying the unification of Germany or 
the repeal of the Corn Laws. 
112 no it is not too soon, history is history it 
cannot be ignored. 
It should be placed in a world wide 
context, which then focuses in on Britain. 
I believe the war is taught far too much 
from an American perspective. 
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113 It is not too soon, this was a truly vast 
paradigm of human existence that 
profoundly affected those who lived 
through it and which continues to shape 
global geopolitics today: understanding 
how and why it came about, how and why 
it was sustained, and how and why it came 
to an end, will provide valuable information 
for the conscious planning of a brighter, 
more peaceful future. Protecting sites 
should form part of these efforts to 
consider and evacuate the impact and 
legacy of the Cold War.  
Yes, with the emphasis on A. The Cold 
War was a global event that marked the 
moment when Britain was no longer in a 
position to shape the world 
independently. It is thus important to 
explain how Britain fitted into this new 
world order, and how global events that 
were precipitated in this historical period 
are still affecting our world today - and 
thus, Britain's place within it. 
114 It's not too soon - particularly since we 
have greater access to both documentary 
evidence and living memories - but it 
should be understood that many looks are 
unlikely to be detached due to connections 
with current politics and so on, and 
consequent emotional engagement. The 
preseveration of historical sites is certainly 
valuable (and with some of the 
aforementioned bunkers is already taking 
place), the notion that we need to 
'confront' the period seems a loaded term 
that displays the emotional engagement I 
referred to above. 
It's not that new a topic - certainly not 
for A-levels, where some course engaged 
with it back in the 90s. It should certainly 
be taught, as a period that continues to 
have a significant influence today. I do 
not see how it can be effectively taught 
without including the worldwide context 
- Britain after all was not one of the 
primary actors as its empire declined. 
115 No it is not too soon. It was a very 
important period which is good to begin to 
understand historically, and while people 
who lived through it are alive to give 
personal witness. As for sites - I struggle to 
think which you might mean ? Christmas 
Island or Bikini atoll ? ! If there is a nuclear 
bunker somewhere in England fine - but I'd 
need some further guidance about what is 
intended here to give a proper reply. (Sorry 
- I guess you have archaeol sites that I don't 
know about) 
Yes it should be taught, but surely it can 
only be taught in a worldwide context. 
Britain was only a small part of it often 
hanging on the coat-tails of the USA.  
However history is often taught using 
local examples in order to make it 
relevant to students. So the British story 
needs to be included - but in my view it 
should be taught with the focus on the 
global context but also showing what it 
meant for Britons at the time. 
116 It is inevitable that the Cold War will be 
perceived differently in future generations.  
It is useful to start now while there are still 
people who lived through it. 
World-wide context. It is part of and sets 
the context to the change in Britain since 
the Second World War and Britain's 
place on the global stage. 
117 No, it is not too soon to investigate the 
Cold War. Select sites should certainly be 
preserved for future generations. In 
comparison, the bunkers on Jersey are 
today a reminder of WWII and some of 
them are preserved. 
In the modern era, it should be a). My 
son in year 10 notes a lot of anti-
Americanism in the school curriculum 
and the way it is presented. By 'a 
worldwide context' what is needed in a 
non-nationalistic narrative. The USSR's 
story should also be told. 
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118 In some places it is essential to investigate 
the Cold War. An example that springs to 
mind is Germany, where academic studies 
and a general public analysis can assist with 
understanding their reconciliation. 
However, somewhere like the Ukraine, 
which is still suffering from the aftershock 
of the Cold War (and is currently 
undergoing riots between pro-Western and 
pro-Russian factions), it is perhaps too son.  
A worldwide context is crucial for 
understanding this conflict.  
119 Now is especially the time to investigate 
and preserve, before it's all lost. 
This country does not teach us well 
about our past, and is rather solipsistic.  
Schools should teach about (b) our role 
in the Cold War, but of course there is 
great competition between different 
topics on the curriculum. 
120 It's over 20 years since the Cold War ended 
- I think it is essential that the Cold War is 
investigated. I think we should be forced to 
confront the period as it is an essential part 
of our history and has shaped our country 
probably more than we realise.  
I was taught the Cold War as part of my 
GCSE syllabus (exams taken in 1998). I 
thought it was fascinating. It was taught 
in the content of 20th Century History 
which included both World Wars, the 
Cuban Missile crisis and The Cold War. 
To be taught this subject in this context 
was really interesting and took the story 
right up to the fall of the Berlin Wall (one 
of my earliest international memories). I 
think it should be taught in a worldwide 
context with consideration given to 
other experiences apart from the British 
experience. I think it is almost impossible 
to teach The Cold War by just focusing 
on the British story. As a former teacher, 
I know that it is subjects like these, with 
multiple stories and perspectives, that 
really engage students. 
121 It is never too soon to throw light on the 
darker areas of the past.  
I think we should be teaching our 
children about this period from both a 
world wide and a British perspective. I 
am struck forcibly by the ridiculous truth 
that my own kids know more about the 
Tudors and Stuarts than they do about 
the fifties and sixties which have been so 
important in shaping the world in which 
they now live.  It seems to me that the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
war in Vietnam are more relevant to 
understanding the world in 2013 than 
the Spanish Armada and the exploits of 
Sir Walter Raleigh!  
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122 Don't understand the question. Worldwide context is important for 
understanding the cold war as it involved 
2 major world powers. 
123 Study all conflict in detail - remembering to 
describe the ever-expanding effects of it on 
the civilian population. 
A) But with a little more concentration 
on the British story.  
124 Don't understand the question a) as need to see from different 
perspectives 
125 It's never too soon. By all means protect 
some sites- a few are already open as 
private museums  and the National Trust 
have Orford Ness.  I don't see why they or 
English Heritage shouldn't have some 
more, just as they open Victorian 
workhouses, tenement flats and author's 
houses as examples of a moment in history. 
(a) If ever a story was international in 
scope, it's this.  Proxy wars between the 
communist world and the capitalist one 
caused havoc all over the globe. 
126 No, its never too soon for anything, the 
quicker we look at things the better 
research and knowledge we could gain 
from it and the better our defences could 
be, 
Worldwide context, I hated history at 
school because it only taught me about 
the British hardships and our victories, I 
hated it, I wanted to know more about 
worldwide conflicts and important things 
around the world, I had to gain multiple 
text books to learn about other countries 
conflicts which I think is wrong, the more 
knowledge we have about the world as a 
whole and not just focusing on our own 
battles and conflicts, the better. we 
should stand untied and see what went 
wrong in certain things so that if any 
situation arises, we know where people 
stand, weak or strong in different 
aspects, like the saying, knowledge is 
power, and power is what gives us the 
upper hand, what's the point in knowing 
the Tudors inside and out when we can 
learn about the American civil war, or 
the Sri Lankan civil wars sands so forth.  
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127 I feel the Cold War should be investigated 
and preserved now otherwise I fear in the 
near future there will be very little left to 
conserve, so we should start now before its 
too late as it is a key part not only in 
national history, but also World History.   
The Cold War is often overlooked by the 
upcoming generations, and I feel education 
for the future generations is important so 
that they learn the lessons of the past, and 
I feel this education would and could be 
aided with preservation of sites and 
features from the period.  
I believe we should cover the World 
Wide context for all, as the key points 
here could aid future generations in 
understanding the wider world and what 
can happen if things go wrong to try and 
prevent these things from happening 
again.  I do also feel however that if 
people are further interested after the 
general Global Overview, there should 
be the opportunity to delve deeper into 
the British perspective and see how 
much the Cold War influenced Great 
Britain.  But I definitely agree with the 
view that everyone should be the taught 
the Worldwide Context. 
128 I think it is important to learn from our 
mistakes and appreciate that a cold war 
style situation is not something that is 
favourable.  
A - I believe that we should teach it in a 
worldwide context. I think it is important 
to understand all perspectives of the 
situation and I believe that it is 
important to understand things that 
happened in the past in order to learn 
from mistakes. As well as this the cold 
war is an interesting subject and having 
interests is highly important in my 
opinion.  
129 yes we should protect sites and items now! 
there are lots of things missing from WW2 
like planes and tanks that were deemed 
surplus and were destroyed and no real 
ones exist. that to happen again would be 
stupidity. whilst people are still alive they 
should answer to real questions everyone 
wants to know and not just ait until they 
die before looking at the history. 
A you cannot just give one side of a story 
although that is always going to happen 
here. however when possible you should 
give all sides of the story, ignoring 
history is idiotic and leads to mistakes 
been made again. 
130 No I believe we should investigate 
,understanding how we reacted in the past 
in numerous scenarios would give us better 
guidance in possible future problems. It 
also incredibly interesting subject 
I think we should teach it at school in 
with a smaller emphasis on worldwide 
context and more on the British aspect 
or story. I also find it a interesting 
subject much more than some of the 
boring subjects like 1920s America which 
I was taught at school. It is overlooked 
throughout GCSE and school but I think 
plays such an interesting part in our 
current history and more importantly 
world wide politics and diplomacy.  
131 No I think that it now falls into the category 
of history and should be looked into 
A, because there was a lot more than 
what just went on in Britain  
132 No we should learn the lessons. Concentrate on the UK aspect. 
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133 As a military archaeologist I am keen to 
ensure that Cold War 'remains' are properly 
recorded but I'm not part of the preserve 
everything camp, though representative 
examples should be preserved. 
The 'war' was being prosecuted on a 
worldwide basis with nuclear ballistic 
submarines deploying in the polar, 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Espionage 
was also conducted on a global basis. 
Then there are the periodic 'proxy wars' 
to be considered. I think the scope is too 
great to be covered other than at a most 
superficial level. Much of the detailed 
material is still to be released and 
historians will be constantly revising as 
new material is released. We can 
probably cover the British / NATO 
Europe story reasonably accurately with 
current information. 
134 Yes. B. 
135 Absolutely.  It is never too soon, 
particularly where the historical period has 
as much political resonance now as it did at 
the time 
It certainly should be taught, but it will 
make no sense without the worldwide 
context.  Children need to understand 
the geopolitical framework because it 
makes the period explicable, and also 
helps to understand where we are now. 
136 Not at all, we need to learn from the past 
to deal with the future - especially given 
the current situation of rising tensions. 
A - teach in a worldwide context. Too 
often we focus on British involvement in 
all of history in a very biased view. Much 
of history taught in schools is quite 
ignorant to the global context. 
137 I don't think that it is too early to study the 
Cold War, as it was such a critical period of 
our nation's history. 
a) I think it is important to teach the 
worldwide effect that the Cold War had, 
rather than just focussing on the British 
story; as many countries had an input. 
138 No, I don't think it's too soon, but I think it 
needs to be done carefully, as not to 
damage the sites or cause offense or upset 
to those involved. But I think it is important 
that we do investigate these sites so that 
we can learn the lessons of the past and try 
to avoid the same situation happening in 
the future, as if it does happen again it may 
not remain cold as the cold war did.  
I think it is important to try and take an 
impartial stand point where education is 
concerned, teach from a worldwide 
context as this allows us to learn the 
lessons from all nations and prevent 
getting so close to annihilating ourselves 
again. 
139 It's not too soon. Many things can be 
learned from the technology made by all 
sides and still secrets could be shared to 
progress the human race as a planet; rather 
than as a group of countries. 
Everything should be taught in a 
worldwide context. Only biased views 
can come from looking at only one side. 
Unfortunately all history is written by the 
conquerors and never by the 
suppressed. 
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140 I believe its essential to be investigated, 
since it has shaped the world today. It 
shows us how far we have come and how 
close it was to mutually assured 
destruction, it should be preserved and 
taught now and in the future.  
I think both England's part since it 
teaches you about your nations history 
and the part we played. Also the world 
stage because it give you a larger 
perspective of the world and also it 
doesn't give you a bias perspective of 
only a British opinion.  
141 We should investigate Cold War structures 
while many of them  are still available  
It should be taught in a worldwide 
context but including sections on how if 
affected the British way of life. 
142 I think that it is almost never too soon to 
begin recording and preserving parts of 
history, in a lot of ways I wish this practice 
had been properly thought through earlier 
in our history. Documenting and recording/ 
finding out about the past in non-
destructive ways leaves everything there 
and open for the future and it will be the 
future generations looking back at this that 
will matter. In the cold war case, the history 
is already disappearing. 
Definitely teach it in a worldwide 
context, nothing should be left out and 
all history and view points should be 
taken into account. If only the British 
story was heard then valuable view 
points and truths will be missed and 
without the whole picture it would be 
very easy to misconstrue the events and 
justifications surrounding the actions 
and decisions that shaped the Cold War.  
143 Definitely not! I am a local authority 
historic environment officer, and I regularly 
argue (with varying degrees of success) that 
Cold War heritage assets should be 
protected. I give lectures on the 
archaeology of the Cold War to local 
societies, and the reaction to these talks is 
always very positive. I have also been 
thanked for telling these stories by two 
Operation Grapple veterans and the widow 
of a pilot who did a lot of QRA duty. The 
Cold War is responsible for the economic 
situation we are now in, and we are not 
going to move on from that until we 
confront it. The Germans claim the UK is 
still fighting the Second World War, and 
that will remain the case until we face up to 
the realities of what the Second World War 
and Cold War did to Britain economically. 
a) Yes - The parochial belief that "We 
won" is untrue (q.v. China...), and 
unhelpful. We should, as a nation, face 
up to the fact that we sold off a lot of 
technology extremely cheaply, then 
economically devastated the country 
attempting to deal with the 
consequences of that (including keeping 
up with developments on what we sold). 
Similarly, the idea that the Warsaw Pact 
were a sprawling, faceless aggressor, 
with NATO bravely standing her ground 
in a 1914 Belgium/BEF style just does not 
stand up to impartial scrutiny. 
144 Tricky one - we have come full circle in 
bullshittery, creating a new cold war , likely 
to deflect from the red hot ones around the 
globe. Before current political regime, 
there was a good chance of objectivity, 
now, not so sure. 
Worldwide. Too much regionality in such 
a topic is dangerous, can lead to 
jingoism. Education at secondary level 
needs re-examined too, of course. And 
yes, tell the story as long as the truth is 
told, with flaws on all sides. 
145 Some of the artifacts date from 1945 so it is 
not too early to investigate. A lot has been 
lost already.  
World context is best as most 
governments are lying bastards, so with 
both sides of the story the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle.  
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146 It is never to early to engage with public 
history, the first draft of which features in 
contemporary forms from diaries and 
letters to reportage. I agree about the 
selection and protection of particular sites, 
this process needs to be carried out whilst 
those that inhabited these areas can closely 
advise. 
It being a global issue worldwide context 
is essential, as would be the British 
experience. There is very little history 
followed up from the curriculum where 
pupils get to engage direct with those 
that took part, and living memory 
strands are surely one of the most 
appealing ways to draw young people 
into imaginative engagement. 
147 Its never too soon. Our perspectives will 
change over time, but this perspective is as 
valid as one from the future. 
Its important to teach it in worldwide 
context.  There is far too much focus on 
'the British story' in our history teaching, 
as if it were possible to separate out our 
Cold War from another. The British Story 
also tends to lionise any narrative - it 
becomes the story of British 
achievement or 'pluck' not a wider story 
in which we were pawns. 
148 i think there are so manysites that it would 
be difficult to select which ones should be 
preserved. Other people may argue that 
sites should not be protected as it is then a 
constant reminder of  the Cold War.  Some 
sites are also in disrepair and there has to 
be consideration over cost versus 
preservation. 
Teach it in a world wide context. 
149 I think it may be appropriate to look at the 
period now and to protect some sites, 
especially whilst there are still some of  
those who were involved alive . 
If you are to teach anything it should 
always be in context , not in isolation , 
otherwise you don't get a true 
representation . 
150 Valuable to record memories - imagine 
having personal thoughts wondering if 
building Stonehenge worth the effort - but 
our memories are not accurate and there is 
need to stand back  to see bigger picture 
and where the bit of jigsaw fits in our 
narrative. Collect now, interpret then 
reinterpret later 
I don't know what or how it is included in 
school curriculum  but in general I would 
say nothing should be taught solely from 
British point of view. That comes from 
schooling when loads of the map was 
pink and that was thought to be quite 
proper. A colonial attitude that has had 
to be unlearnt.  
151 As an historical event with both physical 
and documentary evidence, efforts should 
be made to preserve for posterity and 
future generations to learn from and study. 
As an event that happened on an 
international scale I feel that to keep the 
subject in context it has to be taught on 
a worldwide context. To not teach it 
would be like denying that it happened 
at all. 
152 I agree that we should be protecting these 
sites, and with the reasons given for doing 
so. 
It is a good subject to teach because it is 
relevant, and because an analytical 
approach might challenge widely held 
beliefs, particularly given that parents 
and grandparents will have lived through 
the period.  Such an approach would 
require a worldwide context. 
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153 I think that the cold war is part of our 
history that should not be allowed to be 
erased. Sites should be protected and 
where possible opened to the public. 
We should teach the full picture giving 
equal credence to both warsaw pact and 
allied sides to provide the most honest 
picture , warts and all. 
154 No that would be a waste of time and 
money  
Teach it in a world content and hope 
that the people teaching stick to facts 
and figures  
155 it probably is too soon. I was too young to 
really remember the Berlin airlift, and grew 
up in a climate of the fear of total mutual 
destruction. There can be no people 
around that can be objective on that 
period. Stalin was a lunatic with no 
compassion for human life; whether 
military might was the only response is 
something I can not say 
I think it is too recent. It is impossible to 
talk about it without having Putin and 
the present USSR (?) at the back of one's 
mind. It fits in with M Gove's original 
suggestion that children should be 
taught that until the Romans arrived 
Britain was populated by primitive 
savages. The only way that the subject 
can be taught is in a chauvinist way, it is 
a poisoned chalice and potentially 
indoctrinates another generation  
156 No. It is very timely, and should be a valid 
part of the contemporary archaeology 
movement. Archaeological approaches 
offer means of interrogating this 
phenomenon when much of the historical 
documentation is still classified. 
The Cold War era was one of the 
defining periods of the C20. It is essential 
that it is taught to students at all levels. 
It was a global phenomenon, so in my 
opinion it cannot be the focus of a solely 
British story. It has to be set in a 
worldwide context, in order to 
understand the defence networks and 
the global political, social and economic 
drivers. The global context then is also 
essential to understand the conflicts of 
today. 
157 It is much too easy to overlook fairly recent 
events and thus they can be lost for future 
generations. Some work is being done now, 
but what is done mostly seems to be 
carried out by volunteers. It would be good 
to think that by confronting and recording 
the issues we would learn from them. 
Regrettably, history tells us differently, and 
the same mistakes are made time and 
again. 
History is always written by the victor! Of 
course, in this case there were really no 
winners, but the story should certainly 
be told. While we should naturally 
concentrate on the British side of the 
story, it would have no real meaning 
unless placed in a worldwide context. 
The divisions that developed as early as  
the latter part of WWII, particularly the 
American-Russian antipathy and distrust, 
are important in understanding how and 
why the Cold War came about. My 
personal view is that effectively, there 
was a game of one-upmanship between 
these two main protagonists which 
dragged everyone else along. Our own 
actions therefore were largely 
predicated on what the US was doing 
and so our own role should be seen 
within that context. 
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158 It's never too early to look at how sites play 
a role in the way we understand ourselves 
and the recent past, near future.  
We should definitely teach in global 
context.  
159 These sites should be treated as one would 
a medieval castle.  
This must be taught in a worldwide 
context. 
160 Its never too soon to investigate a potential 
archaeological site. The information gained 
today will be invaluable whenever 
tomorrow happens. 
It should be taught as both a worldwide 
situation and the resulting British 
response. 
161 Not too soon to investigate.  Always good 
to look while the people who were there on 
both sides are still alive. 
Definitely needs to be taught in a 
worldwide context.   Even if from a 
British point of view.  After all people 
acted with the knowledge that they had 
at the time.  It is no good having 
hindsight and not putting that in context 
too. 
162 It's not too soon.  The post war period 
shaped the UK's direction for many decades 
and we still live with the culture and 
opinions that were created at that time.  
The physical evidence are an important 
part of this history. In the same way we 
preserve the physical evidence of two 
world wars we should guard against loosing 
the physical evidence of this important 
period of history. 
Worldwide context. It is important to 
understand what the state of the world 
was at this time, particularly the anti 
communist rhetoric in USA and how this 
shaped the feeling in the world as a 
whole.  
163 Yes defiantly, it effected everyone u 
recently saw a small plot of land in the 
Scottish highlands for sale which included a 
underground Cold War bunker room for 
£7000 - I don't like sites being sold off but 
think we deserve access for me it's modern 
history  
Yes I remember my brother being based 
at Greenham common in the 80's and 
the hippies that used to protest st the 
fence against the nuclear weapons we 
had. I think it caused world wide fear of a 
Third World War and ultimate 
destruction of the planet. Yes we should 
teach it the kids need to learn about how 
the world developed after the Second 
World War how governments behaved 
secrecy spying on each other. We were 
all at risk and we spent huge amounts of 
money no doubt  
164 I agree - these sites should be considered 
and where relevant preserved now. As a 
keen visitor to heritage sites including 
York's nuclear bunker, I think they tell us 
important stories about the recent past 
that should not be ignored. 
I do not know much about school 
curricula so can't give a very specific 
answer, but I would inherently prefer a 
model that divided time between (a) and 
(b). Overall I think the cold war period an 
important one to cover because of its 
significant relevance to understanding 
recent and current political relationships 
and ongoing debates about the British 
commitment to defence, the budget etc.  
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165 No, investigate  now while people can still 
remember their experiences and the 
general fear of the era. 
 Currently the worldwide context is being 
taught, personnally I think more 
emphasis should be given to how many 
people in this country were involved in 
cold war industries/defence.  What did 
you do in the cold war Daddy! 
166 I don't think it's too soon. It shoulkd be taught in a world wide 
context. I don't believe for a moment it 
was just the USA, Great Britain and the 
former USSR. 
167 No, it is important these sites are 
investigated and understood before they 
are lost and it is to late. It is an important 
part of our history  
In a worldwide context, history in school 
tends to focus on one nation to much!! It 
is important to understand from all 
points of view  
168 We should be protecting key sites, that 
show the best of each function, for 
example there is no need to protect and 
preserve every ROC post or Command, 
however, good examples must be 
protected.  The same must also apply to 
the CCC, and to an extend certain RSG C&C 
Bunkers (such as Kelvedon Hatch or even 
teh RGHQ at Chilmark) 
It should be taught in a wider context, 
based on military and geo-political 
theories. For example what were the 
precursors to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
not just in the UK and the US, but what 
was the USSR game plan.  Teach wider 
context thinking now and that will allow 
future generations to be able to take a 
wider view and to seek / find solutions 
that remove the blinkered standpoint. 
169 it's never too early to start thinking 
sensibly. 
I often think all history taught at school 
has a national bias, no matter what 
country you live in - people should grow 
up understanding what's lead to the 
country they live in being as it is now. 
170 No, never too soon  I'm not sure we can be sure of/trust a 
'British story' about this - I think, as with 
much history the underlying drivers are 
complex and we are often aware of only 
one part of the story 
171 Not too soon. Yes we should. Both history essential for us to make 
wise decisions and we're in a global 
world now. 
172 We should investigate fully As any other 
period of history  
We have a duty to teach both sides so 
young people today can evaluate the 
actions of their government  
173 I think that as a part of our resent history it 
and they are a valuable source of 
information both historically, politically and 
archaeologically that should be both taught 
and studied in the main stream schools to 
allow people to understand and make the 
choices that take us into the future. 
a). because we all live in a world where 
technology has made  it's information 
available all over the world and it's 
impact on us as a global peoples. 
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174 It is not too soon. It's always important to 
investigate history not matter how recent. 
In fact, it could be argued that the more 
recent the history, the more relevant it is to 
current political climates. 
b) concentrate on the British story, 
though within a worldwide context. 
Focus in school I found was far too 
obsessed with USA vs USSR- it's 
important to realise that other nations 
were vastly effected too, and since we 
are in Britain, primarily our own 
involvement needs to be understood in 
order to fully understand our current 
relationship with the West and the East. 
175 Not too soon. Some sites should be 
preserved as part of our heritage and for 
educational purposes. 
a). No man is an island! 
176 Protect them now. Many sites get 
dismantled as soon as they are no longer 
needed. Much of the WWI & 2 
infrastructure would have been interesting 
to see now. 
Worldwide context with a leaning 
towards our (British) role. Much of the 
madness around leaving Europe is 
because of our little island mentality and 
the next generation should be though to 
think more widely. 
177 There is a whole generation growing up, 
unconnected with little awareness, very 
similar to Aparteid where "it was nothing to 
do with me" prevails.  Protecting sites can 
be important dependent upon significance. 
Confronting the period smacks of 
arrogance and a similar biased belief on 
both sides that fear will prevail. 
Is it? I have not seen it in a Primary 
education context, at least not as 
prevalent as other periods of study. I feel 
it should be covered, yes, for a general 
level of understanding, however it 
should be taught in a worldwide context 
to allow for reflection and affect upon a 
variety of nation states & cultures.  
178 I think we should investigate. It should be in a worldwide context. 
 
Entry Id Have you any other thoughts on the subject? 
1 Greater engagemeny in schools with British history. Often the pupils are taught the 
negatives, I am sure much has comeout of the period that was positive. 
2 Should have more research. 
3 I think many people would benefit from visiting places like Boscombe Down, if they 
could be opened up, just to get a better understanding of the things we were doing in 
the 50's and 60's to supposedly defend ourselves. 
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4 An example if how history gets distorted is current criticism of the nuclear bombing of 
Japan in WWII. Critics ignore the facts that substantially more people were killed in the 
fire bombings in Tokyo or several German cities as well as the millions of both Japanese 
and Allied people that would have been killed if Japan had been invaded. Unfortunately 
histories are rarely written by people who were there. 
5 I cannot really see any circumstances where a war (hot or cold) is a good thing.  The 
difficulty of stopping what we started in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that.    Even so, 
some good does come out of it. Despite the pressure to make weaponizable 
discoveries, the cold war resulted in inventions and discoveries that are of peace time 
value. 
6 I have been on several courses and read books on this subject and visited quite a few 
cold war sites while carrying out my work duties (I work for Thames water) around the 
countryside in wiltshire,gloucestershire, berkshire and oxfordshire, and also while on 
holiday, in fact you don't seem to be able to go anyware and not discover some kind of 
structure or site assosiated with the last war and the cold war, especially if you keep 
your eyes open. The sad fact is that a gould many of these sites are being just left to go 
to rack and ruin an will soon disapear altogether in no money or interest is afforded to 
them. 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 Not really. 
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12 Although still quite recent, the Cold War is slowly slipping from the collective memory. 
There is a danger that if not studied and recorded, structures will be lost and the 
reason they were built will be forgotten. We should not glorify the period, but rather 
remember it objectively and ensure that the paranoia of that era is never allowed to 
happen again.  
13 I have found it an interesting subject and so has my nephew who had a cold war history 
session in his Junior school and quized both myself and brother on the subject 
14 The cold war was the final act in the century long formation of the modern world and 
should be taught in an historical context alongside ww1 and ww2 and the rest of the 
skirmishes that filled the 20th century! 
15 I never felt really concerned that the Russians would blow us to pieces, perhaps 
because I'm a natural optimist. I'm certainly more concerned that the insidious creep of 
religious fanaticism will destroy a largely tolerant and inherently generous British 
lifestyle. 
16 Nuclear energy epitomises Man and his duality. A brilliant achievement. A source of 
unlimited power, set to release us from the dependence upon fossil fuels. Harnessed as 
a weapon and used to keep us alive comfortably, whilst simultaneously used to prevent 
further loss of life via deployment in Japan and as a future deterrent. Mutually Assured 
Destruction sums it up. A toy in Dystopia... 
17 None at all 
18 Nope not untill this survey, we loose sight of such important subjects/politics/economy 
etc when things are no longer 'news topics' 
19 In the current era where most of warfare is of an asymmetric nature and the use of 
nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur, the continuation of an independent nuclear 
deterrence could be questioned. Deterrence relies on a rational approach to war 
fighting and those nations now developing nuclear weapons are unlikely to be rational; 
furthermore, it seems unlikely that the UK will ever embark on operations 
independently as opposed to in a coalition. Looking back at recent history, nuclear 
weapons do not seem to have deterred numerous countries in embarking in conflict 
with UK or her allies. Having said all that, the future is uncertain and abandonment now 
might be somewhat premature.  
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20 No, thank you. JL. 
21 
 
22 No 
23 It seems now that warfare/intelligence is aimed at the Middle East/China- these are 
seen as modern threats, rather than Russia etc... 
24 A fascinating time where the world was held to ransom by the might of the 
superpower. It proves substantially that there is power in wealth. Through threat and 
fear we established peace? It worked...go figure 
25 I am no expert on this subject - so these are my uninformed opinions! Most of the 
questions could trigger a six hour debate and clearly need further consideration. 
Bloody interesting subject, I should go and read some books!! 
26 Growing up in the 1980s I felt the tail-end of the annimosity of the Cold War. It was 
confusing as a child - why did countries who fought together to beat Nazi Germany and 
Imperialist Japan turn so quickly on eachother? By 1989 and the fall of the Berlin wall It 
was obvious we were living through changing times (more so than the 1960s?). 
27 
 
28 
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29 Only that we are currently wasting a huge amount of money on an unnecessary nuclear 
deterrent, largely just so our politicians can feel important and retain a seat "at the top 
table" of world affairs. 
30 People who did not live through it have no idea of the dread we lived in.  Global 
warming with its threat of sea level rises over the next 100 years is nothing, we only 
had four minutes before we all got wiped out.  That is a feeling I doubt archaeology will 
ever be able to recreate, unless we turn the world into a Cold War theme park and 
hand out big red buttons to people with extreme but opposed political views! 
31 What a total waste of time and money it was, the only people who profited was the 
military/business in the states. The losers were Eastern Europe as the Russians tried to 
compete at their expense. 
32 Objectivity, objectivity, objectivity 
33 
 
34 Teaching just the Cold War would result in too short a view. Begin it earlier and include 
Collectivization and the Ukraine famine, the Terror, WWII, the Nazi-Soviet partition of 
Poland, and Stalin's egotism and paranoia (we know too little about the mind of Stalin).  
Forget about convergence and the stance of the non-judgemental, make Timothy 
Snyder's Bloodlands staple reading, remember that the Cold War was worth winning, 
and that it was indeed won by the right side, Gorbachev's disclaimer notwithstanding. 
35 
 
36 
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37 It is probably obvious from my comments that I think discussion not warfare is the 
better option.     'Romantic' past warfare has recently been exposed as horrific by 
weapon and other studies. This is a good outcome.   Two great uncles were killed in the 
First World War. The family stories and my great grandmother's grief have influenced 
ny views as has the fact that I had small children during the Cold War. 
38 I'm a curatorial archaeologist: of course I feel strongly about this. Cold War studies are 
where WW2 studies were in the early 1980s, but no-one would now deny the 
importance of understanding the archaeology of WW2. Neither sets of monuments 
were ever used, but the reason I have never had to fight in a war is the existence of 
nuclear weapons and the Cold War (and human common sense). 
39 Given the 'nasties' that were used in some of these installations [ asbestos, chemicals 
etc] preserving and maintaining them might well be cheaper that a proper 
decomissioning process. 
40 Are you familiar with the extensive historical and anthropological literature on the 
impact of Cold War policies on the funding of scientifiac and academic research in the 
United States? This sort of approach, which for the most part avoids concrete, seems a 
much more interesting line of enquiry to me. What impact did the Cold War have on 
modern conceptions of the Cold War itself? 
41 I can see this is a bit of a thorny issue to some.  In some ways, it would be fascinating 
for young people to learn about this as they could have first hand accounts from people 
involved which is a fantastic way to spark interest.  On the other hand, a lot of 
"national secrets" are still "secret" in law because it's so recent.  It is also something 
that would affect some people very personally in the same way as digging up WW2 
sites is still painful for many - although we're not talking about the same scale 
regarding death and destruction - there were some dark moments and I can really 
understand some saying it's too soon to be doing research that may re-open old 
wounds.  Additionally, there will be people that were directly involved that now have a 
new life and I can understand they might not want things raked up just now.  Great 
care and sensitivity would need to be taken as we're talking about something that's 
within living memory with participants still alive and well today.   
42 
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43 I think the above covers most bases. 
44 
 
45 
 
47 The cold war is a fascinating subject, many of the sites and artefacts that are remnants 
of that period in our history are being eroded or destroyed and need adequate 
recognition. Education, information, ownership, understanding these are all things that 
will help people value a unique part of our past. 
48 
 
49 
 
50 
 
51 
 
52 I am a pacifist and I have no time for 1 and 2 ww stuff (a real yawn!) but I find the Cold 
War far more interesting - I don't know if that is because I lived through it or ??? 
53 I was forwarded this survey, never seen Part 1. I have just spent 7 minutes doing this 
and have no idea why, other than the pure fact that I loive OCld War architecture and 
bunkers and stuff. 
 501 | P a g e  
54 Put 'From Yalta to Vietnam' on reading lists of not there already. 
55 
 
56 
 
57 You seem to think that the Cold War is a hot potato?  It happened, so get over it.  
58 
 
59 Are we not currently in a cold war with Iran? 
60 
 
61 
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62 
 
63 I remember the day when my late father remarked upon the death of Stalin. I was six. 
Whatever the crimes of Stalin he had not forgotten that Hitler would not have been 
defeated without the military organisation and industrial production the Soviet system 
was able to command, and the heroism of the russian people. It was too late for our 
family which perished in the ghetto of Kaunas(Kovno). Too much weight is given to 
celebrating the victory of DDay and the allies, but the western front was only launched 
when the allies were getting worried that Stalin was getting too far into central Europe. 
Looking at the way victory was interpreted is an important precursor to studying the 
cold war and the attitudes that informed it.  
64 
 
65 According to age concern 23,000 people die of the cold each year. In the next century 
that suggest that 2.3million people in Britain will die and early death due winter cold.  
There are been around 1million deaths due to motor cars (or is it 500,000). The cold 
war killed, how many? Global warming -- latest figures suggest that on the whole 
people have benefited from the slight warming seen in the 20th century.  Evidence 
suggests that we are on the verge of a new Maunder Minimum ... in the 1690s during 
the last maunder minimum something like a quarter of Scotland's population died from 
cold.  In the worst year on record, 2,300 people died from heat in the UK, and 23,000 
across all Europe. Yet we live in a world that is terrified of getting a little bit warmer.  
More importantly, how will the public and politicians perceive the threat of a new 
Maunder Minimum. Like the cold war and global warming (and swine flu ... millennium 
bug) will these be blown up out of all proportion netting capitalist entrepreneurs (aka 
scamsters) billions.  How do we stop the poor in Britian seeing ever rising fuel costs 
which undoubtedly kills, and stopping the rich raking in money from flogging scams to 
the public?  Every scam has a core of truth surrounded by a sugar coating of hysteria. 
Only through careful historical research is it possible to detect this sugar coated layer of 
hysteria which the scamsters have and always will use, and only when the public are 
given the tools will they be able to stop future scams. 
66 
 
67 The Cold War already feels like ancient history. It seems very strange that people were 
so afraid of 'the Bomb', something that seems so remote, when people get on with 
their daily lives with the current more likely possibility of suicide bombers in Britain. As 
a child I really wasn't aware there was any danger and even read books like 'When the 
Wind Blows' by Raymond Briggs and 'Z for Zachariah' (a rather dull set book in school) 
without connecting them with the idea of a nuclear disaster here. 
68 I have managed cultural resources for the US Army since 1991 and immediately began 
to address Cold War sites. My email is  joseph.murphey@us.army.mil.  We developed a 
methodology for Cold War identification and assessment in the late 1990s. 
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69 The Cold War is commonly taught as a conflict between East and West, but the 'hot 
wars' within the Cold War might lead us to investigate otherwise... 
70 I adore it and I wish I knew more.  I see a beauty and majesty in these monuments, but 
I struggle to convey my enthusiasm of them to others who simply see a useless, ugly, 
decaying lump of concrete that would be better off in landfill.  I'm particularly drawn to 
the paradox between their strength (i.e. the robust nature of the raw materials 
involved in their construction - concrete, steel, etc) and their fragility (through lack of 
maintenance, lack of modern uses, perceived ugliness, obselete purpose, etc). 
71 The threat of nuclear annihilation did prey on me as a teenager (early 1970s) - then 
from it being done by error - now by terrorists or looney religious nuts (all religions), or 
by barmy leaders 
72 Yes, but they are far too broad for a survey. I shall no doubt write another book. 
73 I do believe that the Cold War was a defining moment in European history. A moment 
which has still an impact on the contemporary world. Therefore scholars should engage 
with it.  
74 
 
75 The Cold War should not be treated as a 'closed period', it was the result of WW2 
whilst many of the worlds current political and military conflicts have their roots in it.  It 
has to be seen as a product of a very different world whilst being a strong influence on 
the current one. 
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76 
 
77 The cold war is a vitally important part opf our cultural heritage. It impacted on Europe 
in a dramatic way, and the subsequent instability in many parts of the world can be 
directly attributed to the vacuum left after the demise of the East/West standoff. 
78 Yes, lots.  
79  groups like owers need to be proactive and get the subject out there to the public and 
govermunts 
80 You use the phrase Cold War as if it was well understood at the time with a beginning 
and an end. Maybe it had an end, but these were simply the conditions of life. Only 
since 1990 have we realised how stable were those conditions for 4 decades. 
81 
 
82 
 
83 
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84 My family lived near Aldermaston and close to Greenham Common; we joked that we 
did not fear a nuclear attack as we were so close to these major targets that we would 
not feel a thing - instant oblivion!  It was a time of suspicion and fear; a necessary time, 
but one I am relieved is over. 
85 The profile of the Volunteer Reserve Forces as part of our community is definitely 
worth of curricular inclusion. 
86 
 
87 Tangentially, if we can expect some commemorative events soon for 1914/18 perhaps 
it's a good time to propose a project and attract funding as follow-on from the Defense 
of Britain survey. That could address preservation of some monuments and include (if 
not already done) some oral history. 
88 
 
89 
 
90 I was a young boy living in Miami, FL, USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis.    I remember 
the talk on the TV about what the effects from a missile attack would be. To me it 
sounded like the end of the world was coming.    I remember the Civil Defense alerts on 
the TV and the radio.  I remember the talk on TV, and the news stories about people 
building personal nuclear fallout shelters in their homes and backyards.  The news went 
into great depth about just how difficult it would be to protect your family from either 
the blast or the fallout.  And how they encouraged family drills anyway, just in case it 
happened.  One of the local buildings mounted an air raid siren which they tested every 
Saturday at noon for two minutes.  The sound seemed to come through the walls of 
our apartment when it went off.   I remember the drills in school where we all go under 
our desk and kept our heads down.  I remember thinking what a waste of effort that 
would be as the classroom was in an older building and had a wall of glass windows 
that would shatter and the glass would shred us.  Latter they started moving us into the 
hallway during drills.  I remember that I started to use the closet under the stairs as my 
play area.  Looking back I would guess that that was my reaction to the fear that the 
news stories had caused me personally.  
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91 The more we learn from history the less likely, hopefully, is that we would make the 
same mistakes again. 
92 the past starts here 
93 
 
94 
 
95 
 
96 Russians would have won if they invaded before the 70s. 
97 Not really...  
98 
 
99 I believe that there is a lot of stuff that is not known about which also contributed to 
the cold war. Some events are not fully understood, such as the bay of pigs operation, 
where the CIA trained Cuban rebels to invade and kill Castro an ally of the Russians. 
However, the CIA knew they were outmanned and outgunned yet they sent the troops 
anyway with the risk of retaliation and this does not make sense to me. 
100 
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101 It was an expensive but worth while time as it protecdted our life style and caused 
advances in many fields 
102 It has helped us further develop nuclear wepons but so long as lots of different 
countires have nuclear wepons then there will never be world piece and there will 
always be the need to be on standby for any eventuality. 
103 This period of history definitely needs more attention as it is such a defining moment of 
world history.  
104 The cold war was a very terbulant and important part of the 20th century that should 
be studied indepth, within schools and outside. I feel that looking into not only the 
facts and events, but also the ideoligy of both sides and the politics of diferent 
countries should be studied. 
105 I find it a very interesting subject. 
106 
 
107 No 
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108 
 
109 
 
110 No more thoughts. I presume you had filtered out your e-mail addresses to only send 
this to British nationals, because I imagine the opinions would vary greatly per 
nationality, even if they were living in Britain during this period. 
111 The Cold War is kind of unique for "wars" in that not much actually happened. 
Compared to say the First and Second World Wars, where millions of died, the Cold 
War was a conflict of ideologies. That nothing much happened makes it harder to 
engage with as a period of history, despite the fact that the period saw the potential to 
wipe out billions of lives. Nevertheless, the remaining architecture sum up the 
prevailing political ambitions of the country during a certain period of time in the same 
way medieval castles do, for example. It's just not easy persuading people that Cold 
War remains have as much value. 
112 
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113 The Cold War is already the subject of an odd form of nostalgia, Soviet style 
memorabilia and tv documentaries that aesthetise the imagery of the period are 
becoming increasingly common in the west. Whilst there is nothing essentially wrong 
with any of this, it would be good to recognise just how frightening and bleak this 
period of human history was for many people at many times. Therefore, efforts to 
better understand that Cold War, to evaluate its legacy, may help to better highlight 
these far less "glamorous" moments that bring the essential tragedy of this period into 
relief. 
114 It's an important period that needs to be kept in mind as the context for much of the 
latter half of the 20th century, particularly as some public discussions about events in 
that period (for example, US involvement in the Middle East) tend to forget that 
context and place those events in a vacuum. 
115 I guess your questions might have been differently framed if all respondents were of 
my age group or older. 'Personal atitudes' to the Cold War were of course greatly 
influenced by living through it rather than hearing about it second-hand. Above all I 
think I remember people being genuinely very scared in the 1950s, 60s & early 70s. 
They had seen the effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and were terrified that the wrong 
hand on the button in USA or Russia might spell total conflagration for us all. I 
remember reading an article in a magazine one day which asked if there was anywhere 
in Britain you could live to avoid the risk of nuclear fallout if a British cold war 
establishment were targetted (remember we had all the USA airfields and listening 
stations as well as our own). They couldn't actually find anywhere as there were so 
many scattered around ! No use being in the Highlands as they built nuclear 
submarines near there; no use being in Wales as plenty of bases there; Aldermaston 
and Greenham glowing red in the south; Filingdales and Menwith up in Yorkshire; vast 
USA air bases in east Anglia and so on and so on.... 
116 I am surprised to find myself history. 
117 Ultimately the Cold War was an expression of the opposition between Capitalism and 
Leninist Marxism. In terms of victory, Capitalism proved more economically powerful 
and able to overwhelm the USSR's industrial and scientific capabilities.  
118 
 
119 None spring to mind. 
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120 
 
121 Only that we need to learn the lessons that the cold war has to teach us about the 
human condition and its propensity for self -destruction as well as for the most 
remarkable acts of self sacrifice and nobility.  
122 
 
123 No 
124 
 
125 
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126 Not really 
127 
 
128 I think the cold war is a highly interesting subject and I certainly enjoyed learning about 
it in GCSE history. I think It is important to learn about the history of humanity and the 
cold war is certainly a significant time period.  
129 it is a very interesting section of history which I find was always under taught in school 
and not mentioned too often. 
130 I find the subject truly fascinating however I studied history at school and never even 
touched on this subject.  
131 
 
132 No. 
 512 | P a g e  
133 In some respects this was a world-shaping struggle, the full ramifications of which we 
can probably not fully assess accurately. It must be an important study topic as it 
shaped the present political and economic world every bit as much as WW2. 
134 
 
135 Study of the Cold War is a very important development and I wholeheartedly support 
the initiative 
136 
 
137 
 
138 No 
139 The name of this 'conflict' should be renamed The Cold Threat! 
140 None 
141 
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142 I feel that all history should be taught, throughout history you can see blatantly obvious 
links between different time periods and civilisations which have helped the 
development of technologies, landscapes, architecture - the list goes on. Studying only 
one period of history or one event in history allows for the ability to go into detail 
however, it doesn't always allow for the inter-historical links to be taken into account 
and they could have a profound effect on interpretation.  
143 I use the Cold War as an example of how we do our job as local authority historic 
environment officers - it is a brilliant vehicle for explaining that everything has a 
significance, but a lot of material can be recorded, rather than preserved. This is as true 
of the Bronze Age as it is of the Cold War. It also explains clearly why any post-medieval 
archaeology is significant: the disconnect between historic sources and personal 
experience is not always obvious, but (for example) it becomes very clear when 
comparing ROC bunkers with what ROC officers would have done in the event of an 
attack. One thing which has become clear, though, is that it is difficult to explain that 
significance to designation officers at Historic England... 
144 
 
145 The cold war had the potential to and came very close to anhillation of the human race. 
It's mistakes should be analysed in great detail so as not to repeat them. 
146 I'll give you more on this if required, sorry, I shouldn't have started this on a Saturday 
tea time. 
147 Great to see you doing this work. Its amazing how quickly the Cold War has faded from 
our collective memory, and yet it underpins so much of today's politics. 
148 my knowledge of the Cold War as a small child, my mother did stock pile food and 
spoke of needing a cellar, which we didn't have.  The literature protect and survive is 
actually laughable, not in the light of knowledge and further information. The common 
person would most definately have perished.  
149 As someone who was just 13 during the Cuba crisis it was a terrifying time , I would not 
like our grandchildren to have to live with the threat of a neuclear war hanging over 
them . 
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150 I remember going to a talk that included instructions to wash your curtains in some 
mixture with fire-retardant properties and similar instructions along with your stock 
piling baked beans under the stairs to hold out against a nuclear winter. As I and many 
others knew this was total nonsense and regarded such advice on the same level as 
Dad's Army depending the country. Most people would not survive without clean air 
and water even if surviving initial blast. Was astonished during year in US in 60s when 
people said weren't we worried as we were nearer Russia. I don't remember ever being 
really worried - too busy with small children 
151 If you don't learn about history how can you learn from it and progress as a culture. 
152 
 
153 
 
154 No  
155 
 
156 The Cold War is under valued as a subject. Every initiative to place this important 
period within a wider understood context should be welcomed. 
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157 
 
158 
 
159 It should be taught that the whole thing was a waste of time, stress,money etc. it was 
politically motivated and remains so.  
160 Is history repeating itself, but this time its North Korea ? 
161 Becoming increasingly pacifist but we can't lie down in front of the people who aren't.  
They take our rational stance as weakness.  I don't think we need Trident but keeping 
the subs unarmed is pretty silly. We've already got an aircraft carrier with no planes! 
I've no idea what we should do but current activities are very depressing.  
162 
 
163 Only that I think you should promote this more to schools - how it effected us all we 
tested nuclear weapons with British soldier as witnesses as did the Japanese and 
Americans in the 50's our soldiers and families suffered as a result very little taught on 
this. 
164 
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165 
 
166 Not at present 
167 
 
168 BRIXMIS was fun! 
169 we need to learn the lessons that lead us constantly trying to kill other people and stop 
doing it. 
170 
 
171 We are in danger of not learning anything from our past in terms of war.  
172 
 
173 I have studied some aspects of the cold war both historical and archaeological and had 
familial contact via my father, also I have seen first hand both here and abroad  the 
state that some of the cold war sites are being allowed to get into by neglect and 
vandalism. I think that some sites and artifacts need to be preserved for future peoples 
to visit and study so that they can make their own sense of it. 
174 
 
175 The cold war was a major event, threatening the existence of our race.That  its 
outcome did not result in hot war is a major triumph --although of course danger 
remains while nuclear weapons continue to exist. 
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176 
 
177 The predominant factor of the Cold War was fear in my experience. The war machine 
mentality of successive cash generating governments filtered belief & coerced one into 
reaction against a perceived enemy. How it went for the "other side" I have little 
knowledge however this was a part of it was it not? Suspension of belief, & 
perpetuation of negative fear. 
178 No 
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APPENDIX 3 - ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS SURVEY RESPONSES 
 
The following section comprises the responses made, via the internet, to the Royal 
Observer Corps survey prescribed during this project. Each section comprises two 
questions. The whole responses set is also provided as a spreadsheet in Appendix 
4. 
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Entry 
Id 
What made you want to join the Royal Observer 
Corps? 
To which group did you belong? 
ROC#1 I was in the TA in 1981 and felt it wasn't really me. I 
still wanted to serve my country and remembered 
having met someone who said he was in the ROC. I 
looked up the ROC and what I found out seemed 
interesting, so I applied to join 
14 Group. Winchester 
ROC#2 My initial interest was in aircraft and aircraft 
recognition.   I later became interested in military 
strategy and cold war procedures. 
10 Group ROC 
ROC#3 A friend was a member and I was interested in 
aviation so I decided to join 
11 then 11 
ROC#4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I had just left the Army Cadets as an adult Sergeaqnt 
Instructor and was looking around for another 
volunteer job. I thought the work the ROC did was 
important in the event of an attack as we warn the 
population of dangers of nuke dust clouds as well as 
helping the Government forces. 
10 Group 
ROC#5 Being interested in aircraft and aviation from early 
childhhood Was a founder member of 781 squadron 
Air Training Corps and constant badgering from an 
ROC observer. Turned down from RAF aircrew with 
poor eyesight  
11 Truro &  10 Exeter 
ROC#6 My late father worked for Post Office Telephones at 
the start of WW2 and looked after phone 
communications for 24 Group, Gloucester. He joined 
the corps also. After he had completed war service 
in the Army he rejoined the corps. I joined in 1958 at 
age 15. 
12 Group 
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ROC#7 Being Ex Royal Air Force i felt it was an interesting 
and woth while hobby to join . 
At 1st 11 Group then 10Group 
ROC#8 joined because my husband was in the corp and 
wanted to do something differant. 
10 group 
ROC#9 I joined in late 1962 with The Cold War at its height, 
the Cuban Crisis had only recently been resolved.  I 
felt that I could contribute something without 
having to give up my job and join the services. 
No 10 Group Exeter 
ROC#1
0 
I wanted to `do my bit` for the defence of our 
country. I was invited to join by the Leading 
Observer of Callington `C3` post. Later I changed 
jobs and went to Plymouth where I was attached to 
Plymstock post. 
11 Group 
ROC#1
1 
My father was a long serving member so I was well 
aware of it having been on exercises since the age of 
three. At sixteen it was a source of pocket money 
and interest, the latter being my main reason for 
continued service as I moved around the country 
with education and work. 
23,1,21,9,16,17 
ROC#1
2 
I left the army and some family connection to the 
ROC . Seemed like a good idea at the time. 
21 
ROC#1
3 
Me and my four grammar school friends were 14 
years of age and the local ROC post held their 
meetings in the town's RAFA club. It was thus the 
only place where we could drink pints of beer at 
least once a week. (The minimum age limit was 16, 
but nobody asked for birth certificates and we lied - 
so sue me!) 
12 Group Bristol 
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ROC#1
4 
I was sixteen and at school. I was looking for a new 
hobby and, moreover, I had been pressured by a 
parents to get a part time job. I didn't fancy any of 
the traditional schoolkid jobs i.e. shop work, 
newspaper delivery, etc. By chance, I saw an advert 
for the ROC in a local newspaper.   I toured the HQ. 
It looked like interesting work; it appeared 
somewhat clandestine as I would have to sign 
Official Secrets Act, another pulling point was that it 
seemed vaguely connected to the RAF. Furthermore, 
I would meet lots of people, the commitment was 
one night a week and a few weekends,  ....... I got 
paid for it.  I signed up immediately. 
Bath HQ and a post in 
Birmingham 
ROC#1
5 
I wanted to do something to help the country plus I 
was interested in the armed forces. 
"% Group Ayr 
ROC#1
6 
I joined ROC in 1976 when the Soviet Union was 
flexing its muscles and the future looked bleak. 
Because of my age (then 37) I doubted if I would be 
called-up for military service. One day whilst 
pondering on what to do I saw an article in The Daily 
Telegraph which featured the appointment od Air 
Cdr Howe as Commandant ROC. I was amazed as I 
assumed that the Corps had been stood-down in 
1946. I applied to join was accepted and had the 
best 15 years of my life. I started as Post Observer 
and at stand-down in 1991 I had attained the rank of 
Observer Captain, Southern Area Commandant. 
12Group ROC 
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ROC#1
7 
Two reasons:- Friends and relations were members, 
therefore I had a basic interest in the organisaton.                       
I had/ have a lifetime passion for aircraft and apart 
from the recognition aspect, I knew about the RAF 
visits and flights available to members of the Corps. 
12 Group/ 22 Post 
ROC#1
8 
I was asked by my Daughter to take her to the 
H.Q.at Poltimore Exeter as she was intrested in 
joining, i was invited to stay for the evening she 
decided not to and i joined instead. 
Exeter 10 Group 
ROC#1
9 
I had always had an interest in the RAF - father and 
uncle both served. One Saturday lunchtime, when I 
was 18, I saw a public information film on the 
television about the ROC. It seemed to have 
everything to attract me - links with the RAF, RAF 
blue uniform, important and secret role, also being a 
self contained organisation rather than a reserve of 
something else. The ROC was doing a vital job not 
done by anyone else and all performed by 
volunteers. I applied straight away, but because of 
lack of vacancies (probably a hang over from the 
1968 cuts) I tried again the following year and was 
duly enrolled. 
 30 Post No. 2 Group Horsham. 
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ROC#2
0 
Nuclear Physics was one of my specialities as a 
higher education lecturer and was alerted to the 
existence of the ROC through running in service 
courses for teachers on radioactive materials.  At the 
time (1971), most ROC members found this subject 
"boring" - they were mainly aircraft recognition 
experts. I soon took on the job of post instructor to 
try to bring interest in radioactivity. l  
8 Group Coventry 
ROC#2
1 
I served in the Royal Navy from 1959 – 73. On 
leaving I spent time studying and developing my 
civilian career, I then looked for a TAVR role as a 
spare time activity with purpose and the espirit  de 
corps that I had experienced in the Armed Services. 
The ROC was mentioned by a former member when 
I was working on a project in Maidstone. At that 
stage I had never seen the ROC advertised or 
promoted, I enquired and declined to enrol on a 
Post as the duties did not seem challenging enough. 
I was then invited to visit the Control and as that 
demonstrated a more active range of duties I joined 
a Control Crew During my time in the Royal Navy 
(from the age of 16) I had been brought up on the 
concept of MAD (mutually assured destruction) as 
the best way to avoid a nuclear war. The ROC 
seemed to be the only line of defence and 
protection for the civil population if peace talks 
failed  
No 1 Group Maidstone 
ROC#2
2 
Looking for an opportunity to serve in a worthwhile 
way following my National Service in REME. 
Interested in the Cold War and thought that we as a 
country should be prepared for an eventuality - 
luckily no war happened.  
No. 5 group Watford then No. 7 
Group Bedford 
ROC#2
3 
Dear Bob You may be interested in the work which I 
carried out to get Seaton Town Council/East Devon 
District Council to get a new road in Seaton, Devon, 
named Royal Observer Way. Work is still going on 
with and by Seaton Town Council to have a sign 
placed at the Seaton Down Hill picnic area which will 
include a reference to both an above and below 
ground post near to this area. Please contact me on 
my email irving.roberts@mypostoffice.co.uk  should 
5 and 7 
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you be interested in learning more. Irving Roberts 
former member of the ROC    
ROC#2
4 
My twin brother was a member and took me to an 
open night in Group HQ, after this visit I was 
interested in becoming a member and eventually 
joined as a Post Observer I was 17 years old . 
25 GRP AYR 
ROC#2
5 
An interest in the secrecy surrounding the nation's 
defence, and a desire to become part of that system 
and "do my bit" should the worst ever happen.  I 
was aware that the ROC existed (but not the 
UKWMO) before viewing an ROC stand at an RAF 
Stafford open day in the mid-1970s.  As far as I 
remember, it was at that stand that I picked up the 
leaflet to enquire about joining the Corps. 
16 Group, Shrewsbury and 15 
Group, Lincoln before returning 
to 16 Group. 
ROC#2
6 
My uncle served in the ROC,he told me what they 
did.I was interested in planes and the RAF.On 
further research the idea of serving with a small 
group on a post attracted me and the thought fo 
helping the countyr 
lincoln 15 group 
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ROC#2
7 
Basically because I had always wanted to join the 
RAF, but in my day (the 1960s) girls "didn't do that 
sort of thing" and were steered towards 
nursing/teaching and the like.  I saw a poster of 
people in RAF uniform and decided to give it a try.  I 
thoroughly enjoyed the work and the challenge, as I 
had done nothing like that before, and it gave a very 
shy person a great deal of confidence to be treated 
as a valuable member of the Corps.  When I was 
considering joining the Corps, I asked my father, 
who was ex-RAF and in favour of my joining the RAF, 
his opinion, and he encouraged me, saying that they 
had done a fine job during the war. 
Oxford, Winchester & Bedford 
ROC#2
8 
Family connection. My father served in the war and I 
was interested from then.  
16 Group. Shrewsbury 
ROC#2
9 
wanted to serve  24 
ROC#3
0 
I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father 
wouldn't let me.  He didn't think it was a "proper" 
job for a young lady.   I wasn't fit physically but I 
wanted to serve.  I don't think I would have made 
the grade at that time, but a friend mentioned that 
he had seen the ROC and thought of me!  I was 18. It 
was the best decision I ever made - I became 
independent, self reliant, confident and I made 
some of the best friends ever.  I got to go to RAF 
Stations to train and I had the time of my life! 
23 Group Durham 
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ROC#3
1 
At the age of 15 (as the Corps’ minimum age was in 
1964) I had a straight choice between the Scouts and 
the Boys’ Brigade and asked an ex-Boy’s Brigader for 
his advice. I found he’d joined an organisation called 
the Royal Observer Corps, which, to my surprise, not 
only provided the uniform for free but actually paid 
you to attend, rather than requiring subs. To a young 
lad, whose only source of income was a paper 
round, it was a no-brainer, especially when, 
following the recent Cuban missile crisis, I’d come to 
expect a nuclear war within my lifetime and worked 
out that I’d rather spend it “underground” in an ROC 
control room, than in a Scout hut. 
I joined 18 Group, Leeds in 1964 
at their control in Yeadon and 
stayed there until it closed in 
October 1968. I then transferred 
to the group control of 20 Group, 
York, where I stayed until stand-
down in September 1991. 
ROC#3
2 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/">fqzkgxhshpgc</a>
, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/"
>fqzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]h
sevqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]ll
bpjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
ROC#3
3 
Russian Threat against UK Experience/training 
before enlisting to RAF as Air Prop Tech until 
Eurofighter idea was delayed so ended my career 
plan. 
No.1 Grp HQ, 31 Post 
ROC#3
4 
At the time, I envisaged joining the Royal Air Force 
when old enough. My Mum suggested that we 
should all join the ROC as a family in order to give 
me a start in the military world. I also wanted to be 
involved in the defence of the country. 
16 group and NRC Northwood 
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ROC#3
5 
A friend persuaded me. I wanted to do my bit for my 
country, but did not want to join up full time for the 
armed services. I knew it would be good for my CV 
and career, as well as having a good social aspect. 
Bristol Group Control 
ROC#3
6 
I intended to join the Royal Navy, from a careers talk 
at school ,however I didn't do that, which I always 
regretted, I happened to see an advert for the ROC, 
and felt it would be a worthwhile thing to do, as it 
was part time, and I was quite concerned about the 
Cold War. 
23 group, Durham HQ 
ROC#3
7 
 Just went along to find out more as she was 
interested  
 28 group dundee 
ROC#3
8 
Always associated (by relatives) withR A F.  
Interested over many years with military aircraft and 
when 'Cold war' was intensifying felt I needed to "do 
my bit" 
16 crew 3 
ROC#3
9 
My mother was already a member 10 Group HQ 
ROC#4
0 
Friendship, curiosity (quarterly attendance payment 
also quite useful for a teenager) and enjoyment 
from the first meeting onwards. As understanding of 
the role of the corps dawned a sense of duty and 
community service developed. 
Initially 22 Carlisle 
ROC#4
1 
A desire to do something, it was really a hobby 
initially and it was instigated by my college physics 
teacher. 
Preston (21) Carlisle (22) Durham 
(23) Edinburgh(24) 
ROC#4
2 
I did a job at 10 group hq and could see the benefits. 10 group 
ROC#4
3 
Failed to get into the RAF 07 Bedford Crew 1 
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ROC#4
4 
As an ex-WRAF it was a way to get back in uniform. HQ 15 Group 
ROC#4
5 
 I was ribbing a warning officer about that he was 
going to Doom watch and it was a bunch of 
nonsence. He told me to come a long and see what 
was what. He said he would take me to the warning 
team meeting and a ROC meeting. I went to both, 
being 22 at the time I found the warning team stuffy 
and too old but was so warmly welcomed by the 
ROC group that I decided to go to the Intext exercise 
that following weekend. I was so amased and joined 
up.  
13 group SWA 
ROC#4
6 
I wanted to do something to serve the country. I had 
a passion for military aviation and was in the Air 
Cadets at school. My eyesight prevented me from 
joining the RAF so part-time service in the ROC was a 
good alternative. 
10 Group Exeter 
ROC#4
7 
After my RAF service ended, and my reserve 
commitment was completed, I needed a hobby or at 
least something of interest to do.  My manager at 
the time was a member of the Corps and invited me 
along to one of the meetings.  It just so happened 
that they were having a 'Quiz' night in preparation 
for their annual Master Test.  What I realised was 
that 90% of the questions asked, I actually knew the 
answer too.  The reason being that whilst in the RAF 
I was in Air Defence and the ROC was as you might 
say the final customers of the Air Defence Network.  
So I joined. 
9 Group Yeovil 
ROC#4
8 
Family tie and looking for a useful spare time 
occupation.  
17 
ROC#4
9 
Parents would not let me join army or Navy and I 
could join ROC at 17 without their permission. 
31Gp Belfast 
ROC#5
0 
I would have liked to join the WRAF but my father 
didn't approve so I went into engineering and I 
(think - 1964) I applied to an advert. I visited the 
Coventry Group HQ, which was a fairly recently built 
sub-surface building and was shown round by Jack 
Matthews, my soon to be Crew Officer. Half-way 
round I decided it probably wasn't for me; too 
complicated and very little to do with the aircraft in 
which I was interested BUT for some reason I don't 
understand I found myself signing on the dotted line 
one of the best things I have done - 30+ good years 
and a husband. 
8gp(COV) & 2gp(HOR)  
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ROC#5
1 
through friends speaking about it though it was a 
worth while organisation to look into 23 years later 
still thought the same  
22 group 
ROC#5
2 
My aunt had been in for many years and i went 
along to see what she did and i joined for something 
to do for myself for a break from the family one 
night a week .. 
23 group 41 post 
ROC#5
3 
I was taken to an open night in AYR 25 Grp HQ by my 
twin brother who had joined the ROC [Post ]. After 
seeing HQ I decided I was interested in joining ROC. 
25 Grp AYR  
ROC#5
4 
Friends were in and so was my father. 3 Group Crew one 
ROC#5
5 
I grew up in the 70's/80's under the 'shadow of the 
bomb'. I did not like the thought that a foreign 
power could take everything away from the UK at 
the touch of a button as simplistic as that sounds.  I 
found out about the the ROC having read a book 
called 'War Plan UK' and their role during a nuclear 
attack. I decided that I wanted to do something that 
would help to protect the country and my family and 
friends, should the unthinkable happen. It may seem 
niieve but I believed I was doing the right thing. 
No 2 Group (Horsham) - The best 
:) 
ROC#5
6 
I wanted a worthwhile hobby, after Scouts, and was 
unable, for health reasons, to join the TA.  A friend 
of my father's was in the ROC, and arranged for me 
to visit the North Wales HQ. I loved what I saw, and 
joined immediately. 
17 Group, North Wales 
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ROC#5
7 
To serve and help protect our nation while it was a 
risk 
28 Group Dundee 
ROC#5
8 
 My uncle was in the ROC. after chatting to him I 
decided to join.I liked the links to the RAF 
15 Group 
 
Entry 
Id 
Could you describe some of the duties 
you undertook during your time in the 
ROC? 
What would you say was the greatest advance 
made in the equipment used during your time 
in the Corps? 
ROC#
1 
Underground Post duties: Not in any 
particular order. These comprised of 
monitoring the various instruments we 
had which could record a Nuclear blast 
and Fallout etc., Making the relevant 
report via the landline, filling out the 
appropriate form. Changing the GZI 
papers, sounding the air raid warning 
and fallout alarms (in theory only; we 
never actually sounded them). Mobile 
monitoring by car in the surrounding 
countryside. Using the generator set to 
charge the batteries. 
Radiation monitoring equipment. When i 
joined in 1982 we still used monitors designed 
in the 1950s. Within a couple of years we had 
very modern lightweight and easy to use 
equipment. Interestingly, these monitors still 
look modern now, 30 years later. 
ROC#
2 
Initially I worked on a post carrying out 
the aircraft role then when the Corps 
went nuclear I carried out the nuclear 
role on several posts.   For a time I also 
worked in a nuclear Control (Ops 
Room) and was the Duty Officer.   
Latterly I was the team Officer at a 
nuclear reporting cell, later an NBC Cell.  
The greatest advance was undoubtedly the 
Message Switch located at Group Controls.   
This allowed all manner of different routings 
for messages to pass around the ROC/UKWMO 
network.    A smaller advance was the 
introduction of radios at some posts to enable 
information to be passed even if the telphone 
nectwork broke down. 
ROC#
3 
I learnt to use ROC equipment  ie 
BPI,GZi, FSM etc. I took part in regular 
exercises dealing with nuclear war 
scenarios. 
Very little|! Radios were introduced at a late 
stage and a much improved FSM and FSM 
trainer were provided. 
ROC#
4 
Observing and judging hieght of clouds 
and wind direction. Telephoning that 
information on to Master Post(I think). 
I was only in the Corps for one year.1990 to 
stand down 1991. 
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ROC#
5 
Joined as an Observer in 1954. 
Promoted to L/Obs in 1956 to become 
Post Instructor just in time to begin 
instruction for new UKWMO role. 
Knowledge of chemistry & physics 
helped enormously. Continued as 
C/Obs in same role Admin done by 
L/Obs. Continued Post's deep interest 
in aircraft and aircraft recognition 
Organized trips to Farnborough air 
shows and other international events. 
Encouraged local organizations to visit 
post. Organised air experience flights 
from RAF St Mawgan,and glider flights 
with ATC. Set and presented Plymouth 
and Cornwall aircraft recognition tests 
1960-90. Hosted various units from RAF 
St Mawgan 
The introduction of Radiac instruments 
following the rudimentary equipment used for 
the aircraft reporting role 
ROC#
6 
Gloucester ops room was a secondary 
training base only and all personnel 
travelled to other groups, (Bristol, 
Oxford, Yeovil, Truro) for live exercises. 
In my service time the aircraft reporting 
roll had all but finished and I was only 
involved on the nuclear side of things. 
Teleprinters replacing speech between groups. 
ROC#
7 
All under gound post duties Introduction of the teletalk 
ROC#
8 
all duties including training the rest of 
the crew as Leading Observer. 
Tele talk 
ROC#
9 
My job took me around the country 
relocating each time. So I spent time on 
Posts and the Group controls. I was also 
attached to ADOC and NRC later to 
become NBC when we were refered to 
as "Specials" as we were attached 
direct to the Military. Duties on Group 
controls were varied from being Post 
plotter to the Triangulation team which 
pinpointed where a nuclear device had 
gone off based on information supplied 
from the Posts. Also logging the 
radiation readings and  recording the 
"hot" spots. At ADOC we would advise 
of the threat of attack and await any 
confirmation of attack which would 
come up through the system initiating 
at the posts. At NRCs we would advise 
our "customer" of the attack and give 
information as to where the radiation 
was liking to go and at what strenth. 
Telephonic communications improved and the 
use of Data transfer by Teleprinter. 
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ROC#
10 
We were in continuous training during 
the 14 years I served. In 1959 we were 
still concerned with Aircraft recognition 
as well as Nuclear side. The aircraft was 
later dropped when we were 
concerned with nuclear attack 
detection 
Radio 
ROC#
11 
All Control room duties (plotting, 
telling, traingulation, keyboard 
operations) in both the telephone and 
message switch eras. All aspects of post 
operation. Plotting and other duties at 
ADOC (ROC cell there). 
Introduction of Message Switch. 
ROC#
12 
I mainly help man a post with 6 others . 
Main duties included Meta Bravo 
reports , Coms with GHQ , Mobile 
monitoring. As well as taking my basic 
test .  
The Swiss air filter system that never 
happened. 
ROC#
13 
Post Observer 12/K2 Penarth Post 
Observer 12/F2 Llanishen/Lisvane 
Group Staff Officer (Obs Lt) 22 Gp 
Carlisle Group Staff Officer (Obs Lt) 31 
Gp Belfast Deputy Group Commandant 
(Obs Lt Cdr) 16 Gp Shrewsbury 
Operations Training Officer (Obs Lt Cdr) 
HQROC Personnel Services Officer (Obs 
Lt Cdr) HQROC  
Introduction of Message Switch (MSX) digital 
data-transfer and SX2000 EMP-hardened 
countrywide vox communications in the 1980s  
ROC#
14 
At HQ: -communicating with posts -
recording data from different posts -
working alongside members of the 
warning team -helping to map fallout 
patterns -running messages for 
commander -miscellaneous duties -
attending training  In posts: -
monitoring instruments -recording date 
-reporting to HQ -attending training   
I cannot comment as I was not aware of any 
development in equipment. 
ROC#
15 
I started off as an Observer on a post 
and then quickly moved to Leading 
Observer, Chief Observer and then to a 
Group Officer responsible for 5 posts. 
The improvement is communications from the 
old teletalk to a much more efficient system. In 
addition the comms at headquarters from the 
use of tapes to VDU's greatly increased 
efficiency. 
 533 | P a g e  
ROC#
16 
As a Post member I undertook nuclear 
intrumentation and  meteorolgical 
observations. Weekly winter training 
was undertaken in Maindy Barracks, 
Cardiff and in the spring Summer and 
Autumn I attended the Post on a 
weekly basis to  help with Post 
maintenance, There were three major 
NATO excercises during the year when 
the Post had to be fully manned to 
play-out the excercise scenario. I 
became a Group Officer in charge of a 
Cluster of five Posts in the East 
Glamorgan and Gwent area. This 
involved recruitment, the supervision 
of training, admin and man 
management. I was advanced to 
Observer Commander as Group 
Commandant 12 Group and was 
responsible for 31 Posts and the 
undergound Group/ Sector Control at 
Lansdowne. My last advancement was 
to Observer Captain as Southern Area 
Commandant and was the head of five 
groups, 130 Posts and an establishment 
of 2500 Observers. My job was to 
ensure the Area's morale was 
maintained, the training was uptodate, 
the officers were  efficiently doing their 
job and that Southern Area  was in a fit 
and proper state to provide the 
necessary service to HMG. I also had 
the privilege of presenting the ROC 
Medal and Clasp to qualifying 
members. 
For the Posts the introduction of the PDRM to 
replace the old mechanical Fixed Servey Meter 
and, had the programme had been rolled out 
nationally, the introduction of 'Lowe' Post 
ventilation equipment. The Group Controls had 
all their old punched tape comms system 
replaced by an electronic message switching 
system similar to the current email system. All 
Nuclear data and messages could be routed 
and re-routed around the UK to avoid any 
damaged area. 
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ROC#
17 
i was an ordinary Observer rank in our 
post but I eventually had responsibility 
as a crew leader. The crew leader 
helped with induction and settling in of 
new members; also during exercises 
organised duty rotas during our shift 
and made the hand-over report to the 
relief crew. 
Undoubtedly the main advances were in the 
means of communicating. Better telephonic 
equipment was installed during the mid 1980s. 
Updated general warning receivers were 
introduced in the late 80s. Training and major 
monitoring equipment (or devices??) remained 
strangely primitive but we were assured that 
they were effective. Radiation monitoring 
equipment was also improving by Stand-Down. 
Post comfort and ventilation was never good, 
we did many self-help projects to get around 
this. Also, personal radiation protection was 
never properly considered or issued. Our Post 
team was very lucky because our meeting/ 
training room was sited inside an RAF Station 
which was shared by Special Forces personnel, 
they took an interest in us and provided 
equipment and training well above and beyond 
that provided in the Corps' Standard Operating 
Procedures; our whole post team had CBW 
Suits.   
ROC#
18 
I took part in most of the duties and as 
a leading observer i was responsible for 
training in all departments. 
I would say that the introduction of the 
computer for communications, it was far in 
advance of the telephone and ticker-tape i 
used when i joined but we still retained the 
underground telephone lines because of the 
electromagnetic pulse caused by a nuclear 
attack. 
ROC#
19 
Everything involved as a post Observer, 
Leading Observer/Post Instructor and 
Chief Observer/Head Observer. For 
details please see ROC Training Manual 
- not room here ! 
I think the most important to a post was the 
improvement in communications when the 
private wires were installed and the teletalk 
replaced by the loudspeaker telephone. The 
radio was available so infrequently that I never 
received the full benefit from it. What should 
have been vital to post was ventilation pumps. 
My post was involved in most of the testing 
and proving of the Luwa pump. It was amply 
proved that without forced ventilation the 
carbon dioxide levels would have made the 
posts uninhabitable in a shutdown situation. 
Really everything stood or fell on this and it 
was scandalously neglected. Mention should 
be made here of Obs Commander  Roy Bent 
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who was the driving force behind the need for 
forced ventilation. 
ROC#
20 
Observer on post, then post instructor. 
Promoted to Group Officer (Obs .Off, 
then Obs Lt) in 1975. Responsible for 
the organisation and training of 
personnel in five posts and also 
instructional duties at annual training 
camps and weekend courses 
Simplified instruments (radiation meters etc) 
and better communications although radio sets 
which actually worked only came in just before 
stand-down  
ROC#
21 
Observer 1980 - 82 Post Display Plotter 
BPI Plotter Triangulation Feeder 
Triangulator Group Information Orderly 
Group Information VDU Operator Log 
Chart Teller Log Chart Plotter Display A 
Teller Display A Plotter Display B Teller 
Display B Plotter Display E & T Teller 
Display E & T Plotter NB Tote Teller NB 
Tote Plotter Data Orderly Warning Key 
Board Operator  Leading Observer 1982 
- 85 Post Supervisor Triangulation 
Supervisor Data Supervisor Operations 
Table Supervisor  Chief Observer 1985 
Display Supervisor Group Information 
Supervisor  Observer Officer & 
Observer Lieutenant 1986 – 91  Duty 
Officer  Administration Officer  
Introduction of the Message Switch and the 
SX2000 exchange. The later allowed contact 
with all Groups and removed the blockage on 
information at Sector Control 
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ROC#
22 
Served on Great Offley post as an 
Observer, Leading Observer and then 
Chief Observer. Later become a Group 
Officer in No. 7 Group. 
When Offley Post become a radio (master) 
post. And had a electic generator, mechanically 
petrol operated, for charging the post battery.  
ROC#
23 
Post observer and later group officer in 
charge of six posts. 
Will discuss. 
ROC#
24 
Started as Post Observer becoming a 
Post Instructor until 1991 Stand down 
when I transferred as an Observer to 
local NRC until their stand down in 
1995 
Introduction of tele printers in GRP HQ,S 
upgrading of Post communications and  radiac 
instruments 
ROC#
25 
I started on an underground monitoring 
post in 1976.  This was 35 post (F1 post) 
in 16 Group at Market Drayton. I then 
moved (c.1979) to Nottinghamshire 
and was a member of a nuclear 
reporting cell (I believe it was one of 
two NRCs in 15 Group) at RAF Bawtry 
on the Nottinghamshire/Yorkshire 
border.  Upon returning to live near 
Stafford (c.1981), I persuaded the 
officers at 16 Group to allow me to join 
the group control at Shrewsbury 
(despite the long travelling distance) as 
this work was more akin to the role I 
had been trained in at the NRC.  They 
were reluctant at first, as the idea was 
to have people serving near to their 
place of residence (and there were 
several monitoring posts a lot nearer 
than Shrewsbury Group Control) - 
however, they agreed to allow me to 
serve at Shrewsbury on Crew 3.  For the 
monitoring post, duties involved all 
those associated with posts apart from 
those performed by the Leading and 
Chief Observer.    At the NRC our team 
performed functions which were a 
combination of plotting nuclear bursts 
(and associated fallout plumes) and 
some of the duties which would have 
been carried out by the UKWMO 
warning teams had we been at an ROC 
control rather than an RAF control 
room.  In a nutshell, we were receiving 
information from the ROC control at 
My later years were at Group Control, so I can't 
comment on the advances made in the 
equipment at monitoring posts.  As far as the 
control was concerned, I would say the 
replacement of the punched tape machines 
and teleprinters with VDUs and dot matrix 
printers, and the replacement of the telephone 
switchboard (with cord and plugs) with a 
computerised system.  This technology was 
introduced some ten years after similar 
systems had become available commercially; I 
believe the delay may have been owing to both 
expense and the need to make the sensitive 
electronics resistant to the effects of the EMP 
(electro magnetic pulse) generated by nuclear 
weapons. 
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Lincoln, interpreting it, and providing 
reports and advice to the control at 
RAF Bawtry.  Within the Group Control 
at Shrewsbury I trained in practically 
every job, especially Post Display 
Plotting, Triangulation, Display A and B 
plotting and Switchboard operating.  
Some of the other jobs involved a 
knowledge of the air conditioning plant 
operation and the complexities of the 
communications centre (originally on 
"torn tape", later on VDUs).  I was 
promoted to Leading observer and 
then trained others in the Traffic 
Centre, particularly the computerized 
Message Switching system that had by 
then been introduced.  The jobs were 
so diverse; I can always give more 
information if you need it - please feel 
free to e-mail: m.kenzie@tesco.net. 
ROC#
26 
As part of the crew manning Lincoln 17 
post Roxton.As an Observer then as 
Leading Observer and finally Chief 
Observer.I was then promoted To 
Observer Officer in charge of 5 
monitoring posts 
I served the last 8-9 years of the ROC there 
wasn't much change in equipement.The new 
WB1400 was a big improvement,not having to 
listen to the old one ticking away. 
ROC#
27 
Initially I worked in 3 Gp Oxford Group 
Control, and in time, learned all the 
non-supervisory jobs.  I was promoted 
Leading Obs, and later Chief Obs on 
Crew 3. On promotion I became a 
Group Officer in 14 Gp Winchester, 
with responsibility for four posts 
adjacent to Reading. Two years later I 
applied for and was appointed to the 
post of Group Commandant, 7 Gp 
Bedford, where I remained until stand 
down in 1991. 
Although somewhat unpopular at the time, it 
would have to be the message switching, which 
raised the technology from teleprinters to 
what began to look like computers. 
ROC#
28 
Triangulation Supervisor Display 
Supervisor. (Leading Observer) 
The use of main frame computers. 
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ROC#
29 
post obs met reporting and radio the food 
ROC#
30 
Initially I was trained on all aspects of 
the crew.  Post Display Operator - 
taking radio messages from the posts at 
regular intervals.  Telephonist - learning 
to use the archiac, even then, 
switchboard - but I am proud to say 
that I mastered it when some could not 
and could still use it today!  Display 
board marker - where you had to learn 
to write backwards so that the Ops 
room staff could read all bomb 
messages as they were written.  
Comms room - where initially all 
messages were sent and received by 
telex tape - punched holes in tape - 
latterly by fledgling computers!! 
Triangulating the post information 
given by radio on a main board up on 
the balcony so that others could use 
the information for a safe passage 
through our geographical area.  Going 
outside (sometimes in 
chemical/biological suits) to check 
these instruments and change papers 
etc.,  look at the weather for the wind 
direction etc., and then after all that, 
each crew had to do their turn with the 
cooking and the plant room 
maintenance.  It was great!!!! 
computers.  We went from telex tape that was 
punched holes, then written information to 
computers - made a big difference. 
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ROC#
31 
Throughout my 27 years with the 
Corps, I remained a member of a 
control crew, first as an Observer, 
undertaking all non-supervisory roles, 
before becoming a Triangulation 
Supervisor, with the rank of Chief 
Observer in 1972. I then became Group 
Information Supervisor when the post 
was created during a reorganisation, 
with the additional roles of crew 
training and later, assistant to the Crew 
Officer. I was promoted to Crew Officer 
in 1982, with the operation role of Duty 
Officer and peacetime duties of 
managing, supporting, training and 
motivating a control crew of a couple of 
dozen volunteers. A role I undertook 
until stand-down in 1991. 
Without doubt, the greatest advance was the 
Corps’ evolution away from purely manual 
“telling” and recording of information to the 
“information technology” we take for granted 
these days, as brought about by the Corps’ 
adoption of the Message Switch for the input, 
dissemination and storage of its data and 
messages. 
ROC#
32 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/">fqzkg
xhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevq
maavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqx
lmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/">fqzkgxhshpg
c</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[
/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/li
nk], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
ROC#
33 
Post Maintenance. Intelligence 
gathering/reporting Participating in 
regular training/exercises. Exam tests 
Radio/Comms operator Installing 
equipment above ground i.e GZI  
Better comms/radar equipment at time Corps 
was stood down. 
ROC#
34 
Undertook Observer duties at my post 
(56 post) during weekly meetings and 
exercises. Attended Summer camps at 
RAF Scampton. 
The change from aircraft recognition to the 
nuclear priorities and communications 
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ROC#
35 
As a C/obs I was a trainer during weekly 
meetings, and a supervisor during 
operations. I did every job an observer, 
L/Obs and C/Obs could have done. 
I'm not sure if the newer technology actually 
improved efficiency or reliability. The 
replacement of punched paper tape for data 
transmission was probably the best at 
operations rooms. 
ROC#
36 
At HQ, we all trained as Post display 
plotters, receiving information from the 
posts, regarding, bomb bursts, they 
were plotted by the triangulation team, 
and recorded on displays, fallout 
readings were also received from the 
posts, and plotted on displays, and log 
charts, I was a display B plotter, mainly, 
which was a local area map. The log 
charts were in a graph, the information 
was shared between groups. 
When we had computer terminals installed, 
and a newer switchboard 
ROC#
37 
 mobile monitoring  reporting on 
exercise  changing gzi papers  weather 
reporting  charging batteries and any 
other duties asked of us. 
 Not much changed in my time 
ROC#
38 
Group H Q logging of post supplied info 
for plotters. 
Clearer communications 
ROC#
39 
Plotting nuclear fallout during 
exercises, maintaining info boards  
No idea - only served 2 years before joining 
WRAF 
ROC#
40 
Centre duties, Observer, promotion to 
C/Obs (triangulation) then Crew 
Officer. Promotion to Group 
Commandant and then Area 
Commandant (Western Area) 
Communication systems 
ROC#
41 
Initially I was control room Observer, I 
manned the post comms, worked in the 
data centre, plotted on the displays. I 
then moved with work and became a 
Post observer, I undertook all roles in 
the post, reading the FSM and 
reporting to Control, changing GZI 
papers etc. I then moved back to the 
control as the day job changed. I was 
quick promoted to Data supervisor, and 
eventually I applied for an officer role, I 
was successful and became a Group 
officer in charge of a cluster of posts. 
The natural inclination after a year or 
so was to become a full time officer, so 
i applied and was successful becoming 
a Group Staff Officer at 23Grp ROC 
Durham, I was responsible for the 
facilities management of all the 
building, training of all personnel and 
organising Group training sessions for 
Communications equipment we moved from 
old tickertape telex type machines to state of 
the art hard wired comms. Even the radios 
used by master posts were quite good for their 
day. 
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the NCO’s and officers in specific tasks.  
Eventually I was again promoted to 
Observer Lieutenant Commander and 
posted to 24 Grp Edinburgh as Deputy 
Group Commandant. responsible for 
the day to day operation capability of 
the whole group and its TTW 
effectiveness 
ROC#
42 
Fire/security also on camp , everything  
that was needed for training and on 
exercise from manning the comms to 
the posts to making tea.j 
Not upgrading from electromechanical to 
electronics for communication , which would 
have been highly suscepical to EMP. 
ROC#
43 
General duties in the Grp HQ   inc 
security fire marshal 
Computerisation of the message switching and 
data handling 
ROC#
44 
A bit of everything Teleprinters 
ROC#
45 
Display A & B plotter, Dislay A & B 
Teller. Post display plotter (AT a push, 
disliked that job ) some trianglation.  
It went computerised,  
ROC#
46 
My time in the Corps was spent on a 
post.  My duties were standard post 
observer work monitoring the post 
instruments etc. 
Telecommonications. 
ROC#
47 
During the course of my service with 
the Corps, I managed to cover all the 
tasks that were associated with a 
Group Control.  Post Display Plotter, 
Triangulation Centre, Comms Centre, 
Switchboard.  Display A, B & E Plotters.  
Not only as an Observer but also as a 
supervisor and eventually ended up as 
Crew Officer. When the UKWMO were 
short of bodies I also stood in as part of 
the Warning Team. If the crunch had 
come, I was Duty Officer designate due 
to my proximity to Group Control.   
The updating of the Radiac Survey equipment, 
and the introduction of the SX2000 
communications equipment which did away 
with the necessity of the PBX1A switchboard. 
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ROC#
48 
Triangulation,  display superior at 
Group HQ.  Reached the rank of Chief 
Observer so a lot of administration and 
training duties.  
Replacing punch tape with computers.  
ROC#
49 
All Observers were Post Display Plotters 
in communication with 3 - 6 posts.  As a 
Leading Observer I was in 
communication with all posts in our 
group.  In my role as a Chief Observer I 
was a Triangulation Supervisor and 
pinpointed, as accurately as possible, 
where the bomb bursts had exploded. 
Most observers were also Long Range 
Board Plotters, plotting bursts on 
screens for the scientists to translate 
The move to VDUs  
ROC#
50 
Started at COV as Obs plotting on the 
Main Table, a mix of aircraft and 
Nuclear plotting also Long Range Board, 
plotted fallout on log charts. Promoted 
L/Obs Floor Supervisor, C/Obs 
Triangulation Supervisor - calculating 
position,power,height of burst, 
Assistant Duty Controller. Appointed 
Crew Officer running crew of 5 NCOs & 
30/40 Obs. Moved to HOR appointed 
Obs on a Post acting as 2 or 3 Observer. 
Appointed Obs at Northwood NRC 
initially plotting data on reverse of 
transparent screen, Appointed L/Obs 
calculating wind triangles from Met 
data and drawing these on front of 
screen to show fallout. Appointed NRC 
Officer responsible for 3 NCO's and 15-
20 Obs. Appointed Obs at NRC in 
Portsmouth dockyard learning the new 
NBCC duties. Appointed Crew Officer 
till stand-down. 
There were so many changes over my 30 years, 
it was probably a bit like 'dads army' in the 
early days (and arguably) more enjoyable, with 
pretty basic equipment. Communication and 
equipment improved but the majority of the 
work relied very much on manual telling and 
plotting. Living/survival changes such as air-
conditioning etc in HQ buildings, investigations 
into ventilation equipment for posts, ration 
packs etc. I am not sure I can separate 1 
individual item. I will say that the techniques 
we had to go 'back' to when the main body of 
the Corps stood-down were worrying - no 
remote instruments all done by visual 
inspection!!  
ROC#
51 
ops room post controller ,triangulation 
supervisor. plus other jobs as and when 
required. OBS officer posts  then crew 
officer group HQ 
the use of computers in the ops room  
ROC#
52 
I wasn't in long before ROC was 
disbanded so i was still learning. I took 
part in training days at the post where i 
manned the radio, set up the 
equipment and took readings from the 
GZI . 
I wasn't in long enough to notice any 
advancements. 
ROC#
53 
Started as Post Observer then 
promoted to Post Instructor L/OBS. 
1991 Stand Down I transferred to 
NBC/NRC . 
Introduction of new radiac instruiments and 
PW Lines for better  communications.  
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ROC#
54 
Triangulation Team Equipment with Civilian Standard Batteries. 
ROC#
55 
1. Monitoring radiation levels 2. 
Monitoring the BPI (Blast Pressure 
Indicator) 3. Changing the GZI papers 
(Ground Zero Indicator) 4. Changing 
water in the post 5. Charging the 
batteries 6. Decorating the post so it 
looked spic and span! 7. Undergoing 
lots of training and drills 8. Taking part 
in national and local exercises 9. Going 
on camp (Fabulous experience) 10. 
Visiting the Luftmeldakorpset in 
Denmark (There was a fantastic 
relationship with these guys and it is 
worth exploring in your thesis). 11. 
Monitoring and reporting the weather 
12. Aircraft recognition training 13. 
Reporting diplomatic number plates on 
cars  
Nothing really changed during my short time in 
the Corps 
ROC#
56 
Basic Observer duties, such as Post 
Display Plotter, Displays A & B Plotting, 
Teleprinter Operator, Displays A & B 
Telling. In fact, every Observer position.  
Progressed through the ranks to Chief 
Observer, and was Training new 
Recruits, and experienced Observers.  
At Stand Down, I was the Traffic 
Supervisor, on Crew 3. 
Most certainly, the introduction of the 
Message Switch (MSX).  Communication 
between Group & Sector Controls was almost 
instantaneous - dependent upon the transfer 
speeds through BT Lines, and did not rely on 
outdated punched tape machinery. 
ROC#
57 
Basic training and instruction including 
during NATO exercises , annual Camps ( 
1988 & 1990)  mobile monitoring , 
basic Post maintenance , taking part in 
annual Master Test. 
Radiac Survey Meter  
ROC#
58 
 After 9 months I was promoted to 
Leading Observer Whose duties were 
Post instructor.Later on I was promoted 
to Chief Observer carrying out the 
admin for the post. I was a Group 
Officer at stand down with the rank of 
Observer Officer. 
I was on on a Post the equipement was quit 
basic.I would say the updated Carrier Receiver 
would be the best. We didn't have to listen to 
the constant ticking sound of the old one. 
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Entr
y Id 
If the 'balloon had gone up' how 
do you think you would have 
coped knowing everyone you 
held dear could be in grave 
danger? 
What were your feelings towards 
members of the peace movements 
such as CND? 
 How long did 
you serve in 
the Corps? 
Please 
indicate your 
first and last 
year i.e. 1976-
1987. 
ROC
#1 
With difficulty. It was something 
we all discussed, but none of of us 
could honestly say what we would 
do. We weren't subject to Military 
law so I think some desertion 
would have occurred. 
Well intentioned and sincere but, 
out of touch with reality. 
Surprisingly most members of the 
ROC I knew had quite a bit of 
sympathy with their cause but, not 
their methods. 
1982 - 1991 
ROC
#2 
I honestly thought that the best 
way I could help my family in time 
of a nuclear war was to man my 
ROC place of work and carry out 
the role for which I had been 
trained.    I was an officer and I 
never doubted that I could not 
cope with the pressures that 
would have arisen. 
I thought they were misguided but 
respected their different beliefs.   I 
very much thought they were 
wrong in resorting, at times, to 
physical violence to put their beliefs 
over to the public and the 
government of the day.   For 
example CND set fire to  more than 
one ROC post.   
1953 -1995 
ROC
#3 
This was discussed at times and 
arrangements for families of those 
on duty would be implemented by 
other post members. However 
nothing formal had been decided. 
No animosity was felt, in fact it 
would have been good if nuclear 
weapons had been abandoned. 
1966-1995 
ROC
#4 
I am a loner and would not have 
bothered too much about my 
sisters or parents.As a member of 
ROC I would have had a short life 
anyway.If no nuclear threat to us 
we were meant to go out and look 
for hazadous areas and then 
report back.We had no  NBC suites 
or masks. 
I believed they were backed by the 
USSR and that they did not realise 
that we were there to warn the 
local population as well as the 
Government. 
1990-1991 
ROC
#5 
I am sure that the majority would 
have agreed to man the post. 
Those not at the post on Attack 
Warning Red would have been 
aware of the beast method of 
protection for their families 
individually and collectively 
MY PERSONAL opinion is that every 
individual has the right to have and 
express his/her own belief. I  think 
that the CND were mistaken in its 
beliefs and I supported the actions 
of the British government in having 
a nuclear detterant but I bore the 
CND no animosity 
1954-1990 
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ROC
#6 
Can't really say but would have 
done my best to cope. 
Pardon my French - A load of 
w***ers!! 
1958 - 1976 
ROC
#7 
This question I always asked my 
self,probally i would have stayed 
Not a lot 1963 1991 
ROC
#8 
my immediat family was also in 
the corp  
they were very nieeve  with their 
heads in the sand 
1978-1991 
ROC
#9 
It would have been difficult. I 
would not be able to do anything 
about the what was to happen, 
but I was hopeful that we could 
mitigate some of the effects by 
being able to warn people of the 
threat.   
I felt they were deluded and the 
2nd World War was partially caused 
through not standing up to an 
aggressor at an earlier stage. I felt 
the USSR was aggressive and 
wished to dominate the whole of 
Europe and CND were doing just 
what Chamberlain had done in 
theThirties which was 
appeasement. That hadn't worked. 
1962-1995 
ROC
#10 
I was very much aware of what 
was at stake.I had discused the 
possibilities with my wife who 
agreed with me that what I  was 
doing and should go and do my 
duty to protect others Yes, I was 
prepared. 
CND members annoyed me, I am 
sure some were paid to cause 
trouble. When `non-nuclear` tests 
were being carried out near my 
home in early 60`s , CND 
`protesters` were staying at the 
same hotel as the MOD police.  
1059-1973 
ROC
#11 
With a great deal of difficulty, 
especially after I married and had 
children. 
Ambivalence. They were entitled to 
their view. The biggest concern I 
ever had was that they would 
obtain entry to a post and then 
refuse to leave. 
1963-1991 
ROC
#12 
I think I would have put it to the 
back of my mind , carried on with 
the job in hand . As i said earlier I'd 
just left the army and my mind set 
was almost unaware of the realish 
threat. O that and being young . 
However the reaction to the little 
letter,MARKED  HQ 21 GROUP 
.Royal Observer Corps. Transition 
to War - To be opened on Receipt 
of Activation Message. Went do 
rather less favorablely with close 
family, friend couldnt get there 
heads around that little one. 
By the nature of our job and what 
we were up to. To say we had the 
same goal would be to far from the 
truth. The only thing was we 
couldnt tell them what we were up 
to , They didn't understand .  
1990- 
standdown 
1991 
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ROC
#13 
As part of Transition to War 
strategic planning I had always 
made local arrangements for my 
wife and children to be in the 
safest possible location with a 
supply of water and food. 
Totally benign feelings mixed with 
mild amusement at some of their 
naive misconceptions. On one 
occasion during a weekend exercise 
in Northern Ireland I was 
dispatched to a monitoring post 
that was besieged by a throng of 
CND protestors. While talking to 
them the post hatch swung open 
and they all flung themselves to the 
ground, apparently convinced that 
a missile was about to be launched 
from the 'silo'. 
28 years 
service (1963 - 
1991) 
ROC
#14 
Both my parents had been in the 
army. My father worked for the 
MOD. We discussed the possibility 
of nuclear attack and what 
preparations could made against 
nuclear fallout in the house.  I 
would have no doubt coped like 
any other young person.  The ROC 
quanitfied and measured the 
unthinkable but it did teach me 
not to be afraid. I understood that 
people could survive even with 
very basic anti-fallout precautions. 
At school, we had a cohort of 
teachers who promoted CND. We 
also had CND protests at the Bath 
HQ when we had weekend long 
exercises.  I found many of the pro-
CND teachers to be career activists, 
many were bullies and all seemed 
incapable of understanding with 
US-Soviet realpolitik nor of 
presenting an objective viewpoint. 
For this reason, I never disclosed 
my ROC work to classmates or 
teachers. 
1982 -1989 
ROC
#15 
This was a major concern however 
I felt that what we were training 
for would be of great value to 
both the military and civilian 
authorities. 
While I respected their views I 
found it most annoying when they 
targeted posts and damaged our 
facilities. 
1972-1991 
ROC
#16 
I laid contingency plans with my 
wife who  ensured our larder held 
three weeks supply of food at all 
times. In the garage were empty 
plastic water containers which 
would be filled at the first signs of 
the 'balloon going up.' Neighbours, 
friends and family members were 
briefed to provide mutual support. 
That was all that could be 
expected. As a Senior Officer my 
major concern was how many 
Observers would report for duty 
and how many would have to be 
reported to the Police 
I held no strong anti-feelings 
towards them, until they started to 
interfere with my Observers duty. 
Stupid acts like Supergluing locks to 
stop access to Posts, breaking 
fences and even breaking into and 
ransacking Posts.This was very 
demoralising to my Volunteers who 
took great pride in their Posts. As 
Group Commandant 12 Group I 
took the bull by the horns and in 
1988 I arranged an Open Day for 
the public. I knew the CND would 
turn-up and they did, in force. They 
took the conducted tour 
throughout the Control building 
and we impressed our visitors on 
the life saving tasks that with which 
we were charged. We showed them 
that we were not the warmongers 
they thought we were. Towards the 
1976 - 1991 
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end of a very successful Open Day 
the CND contingent made a 'sit 
down' protest in front of the admin 
office. I took the opportunity to 
thank them for visiting us but 
mentioned that at 5.30pm we 
would be locking the high security 
gates and going to our homes. At  
5.25pm they arose en masse and 
trooped out of the gate like lambs, 
bless em! I subsequently was at 
pains to explain to the CND people 
that we were there in case some 
idiot started a Nuclear war, were 
the Nuclear ambulance or fire 
engine, hopefully never to be used 
but there just in case. They had no 
answer to that other than nuclear 
disarmament.  
ROC
#17 
Few of us truly believed that there 
would be a need to call us to 
active service despite the stupidity 
of the Regan/ Thatcher attitudes, 
most of us saw the end of the 
proper "threat" as being after the 
1962 Cuba Missile Crisis was 
resolved.  Our Post had a team 
plan based on using some of our 
homes, close to the post and clear 
of the town area. This would 
provide collective shelter for our 
immediate families.... We never 
did make a test run of the plan nor 
did we (or at least I did not) tell 
our families about this. 
Most of us had no issues or 
problems with such organisations. 
Our hope was that we need never 
have to properly exercise our skills; 
so did CND, etc. but at a far more 
fundamental level. During exercises 
our post was picketed by a local 
peace organisation on occasions. I 
was quite happy to chat about our 
status as being a local point of 
information and help and not being 
a military organisation, also my 
belief that we would never likely be 
used in reality seemed to help. I 
think uniforms were a misleading 
aspect of our purpose. The only 
time we had any issue with 
protesters was when one of my 
colleagues stood at the entrance to 
the post and made loud suggestions 
about the women needing to be 
home to cook dinner for their 
husbands. This was not well 
received and caused an hour's 
worth of noisy protest. For other 
reasons, this member did not last 
long in the Corps.   
1981 to stand 
down. 
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ROC
#18 
It was something i think we were 
concerned about, but if the worst 
came i think i would have 
responded as this is what i had 
trained for. 
The Peace movements we 
encounterd at the H.Q. at Exeter 
unfortunately did not understand 
what we were about ,some of them 
thought we held nuclear weapons 
in the building, at times we allowed 
members in to explain our roll in 
the defence of the Country. 
1983-1991 
ROC
#19 
It was a duty I had signed up for. I 
could help more by doing that 
duty. 
Unprintable. They attacked and 
vandalised my post. To have 20 or 
30 people shouting 'Warmonger' at 
me was not a nice experience. After 
all our training we were under no 
illusion as to the effects of nuclear 
war. We hoped our work would 
help to mitigate them by giving 
people warning. The CND were 
attacking the wrong target. We 
probably hated the thought of 
nuclear war every bit as much as 
them, but we were doing 
something practical about it.  
1971 - 1987 
ROC
#20 
Hopefully would have been more 
forewarned of need for fallout 
room etc at home and hence able 
to obtain materials needed. This 
problem made publications such 
as "Protect and Survive" rather 
unrealistic once made public. Can 
picture the queues at B & Q  
Tried to convince them that they 
were unrealistic - multilateral 
nuclear disarmament yes, unilateral 
no. Objected to their vandalism 
before exercises - eg. superglue in 
padlocks.  Pleased to have taken 
part in a school debate about 
nuclear disarmament - opposite a 
local CND activist. Wiped the floor 
with him !!  
1971 to  1991 
(stand-down) 
ROC
#21 
It was an improvement on the 
Royal Navy as at least you were 
near home. You would know from 
the Display A & B plots the level of 
danger 
They didn’t appreciate that we 
were not an armed service.  We had 
a similar objective of avoiding a 
nuclear war. I could not understand 
the “Better Red than dead” 
mentality 
1980 - 1991 
ROC
#22 
As a group officer I would have a 
duty to serve. Being single it would 
have helped. 
Some were sincere in their beliefs, 
others I guess were politically 
motivated.  
1965 - 1978 
ROC
#23 
Will discuss Ambivolent. 1965-1978 
ROC
#24 
This was always the question 
know one really liked having to 
answer . My view was being 
trained to help provide warnings 
to  the general Public as part of 
UKWMO could only help . 
Thankfully the Cold War 
Being in a democratic country 
everyone has the right to protest 
but did not agree with CND tactics 
when  damage etc was carried out 
on ROC Posts , Controls etc .  
1963 -- 1995 
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preparations never got made 
operational.  
ROC
#25 
Not having been in the Corps 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, I 
had never given this a lot of 
thought.    I got married in 1988 
and my wife immediately joined 
the ROC in order that we wouldn't 
be separated in a war situation.  
As for the rest of my family, I 
would have prayed that the role I 
was performing would be of help 
in assisting their survival.  This is a 
particularly difficult question to 
answer - it is almost impossible to 
know what feelings I would have 
had during a war, and whether 
these would have had a 
detrimental effect on my 
operational abilities. 
I was in sympathy with the CND, 
but believed that unilateral 
disarmanent was not the way to 
avoid conflict.  As long as the US Air 
Force was based here and we were 
supplying intelligence to the USA, 
the UK would have been targeted 
by the Eastern Bloc whether we had 
nuclear weapons of our own or not.  
Morally I am a pacifist, but 
realistically I believe in the strong 
defence of our nation.  I consider 
the present conflicts we are 
involved in (i.e. in the Middle East) 
as "overstepping the mark" in 
defending the UK despite the 
reasons given for our forces being 
sent there. 
1976 - 1991 
ROC
#26 
It would have been difficult.On our 
Post we tried to arrange a system 
where we would have moved the 
families concerned to other 
observer's houses. 
Misguided fools.They injured 
people in our Group.We weren't 
armed.I think they were just 
trouble makers and by some of 
their actions weren' t a peace 
movement 
1979-1987 
ROC
#27 
I may not have coped particularly 
well emotionally, but I think that 
the training would have enabled 
me to set an example to others 
and to continue to do my job.  
That's what my parents' 
generation did during the Second 
World War, when serving 
personnel were losing families and 
homes during the blitz.  Although 
on a different level, I believe that 
people with a sense of duty would 
have reacted in the same way, and 
their family members who 
remembered the war would have 
expected it. 
Misguided!  Minority and pressure 
groups always have a point, but 
they don't always look at the big 
picture, and tend to emphasise only 
a part of the overall scenario. 
1975-1991 
ROC
#28 
I really don't know. Was always a 
worry. 
Felt they were misguided but did 
not feel any antipathy towards 
them.  
1980 - 1991 
ROC
#29 
YES each to there own  1981 - 1991 
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ROC
#30 
I have thought about this long and 
hard and many times.  Different 
when just you and hubby and the 
rest of the extended family - but 
when I had my son, Dec 1990, that 
first exercise in the spring was a 
bummer.  My husband would have 
been deployed to Germany as 
British Army of the Rhine and I 
would have been called into the 
Durham HQ - my mum and dad 
would have had our son, I think I 
would have gone, knowing he was 
in safe hands and I would have 
told them what to do so far as I 
could.  Always on the look out foor 
good "hiding places"!!!!! 
Hmmh.  Durham is a university city 
and therefore attracts "causes".  I 
was disturbed that the leader of 
CND was a member of the clergy.  
We reguarly had "protesters" 
outside our Group HQ.  I 
remember, shortly after I had 
joined, that our Obs Cmdr being 
really exasperated with these 
people, who thought that we were 
harbouring all the "toffs and theirs" 
in our bunker.  I was a runner that 
day and was requested to bring in a 
delegation to let them see who was 
working in the bunker and our 
conditions.  Suffice it to say we did 
not have any further bother with 
CND after that! 
1980 - 1991 
ROC
#31 
During my early years with the 
Corps, I was a single lad and had 
resigned myself to it being a 
straight choice between the Corps 
or call-up to the armed services in 
the event of hostilities. As both 
options carried the requirement to 
leave any loved ones at home, I 
had no issues turning up for duty 
with the Corps, especially as by so 
doing I would be working to warn 
the civilian population (and hence 
my own loved ones) of the after 
effects of any nuclear exchange. I 
also believed that by 
demonstrating that the country 
was preparing and training for the 
aftermath of a nuclear attack, I 
might in some small way be 
helping to reduce that threat by 
demonstrating to any potential 
enemy that my country was taking 
the matter seriously  I then met 
my wife through the Corps (there 
were six married couples who had 
met in the Corps in my crew at 
one time or another) and knowing 
that she too had a place “in the 
bunker” removed any concerns I 
may subsequently have had on 
that score. After having children, 
there was a time when some 
comfort was found in knowing 
that the control had plans for how 
and where to house the crews’ 
Our county’s demonstration of its 
nuclear preparedness, through 
organisations such as the ROC, was 
an essential part of our nuclear 
defences and as such will have 
given second thoughts to any 
aggressor who sought to take-out 
or take-over “America’s Aircraft 
Carrier” and may have helped to 
deter the USSR’s expansion of its 
“Finlandisation” of Europe. In 
peacetime, the ROC had no 
operational role, being instead 
merely a training unit, preparing 
civilian volunteers to provide an 
essential service during wartime. 
However, by demonstrating that 
the UK was preparing and training 
for nuclear war, the Corps was 
nevertheless part of the UK’s 
nuclear deterrent and as such 
thought by some peace activists to 
be almost as legitimate a target as 
the nuclear weapons themselves. 
Despite this association, I viewed 
the peace movements’ actions 
against us as misguided and 
misinformed and would have 
preferred it if they had seen our 
organisation as some form of 
insurance, were their well-
intentioned efforts to fail. Alas it 
was not to be and their attitude 
towards us was a distraction we 
could have done better without. 
27 years, man 
and boy. 
1964-1991 
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families communally, though by 
that time, the world had moved 
on and, coupled with the 
knowledge I has assimilated in my 
time in the Corps, I thought 
nuclear war to far less likely. 
Eventually the children were of an 
age when they could join the 
Corps in their own right, and 
indeed one of them managed just 
that shortly before stand-down. 
You must also appreciate that 
although all Corps members were 
expected to do there bit in the 
event of an emergency, the 
controls and posts were to be 
operated on a shift system during 
the run-up to a nuclear exchange 
and it would be whichever team 
was in the building at the time of 
hostilities that would be “locked-
down” for the duration. It was 
therefore not impossible that, 
despite all the years of training, I 
could find myself on the wrong 
side of the steel door and have to 
spend Armageddon at home. 
ROC
#32 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/">
fqzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hs
evqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llb
pjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com/">f
qzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hse
vqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpj
kqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
 
ROC
#33 
Lots of factors to consider and safe 
survival still viable depending on 
location, i felt just as vulnerable as 
them in a nuclear bunker. I was 
too young 16/17 years okd to 
worry about family. 
I felt that they were right to 
protest, until the chain of threat  is 
broken peace cannot proceed. It 
helped the peace process and 
public views. 
89-91 
ROC
#34 
My mum and sister would have 
been with me in the bunker. I 
would have been concerned about 
friends and other people, but 
would have done my duty as 
required. I grew up with the 
constant threat of a nuclear strike 
and accepted that it may happen 
Well meaning, but blinkered, 
pacifists who seemed to refuse to 
understand that the defence of our 
country could include necessary 
conflict. I went on to join the police 
instead of the RAF and had lots of 
contact with Greenpeace and CND. 
They refused to see that the world 
was not nice and fluffy and that 
1983-1985 
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and we would just have to deal 
with it. 
sometimes, maintaining a strong 
armed presence would give the UK 
an advantage should we have to 
enter a theatre of war 
ROC
#35 
By doing our job properly we were 
giving everyone else a better 
chance of surviving. Most friends, 
family and the public preferred to 
not think about it or prepare for it. 
I had no problem with their beliefs. 1976-1991 
ROC
#36 
Very badly, I think, knowing your 
family was in danger outside, we 
were told approximately 40 per 
cent would report for duty, I was 
hoping my children would be 
older, and I would have persuaded 
them to join too, there were 
several crew members who were 
parents and their adult children on 
my crew. 
I thought they were very naive, if 
not well meaning, I could see their 
point of view, but I didn't agree 
with it, I think nuclear disarmament 
would make us very weak, I see 
them as a deterrent, a necessary 
evil. 
1984 -1991 
ROC
#37 
 I was told they would be looked 
after  
 Didn't worry about them, thought 
they were will informed  
1981  1991 
ROC
#38 
very debatable.  We had training 
on this and lots of  all weekend 
'lock-down' exercises 
idiots but entitled to their point of 
view as long as not interfering with 
me or family 
1978 - 1982 
ROC
#39 
Yes - my mother and sisters were 
all members 
None  1978 - 1980 
ROC
#40 
Honest answer! Not sure as final 
duty station some 100 miles from 
home.  Plans made but? 
Supportive of the aims of MUTUAL 
disarmament but frustrated by the 
simplistic approach of most 
members and angry and 
contemptuous of the violent 
minority. 
1964-1972 
and 1975-
1991 
ROC
#41 
I would have done my duty as 
expected, most corps members 
would have done the same, the 
Group control was over manned in 
that it could operate effectively 
with 1.5 crews instead of the 
peacetime 3 crews, it was an 
expectation that the crews not in 
the control would look after an 
advise the families of those that 
were inside to enhance their 
chance of survival, Post crews 
operated in a similar way. 
My personal feeling were that we 
hoped they were successful in their 
campaigns, I felt we were on the 
same side, just perhaps going about 
things in a different way. I don’t 
think I met a Corps member who 
hoped to do the job for real. 
1972 - 1992 
ROC
#42 
With great difficulty but would 
have. 
Misguided but good intentions. 1974-1990 
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ROC
#43 
Good question to be honest I don't 
know as I didn't have to do it for 
real. In reality probably not very 
well. Always wondered how many 
would stay during the run up to 
war. Do not know what I would 
have done 
Had no issue with them. mid to late 90 
to stand down 
ROC
#44 
To be frank would never have left 
my children. 
Have always been pro CND  1980-1981 
ROC
#45 
At the time I had no children so I 
was ok with it.  
I was very anti nuclear warfare and 
was in sympathy before I joined. 
Once I had an understanding of the 
corps, I felt they were uninformed. 
1987-1991 
ROC
#46 
It would have been very difficult to 
leave loved ones but both my wife 
and father-in-law had served in 
the ROC. They understood that I'd 
do my duty so that took a lot of 
the potential pressure off me. 
Somewhat contemptuous. I felt 
that they were too idealistic with 
little sense of the practical. Nuclear 
disarmament would have been 
wonderful if every nation did so but 
that was never going to happen. 
Unilateral disarmament would not 
have made us any safer.   
1977 - 1991 
ROC
#47 
Not sure, I was asked on my 
promotion board whether I would 
turn out if a nuclear war started.  I 
said that I hoped that I would, but 
could not give a guarantee.  I also 
asked them the same question, 
but received no answer.  I was a 
little lucky that towards the end of 
the ROC era, my wife was also a 
member which made the decision 
a little easier. 
As long as they demonstrated 
peacefully I had no animosity 
towards them.  I did not agree with 
CND, but applauded all movements 
associated with world peace. 
1973 - 1991 
ROC
#48 
Always felt anxious about this but 
never felt that the nuclear button 
would be pushed by either side! 
They had the right to their point of 
view!  We only came into contact 
with them once and things were 
amicable.  
1980 -1991 
ROC
#49 
Having been asked this in an 
earlier course I said I would 
volunter but life changes like 
marriage and babies changed my 
opinions.  It was therefore 
suggested that I could have a role 
similar to that of an ARP and give 
advice to civilians in my local area. 
I totally disagreed with them.  I 
think they had less knowledge than 
they thought.  We were doing a job 
and I think we better understood 
the implications than they did. 
c1968 until 
c1991  25 
years 
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ROC
#50 
Personally this would have 
changed over the years, early on I 
wouldn't have had a doubt about 
going, it would have been very 
difficult looking at the display 
seeing where the bombs/fallout 
were, but it would have been too 
late then.  Later when I had 
children then I wouldn't have been 
able to leave as my husband was 
also ROC. 
Disillusioned - but most of them 
were peacefully protesting because 
they felt impotent, there was 
nothing else they could do. Very 
few had any idea what the ROC 
were about, they thought the posts 
were huge underground bunkers 
for privileged people. Of course 
there were the fanatics, some posts 
had super glue poured into the 
locks etc. and some were regularly 
picketed. 
1964 - 1995 
ROC
#51 
my wife and son were also in the 
ROC and the  other members of 
my family were 100 % behind me 
and knew the ROC had the ability 
to save many  
they had the right to there opinion 
as I was mine 
1965 to1987 
ROC
#52 
I don't think I would have coped 
very well, as i would have wanted 
to stay with my children.. But i do 
think i would have done my stint 
to the best of my ability. 
I agreed with the principal,  but was 
not at all sure the practicalities,  I 
didnt like the idea of nuclear war, 
but i also understand the need for 
some kind of deterrent. 
1989-1991 
ROC
#53 
Our training tried to help you 
realise that the ROC role could 
help if attack was made on UK . 
This helped .  
UK is a democratic country so CND 
/peace movements allowed to 
operate but did not agree if they 
broke the law.    
1963 to 1995 
ROC
#54 
Difficult but my father said to just 
get on with it and be professional. 
Not an easy option. 
Kept quiet about being in the ROC 
at Work. though know of people 
who were assaulted spat at had 
damage done to vehicles etc 
1976- 1988 
ROC
#55 
I felt that if I wasn't doing what I 
was doing in the Corps they would 
have less chance of survival. I had 
arranged a plan with my 
immediate family that would 
maximise their chances of survival 
should the 'balloon had gone up'. I 
still have dreams/nightmares 
about nuclear attack and the 
consequences it might have on my 
family and friends. 
We wanted the same things as 
them, that being that nuclear war 
never happened. They protested 
against it to influence political 
decision; we formed part of the 
deterrent against it. Two 
approaches to reach the same goal. 
87-89 
ROC
#56 
I think I would have coped. I was 
trained by great Instructors, who 
left us in no doubt as to what 
would be happening outside the 
Control. 
They had their own opinions - most 
very misguided.  Our Officers, when 
they could, allowed us to invite 
these groups to the Control, to 
educate and inform them of our 
Role. Most of them left with a 
changed attitude. 
1970-1991 
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ROC
#57 
As best I could, at least with my 
training I would be able to assist 
somehow in their safety, by 
providing information on property 
protection & water & food storage 
, advising on not leaving property 
until ALL CLEAR on Radiation fall-
out contamination 22 days after 
last Nuclear Blast.   
It was felt at the time that C.N.D did 
not understand the R.O.C role in 
U.K defence role, and as such 
"They" felt that we (The R.O.C )  
were an enemy. I had heard stories 
of C.N.D pouring petrol & such 
items down our bunkers when 
personnel were inside & on duty 
and threatening the Crew to set the 
bunker & them on fire. These 
stories may have been propaganda 
against C.N.D but it totally changed 
my former opinion of C.N.D being a 
friendly organisation.       
1986-1991 
ROC
#58 
It would have been difficult but we 
had a plan where all the families 
would look after each other. 
Mis-guided fools  1982-1991 
standdown 
    
 
Entr
y Id 
Were you serving at the time 
of the stand down? If you 
were, what were your 
thoughts on the way it was 
conducted (be as frank as you 
like)? 
Are you, or did you ever 
consider joining an ROC 
association? Please give 
reasons why you did or 
did not join. 
Finally, do you think the 
role of the ROC should be 
taught in schools, and if so 
why? 
ROC
#1 
I had resigned 5 months earlier, 
so just missed it ! Frankly, I 
wasn't surprised. The reason I 
left was because for the last 
two years or so I felt we were 
being slowly wound down. 
Exercises were cut short, 
promised new equipment 
never materialized etc., plus a 
general feeling that we were 
not really required anymore.  
I joined the ROCA a few 
years ago but didn't renew 
my membership last year 
as no-one would ever 
contact me to advise when 
the next meeting was 
being held. This made me 
feel unwelcome so I left. 
Why not. It was an integral 
part of this country's 
defence forces, albeit in a 
passive role. It proved vital 
in 1940 and would, I'm 
sure have been just as vital 
if war had broken out with 
the USSR in the 50s,60s, 
70s or 80s. 
ROC
#2 
Yes, I was serving at the 1991 
and 1995 stand downs.   I 
thought the 1991 stand down 
was handled very badly.   Many 
observers had no inkling of 
stand down and the first they 
saw of it was on Ceefax.   Many 
thought that all their volunteer 
effort was not appreciated.    
The 1995 stand down was 
handled much better and 
although NBC training had 
gone very well, many members 
of the NRCs were not surprised 
when stand down came.   
I joined the ROCA in 1991 
on general stand down.   I 
joined because I wanted to 
continue in some form the 
'espirit-de-corps', 
friendship and interests, 
which I found existed in 
the ROC and I thought this 
would be continued in the 
ROCA.  I was right ! 
The ROC was always a very 
secretive organisation and 
the general public knew 
very little of its work.   
Now some 20 years post 
stand down, the ROC is 
better known largely 
because there is great 
interest in the Cold War.   I 
think the role of the ROC 
should be taught in 
schools but only in the 
overall context of WW2 
and the Cold War.   The 
important role of the 
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Corps in WW2 is often 
completely overlooked 
and knowledge of this 
should be spread more 
widely.   
ROC
#3 
Yes I  was serving. I do not 
think it could have been 
conducted in any other way.  I 
do feel however that the posts 
should have been retained on a 
care and maintenance basis as 
who knows what might happen 
in the future. 
I joined ROCA to keep in 
touch with ROC friends. 
Yes it should be taught as 
part of the history of this 
country. 
ROC
#4 
I was shocked. I joined the ROCA initialy 
because last time they 
were disbanded and later 
reformed they had no 
record of previous 
members.I thought that by 
being a member of the 
association, if the Corps 
was reformed again  I 
could rejoin.I have now 
been in the association for 
20 years. 
Yes.To highlight its work 
with radar and the RAF 
during the war and to 
educate them about the 
once secret cold war 
organisations and bunkers. 
ROC
#5 
No I had retired in May 1990 
having derved since 1954 and 
having gained the 
Commandant ROC  
commendation. It was 
probably a co incidence that 
the ROC stood down within a 
year of my retiirement. The 
actual stand down was 
somewhat inconsiderate.The 
ROC was cast aside like a worn 
out boot 
I am a member of ROCA 
Truro branch and enjoy 
the company of those who 
speak the same language 
although I did not join until 
I came to Fowey to live. 
Our branch is lively and 
well supported with some 
very interested topics 
mostly from in house and i 
have been able to 
contribute from 
myphotographic collection 
and aviation knowledge 
Most certainly. The 
younger generation should 
have a much wider 
knowledge of British 
history and especially of 
the people who have 
contributed so much to 
that history which uas 
allowed them to live in the 
free and relatively rich 
environment which so 
many take for granted  
36752 Denis Ellery   
ROC
#6 
No. I joined 12 Group ROCA on 
the day it was formed 
becoming Treasurer and 
Membership Secretary. On 
moving to Cornwall in 
1990's joined 10 Group 
ROCA. 
Yes, it should be 
mentioned as children 
should be aware that there 
were other organisations 
as well as the Home 
Guard. 
ROC
#7 
Yes ,a bit shocked but thought 
it would come anyway 
i am in the Royal Observer 
Corps association.    
Not really 
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companionship with the 
rest of ex observers 
ROC
#8 
yes. disgusted by the way it 
was announced to the nation 
before tell the members first. 
I Have joined. and started 
our own branch in our 
area with the help of my 
husband who has since 
died. I am still the hon sec 
for our branch 
I think we should get a 
mention as part of the 
countries past history. 
ROC
#9 
I was serving at the time in 
1991 and the NRCs continued 
until 1995 whilst the Corps as 
such had stood down.We 
continued to wear the uniform 
and as such I have to confess to 
being somewhat confused as 
there seemed to me to be a 
mixed message of the threat 
has gone but maybe it hasn't. 
I have joined a ROCA 
group. It is a means to 
keep in touch with others 
members and have a get 
together. The ROC was 
always a medium in which 
you met new people and 
we did have our get 
togethers then. 
I think the whole Cold War 
and how it came about 
should be taught in 
schools and the part which 
the ROC played in the 2nd 
World War and would 
have played had the 
disaster happened. 
ROC
#10 
NO I am a member of ROCA. It 
is only in the last 4 years 
that I found the ROCA 
existed.   
Yes, sadly ancient  or 
modern history are not 
being taught widely in our 
schools. Its all about `Dont 
mention the War`,that was 
old hat.  The cold war was 
a real theat,it could 
happen again. Hitler,Stalin, 
the Cold war, is more 
important than Oliver 
Cromwell. 
ROC
#11 
I still think the politicians sold 
the Corps down the river. 
Having said that the standown 
was conducted well by the 
fulltimers even though they 
were loosing their occupations. 
My only remaining niggle is 
that we were locked out of our 
own control immediately the 
announcement was made - 
hardly a show of trust to loyal 
volunteers. 
Yes but I didn't.  For me it 
was all over with 
Standown and I went on to 
join the RN Auxilliary 
Service for three years 
until it too was disbanded. 
Yes it should be mentioned 
in the overall context of 
voluntary service and the 
extent and role of the 
organisation created both 
for WW2 and the Cold 
War, but I don't think the 
ROC is a major topic. 
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ROC
#12 
Yes i was serving at the time , It 
came a bit out of the blue. 
even thou 12 months earlier I'd 
had a conversation on the day 
Berlin wall had come down 
saying it was going to cost jobs. 
As it stands the goverment is 
worried about a nuclear threat 
, limited to small dirty bombs . 
If only now they had re-
deployed us into some other 
job then there would have 
been more know how about, in 
the current climate. At the time 
the navy were after ex 
observers . then that 
department went out the 
window . So you could keep in 
the same line of work 
anywhere.    
Yes I am a member of 
ROCA. I lapsed for about 
10yrs but having stopped 
what I was doing I realised 
I was part of somthing that 
never got much 
recognition anywhere , I 
be as young as i am it help 
me after leaving the Corps 
to move on into thing i 
couldn't have got into 
other wise. Now the MOD 
, Fighter Command and 
the Home Office want little 
to do with ex members , 
the therefore its up to us 
to look after our own . The 
ROCA does that and 
Educates as well.  
Of course it should . If 
people were going to help 
protect others  , threw a 
shadowie part of UK 
history and the Second 
World War then it need to 
be added in the classes. 
Museums need to show 
more. ie Imperal war 
museum north . How can 
anybody not no about 
somthing that has 
remained hidden from 
view for years , and 
offered a service to all 
around but never took any 
glory and praise in the 
later years except by being 
stood down .  
ROC
#13 
Headquarters Royal Observer 
Corps.   As Personnel Services 
Officer I was i/c Human 
Resources involved in placing 
all wholetime staff in alternate 
employment with other 
government departments or 
organising 
redundancy/retirement 
courses. My private feelings 
were of a deep personal loss of 
a cherished lifetime vocation 
and losing contact with so 
many close friends and 
colleagues. 
I have been a fully paid up 
member of the 16 Gp 
Shrewsbury chapter of the 
ROC Association since the 
association was first 
formed in 1986 
Without doubt. It was a 
totally unique organisation 
that melded volunteer 
civilians into a disciplined, 
proficient and dedicated 
body that could hold its 
own against any 
professional military force 
and would have provided 
the population of the UK 
with its best possible 
chance of survival in the 
event of nuclear conflict. 
Unsung and barely 
acknowledged throughout 
its 70 year existance, there 
has never been another 
organisation quite like it 
anywhere in the world.  
Former Obs Lt Cdr Adrian 
Angove 
adrian_angove@btinterne
t.com 
ROC
#14 
I was working abroad when the 
ROC stood down. I was sent a 
newspaper cutting by my 
father to let me know that the 
ROC had ended. I instinctively 
understood it has to be shut 
down as there was no need to 
retain a cold war service ( 
albeit it a cheap one). Beyond 
that, I cannot comment. 
I would be happy to join 
one - I enjoyed my time 
with the ROC. I  had the 
privilege of working with 
retired commanders who 
had been active in World 
War Two and who were 
superb models of people 
management and 
efficiency. I also worked 
I think it should only be 
taught if it fits into the 
syllabus and context.. The 
only context I could see is  
the Cold War and UK 
preparation for nuclear 
attack.  I don't think you 
would need to teach about 
the ROC outside of a 
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with many people from 
very different 
backgrounds. I have fond 
memories of the ROC.   
definitive historical 
context and syllabus. 
ROC
#15 
I was very saddened at stand 
down and felt let down by the 
government of the day who 
cast us aside without any 
attempt to devise a new role 
for the Corps. I understand the 
difficulty that HQ ROC was 
placed under as regards the 
secrecy surounding stand 
down. 
I am a full member of the 
ROC Associa tion and have 
been active in promoting 
the Corps and our 
Association through 
displays, events etc. 
I feel that the Cold War era 
has been a fairly neglected 
area and should be more 
widely known. This 
obviously includes the vital 
role played by the Corps 
during the Cold War but 
equally their role in the 
defence of Britain during 
World War Two should 
also be highlighted 
ROC
#16 
Yes I was Southern Area 
Commandant at the time of 
stand-down and had the very 
sad task of saying an official 
good-bye to 2500 Observers. 
There were tears and tantrums 
galore. The RAF did its best to 
find an alternative task for us  
they even sent two Wing 
Commanders on a fact finding 
tour of the country to listen to 
ideas.  As Senior Officer it was 
very difficult to maintain 
morale as rumour swept the 
Corps. But the plain fact was 
there was no  new role for the 
ROC that the UK Government 
wanted to fund. I know that 
the way the news of the stand 
down was announced in 
Parliament and to the nation 
by a embargoed CEEFAX 
message was deeply resented 
by Observers who thought 
each one should have notified 
by personal letter. An 
impractical task but you try 
telling that to an Observer who 
spent twenty years on ROC 
service. On reflection I think we 
made the best of an emotional, 
As Group Commandant 12 
Group in 1985 I was 
charged by Air Cdr 
Horrocks  Commandant 
ROC to start a 12 Group 
ROCA which I did and I 
made sure that I had 
membership number is 
No1, which I still have, i 
am now Chairman of 
Cardiff & Newport Branch 
The role of the ROC could 
be taught in schools as an 
example  of the big 
society, where 12000 UK 
citizens volunteered to 
undertake a difficult and 
dangerous task for the 
service of the country. The 
role of the ROC and why 
and when would have to 
be explained to the pupils 
who might find it strange 
that there was no pay ( 
except for the small cardre 
of full-time officers, I was 
by the way a volunteer) 
and only limited travelling 
expenses. The free 
uniform  and an annual 
week at an RAF Camp for 
extra training plus the 
great and lasting 
camaraderie were the only 
perks. However in contrast 
to our current highly 
materialistic world the 
esprit de corps was 
fantastic, people loved 
being in the ROC despite 
everything and that is why 
there was so much 
adverse reaction to stand-
 560 | P a g e  
distasteful but necessary 
decision. 
down, ROC members took 
it very personally.  
ROC
#17 
I was shocked by the speed of 
notice and action over the 
enacting of the stand-down of 
the Corps. The puzzlement of 
even full-time officers who did 
not know or understand what 
was happening served only to 
increase feelings of resentment 
and uselessness. I felt as if I 
was being scrapped.  
Our local post cluster 
quickly established a 
continuing series of 
meetings as social and 
learning history events but 
soon some of us took on a 
role in the process of local 
monitoring of background 
radiation levels for the 
local authority Emergency 
Planning Officer.We 
formed a branch of ROCA 
very quickly and I remain 
in the organisation. 
I definately feel that the 
ROC should be included in 
the teaching of recent 
history. It was a feature of 
20th century warfare that 
Ordinary Civilian people in 
our countries became 
direct victims or in some 
industries, targets of 
interest. The Observer 
Corps was founded in 
response to bombing raids 
of WWI and developed as 
a civilian organisation 
(albeit under military 
administration) which had 
a very important role in 
WWII. This role survived 
the growth of technical 
sophistication which began 
in the late 1950s and 
became adapted to the 
threat to civilian 
populations posed by 
nuclear weaponry. We 
survived the disbanding of 
the Civil Defence Corps 
and other similar 
organisations, thriving 
until the 1990 stand-down.  
I believe that the ROC 
stands as the last 
organisation of civilian 
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volunteers which had a 
role in modern warfare. 
Our current military is very 
sophisticated, highly 
trained and service needs 
are beyond the capacity of 
volunteer conscripts. The 
ROC was skilled and 
trained in a set of unusual 
and remarkable activities 
which bridged the military 
and civilian services and as 
such is the last of the true 
volunteer Civil Defence 
Services. Modern history 
teaches about the 
experiences of participants  
or observers of events 
from a personal 
perspective and the role of 
civil volunteers is one 
which is more relevant to 
the range of experience or 
expectation of any citizen. 
This alone makes the 
knowledge of the Corps 
important. The fact that 
ordinary people had and 
were prepared for a role in 
nuclear warfare is 
exceptional and important, 
that knowledge must not 
be allowed to fade. I was a 
Cold War Warrior and 
proud of it!  Best wishes 
with your project, Bob. 
Regards,              John 
MacNaughton    
ROC
#18 
From what i understod it was 
decided by the Ministry at the 
end of the Cold War to stand 
down members of the R.A.F.as 
uniformed members attached 
to the R.A.F i think we fitted 
the bill instead of front line 
troops. 
Yes i did join the 
association i made a lot of 
frends in the corps and did 
not want to loose touch 
with them, i am serving as 
the Chairman of Exeter 
Group and if i can help in 
any way please call me on 
Exeter 01382 438956. 
Yes i do as it was an 
essential part of the 
defence of the Country 
during the second World 
War. 
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ROC
#19 
Not serving then, but friends 
told me it was not well handled 
and left an unpleasant taste. 
Glad that all my memories 
were very happy ones. 
Was a member for about 
20 years, but left because 
of distance to events. Also 
the feeling that old times 
cannot be recreated 
especially as almost all of 
my old friends have since 
died. 
Yes, as part of the 
traditional British 
volunteer ethic which, 
apart from 'Dads Army' 
seems to be generally 
unknown. 
ROC
#20 
Yes. Think that the UK 
Government was optimistic in 
the view that the World was a 
much safer place. Suspect that 
saving money was the main 
reason.  For a short time, it was 
planned to replace us with 
some spherical automatic 
direction finding pressure 
gauges which were to be 
installed nationwide (described 
by me in an article for the ROC 
Journal under the title "A Load 
of Balls". System had two 
drawback - it didn't seem to 
distinguish between air bursts 
and ground bursts and. I'm told 
was found not to work at all !! 
Am Secretary and 
programme planner for a 
section of the Coventry 
ROCA. Also a member of 
AEROC.  My view of the 
national ROCA is that it is 
too concerned with 
formalities, constitutions 
etc which are of little 
interest/concern to most 
foermer members of the 
ROC 
Yes. I have visited one 
school in Cheshire to give 
my talk "From zeppelins to 
ballistic missiles - a history 
of the ROC and regularly 
give the talk in my area to 
groups such as RBL, 
Probus, Round Table etc 
ROC
#21 
Abysmal – I read about it in the 
Daily Telegraph before being 
told officially. I had to answer 
questions from my Crew 
without any briefing. The anger 
was dissipated by the Royal 
Review at RAF Bentley Priory. I 
may be biased as I was the 
Officer selected to receive the 
new Royal Banner from Her 
Majesty the Queen 
In No 1 Group all serving 
Officers joined in order to 
set up the Group ROC 
Association Branches. As 
such I was 01/007, the 
seventh member in No 1 
Group. I am currently the 
Group Chairman. (I am 
also the Deputy Chairman 
and Secretary of the Board 
of Trustees of the ROC 
Benevolent Fund)  
Yes • The Cold War was a 
significant period in our 
history that has shaped 
the current political 
situation in Europe • The 
role that volunteers can 
play in the community • 
Duty to your fellow 
citizens is an integral part 
of a civilised society • 
Chernobyl taught us that 
borders are no protection 
against nuclear fallout. We 
need to plan for nuclear 
accidents and possibly a 
foreign war where nuclear 
weapons are used. We 
need to prepare for every 
eventuality • Negotiations 
require a position of 
strength and conviction. 
Appeasement will always 
lead to a worsening 
position • MAD (Mutually 
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Assured Destruction) that 
prevented attack during 
the Cold War holds no fear 
for some as demonstrated 
by suicide bombers • The 
ROC was one of the first 
classless groupings that I 
had encountered. On my 
Crew I had a lorry driver 
and an analytical chemist 
who enjoyed ach others 
company on a training 
evening. They would never 
have met in any other 
circumstance. Each tended 
to gravitate to tasks in 
which they excelled and 
respected the skills the 
other could demonstrate. 
• The Annual Training 
Camps drew personnel 
from across the whole of 
the UK. Breaking many 
misconceptions that may 
have been inbred (such as 
a North/South divide) If 
you wish to ask further 
questions than please do 
not hesitate to contact me  
Eur Ing Terry R A Giles              
BSc BA MSc CEng 
HonFCIBSE FIMechE 
MBIFM 120 Perry Hall 
Road Orpington Kent BR6 
0EF  Telephone 01689 
839031 email 
terryrgiles@btconnect.co
m   
ROC
#22 
No Joined ROCA in the 1990s I 
think, can't be sure of the 
date. Still a member. 
Currently aiming to get the 
ROC recognised in Seaton, 
Devon. Have had some 
success in getting a road 
named 'Royal Observer 
Way', Other recognition of 
former below-ground post. 
Yes. before the very 
valuable service of the 
volunteers is forgotten. To 
emphasise the volunteer 
spirit to serve the country. 
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ROC
#23 
No Am a member. Will discuss. 
ROC
#24 
Found out from Newspaper 
before receiving official 
confirmation . Could have been 
handled a lot better . Think the 
stand down method made a lot 
of long term members of the 
Corps decide to having nothing 
more to do with it or its 
Association . 
Joined before stan down in 
1991 and have been active 
in Association ever since . 
Yes as the Cold War is part 
of modern history and in 
2012 young people are 
astounded when they hear 
the number of adults who 
were willing to join a 
voluntary organisation like 
the ROC and serve the 
Queen and Country . 
ROC
#25 
I was serving at stand down.  I 
remember writing to Paddy 
Ashdown asking him if 
something could be done to 
reverse the decision - it should 
be remembered that Iraq at 
that time was building a "super 
gun" with a range said to 
encompass Paris.  I thought it 
was very premature to stand 
the Corps down so soon after 
the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Taking into 
consideration the investment 
during the 1980s in upgrading 
the monitoring equipment and 
communications within the 
Corps and the insignificant 
annual costs of running the 
UKWMO/ROC compared with 
the armed services, made 
people question just what was 
behind the government's 
thinking.  Kenneth Baker as 
Home Secretary had, in the 
ROC, a large body of volunteers 
who would have welcomed the 
chance to retrain in whatever 
role was appropriate for the 
changes in our defence 
structure.  The way in which 
the government handled the 
stand down (i.e. suggesting 
that if anyone was interested, 
then we could always join the 
ATC or a new home defence 
I joined 16 Group ROCA at 
about the time the Corps 
was stood down.  The 
ROCA had been 
established a few years 
earlier to enable social 
contact to be maintained 
with retired members.  I 
joined so that I could meet 
up several times a year 
with my friends from the 
ROC, otherwise I would 
probably have lost contact 
altogether given that I 
lived a long way from the 
group control and most of 
those manning the control 
lived in Shrewsbury or 
surrounding villages. 
Not specifically the ROC, 
but the financial, political 
and logistical problems 
faced in defending this 
country during a cold war 
should certainly be taught.  
It is almost impossible to 
discuss this subject 
without the UKWMO and 
ROC being mentioned as 
"The eyes and ears of the 
RAF".  To discuss the exact 
role of the ROC would be 
extremely complex, 
especially as it was one of 
many civilian defence 
organizations involved in 
the Cold War, e.g. the Civil 
Defence Corps and AFS 
(until 1968), the WRVS, 
UKWMO personnel, the 
network of regional seats 
of government (later sub-
regional controls and then 
SRHQ/RGHQs) etc. 
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corps -I forget the exact name 
of this latter organization) was 
rather undiplomatic and almost 
without exception it was a 
body-blow to those who had 
given so much over the years.  
To the best of my knowledge, 
very few joined these 
alternative organizations.  We 
were also told that nuclear 
monitoring could be done by 
automated equipment 
(RIMNET - set up in 1988 
following the Chernobyl 
disaster) and this was 
perceived as particularly 
tactless.  A human can be 
asked to carry out any task in a 
war situation such as assisting 
those in need or (for instance) 
transporting medicines or 
other supplies from area to 
area.  A piece of equipment has 
no flexibility to perform any 
role other than that for which 
it was designed, and a 
comparison like this bordered 
on the ludicrous.  
ROC
#26 
Yes we all thought it was done 
too quickly without any 
thought for what could happen 
in the future.We were a very 
cost effective organisation with 
a ferrific morale 
I did join the ROCA for 
short time after stand 
down.I sarted to suffer 
from ulcerative colitis and 
for a long time I was too ill 
to go out 
Yes as part of our most 
recent history,in what was 
a kind of war and could 
have had serious 
consequences.Also to 
show the younger 
generation how people 
had pride in their country 
ROC
#27 
Yes.  I'm not sure that it could 
have been done much 
differently or any better.  As in 
the current economy, it all 
comes down to money, and 
when it runs out, there is little 
that can be done. I was not 
party to any "inside 
information" on the decisions 
or the methodology, but I think 
that we all saw something 
coming, and dealt with it in the 
best way that we could. 
I have been a member of 
the three Group 
Associations (OXF, WIN & 
BED) since stand-down, 
and still am.  I served on 
Bedford committee for a 
number of years, including 
time as vice chairman, but 
living in Norfolk eventually 
made it too much effort 
for too little achievement.  
Having moved to Norfolk, I 
also joined No 6 Gp 
Norwich Association. 
Yes, if only to show that 
people have a sense of 
duty and that the spirit 
evident during both world 
wars was not in vain, and 
lives on.  "Big Society" or 
not, there are always 
people who will rise to the 
occasion and give all that 
they can for something 
that they believe in - 
particularly the values and 
the freedom of their 
country. 
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ROC
#28 
Yes. Appalled at the way it was 
handled. The way that no 
thought of how the Corps could 
have been given another role 
did not do the government of 
the day credit.    
Yes. Joined to keep contact 
with former colleagues. 
Certainly the Cold War 
should be taught and the 
ROC, and the other 
volunteer organisations, 
would have played a vital 
part if the worst had 
happened.   
ROC
#29 
same post as I joind yes was a member before 
standown 
YES as part of  social 
history 
ROC
#30 
Awful.  Totally in the dark.  The 
Queen was giving us our new 
colours in the July and the day 
before the local press ran the 
story that we were being 
disbanded.  We actually went 
down to RAF Bentley Priory the 
next day to represent the 
Group and see the  colours 
given by the Queen.  Everyone 
was in devastated and totally 
gobsmacked.  The Queen and 
the Duke of Edinburgh walked 
amongst us after the parade 
(when we were having tea) and 
HM did not leave us in any 
doubt about her anger at the 
decision.  She was not pleased.  
HM mentioned that her father, 
the King, had taken herself and 
Princess Margaret to the post 
at Harrow on a few occasions 
and she was very proud of the 
assocaition.  Very, very 
emotional day, especially when 
we had the BBMF fly past at 
the end.  Never forget it. 
Yes, I joined the 
Durham/Northumberland 
Association on 
disbandment - still a 
member today.  I think it is 
a very worthwhile 
association and that in the 
future, the government 
may very well need our 
knowledge. 
I don't know about 
teaching the role of the 
ROC in schools, although I 
do think it should be 
taught as part of WW2.  It 
is an important turning 
point in the Battle of 
Britain.  Without the ROC, 
we wouldn't have won 
that battle and inevitably, 
the war.  I would love to 
speak with you - I was one 
of the youngest members 
of the Corps at the time - 
contact me via 
ian.watson31@virginmedi
a.com or 07752 257 625.  
Marie Watson ex-Ldg 
Obs(W) 
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ROC
#31 
When peace broke out all over 
Europe; the writing was on the 
(Berlin) wall for the Corps. Even 
before then, our role (and 
expense) had come into 
question as it became 
increasingly unlikely that we 
would ever be called into 
service. Our buildings and 
infrastructure were well 
overdue for refurbishment and 
upgrade and in an age of 
increasing health and safety, 
some of our practices were 
becoming questionable. It had 
also become apparent to me 
that, unless our buildings were 
secured and guarded properly, 
any civil unrest following the 
outbreak of war would see our 
posts and controls overrun and 
occupied by a population 
demanding shelter, which 
would render us unserviceable. 
The members of the ROC had, 
by that time, enjoyed many 
happy years but the Corps was 
unlikely to be kept going just 
for its own benefit. With 
hindsight, I’m surprised that we 
were not found out any earlier 
and that we got away with it 
for as long as we did. Once the 
dreaded review had reported, 
our days were well and truly 
numbered, but in typical ROC 
fashion, the wind-down 
happened slowly, which gave 
both the sparetime and 
fulltime members of the Corps 
the necessary time to arrange a 
smooth transition into 
mothballs. In all fairness, I think 
the process was handled as 
well as it could be. 
It would have been 
unforgivable for me not to 
join the Royal Observer 
Corps Association. Indeed, 
I was offered a “section” of 
20 Group ROCA for my 
crew but we instead 
decided to go it alone and 
run our own social group 
post-stand-down in an 
effort to keep the unit 
together and retain our 
own autonomy, but with 
obvious links to the Corps’ 
official association. This 
has now continued for 
over twenty years, though 
has diminished in size and 
content, from over 30 
members meeting several 
times a year to (since our 
20th anniversary) a single 
annual reunion attended 
by a dozen and a half. 
However, I have remained 
a member of the ROCA 
throughout this time and 
still support its activities. 
Though interest and 
membership of the 
organisation have declined 
over the years, the ROCA 
nevertheless still provides 
a vital and necessary link 
between the ROC and the 
present time. 
I doubt the ROC deserves 
to be taught as a subject in 
its own right, but within 
the context of the cold war 
period as a whole, I would 
be disappointed if we did 
not get a mention. In 1964, 
at the age of 15, I joined a 
“secret organisation” with 
the word “Restricted” 
stamped on the top and 
bottom of every page of its 
training material. The 
Corps was little known of 
then and enrolment was 
done more by word of 
mouth than as a result of 
public knowledge (though I 
later found that this was 
more to do with budgetary 
constraints). We were a 
little known and little 
understood part of the 
UK’s nuclear defences, yet 
would have provided a 
useful and necessary 
function were we ever 
called upon to do so. It 
would indeed be a pity if 
knowledge of the Corps 
and its role died along with 
its members. We 
volunteers, who gave so 
freely of our time, for so 
long, deserve better than 
that. 
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ROC
#32 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.com
/">fqzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/
]hsevqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]
llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/ 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.
com/">fqzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.c
om/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.c
om/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.co
m/ 
DnYuLp  <a 
href="http://fqzkgxhshpgc.
com/">fqzkgxhshpgc</a>, 
[url=http://hsevqmaavqti.c
om/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], 
[link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.c
om/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], 
http://mwdfcumaymsh.co
m/ 
ROC
#33 
Yes, came as a big shock and 
effected immeduatly, no time 
messing around wasting money 
so was efficient in that respect 
but volunteers could have been 
signposted to other 
organisations such as Air 
Cadets or Army Cadets instead. 
Yes I am, to keep our 
history alive. 
Yes, but not for any 
particular reason over and 
above any other service 
(armed or volunteer) as we 
all had great history with 
an interesting story to tell. 
ROC
#34 
No Am a member Yes, understanding the 
steps we in the UK had to 
take in order to protect it's 
citizens will help generate 
a sense of pride in this 
country; something I feel is 
sadly lacking in this day 
and age. 
ROC
#35 
I was not upset, it felt like I'd 
helped to win the Cold War. 
There is no good way to deliver 
bad news about the ROC not 
being offered any future role. 
After a while I was glad to have 
my spare time back. 
I've only recently joined 
ROCA to share memories 
and help its heritage. I 
didn't want to join ROCA 
for its social events. Good 
friends I made during my 
time with the Corps are 
still in contact, we didn't 
need ROCA to help us keep 
in touch. 
No more than any other 
service. In terms of our 
country's military history, 
the ROC was only a very 
small (but important) part. 
If Army, Navy and RAF 
history were ever taught in 
school, ROC might deserve 
a mention, but I can't see 
it happening. 
ROC
#36 
Very badly treated, I believe 
there was an election due, we 
were advised not to vote 
Labour as they would stand us 
down, in the event it was the 
Conservative government that 
made the decision. We had no 
real warning, only informed on 
our training night, and that was 
that, we were all very upset at 
the way we were informed. 
I did consider joining, but 
they are aimed at different 
groups, I believe,and as I 
moved away to live in 
Bristol, I wouldn't have 
known any former 
members in this area, I 
may join in the future, but 
I am a member of a FB 
group, which I enjoy 
Yes, as part of a history 
lesson, not many people 
seem to be aware of their 
role. I also think , in 
comparison to other 
countries, the U.K. Was ill 
prepared, really, and we 
didn't even have any 
public shelters, when I was 
at school, a teacher 
thought us about the Cold 
War, and the effect 
nuclear weapons had on 
humans, it was very 
shocking to me, but I think 
that was part of the reason 
I decided to be part of civil 
defence. 
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ROC
#37 
 Very disappointed  Did join  Yes  as it is cold war 
information 
ROC
#38 
No. Emigrated 1982 Stupid idea 
and political decision. Not 
logically thought out. 
overseas (still am) and 
costly after overseas 
removal and other costs. 
Still in touch with few 
people. 
yes, in history. Just like D 
Day landings and air raids. 
I lived thru all. Now 77 
year old. 
ROC
#39 
No No - not interested as I 
was only in for 2 years 
Maybe the earlier role of 
aircraft spotting  
ROC
#40 
Yes, Handled disgracefully, 
lacking compassion, 
sympathetic organisation and, 
above all, an appreciation of 
the commitment and 
dedication of the thousands 
who had served or were still 
serving Queen and country, 
both full time and part time 
members. 
Joined on creation of the 
assoc. To enable retired 
and (as it turned out) 
stood down members 
continue friendship, retain 
pride of service and share 
memories. Also, since 
stand down, to protect 
and communicate the 
history of the corps. 
Yes, it is a shining example 
of community service to 
the nation by ordinary folk. 
It also played an essential 
role in home defence 
during the 39-45 war. It's 
role should be 
acknowledged and 
understood. 
ROC
#41 
24 GROUP EDINBURGH (RAF 
Turnhouse) the stand down 
was appalling, as a full time 
officer I had in my safe two 
numbered envelopes which I 
could not open until instructed 
to do so by Senior staff officer 
at HQROC, and then only the 
envelope I was instructed to 
open, the second was to be 
returned unopened. When I 
was given the instruction to 
open are the speech by Earl 
Ferrers, I was astounded, at the 
loss of an organisation that 
cost a shade under £10milion a 
year to run, that gave 
nationwide coverage and all 
the goodwill it embedded was 
to be stood down. But it also 
meant that I had no way of 
informing all my Observers, 
Chief and Leading Observers 
personally so many found out 
through the media, which led 
to unnecessary bitterness and 
resentment.    
I am a ROCA member, and  
I still meet with my old 
comrades, Facebook has 
been superb in rekindling 
old friendships Its a 
chapter of my life that I 
was proud of, I met some 
wonderful dedicated 
selfless people who were 
very professional in their 
approach to the task. I 
would not like to lose that 
link.  
Maybe not the ROC 
specifically but certainly 
the cld war should be 
taught and the Corps role 
was key within that, 
should the worst ever have 
happened. 
ROC
#42 
no had left by then  Did consider but due to 
family had no spare time. 
YES it should be, history 
need taught so people 
know what really went on 
in the world, 
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ROC
#43 
Yes  handled shambolic  
feelings angry and gutted  
normal training night one night 
locked out the next no warning 
no one told anything. Very bad 
Served on Grp committee 
at founding of ROCA.  Not 
a member now due to 
other commitments 
Unsure.  Would need to be 
done in context with role 
during WW2  then on to 
the nuclear role and how it 
tied in the overall defence 
plan for the country 
ROC
#44 
No No Yes as it's part of our 
history 
ROC
#45 
Yes I was serving at the time of 
stand down. I was very 
unhappy as I still felt the threat 
was still out there. It was done 
quickly and without much 
consulation. 
I joined the ROCA 13 
group, we met for many 
years afterwards. It was 
keeping that contact with 
folk who we all knew. 
No I work in  a secondary 
school, there is too much 
on the curriculum now and 
to be frank, Pupils  would 
not be interested! 
ROC
#46 
Yes I was. I thought it was a 
short-sighted decision which 
didn't save a huge amount of 
money. There was a useful role 
for the ROC to perform then 
and I think there still is today. 
I thought about it but only 
joined a Facebook group 
recently. 
Yes, the role of all the 
voluntary and full time 
defence organisations 
should be taught. People 
need to know of the 
sacrifices that others were 
prepared to undergo for 
the country as a whole. 
ROC
#47 
I served until the bitter end, 
bitter being the operative 
word.  The government were 
very short sighted in just 
abandoning 12,000 plus 
volunteers, with no real 
recognition of their service or 
the contribution that they 
would have made to the overall 
defence of the civilian 
population if the balloon had 
gone up. 
I am a member of ROCA, 
but not active.  When the 
Corps stood down, my 
local ATC Sqn asked me to 
join them as their Adj 
which I did.  Stayed a civvy 
for some 2 years before 
taking a commission in the 
RAFVR(T) and eventually 
becoming a Sqn 
Commander.  Served from 
1991 to 2006. 
I think the ROC should be 
mentioned when teaching 
about the Cold War, but 
not in great depth.  There 
would be a very strong 
chance that the younger 
generation would regard 
them as the Cold War 
'Dad's Army', not 
something that would be 
appreciated by ex 
members. 
ROC
#48 
Yes. Apalled with the way that 
it was done.  The Corps could 
have continued as a voluntary 
'civil defence' type organisation 
but no thought was given to 
this by the Home Office.  
Yes  Still an active member 
to keep in touch with ex 
colleagues.    
As a general part of WW2 
and Cold War history but 
wouldn't expect more than 
that. More important that 
it's role is recognised in 
museums etc.   
ROC
#49 
I was serving at standdown.  I 
thought we were treated 
despicably. We were given no 
information and there were no 
rumours re a standdown.  No 
information was forthcoming 
from higher echelons. I got a 
phone call from a colleague 
who saw the information re 
standdown on Teletext. 
I am presently still a 
member of 31Gp ROCA.  I 
joined to keep in touch 
with friends and 
colleagues. 
I never gave this much 
thought but yes maybe it 
should be taught as it was 
a part of our history and 
we too had a role in The 
Battle of Britain 
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ROC
#50 
Yes-pretty disgusted, it seemed 
to come out of the blue I 
remember being totally bowled 
over and angry. Obviously the 
Corps had been a large part of 
mine and my comrades lives 
and felt as if we were just 
being dumped for no real good 
reason we were cheap (finance 
wise) and efficient. There were 
rumours that the Regiment 
(RAF) were looking for another 
role although I'm fairly sure 
they didn't take it up. 
I was a late joiner, ROCA 
was started when the 
Corps still existed so with a 
family and the Corps I 
didn't have time, also 
apart from the days in COV 
I wasn't near enough to 
the social scene. I am a 
member now, Coventry 
Group, so even further 
away as I'm on the South 
Coast. I attend the annual 
reunion and other odd 
occasions such as the 
Arboretum. The reasons 
for joining are easy to keep 
in touch with former 
colleagues especially as I 
moved around. 
I certainly do - but not just 
the WW2 role which for 
children I'm sure would be 
more exciting. Certainly 
should be part of cold war 
studies and there are 
becoming more and more 
restored sites that can be 
visited, I think many of the 
children would be 
surprised at how small the 
posts were and there were 
people willing to stay 
down there for 2/3 weeks. 
They might also find the 
whole system laughable - 
no computers, ipads etc. 
EMP! 
ROC
#51 
no but felt this was a slap in 
the face to all the members 
myself I left because of the 
attitude of the fulltime officer 
at the time who did not like the 
fact that I was a personal friend 
of the commandant he was 
unaware of this a the time   
yes but never go round to 
it but I keep in touch vie 
face book and friends 
yes the observer corps are 
one of the forgotten forces 
of ww2 did Churchill not 
say during the battle of 
Britain thank god for the 
ROC plus we had Obs on 
board ships all during the 
war 
ROC
#52 
Yes i was, I was a bit 
dissappointed that it came to 
an end as i was just beginning 
to understand what i was being 
taught and why, I was only 20 
at the time i joined.. Dont have 
an opinion as to how 
standdown was conducted 
didnt really affect me. 
I did join the ROCA for a 
while, but work/ family life 
priorities took over so i 
never continued 
Yes i do ..they were a part 
of our history and did a 
major role during the war. 
their efforts should be 
aknowledged.. I had never 
heard of them until i 
joined my Aunt and most 
people i know have not 
but they deserve to be 
known about even if it is 
only in a small part 
ROC
#53 
A difficult time and whole time 
staff had to try and make it as 
painless as possible.   
I joined ROC Association 
prior to stand down in 
1991 and still belong to 
ROCA and have attended 
local and National events. 
I believe the Cold War is 
now part of school 
curriculum and ROC role 
should be included in this. 
ROC
#54 
No was not serving at 
standown 
Yes and no applied to join 
never heard back from 
them so moved on. 
A good idea as a peoples 
history what men and 
women did in WW2 and 
the cold war period may 
help them understand why 
things are the way they 
are. 
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ROC
#55 
I left before stand down. I was 
very sad to hear that it had. 
The ROC was 'very cheap' to 
run compared with other 
aspects of the military and did 
an amazing yet unrecognised 
service to the country. It is 
lovely to see that people are 
now taking an interest in our 
history and its part in the Cold 
War. It was drummed into us 
to be secretive in what we did 
and I'm sure that is why no one 
really knows until recently 
about what we did or were 
prepared to sacrifice should 
the unthinkable happen. 
I joined the ROCA to 
reconnect to a voluntary 
organisation that was very 
special. Social media has 
made it very easy to stay in 
touch and connected with 
others. We had a very 
special form of 
camaraderie forged 
through training for the 
unthinkable, knowing that 
should it happen, we could 
only rely on each other to 
do our duty and serve 
others.  
There is not one school in 
the country that is further 
than 10-14 square miles 
from an ROC post or 
command centre. The 
environment that 
schoolchildren are living in 
now was very much in the 
front line of the Cold War, 
especially if it turned hot. 
The wars that they see on 
the TV nowadays must 
seem so far away from 
them and yet, some 30 
years ago, their schools 
and homes could have 
been so very easily on the 
front line. I think it is 
important for school 
children to know what 
people such as the ROC 
were prepared to do to try 
and protect the country 
and its inhabitants and to 
know the threat that their 
grandparents and parents 
grew up under. I am 
greatly encouraged to see 
so many volunteers 
'keeping the flame alive' 
by restoring posts to 
ensure that our history 
remains alive and that 
people appreciate what 
we did. We did not serve 
in the military, protect our 
country with arms, and 
become eligible for a 
'Veteran's Badge' ; we did 
however, serve in the ROC 
and protect our country in 
perhaps a passive way, 
something equally worthy 
of recognition by the 
government and those 
who enjoy peace in the UK 
today. 
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ROC
#56 
I was a Chief Observer at Stand 
Down.  I thought it was 
despicable, how we were told, 
and the reasons we were given.  
The whole Corps cost only £2 
million/year, and the country 
lost the ability to call on over 
12,500, fully-trained 
volunteers, who could have 
been given other duties, such 
as Flood Warnings. 
I was one of the Founder 
Members of the North 
Wales Royal Observer 
Corps Association.  We 
formed in 1989, which was 
before the National ROCA 
was even thought of. 
Yes, I do.  All young people 
should know of the Service 
given, over 60 years, by 
the dedicated Volunteers 
of the ROC.  My daughter 
was fascinated, when she 
visited Hack Green, the 
"Secret Nuclear Bunker", 
as she was only 9, at Stand 
Down, and didn't really 
understand what we had 
been Members of ( her 
Mother was a W?Obs for 6 
years, too) 
ROC
#57 
YES   I felt the stand-down (by 
Tom King?)  was very hasty and 
didn't take into account the 
continuing threat that remains 
to this day of a potential strike 
to the U.K by Atomic / Nuclear 
weapon systems from another 
nation(s) or rogue  nation state 
or terrorist group(s)  
I am a current  member of 
my local R.O.C.A 28 Group  
Yes, as the Cold War was 
by it's very nature & 
name...... a war. 
ROC
#58 
Yes I thought it was abit 
abrupt.it seemed like we were 
an embarrassment to the 
goverment. 
I joined the ROCA at a later 
date. I was ill for 15 years 
b ut I missed the 
comradeship of the Corps 
so I joined the ROCA. It 
was a wonderful 
organisation.We were like 
one big family especially 
on our post-17 Post 
Roxton 
I don't think the modern 
generation would be much 
interested.A lot of the 
feeling at the time was we 
were only doing it so we 
had protection in case of 
war. 
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